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THE 
NEW MAP OF EUROPE 



'THE 
NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

(1911-1914) 

THE STORY OF THE RECENT EUROPEAN 

DIPLOMATIC CRISES AND WARS AND OF 

EUROPE'S PRESENT CATASTROPHE 



BY 

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, Ph.D. 

AUTHOR OF "THE FOUNDATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 




NEW YORK 

THE CENTURY CO. 

1914 






Copyright. 1914. by J 
THE CENTURY CO. 



Published, November, 1914 



DEC -7 1914 



'01.4387832 



f- 



GO 

MY CHILDREN 

Christine Este of Adana, 

Lloyd Irving of Constantinople, 

and 
Emily Elizabeth of Paris. 

Born in the midst )f the wars and changes that this book describes, 
may they lead lives of peace ! 



CONTENTS 

I. Germany in Alsace and Lorraine 

II. The " Weltpolitik " of Germany 

III. The "Bagdadbahn" 

IV. Algeciras and Agadir 
y. The Passing of Persia 

"" yi. The Partitioners and their Poles 

VII. Italia Irredenta 

VIII. The Danube and the Dardanelles 

IX. Austria-Hungary and her South 
Slavs ..... 

X. Racial Rivalries in Macedonia 

XL The Young Turk Regime in the 
Ottoman Empire . 

XII. Crete and European Diplomacy 

XIII. The War between Italy and Tur 

key ..... 

XIV. The War between the Balkan 

States and Turkey 

XV. The Rupture between the Allies 



i 

21 
58 
71 
84 
96 
119 
131 

I42 
l6l 

I8O 
220 

24I 

263 
319 



Vlll 



CONTENTS 



XVI. The War between the Balkan 

Allies ...... 330 

XVII. The Treaty of Bukarest . . 343 

XVIII. The Albanian Fiasco . . .351 

XIX. The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum 

to Servia ..... 368 

% XX. Germany Forces War upon Russia 

and France . . . . .386 

XXI. Great Britain Enters the War . 399 

MAPS 



TO FACE PAGE 



I. The Political Distribution of Poland . 104 



II. Europe in 1911 . 

III. Europe in Africa in 1914 

IV. Balkan Peninsula after the Treaty 

of Bukarest ..... 

V. Belgium and the Franco - German 
Frontier ...... 

VI. Europe in 1914 



200 
296 

344 

392 
408 



FOREWORD 

ON a July day in 1908, two American students, 
who had chosen to spend the first days of their 
honeymoon in digging the musty pamphleteers 
of the Ligue out of the Bodleian Library, were walking 
along the High Street in Oxford, when their attention 
was arrested by the cry of a newsboy. An ha'penny 
invested in a London newspaper gave them the news 
that Niazi Bey had taken to the Macedonian highlands, 
and that a revolution was threatening to overthrow 
the absolutist regime of Abdul Hamid. The sixteenth 
century was forgotten in the absorbing and compelling 
interest of the twentieth. 

Two weeks later the students were entering the har- 
bour of Smyrna on a French steamer which was bringing 
back to constitutional Turkey the Young Turk exiles, 
including Prince Sabaheddine Effendi of the Royal Otto- 
man House. From that day to this, the path of the two 
Americans, whose knowledge of history heretofore had 
been gained only in libraries, has led them through 
massacres in Asia Minor and Syria, and through mobili- 
zations and wars in Constantinople, Bulgaria, Macedonia, 
Greece, and Albania, back westward to Austria, Italy, 



x FOREWORD 

and France, following the trail of blood and fire from its 
origin in the Eastern question to the great European 
conflagration. 

On the forty-fourth anniversary of Sedan, when 
German aeroplanes are flying over Paris, and the distant 
thunder of cannon near Meaux can be heard, this book 
has been begun in the Bibliotheque Nationale by one of 
the students, while the other has yielded to the more 
pressing call of Red Cross work. It is hoped that there 
is nothing that will offend in what is written here. At 
this time of tension, of racial rivalry, of mutual recrimin- 
ation, the writer does not expect that his judgments will 
pass without protest and criticism. But he claims for 
them the lack of bias which, under the circumstances, 
only an American — of this generation at least — dare 
impute to himself. 

The changes that are bringing about a new map 
of Europe have come within the intimate personal 
experience of the writer. 

If foot-notes are rare, it is because sources are so 
numerous and so accessible. Much is what the writer 
saw himself, or heard from actors in the great tragedy, 
when events were fresh in their memory. The books of 
various colours, published by the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs of the various countries interested, have been 
consulted for the negotiations of diplomats. From 
day to day through these years, material has been 
gathered from newspapers, especially the Paris Temps, 
the London Times, the Vienna Freie Press, the Constanti- 
nople Orient, and other journals of the Ottoman capital. 



FOREWORD xi 

The writer has used his own correspondence to the New 
York Herald, the New York Independent, and the Phila- 
delphia Telegraph. For accuracy of dates, indebtedness 
is acknowledged to the admirable British A nnual Register. 

Paris, September, 1914. 



There are general causes, moral or physical, which act in 
each State, elevate it, maintain it, or cast it down; every 
accident is submitted to these causes, and if the fortune of 
a battle, that is to say a particular cause, has ruined a State, 
there was a general cause which brought it about that that 
State had to perish by a single battle. 

Montesquieu. 



THE 
NEW MAP OF EUROPE 



The New Map of Europe 

CHAPTER I 
GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 

THE war of 1870 added to the German Confed- .' 
eration Alsace and a large portion of Lorraine, / 
both of which the Germans had always con- 
sidered theirs historically and by the blood of , 
the inhabitants. In annexing Alsace and Lorraine, 
the thought of Bismarck and von Moltke was not 
only to bring back into the German Confederation 
territories which had formerly been a part of it, 
but also to secure the newly formed Germany against 
the possibility of French invasion in the future. 
For this it was necessary to have undisputed posses- 
sion of the valley of the Rhine and the crests of the 
Vosges. 

From the academic and military point of view, 
the German thesis was not indefensible. But those 
who imposed upon a conquered people the Treaty I 
of Frankfort forgot to take into account the senti- 
ments of the population of the annexed territory. / 
Germany annexed land. That was possible by the 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

right of the strongest. She tried for over forty years 
to annex the population, but never succeeded. The 
makers of modern Germany were not alarmed at the 
persistent refusal of the Alsatians to become loyal 
German subjects. They knew that this would take 
time. They looked forward to the dying out of the 
party of protest when the next generation grew up, — 
a generation educated in German schools and formed 
in the German mould by the discipline of military 
service. 
I That there was still an Alsace-Lorraine " question " 
, after forty years is a sad commentary either on the 
justice of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by 
' Germany or on the ability of Germany to assimilate 
' that territory which she felt was historically, geo- 
graphically, and racially a part of the Teutonic 
Empire. In 1887, when "protesting deputies" were 
returned to the Reichstag in overwhelming numbers, 
despite the governmental weapons of intimidation, 
disenfranchisement, and North German immigration, 
Bismarck was face to face with the one great failure 
of his career. He consoled himself with the firm 
belief that all would be changed when the second 
generation, which knew nothing of France and to 
which the war was only a memory, peopled the 
unhappy provinces. 

' But that second generation came. Those who 
' participated in the war of 1870, or who suffered by 
/ it, were few and far between. The hotheads and 
extreme francophiles left the country long ago, and 
their place was taken by immigrants who were sup- 
posed to be loyal sons of the Vaterland. Those of 



GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 

the younger indigenous brood, whose parents had 
brought them up as irreconcilables, ran away to 
serve in the French foreign legion, or went into exile, 
and became naturalized Frenchmen before their time 
of military service arrived. And yet the unrest 
continued. Strasbourg, Metz, Mulhouse, and Col- 
mar were centres of political agitation, which an 
autocratic government and Berlin police methods 
were powerless to suppress. 

The year 1910 marked the beginning of a new ' 
period of violent protest against Prussian rule. / 
Not since 1888 was there such a continuous agitation 
and such a continuous persecution. The days when 
the Prussian police forbade the use of the French 
language on tombstones were revived, and the num- 
ber of petty police persecutions recorded in the local 
press was equalled only by the number of public 
demonstrations on the part of the people, whose 
hatred of everything Prussian once more came to a 
fever-heat. 

Let me cite a few incidents which I have taken 
haphazard from the journals of Strasbourg and Metz 
during the first seven months of 19 10. The Turn- 
verein of Robertsau held a gymnastic exhibition in 
which two French societies, those of Belfort and 
Giromagny, were invited to participate. The police 
refused to allow the French societies to march to the 
hall in procession, as was their custom, or to display 
their flags. Their two presidents were threatened 
with arrest. A similar incident was reported from 
Colmar. At Noisseville and Wissembourg the for- 
tieth annual commemoration services held by the 

3 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

French veterans were considered treasonable, and 
they were informed that they would never again 
be allowed to hold services in the cemetery. At 
Mulhouse the French veterans were insulted by the 
police and not allowed to display their flags even in 
the room where they held their banquet. At the 
college of Thann a young boy of twelve, who curi- 
ously enough was the son of a notorious German 
immigrant, whistled the Marseillaise and was 
locked up in a cell for this offence. The conferring 
of the cross of the Legion of Honour on Abbe Faller, 
at Mars-la-Tour, created such an outburst of feel- 
ing that the German ambassador at Paris was in- 
structed to request the French Government to refrain 
from decorating Alsatians. A volunteer of Mul- 
house was reprimanded and refused advancement 
in the army because he used his mother-tongue in 
a private conversation. On July 1st, twenty-one 
border communes of Lorraine were added to those 
in which German had been made the official language. 
On July 25th, for the first time in the history of 
the University of Strasbourg, a professor was hissed 
out of his lecture room. He had said that the Prus- 
sians could speak better French than the Alsatians. 
1 The most serious demonstration which has oc- 
curred in Metz since the annexation, took place on 
I Sunday evening, January 8, 1910, when the police 
/ broke up forcibly a concert given by a local society. 
The newspapers of Metz claimed that this was a 
private gathering, to which individual invitations 
had been sent, and was neither public not political. 
The police invaded the hall, and requested the audi- 

4 



GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 

ence to disband. When the presiding officer refused, 
he and the leader of the orchestra were arrested. 
The audience, after a lively tussle, was expelled 
from the hall. Immediately a demonstration was 
planned to be held around the statue of General Ney. 
A large crowd paraded the city, singing the Sambre- 
et-Meuse and the Marseillaise. When the police 
found themselves powerless to stop the procession 
without bloodshed, they were compelled to call out 
the troops to clear the streets with fixed bayonets. 

These incidents demonstrated the fact that French / 
ideals, French culture, and the French language had 
been kept alive, and were still the inspiration of the v 
unceasing — and successful — protest of nearly two. 
million people against the Prussian domination. The 
effervescence was undoubtedly as strong in Alsace- 
Lorraine "forty years after" as it had been on the 
morrow of the annexation. But its francophile! 
character was not necessarily the expression of^ 
desire for reunion with France. The inhabitants 
of the "lost provinces" had always been, racially 
and linguistically, as much German as French. 
Now that the unexpected has happened, and reunion 
with France seems probable, many Alsatians are 
claiming that this has been the unfailing goal of 
their agitation. But it is not true. It would be a 
lamentable distortion of fact if any such record were 
to get into a serious history of the period in which 
we live. 

The political ideal of the Alsatians has been self-j 
government. Their agitation has not been for 
separation from the German Confederation, but' 

5 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

/ for a place in the German Confederation. A great 
number of the immigrants who were sent to "ger- 
manize" Alsace and Lorraine came to side with the 
indigenous element in their political demands. If 
the question of France and things French entered 
into the struggle, and became the heart of it, two 
reasons for this can be pointed out: France stood 
for the realization of the ideals of democracy to the 
descendants of the Strasbourg heroes of 1793; and 
the endeavour to stamp out the traces of the former 
nationality of the inhabitants of the provinces was 
carried on in a manner so typically and so foolishly 
Prussian that it kept alive the fire instead of extin- 
guishing it. Persecution never fails to defeat its 
own ends. For human nature is keen to cherish 
that which is difficult or dangerous to enjoy. 

To understand the Alsace-Lorraine question, from 
the internal German point of view, it is necessary 
to explain the political status of these provinces 
after the conquest, and their relationship to the 
Empire, in order to show that their continued unrest 
and unhappiness were not due to a ceaseless and 
stubborn protest against the Treaty of FrankfortjJ 
When the German Empire was constituted, in 
I 1872, it comprehended twenty-five distinct sovereign 

I kingdoms, duchies, principalities, and free cities, 
and, in a subordinate position, the territory ceded 

I by France, which was made a Reichsland, owned in 
common by the twenty-five confederated sovereign- 
ties. The King of Prussia was made Emperor of 

j the Confederation, and given extensive executive 

i powers. Two assemblies were created to legislate 

6 



GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 

for matters affecting the country as a whole. The' 
Bundesrath is an advisory executive body as well as 
an upper legislative assembly. // is composed of 
delegates of the sovereigns of the confederated states. 
The lower imperial house, or Reichstag, is a popular ' 
assembly, whose members are returned by general 
elections throughout the Empire. In their internal' 
affairs the confederated states are autonomous, 
and have their own local Parliaments. This scheme, 
fraught with dangers and seemingly unsurmount- 
able difficulties, has survived; and, thanks to the 
predominance of Prussia and the genius of two great 
emperors, the seemingly heterogeneous mass has 
been moulded into a strong and powerful Empire. 

In such an Empire, however, there never has been 
any place for Alsace-Lorraine. LThe conquered ter- 
ritory was not a national entity. It had no sov- 
ereign, and could not enter into the confederacy on 
an equal footing with the other twenty-five states. 
The Germans did not dare, at the time, to give the 
new member a sovereign, nor could they conjointly 
undertake its assimilation. Prussia, not willing to 
risk the strengthening of a south German state by 
the addition of a million and a half to its population, 
took upon herself what was the logical task of Baden 
or Wurtemberg or Bavaria^ 

So Alsace-Lorraine was an anomaly under the 
scheme of the organization of the German Empire. 
During forty years the Reichsland was without re- | 
presentation in the Bundesrath, and had thus had / 
no real voice in the management of imperial affairs. 
By excluding the "reconquered brethren" from 

7 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

representation in the Bundesrath, Germany failed to 
win the loyalty of her new subjects. Where petty 
states with a tithe of her population and wealth 
have helped in shaping the destinies of the nation, 
the Reichsland had to feel the humiliation of "taxa- 
tion without representation." It was useless to 
point out to the Alsatians that they had their vote 
in the Reichstag. For the Bundesrath is the power 
in Germany. 

Nor did Alsace-Lorraine have real autonomy in 
internal affairs. The executive power was vested 
in a Statthalter, appointed by the Emperor, and 
supported by a foreign bureaucracy and a foreign 
police force. Before the Constitution of 191 1, there 
was a local Parliament, called the Landesausschuss, 
which amounted to nothing, as the imperial Parlia- 
ment had the privilege of initiating and enacting 
for the Reichsland any law it saw fit. Then, too, 
the delegates to the Landesausschuss were chosen 
by such a complicated form of suffrage that they 
represented the Statthalter rather than the people. 
And the Statthalter represented the Emperor! 

In the first decade after the annexation, Prussian 
brutality and an unseemly haste to impose military 
service upon the conquered people led to an emigra- 
tion of all who could afford to go, or who, even at the 
expense of material interest, were too high-spirited 
to allow their children to grow up as Germans. 
This emigration was welcomed and made easy, just 
as Austria-Hungary encouraged the emigration of 
Moslems from Bosnia and Herzegovina. For it 
enabled Bismarck to introduce a strong Prussian 



GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 

and Westphalian element into the Reichsland by 
settling immigrants on the vacant properties. But 
most of these immigrants, instead of prussianizing 
Alsace, have become Alsatians themselves. Some 
of the most insistent opponents of the Government, 
some of the most intractable among the agitators, 
have been those early immigrants or their children. 
This is quite natural, when we consider that they 
have cast their lot definitely with the country, and 
are just as much interested in its welfare as the 
indigenous element. 

The revival of the agitation against Prussian 
Government in 19 10 was a movement for autonomy ' 



on internal affairs, and for representation in the 
Bundesrath. The Alsatians wanted to be on a foot- 
ing of constitutional equality with the other German f 
States. One marvels at the Prussian mentality 
which could not see — either with the Poles or with 
the Alsatians — that fair play and justice would 
have solved the problems and put an end to the 
agitation which has been, during these past few 
years especially, a menace on the east and west to 
the existence of the Empire. 

Something had to be done in the Reichsland. 
The anomalous position of almost two million Ger- 
man subjects, fighting for their political rights, and 
forming a compact mass upon the borders of France, 
was a question which compelled the interest of 
German statesmen, not only on account of its inter- 
national aspect, but also because of the growing 
German public sentiment for social and political 
justice. The Reichstag was full of champions of the 

9 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

claims of the Alsatians, — champions who were not 
personally interested either in Alsace-Lorraine or in 
the influence of the agitation in the Reichsland upon 
France, but who looked upon the Alsace-Lorraine 
question as a wrong to twentieth-century civilization. 

On March 14, 1910, Chancellor von Bethmann- 
Hollweg announced to the Reichstag that the 
Government was preparing a constitution for Alsace- 
Lorraine which would give the autonomy so long and 
so vigorously demanded. But he had in his mind, 
not a real solution of the question, but some sort of 
a compromise, which would satisfy the confederated 
states, and mollify the agitators of the Reichsland, 
but at the same time preserve the Prussian domination 
in Alsace-Lorraine. In June, Herr Delbriick, Secre- 
tary of State for the Interior, was sent to Strasbourg 
to confer with the local authorities and representa- 
tives of the people concerning the projected con- 
stitution. It was during this visit that the Alsatians 
were disillusioned. A dinner, now famous or 
notorious, whichever you like, was given by the 
Statthalter, to which representative (!) members of 
the Landesausschuss were invited. At this dinner 
the real leaders of the country, such as Wetterle, 
Preiss, Blumenthal, Weber, Bucher, and Theodor, — 
the very men who had made the demand for au- 
tonomy so insistent that the Government could no 
longer refuse to entertain it — were conspicuous by 
their absence. Those bidden to confer with Herr 
Delbriick in no way represented, but were on the 
other hand hostile to, the wishes of the people. 

We cannot go into the involved story of the fight 

10 



GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 

in the Reichstag over the new Constitution. The 
Delbriick project was approved by the Bundesrath 
on December 16, 1910, and debated in the following 
spring session of the Reichstag. Despite the warnings 
of the deputies from the Reichsland, and the brilliant 
opposition of the Socialists, the Constitution given 
to Alsace-Lorraine, on May 31st, was a pure farce. ^^ 
In no sense was it what the people of the Reichsland 
had wanted, although representation in the Bundes- 
rath was seemingly given to them. The new Con- 
stitution preserved the united sovereignty of the 
confederated states, and its delegation to the Emperor, 
who still had the power to appoint and recall at will 
the Statthalter, and to initiate legislation in local 
matters. A Landtag took the place of the Lan- 
desausschuss. The Upper Chamber of the Landtag 
consists of thirty-six members, representing the 
religious confessions, the University and other 
bodies, the supreme court of Colmar, and the muni- 
cipalities and chambers of commerce of Strasbourg, 
Mulhouse, Metz, and Colmar, to the number of 
eighteen ; and the other eighteen chosen by the Emperor. 
The Lower Chamber has sixty members, elected by 
direct universal suffrage, with secret ballot. Elect- 
ors over thirty-five possess two votes, and over 
forty-five three votes. 

By forcing this Constitution upon Alsace-Lorraine, 
the interests of Prussia and of the House of Llohen- 
zollern were considered to the detriment of the 
interests of the German Empire. A glorious oppor- 
tunity for reconciliation and assimilation was lost. 
The Emperor would not listen to the admission of 

11 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Alsace-Lorraine to the Bundesrath in the only logical 
way, by the creation of a new dynasty or a republican 
form of government, so that the Alsatian votes 
would represent a sovereign state. Prussia in her 
dealings with Alsace-Lorraine, has always been 
afraid, on the one hand, of the addition of Bundes- 
rath votes to the seventeen of Bavaria, Saxony, 
Baden, and Wurtemberg, and on the other hand, of 
the repercussion upon her internal suffrage and other 
problems with the Socialists. 

Since 191 1, the eyes of many Alsatians have been 
directed once more towards France as the only — if 
forlorn — hope of justice and peace. What words 
could be found strong enough to condemn the suicidal 
folly of the German statesmen who allowed the dis- 
appointment over the Constitution to be followed by 
a series of incidents which have been like rubbing 
salt into a raw wound? 

The first Landtag, in conformity to the Consti- 
tution of 191 1, was elected in October. It brought 
into life a new political party, called "The National 
Union," led by Blumenthal, Wetterle, and Preiss, 
who united for the purpose of demanding what the 
Constitution had not given them — the autonomy of 
Alsace and Lorraine. This party was badly beaten 
in this first election. But its defeat was not really 
a defeat for the principles of autonomy, as the Ger- 
man press stated at the time. The membership of 
the new Landtag was composed, in majority, of men 
who had been supporters of the demand for au- 
tonomy, but who had not joined the new party for 
reasons of local politics. Herr Delbriick had given 

12 



GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 

universal suffrage (a privilege the Prussian electorate 
had never been able to gain in spite of its reiterated 
demands) to the Reichsland in the hope that the 
Socialists would prevent the Nationalists from con- 
trolling the Alsatian Landtag. Many Socialists, how- 
ever, during the elections at Colmar and elsewhere, 
did not hesitate to cry in French, " Vive la France! 
A bas la Prusse /" 

The Prussian expectations were bitterly deceived. 
The Landtag promptly showed that it was merely 
the Landesansschuss under another name. The 
nationalist struggle was revived; the same old ques- 
tions came up again. The Government's appropria- 
tion "for purposes of state" was reduced one- third, 
and it was provided that the Landtag receive com- 
munication of the purposes for which the money 
was spent. The Statthalter 1 s expenses were cut in 
half, and a bill, which had always been approved in 
previous years, providing for the payment of the 
expense of the Emperor's hunting trips in the Reichs- 
land, failed to pass. 

In the spring of 19 12, the Prussians showed their 
disapproval of the actions of the new Landtag by 
withdrawing the orders for locomotives for the 
Prussian railways from the old Alsatian factory 
of Grafenstaden near Strasbourg. This was done 
absolutely without any provocation, and aroused 
a violent denunciation, not only among the purely 
German employes of the factory and in the news- 
papers, but also in the Landtag, which adopted an 
order of the day condemning most severely the 
attitude of the Imperial Government towards Alsace- 

13 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Lorraine, of which this boycott measure was a petty 

and mean illustration. 
J The indignation was at its height when Emperor 
; Wilhelm arrived in Strasbourg on May 13th. Instead 

of acting in a tactful manner and promising to set 

right this wrong done to the industrial life of Stras- 
] bourg, the Emperor addressed the following words 
\ to the Mayor: 

"Listen. Up to here you have only known the 
( good side of me: you might be able to learn the 
, other side of me. Things cannot continue as they 
' are: if this situation lasts, we will suppress your 
1 Constitution and annex you to Prussia." 

This typically Prussian speech, which in a few 
lines reveals the hopelessly unsuccessful tactics of 
1 the German Government towards the peoples whom 
it has tried to assimilate the world over, only served 
to increase the indignation of the inhabitants of 
the Reichsland; in fact, the repercussion throughout 
all Germany was very serious. 

The arbitrary threat of the Emperor was badly 
received in the other federated states, whose news- 
papers pointed out that he had exceeded his author- 
ity. It gave the Socialists an opportunity to attack 
Emperor Wilhelm on the floor of the Reichstag. 
Four days after this threat was made, an orator of 
the Socialist party declared • 

"We salute the imperial words as the confession, 
full of weight and coming from a competent source, 
that annexation to Prussia is the heaviest punish- 
ment that once can threaten to impose upon a 

14 



GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 

people for its resistance against Germany. It is a 
punishment like hard labour in the penitentiary 
with loss of civil rights." 

This speech caused the Chancellor to leave the 
room with all the Ministry. On May 226., the 
attack upon Emperor Wilhelm for his words at 
Strasbourg was renewed by another deputy, who 
declared that if such a thing had happened in Eng- 
land, "the English would shut up such a King at 
Balmoral or find for him some peaceful castle, such 
as that of Sternberg or the Villa Allatini at Salonika." 

The answer of the Landtag to Emperor Wilhelm 's 
threat was the passing of two unanimous votes: 
one demanding that hereafter the Constitution could 
not be modified except by the law of the country and 
not by the law of the Empire, and the other demanding 
for Alsace-Lorraine a national flag. 

One could easily fill many pages with illustrations 
of senseless persecutions, most of them of the pettiest 
character, but some more serious in nature, which 
Alsace and Lorraine have had to endure since the 
granting of the Constitution. Newspapers, illus- 
trated journals, clubs and organizations of all kinds 
have been annoyed constantly by police interference. 
Their editors, artists, and managers have been brought 
frequently into court. Zislin and Hansi, celebrated 
caricaturists, have found themselves provoked to 
bolder and bolder defiances by successive condemna- 
tions, and have endured imprisonment as well as 
fines. Hansi was sentenced to a year's imprison- 
ment by the High Court of Leipsic only a month 

15 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

before the present war broke out, and chose exile 

rather than a Prussian fortress. 

i The greatest effort during the past few years has 

been made in the schools to influence the minds of 

the growing generation against the "souvenir de 

} France," and to impress upon the Alsatians what 

> good fortune had come to them to be born German 

J citizens. 

1 Among the boys, the influence of this teaching 
, has been such that over twenty-two thousand fled 
from home during the period of 1900-19 13 to enlist 
in the Foreign Legion of the French Army. The 
campaign of the German newspapers in Alsace- 
Lorraine, and, in fact, throughout Germany, was 
redoubled in 191 1. Parents were warned of the 
horrible treatment accorded to the poor boys who 
were misguided enough to throw away their citizen- 
ship, and go to be killed in Africa under the French 
flag. The result of this campaign was that the For- 
eign Legion received a larger number of Alsatians 
in 1 912 than had enlisted during a single year since 
1871! 

Among the girls, the German educational system 
flattered itself that it could completely change the 
sentiments of a child, especially in the boarding- 
schools. Last year the Empress of Germany visited 
a girls' school near Metz, which is one of the best 
German schools in the Reichsland. As she was leav- 
ing, she told the children that she wanted to give 
them something. What did they want? The answer 
was not sweets or cake, but that they might be 
taught a little French ! 

16 



GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 

Since 191 o, the German war budget has carried 
successively larger items for the strengthening of 
forts and the building of barracks in Metz, Colmar, 
Mulhouse, Strasbourg, Neuf-Brisach, Bischwiller, 
Wissembourg, Mohrange, Sarrebourg, Sarregue- 
mines, Saarbruck,Thionville, Molsheim, and Saverne. 
The former French provinces have been flooded 
with garrisons, and have been treated just as they 
were treated forty years ago. The insufferable 
spirit of militarism, and the arrogance of the Prussian 
officers in Alsatian towns, have served to turn against 
the Empire many thousands whom another policy 
might have won. For it must be remembered that 
by no means all the inhabitants of the Reichsland 
have been by birth and by home training French 
sympathizers. Instead of crushing out the " souvenir \ 
de France" the Prussian civil and military officials/ 
have caused it to be born in many a soul which was*/ 
by nature German. 

The most notorious instance of military arrogance 
occurred in the autumn of 191 3 in Saverne. Lieu- 
tenant von Forstner, who was passing in review 
cases of discipline, had before him a soldier who had 
stabbed an Alsatian, and had been sentenced to two 
months' imprisonment. "Two months on account 
of an Alsatian blackguard!" he cried. "I would 
have given you ten marks for your trouble." The 
story spread, and the town, tired of the attitude of 
its garrison, began in turn to show its contempt for 
the Kaiser's soldiers. Windows in von Forstner's 
house were broken. Every time officers or soldiers 
appeared on the streets they were hooted. Saverne 

17 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

was put under martial law. Threats were made to 
fire upon the citizens. One day Lieutenant von 
Forstner struck a lame shoemaker across the fore- 
head with his sword. The affair had gone so far 
that public sentiment in Germany demanded some 
action. Instead of adequately punishing von Forst- 
ner and other officers, who had so maddened the 
civil population against them, the German military 
authorities gave the guilty officers nominal sentences, 
and withdrew the garrison. 

All these events had a tremendous repercussion 
jin France. It is impossible to exaggerate the ill- 
/ feeling aroused on both sides of the Rhine, in Ger- 
l many, in Alsace-Lorraine, and in France by the per- 
i secutions in the Reichsland. Only one who knows 
j intimately the French can appreciate their feeling — 
, or share it — over the Zislin and Hansi trials, the 
\ Saverne affair, the suppression of the Souvenir 
) Frangais, the Lorraine Sportive and other organiza- 
tions, and the campaign against the Foreign Legion. 
It has given the French soldiers in the present war 
something to fight for which is as sacred to them as 
the defence of French soil. The power of this senti- 
ment is indicated by the invasion of Alsace, the 
battle of Altkirk, and the occupation of Mulhouse at 
the beginning of August. The French could not be 
held back from this wild dash. Strategy was power- 
less in the face of the sentiment of a national army. 
The Alsatian leaders themselves have seen the 
peril to the peace of Europe of the German attitude 
towards their country. They did not want France 
drawn into a war for their liberation. They were 

18 



GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 

alarmed over the possibility of this, and desired it 
to be understood that their agitation had nothing 
international in it. The attitude of all the anti- 
Prussian parties may be summed up in the words of 
Herr Wolff, leader of the Government Liberal party, 
who declared that "all the inhabitants of the Reichs- 
land had as their political ambition was only the 
elevation of Alsace-Lorraine to the rank of an inde-' 
pendent and federated state, like the other twenty-, 
five component parts of the German Empire." Their 
sincerity and their desire to preserve peace is proved 
by the motion presented by the leaders of four of the 
political groups in the Reichsland, which was voted 
on May 6, 1912, without discussion, by the Landtag: 

"The Chamber invites the Statthalter to instruct 
the representatives of Alsace-Lorraine in the Bun- 
desrath to use all the force they possess against the 
idea of a war betweeen Germany and France, and 
to influence the Bundesraih to examine the ways 
which might possibly lead to a rapprochement be- 
tween France and Germany, which rapprochement 
will furnish the means of putting an end to the race 
of armaments." 

The mismanagement of the Reichsland has done 
more than prevent the harmonious union of the 
former French provinces with Germany. It has \ 
had an effect, the influence of which cannot be exag- 
gerated, upon nourishing the hopes of revenge of I 
France, and the resentment against the amputation / 
of 1870. On neither side of the Vosges has the 
wound healed. The same folly which has kept alive 
a Polish question in eastern Prussia for one hundred 

19 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

and twenty-five years, has not failed to make impos- 
sible the prussianizing of Alsace and Lorraine. The 
Prussian has never understood how to win the con- 
fidence of others. There has been no Rome in his 
political vision. As for conceptions of toleration, 
of kindness, and of love, they are non-existent in 
Prussian officialdom. Nietzsche revealed the char- 
acter of the Prussian in his development of the idea 
of the iibermensch. The ideal of perfect manhood 
is the imposition of one will on another will by force. 
Mercy and pity, according to Nietzsche, were signs 
of weakness, the symbols of the slave. 

Under the circumstances, then, we are compelled 
after forty-five years to revise our estimate of Bis- 
marck's sagacity. His genius was limited by the 
narrow horizon of his own age. He did not see that 
the future Germany needed other things that France 
could give far more than she needed Alsace and 
Lorraine. In posterity, Bismarck would have had 
a greater place had he, in the last minutes of the 
transactions at Versailles, given back Alsace and 
Lorraine to France, waived the war indemnity, and 
asked in return Algeria or other French colonies. 

But would it have been different with the French 
colonies? It is impossible to write this chapter, 
and have faith in the success of a German weltpolitik. 



20 



CHAPTER II 
THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY 

WHEN the transrhenane provinces of the old 
German Empire were added to France in 
the eighteenth century, the assimilation 
of these territories was a far different proposition from 
their refusion into the mould of a new German Empire 
in 1 87 1. In the first place, the old German Empire 
was a mediaeval institution which, in the evolution 
of modern Europe, was decaying. Alsace and Lor- 
raine were not taken away from a political organism 
of which they were a vital part. The ties severed 
were purely dynastic. In the second place, the 
consciousness of national life was awakened in 
Alsace and Lorraine during the time that they were 
under French rule, and because they shared in the 
great movement of the birth of democracy following 
the French Revolution. 

France, then, by the Treaty of Frankfort, believed 
that she had been robbed of a portion of her national 
territory. The people of the annexed provinces, as 
was clearly shown by the statement of their repre- 
sentatives at Bordeaux, did not desire to enter the 
German Confederation. 

21 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Germany failed to do the only thing that could 
possibly have made her new territories an integral 
part of the new Empire, i. e. to place Alsace-Lorraine 
upon a footing of equality with the other states of 
the Confederation, and make their entry that of an 
autonomous sovereign state. Consequently, neither 
in France nor in the Reichsland was the Treaty of 
Frankfort accepted as a permanent change in the 
map of Europe. Germany has always been com- 
pelled, in her international politics, to count upon the 
possibility of France making an attempt to win back 
the lost provinces. She has sought to form alliances 
to strengthen her own position in Europe, and to 
keep France weak. France, the continued object 
of German hostility, has found herself compelled to 
ally herself with Russia, with whom she has never 
had anything in common, and to compound her 
colonial rivalries in Africa with her hereditary enemy, 
Great Britain. This is the first case of the unrest in 
Europe that has culminated in a general European 
war. 

The second cause is the Weltpolitik of Germany 
which has brought the German Empire into conflict 
with Great Britain and France outside of Europe, 
and with Russia in Europe. 

On the map of Europe, Russia, Great Britain, and 
France are, in 1914, practically what they were in 
1 81 5. The changes, logical and in accordance with 
the spirit of centralization of the nineteenth century, 
have transformed middle and south-eastern Europe. 
The changes in south-eastern Europe have been 
effected at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, and 

22 



THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY 

have been a gradual development throughout the 
century, from the outbreak of the Greek revolution 
in 1822 to the Treaty of London in 191 3. In middle 
Europe, during the twelve years between 1859 an d 
1 87 1, the three Powers whose national unity, racially 
as well as politically, was already achieved at the 
time of the Congress of Vienna, were brought face to 
face with three new Powers, united Germany, united 
Italy, and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. 

The nineteenth century has been called the age of 
European colonization. Europe began to follow its 
commerce with other continents by the imposition of its 
civilization and its political system upon weaker races. 
Checked by the rising republic of the United States 
from encroaching upon the liberties of the peoples 
of North and South America, there have been no 
acquisitions of territory by European nations in the 
western continents since the Congress of Vienna. 
European expansion directed itself towards Africa, 
Asia, and the islands of the oceans. There was no 
Oriental nation strong enough to promulgate a 
Monroe Doctrine. 

In extra-European activities, Great Britain, France, 
and Russia were the pioneers. That they succeeded 
during the nineteenth century in placing under their 
flag the choicest portions of Africa and the backward 
nations of Asia, was due neither to the superior enter- 
prise and energy, nor to the greater foresight, of the 
Anglo-Saxon, French, and Russian nations. They 
had achieved their national unity, and they were 
geographically in a position to take advantage of the 
great opportunities which were opening to the world 

23 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

for colonization since the development of the steam- 
ship and the telegraph. 

But the other three Powers of Europe came late 
upon the scene. It has only been within the last 
quarter of a century that Germany and Italy have 
been in the position to look for overseas possessions. 
It has only been within the last quarter of a century 
that Austria, finding her union with Hungary a 
durable one, has been able to think of looking beyond 
her limits to play a part, as other nations had long 
been doing, in the history of the outside world. 

By every force of circumstances, the three new 
States — threatened by their neighbours, who had 
looked with jealous, though powerless, eyes upon 
their consolidation — were brought together into a 
defensive alliance. The Triple Alliance, as it is 
called, has drifted into a spirit of common general 
aims and ambitions, if not of particular interests, 
against their three more fortunate rivals, who had 
been annexing the best portions of the Asiatic and 
African continents while they were struggling with 
internal problems. 

Oceans of ink have been wasted upon polemics 
against the peace-disturbing character of the Triple 
Alliance. Especially has Germany and her growing 
Weltpolitik been subject to criticism, continuous and 
untiring, on the part of the British and French press. 
But the question after all is a very simple one: the 
three newer Powers of Europe have not been willing 
to be content with an application in practical world 
politics of the principle that "to him that hath shall 
be given. " Germany and Italy, transformed under 

24 



THE " WELTPOLITIK " OF GERMANY 

modern economic conditions into industrial states, 
have been looking for outside markets, and they have 
wanted to enjoy those markets in regions of the globe 
either actually under their flag or subjected to their 
political influence. In other words, they have 
wanted their share in the division of Africa and Asia 
into spheres under the control of European nations. 

Is a logical and legitimate ambition to play a part 
in the world's politics in proportion to one's popula- 
tion, one's wealth, one's industrial and maritime 
activity, necessarily a menace to the world's peace? 
It has always been, and I suppose always will be, 
in the nature of those who have, to look with alarm 
upon the efforts of those who have not, to possess 
something. Thus capital, irrespective of epoch or 
nationality or of religion, has raised the cry of alarm 
when it has seen the tendency for betterment, for 
education, for the development of ideals and a sense 
of justice on the part of labour. In just the same way, 
Russia with her great path across the northern half 
of Asia and her new and steadily growing empire in 
the Caucasus and central Asia; France with the 
greater part of northern and central Africa, and an 
important corner of Asia under her flag; and Great 
Britain with her vast territories in every portion of 
the globe, raised the cry of "Wolf, Wolf!" when the 
Powers of the Triple Alliance began to look with 
envious eye upon the rich colonies of their neighbours, 
and to pick up by clever diplomacy — and brutal force, 
if you wish — a few crumbs of what was still left for 
themselves. 

The result of these alarming ambitions of the 

25 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Triple Alliance has been the coming together of 
Russia, France, and England, hereditary enemies in 
former days but now friends and allies, in the main- 
tenance of the colonial "trust." 

The great cry of the Triple Entente is the mainten- 
ance of the European equilibrium. For this they have 
reason. Europe could know no lasting peace under 
Teutonic aggression. But is there not also to the 
account of the Triple Entente some blame for the 
unrest in Europe and for the great catastrophe which 
has come upon the world? For while their policy has 
been the maintenance of the European equilibrium, 
it has been coupled with the maintenance of an ex- 
tra-European balance of power wholly in their favour. 

The sense of justice, of historical proportion, and 
the logic of economic evolution make one sym- 
pathize, in abstract principle, not only with the 
Weltpolitik of Germany, but also with Austria- 
Hungary's desire for an outlet to the sea, and with 
Italy's longing to have in the Mediterranean the 
position which history and geography indicated 
ought to be, and might again be, hers. 

But sympathy in abstract principle is quite another 
thing from sympathy in fact. In order to appreciate 
the Weltpolitik of Germany, and be able to form an 
intelligent opinion in regard to it—for it is the most 
vital and burning problem in the world to-day — we must 
consider it from the point of view of its full signi- 
ficance in practice in the history of the world. 

Bismarck posed as the disinterested "honest 
courtier" of Europe in the Congress of Berlin. The 
declaration he had made, that the whole question 

26 



THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY 

of the Orient "was not worth the finger bone of a 
Pomeranian grenadier," was corroborated by his 
actions during the sessions of the Congress. We have 
striking illustrations of this in the memoirs of Kara- 
theodory pasha, who recorded from day to day, 
during the memorable sessions of the Congress, his 
astonishment at the indifference which Bismarck 
displayed to the nationalities of the Balkans, and to 
the complications which might arise in Europe from 
their rivalries. 

Bismarck did not see how vital was to be the Bal- 
kan question with the future of the nation he had 
built. Nor did he see the intimate relationship 
between the economic progress of united Germany 
and the question of colonies. One searches in vain 
the speeches and writings of the Iron Chancellor 
for any reference to the importance of the two pro- 
blems, in seeking the solution of which the fabric of 
his building is threatened with destruction. 

Perhaps it is easy for us, in looking backwards, to 
point out the lack of foresight which was shown by 
Bismarck in regard to the future of Germany. 
Forty-five years later, we are able to pass in review 
the unforeseen developments of international politics 
and the amazing economic evolution of contemporary 
Europe. Perhaps it is unreasonable to expect that 
much attention and thought should have been given 
by the maker of modern Germany to the possible 
sphere that Germany might be called upon to play 
in the world outside of Europe. 

For we must remember that the new Germany, 
after the Franco-Prussian War, was wholly in an 

27 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

experimental stage, and that the duty at hand was 
the immediate consolidation of the various states 
into a political and economic fabric. There was 
enough to demand all the attention and all the genius 
of Bismarck and his co-workers in solving these 
problems. Cordial relationship with Austria had 
to be reestablished. The dynasties of the south 
German kingdoms and of the lesser potentates, 
whose names still remained legion in spite of the 
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss of 1803, had to be 
carefully handled. There were four definite internal 
problems which confronted Bismarck: the relation- 
ship of the empire to the Catholic Church; the 
reconciliation of the different peoples into a har- 
monious whole; the establishment of representative 
government without giving the strong socialistic 
elements the upper hand; and the development of 
the economic wealth of Germany. 

There was little time to think of Germany's place 
in the world's politics. In foreign affairs, it was 
considered that the exigencies of the moment could 
be met by adopting a policy of conciliation towards 
both Russia and Austria, and the winning of the 
friendship of Italy. The Kulturkampf, the creation 
of the Bundesrath under Prussian hegemony, and the 
formation of the Triple Alliance and the events 
connected with them, are important in an analysis 
of Germany's international politics. Unfortunately 
we cannot bring them into the scope of this book. 
We can mention only the various factors that have 
been directly responsible for giving birth to what is 
called the Weltpolitik. 

28 



THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY 

These factors are the belief of the German people 
in the superiority of their race and its world-civilizing 
mission; their connotation of the word "German"; 
the consciousness of their military strength being dis- 
proportionate to their political influence; the rapid 
increase of the population and the development of the 
industrial and commercial prosperity of the empire; 
and the realization of the necessity of a strong navy, 
with naval bases and coaling-stations in all parts of 
the world, for the adequate protection of commerce. 

The belief of the German people in the superiority of 
their race and its world-civilizing mission is a sober 
fact. It pervades every class of society from the 
Kaiser down to the workingman. It is heralded from 
the pulpit, taught in the schools, and is a scientific 
statement in the work of many of Germany's leading 
scholars. The anthropologist Woltmann said that 
"the German is the superior type of the species 
homo sapiens, from the physical as well as the intel- 
lectual point of view." Wirth declared that "the 
world owes its civilization to Germany alone" and 
that "the time is near when the earth must inevitably 
be conquered by the Germans. " The scientific 
book — a serious one — in which these statements occur 
was so popular that it sold five editions in three years ! 
Paulsen remarked that "humanity is aware of, and 
admires, the German omnipresence." Hartmann 
taught that the European family is divided into two 
races, male and female, of which the first, of course, 
was exclusively German, while the second included 
Latins, Celts, and Slavs. "Marriage is inevitable." 
Goethe expressed in Faust the opinion that the work 

29 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

of the Germans was to make the habitable world 
worth living in, while Schiller boasted, "Our language 
shall reign over the whole world," and that "the 
German day lasts until the end of time." Schiller 
also prophesied that "two empires shall perish in 
east and west, I tell you, and it is only the Lutheran 
faith which shall remain." Fichte, one hundred 
years ago, exhorted the Germans to be "German 
patriots, and we shall not cease to be cosmopolitan. " 
Heine believed that "not only Alsace and Lorraine, 
but all France shall be ours. " 

To show the German state of mind towards those 
whom they have not hesitated to provoke to arms, 
the remarkable teaching of Hummel' s book, which 
is used in the German primary schools, is a convincing 
illustration. Frenchmen are monkeys, and the best 
and strongest elements in the French race asserted 
to be German by blood. The Russians are slaves, 
as their name implies. Treitschke's opinion of the 
British is that "among them love of money has killed 
all sentiment of honour and all distinction of just and 
unjust. Their setting sun is our aurora." One of 
the leading newspapers of Germany recently said: 
"The army of the first line of which Germany will 
dispose from the first day of the mobilization will be 
sufficient to Crush France, even if we must detach a 
part of it against England. If England enters the 
war, it will be the end of the British Empire, for 
England is a colossus with feet of clay." 

The Kaiser has been the spokesman of the nation 
in heralding publicly the belief in the superiority 
of the German people, and its world mission. It was 

30 



THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY 

at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the 
Empire that the scope of the Weltpolitik was an- 
nounced by Wilhelm II. He said: 

"The German Empire has become a world empire 
(ein Weltreich). Everywhere, in the most distant 
lands, are established thousands and thousands of our 
compatriots. German science, German activity, the 
defenders of the German ideal pass the ocean. By 
thousands of millions we count the wealth that 
Germany transports across the seas. It is your duty, 
gentlemen, to aid me to establish strong bonds be- 
tween our Empire of Europe and this greater German 
Empire {dieses grossere Deutsche Reich) . . . 
May our German Fatherland become one day so 
powerful that, as one formerly used to say, Civis 
romanus sum, one may in the future need only to say, 
Ich bin ein deutscher Burger. " 

At Aix-la-Chapelle, on June 20, 1902, he revealed 
his ambition in one sentence, " It is to the empire of the 
world that the German genius aspires" Just before 
leaving for the visit to Tangier in 1905 — the visit 
which was really the beginning of one of the great 
issues of the present war — he said at Bremen: "If 
later one must speak in history of a universal domina- 
tion by the Hohenzollern, of a universal German 
empire, this domination must not be established by 
military conquest .... God has called us to civilize 
the world: we are the missionaries of human progress." 
This idea was developed further at Minister, on 
September I, 1907, when the Kaiser proclaimed: 
"The German people will be the block of granite on 
which our Lord will be able to elevate and achieve 
the civilization of the world!" 

3i 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

This attitude of mind is as common among the 
disciples of those wonderful leaders who founded the 
international movement for the solidarity of interests 
of labour, as it is among the aristocratic and intellect- 
ual elements of the nation. The German Socialist 
has proclaimed the brotherhood of man, and the 
common antagonism of the wage-earners of the world 
against their capitalistic oppressors. But, for all 
his preachng, the German Socialist is first of all a 
German. He has come to believe that the mission of 
Socialism will be best fulfilled through the triumph 
of Germanism. This belief is sincere. It is a far 
cry from Karl Marx to the militant — or rather mili- 
tarist — German Socialist, bearing arms gladly upon 
the battlefields of Europe to-day, because he is 
inspired by the thought that the triumph of the army 
in which he fights will aid the cause of Socialism. 1 

There is a striking analogy between the German 
Socialist of the present generation and the Jacobins of 
T 793- The heralders of Liberie, Egalite et Fraternite 
fought for the spread of the principles of the Revolu- 
tion through God's chosen instruments, the armies 
of France, and were carried away by their enthusiasm 
until they became the facile agents for saddling 
Europe with the tyranny of Napoleon. Love for 



' While the Landlage of the German states are mostly controlled 
by Conservative elements, owing to restricted suffrage, the Reichstag 
is one of the most intelligently democratic legislative bodies in the 
world. Its social legislation is surpassed by that of no other country. 
During thirty years the Socialist vote in Germany has increased one 
thousand per cent. It now represents one-third of the total elec- 
torate. But the Socialists are to a man behind the war. 

32 



THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY 

humanity was turned into blood-lust, and fighting for 
freedom into seeking for booty and glory. Are the 
profound thinkers of the German universities, and 
the visionaries of the workingmen's forums following 
to-day the same path? Does the propagation of an 
ideal lead inevitably to a blind fanaticism, where the 
dreamer becomes in his own imagination a chosen 
instrument of God to shed blood? 

There is undoubtedly an intellectual and idealistic 
basis to German militarism and to German arrogance. 

Their connotation of the word "German" has led 
the Germans to look upon territories outside of their 
political confines as historically and racially, hence 
rightfully, virtually, and eventually theirs. A geo- 
graphy now in its two hundred and forty-fifth edition 
in the public schools (Daniel's Leitfaden der Geo- 
graphie) states that " Germany is the heart of Europe. 
Around it extend Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, 
Luxemburg, and Holland, which were all formerly 
part of the same state, and are peopled entirely or in 
the majority by Germans." 

When German children have been for the past 
generation deliberately taught as a matter of fact — 
not as an academic or debatable question — that 
Deutschland ought to be more than it is, we can 
understand how the neutrality of their smaller 
neighbours seems to the Germans a negligible 
consideration. No wonder the soldiers who ran up 
against an implacable enemy at Liege, Namur, and 
Charleroi thought there must be a mistake some- 
where, and were more angered against the opposition 
of those whom they regarded as their brothers of 
3 33 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

blood than they later showed themselves against the 
French. No wonder that the sentiment of the whole 
German nation is for the retention of Belgium, 
their path to the sea. It was formerly German. Its 
inhabitants are German. Let it become German 
once more ! 

But to the Germans there are other and equally 
important elements belonging to their nation outside 
of the states upon the confines of the empire. These 
are the German emigrants and German colonists in 
all portions of the world. In recent years there has 
come to the front more than ever the theory that 
German nationality cannot be lost by foreign residence 
or by transference of allegiance to another State: once 
a German, always a German. 

Convincing proof of this is found in the new citizen- 
ship law, sanctioned with practical unanimity by the 
Reichstag and Bundesrath, which went into effect on 
January I, 1914. According to Article XIII of this 
law, "a former German who has not taken up his 
residence in Germany may on application be natur- 
alized. " This applies also to one who is descended 
from a former German, or who has been adopted as the 
child of such! According to Article XIV, any former 
German who holds a position in the German Empire 
in any part of the world, in the service of a German 
religious society or of a German school, is looked upon 
as a German citizen "by assumption." Any for- 
eigner holding such a position may be naturalized 
without having a legal residence in Germany. The 
most interesting provision of all is in Article XXV, 
section 2 of which says: "Citizenship is not lost by 

34 



THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY 

one who before acquiring foreign citizenship has 
secured on application the written consent of the 
competent authorities of his home state to retain his 
citizenship." 

Germany allows anyone of German blood to be- 
come a German citizen, even if he has never seen 
Germany and has no intention of taking up his 
residence there; and Germans, who have emigrated 
to other countries, secure the amazing opportunity 
to acquire foreign citizenship without losing their 
German citizenship. 

The result of this law, since the war broke out, has 
been to place a natural and justifiable suspicion upon 
all Germans living in the countries of the enemies of 
Germany. It is impossible to overestimate the 
peril from the secret ill-will and espionage of Germans 
residing in the countries that are at war with Ger- 
many. There are undoubtedly many thousands of 
cases where Germans have been honest and sincere 
in their change of allegiance, but how are the nations 
where they have become naturalized to be sure of 
this? A legal means has been given to these natural- 
ized Germans to retain, without the knowledge of the 
nation where their oath of allegiance has been received 
in good faith, citizenship in Germany. 

German emigration and colonization societies, and 
many seemingly purely religious organizations for 
"the propagation of the faith in foreign lands," have 
been untiring in their efforts to preserve in the minds 
of Germans who have left the Fatherland the prin- 
ciple, "once a German always a German." The 
Catholic as well as the Lutheran Church has lent 

35 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

itself to this effort. Wherever there are Germans, 
one finds the German church, the German school, 
the Zeitung, the Bierhalle, and the Turnverein. The 
Deidschtum is sacred to the Germans. One cannot 
but have the deepest respect for the pride of Germans 
in their ancestry, in their language, in their church, 
and in the preservation of traditional customs. 
There is no better blood in the world than German 
blood, and one who has it in his veins may well be 
proud of it : for it is an inheritance which is distinctly 
to a man's intellectual and physical advantage. But, 
in recent years, the effort has been made to confuse 
Deutschtum with Deutschland. Here lies a great 
danger. We may admire and reverence all that 
has come to us from Germany. But the world can- 
not look on impassively at a propaganda which is 
leading to Deutschland iiber alles! 

When we take the megalomania of the Germans, 
their ambition to fulfil their world mission, their 
belief in their peculiar fitness to fulfil that mission, 
and their idea of the German character of the neigh- 
bouring states, and contrast the dream with the 
reality, we see how they must feel, especially as they 
are conscious of the fact that they dispose of a military 
strength disproportionate to their position in mondial 
politics. Great Britain, with one-third less popula- 
tion, "the colossus with the feet of clay," owns a 
good fourth of the whole world; France, the nation 
of "monkeys," which was easily crushed in 1870, 
holds sway over untold millions of acres and natives 
in Africa and Asia; while Russia, the nation of 
"slaves, " has a half of Europe and Asia. 

36 



THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY 

The most civilized people in the world, with a 
world mission to fulfil, is dispossessed by its rivals 
of inferior races and of inferior military strength! 
The thinking German is by the very nature of things 
a militarist. 

But even if the logic of the Weltpolitik, under the 
force of circumstances, did not push the German of 
every class and category to the belief that Germany 
must solve her great problems of the present day by 
force of arms, especially since her military strength 
is so much greater than that of her rivals, the nature 
of the German would make him lean towards force 
as the decisive argument in the question of extending 
his influence. For from the beginning of history the 
German has been a war man. He has asserted him- 
self by force. He has proved less amenable to the 
refining and softening influences of Christianity and 
civilization than any other European race. He has 
worshipped force, and relied wholly upon force to 
dominate those with whom he has come into contact. 
The leopard cannot change his spots. So it is as 
natural for the German of the twentieth century to 
use the sword as an argument as it was for the 
German of the tenth century, or, indeed, of the first 
century. We cannot too strongly insist upon this 
fatal tendency of the German to subordinate natural, 
moral, legal, and technical rights to the supremacy of 
brute force. There is no conception of what is 
called "moral suasion" in the German mind. Al- 
though some of the greatest thinkers of the world 
have been and are to-day Germans, yet the German 
nation has never come to the realization that the pen 

37 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

may be mightier than the sword. Give the German 
a pen, and he will hold the world in admiration of his 
intellect. Give him a piano or a violin, and he will 
hold the world in adoration of his soul. But give him 
a sword, and he will hold the world in abhorrence of 
his force. For there never was an iibermensch who 
was not a devil. Else he would be God. 

But the Weltpolitik has had other and more 
tangible and substantial causes than the three we 
have been considering. It is not wholly the result of 
the German idea that Germany can impose her will 
upon the world and has the right to do so. The 
power of Germany comes from the fact that her 
people have been workers as well as dreamers. 
The rapid increase of the population and development 
of the industrial and commercial prosperity of the 
empire have given the Germans a wholly justifiable 
economic foundation for their Weltpolitik. 

United Germany, after the successful war of 1870, 
began the greatest era of industrial growth and pro- 
sperity that has ever been known in the history 
of the world. Not even the United States, with all 
its annual immigration and opening up of new fields 
and territories, has been able to show an industrial 
growth comparable to that of Germany during the 
past forty years. In this old central Europe cities 
have grown almost over night. Railways have been 
laid down, one after the other, until the whole empire 
is a network of steel. Mines and factories have 
sprung into being as miraculously as if it had been 
by the rubbing of Aladdin's lamp. The population 
has increased more than half in forty years. 

38 



THE " WELTPOLITIK " OF GERMANY 

It was as her population and her productive power 
increased far more quickly and far beyond that of her 
neighbours, that Germany began to look out into the 
extra-European world for markets. She had reached 
the point when her productivity, in manufacturing 
lines, had exceeded her power of consumption. 
Where find markets for the goods? German mer- 
chants, and not Prussian militarists, began to spread 
abroad in Germany the idea that there was a world 
equilibrium, as important to the future of the nations 
of Europe as was the European equilibrium. Ger- 
many, looking out over the world, saw that the pros- 
perity of Great Britain was due to her trade, and that 
the security and volume of this trade were due to her 
colonies. 

Who does not remember the remarkable stamp 
issued by the Dominion of Canada to celebrate the 
Jubilee of Queen Victoria? On the mercatorial 
projection of the world, the British possessions were 
given in red. One could not find any corner of the 
globe where there were not ports to which British 
ships in transit could go, and friendly markets for 
British commerce. The Germans began to compare 
their industries with those of Great Britain. Their 
population was larger than that of the great colonial 
power, and was increasing more rapidly. Their 
industries were growing apace. For their excess 
population, emigration to a foreign country meant 
annual loss of energetic and capable compatriots. 
Commerce had to meet unfair competition in 
every part of the world. Outside of the Baltic 
and North Seas, there was no place that a Ger- 

39 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

man ship could touch over which the German flag 
waved. 

It was not militarism or chauvinism or megalo- 
mania, but the natural desire of a people who found 
themselves becoming prosperous to put secure and 
solid foundations under that prosperity, that made 
the Germans seek for colonies and launch forth upon 
the Weltpolitik. 

The first instance of the awakening on the part of 
the German people to a sense that there was some- 
thing which interested them outside of Europe, was 
the annexation by Great Britain in 1874 of the Fiji 
Islands, with which German traders had just begun, 
at great risk and painstaking efforts, to build up a 
business. This was the time when the Government 
was engaged in its struggles with the Church and 
socialism, and when the working of the Reichstag 
and the Bundesrath was still in an experimental 
stage. Nothing could be done. But there began to 
be a feeling among Germans that in the future Ger- 
many ought to be consulted concerning the further 
extension of the sovereignty of as European nation 
over any part of the world then unoccupied or still 
independent. But Germany was not in a position 
either to translate this sentiment into a vigorous 
foreign policy, or to begin to seize her share of the 
world by taking the portions which Great Britain 
and Russia and France had still left vacant. 

German trade, still in its infancy, received cruel 
setbacks by the British occupation of Cyprus in 
1878 and of Egypt in 1883, the French occupation 
of Tunis in 1 88 1, and the Russian and British dealings 

40 



THE " WELTPOLITIK " OF GERMANY 

with central Asia and Afghanistan. The sentiment 
of the educated and moneyed classes in Germany- 
began to impose upon the Government the necessity 
of entering the colonial field. The action in Egypt 
and in Tunis brought about the beginning of German 
colonization. Bismarck had just finished success- 
fully his critical struggle with the socialists. The 
decks were cleared for action. In 1882, a Bremen 
trader, Herr Liidritz, by treaties with the native 
chiefs, gained the Bay of Angra-Pequena on the west 
coast of Africa. For two years no attention was 
paid to this treaty, which was a purely private com- 
mercial affair. In 1884, shortly after the occupation 
of Egypt, a dispute arose between the British author- 
ities at Cape Town and Herr Liidritz. Bismarck saw 
that he must act, or the old story of extension of 
British sovereignty would be repeated. He tele- 
graphed to the German Consul at Cape Town that 
the Imperial Government had annexed the coast and 
hinterland from the Orange River to Cape Frio. 

Other annexations in Africa and the Pacific fol- 
lowed in the years 1 884-1 886. In Africa, the 
German flag was hoisted over the east coast of the 
continent, north of Cape Delgado and the river 
Rovuma, and in Kamerun and Togo on the Gulf of 
Guinea. In the Pacific, Kaiser Wilhelm's Land was 
formed of a portion of New Guinea, with some adja- 
cent islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago, the 
Solomon Islands, and the Marshall Islands were 
gathered in. Since those early years of feverish 
activity, there have been no new acquisitions in 
Africa, other than the portion of French Congo ceded 

4i 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

in 1912 as "compensation" for the French protecto- 
rate of Morocco. In the Pacific, in 1899, after the 
American conquest of the Philippines, the Caroline, 
Pelew, and Marianne groups and two of the Samoan 
Islands were added. 

In China, Germany believed that she had the right 
to expect to gain a position equal to that of Great 
Britain at Hongkong and Shanghai, of France at 
Tonkin, and Russia in Manchuria. She believed 
that it was just as necessary for her to have a forti- 
fied port to serve as a naval base for her fleet as it 
was for the other Powers, and that by a possession of 
territory which could be called her own she would 
be best able to get her share of the commerce of the 
Far East. From 1895 to 1897, Germany examined 
carefully all the possible places which would serve 
best for the establishment of a naval and commercial 
base. At the beginning of 1897, after naval and 
commercial missions had made their reports, a 
technical mission was sent out whose membership 
included the famous Franzius, the creator of Kiel. 
This mission reported in favour of Kiau-Chau on the 
peninsula of Shantung in north China. 

When negotiations were opened with the Chinese, 
the answer of the Chinese Government was to send 
soldiers to guard the bay ! The Kaiser, in a visit to 
the Czar at Peterhof in the summer of 1897, secured 
Russian " benevolent neutrality." The murder of 
two missionaries in the interior of the province, on 
November 1st of the same year, gave Germany her 
chance. Three German war vessels landed troops 
on the peninsula, and seized Kiau-Chau and Tsing- 

42 



THE " WELTPOLITIK " OF GERMANY 

Tau. After five months of tortuous negotiations, a 
treaty was concluded between Germany and China 
on March 6, 1899. Kiau-Chau with adjacent 
territory was leased to Germany for ninety-nine 
years. To German capital and German commerce 
were given the right of preference for every industrial 
enterprise on the peninsula, the concession for the 
immediate construction of a railway, and the exclu- 
sive right to mining along the line of the railway. 
Thus the greater part of the province of Shantung 
passed under the economic influence of Germany. 

The entry of Japan into the war of 1 914 is due to 
her desire to remedy a great injustice which has been 
done to Japanese commerce in the province of 
Shantung by the German occupation, to her fear of 
this naval base opposite her coast (just as she feared 
Port Arthur), and probably to the intention of oc- 
cupying the Marianne Islands, the Marshall Islands, 
and the Eastern and Western Carolines, in order 
that the Japanese navy may have important bases 
in a possible future conflict with the United States. 

When Germany leased Kiau-Chau, she declared 
solemnly that the port of Tsing-Tau would be an 
open port, ein frei Hafen filr alien Nationen. But 
Japanese trade competition soon caused her to go 
back on her word. She conceived a clever scheme 
in 1906, by which the Chinese customs duties were 
allowed to be collected within the Protectorate in 
return for an annual sum of twenty per cent, upon the 
entire customs receipts of the Tsing-Tau district. 
In this way, she is more than recompensed for the 
generosity displayed in allowing German goods to 

43 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

be subject to the Chinese customs. She reimburses 
herself at the expense of the Japanese ! Berlin could 
not have been astonished at the ultimatum of August 
15th from Tokio. 

There has always been much opposition in Ger- 
many to the colonization policy of the Government. 
The dissatisfaction over the poor success of the 
attempts at African colonization led Chancellor 
Caprivi to state that the worst blow an enemy could 
give him was to force upon him more territories in 
Africa! The Germans never got on well with the 
negroes. Their colonists, for the most part too poor 
to finance properly agricultural schemes, lived by 
trading. Like all whites, they cheated the natives 
and bullied them into giving up their lands. In 
South-West Africa, a formidable uprising of the 
Herreros resulted in the massacre of all the Germans 
except the missionaries and the colonists who had 
established themselves there before the German 
occupation. The suppression of this rebellion took 
more than a year, and cost Germany an appalling 
sum in money and many lives. But it cost the 
natives more. Two thirds of the nation of the Her- 
reros were massacred : while only six or seven thou- 
sand were in arms, the German official report stated 
that forty thousand were killed. The Germans 
confiscated all the lands of the natives. 

In 1906, after twenty-one years of German rule, 
there were in South-West Africa sixteen thousand 
prisoners of war out of a total native population of 
thirty-one thousand. All the natives lived in con- 
centration camps, and were forced to work for the 

44 



THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY 

Government. In commenting upon the Herrero 
campaign, Pastor Frenssen, one of the most brilliant 
writers of modern Germany, put in the mouth of the 
hero of his colonial novel the following words: " God 
has given us the victory because we were the most 
noble race, and the most rilled with initiative. That 
is not saying much, when we compare ourselves with 
this race of negroes; but we must act in such a way 
as to become better and more active than all the other 
people of the world. It is to the most noble, to the 
most firm that the world belongs. Such is the justice 
of God." 

German opposition has been bitter also against the 
occupation of Kiau-Chau. For traders have claimed 
that the political presence of Germany on the Shan- 
tung peninsula and the dealings of the German dip- 
lomats with the Pekin court had so prejudiced the 
Chinese against everything German that it was 
harder to do business with them than before the 
leasehold was granted. They actually advocated 
the withdrawal of the protectorate for the good of 
German commerce! 

But German pride was at stake in Africa after 
the Herrero rebellion. And in China, Kiau-Chau 
was too valuable a naval base to give up. In 1907, 
a ministry of colonies was added to the Imperial 
Cabinet. Since then the colonial realm has been 
considered an integral part of the Empire. 

At every point of this colonial development, 
Germany found herself confronted with open opposi- 
tion and secret intrigue. The principal strategic 
value of south-west Africa was taken away by the 

45 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

British possession of Walfisch Bay, and of east 
Africa by the protectorate consented to by the Sultan 
of Zanzibar to the British Crown. Togoland and 
Kamerun are hemmed in by French and British 
possession of the hinterland. The Pacific islands are 
mostly "left-overs," or of minor importance. In 
spite of the unpromising character of these colonies, 
the commerce of Germany with them increased from 
1908 to 1912 five hundred per cent., and the com- 
merce with China through Kiau-Chau from 1902 
to 19 1 2 nearly a thousand per cent. 

And yet, in comparison to her energies and her 
willingness — let us leave till later the question of 
ability and fitness — Germany has had little oppor- 
tunity to exercise a colonial administration on a large 
scale. She must seek to extend her political influence 
over new territories. Where and how? That has 
been the question. Most promising of all appeared 
the succession to the Portuguese colonies, for the 
sharing of which Great Britain declared her willing- 
ness to meet Germany halfway. An accord was 
made in 1898, against the eventuality of Portugal 
selling her colonies. But since the Republic was 
proclaimed in Portugal, there has been little hope 
that her new Government would consider itself 
strong enough to part with the heritage of several 
centuries. 

For the increase of her colonial empire, Germany 
has felt little hope. So she has tried to secure com- 
mercial privileges in various parts of the world, 
through which political control might eventually 
come. We have already spoken of her effort in 

46 



THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY 

China. Separate chapters treat of her efforts in 
the three Moslem countries, Morocco, Persia, and 
Turkey, and show how in each case she has found 
herself checkmated by the intrigues and accords of 
the three rich colonial Powers. 

Long before the political union of the German 
States in Europe was accomplished, there were 
German aspirations in regard to the New World, 
when Pan-Germanists dreamed of forming states in 
North and South America. 

These enthusiasts did not see that the Civil War 
had so brought together the various elements of the 
United States, the most prominent and most loyal 
of which was the German element, that any hope 
of a separatist movement in the United States 
was chimerical. As late as 1885, however, the third 
edition of Roscher's Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und 
Auswanderung stated that "it would be a great step 
forward, if the German immigrants to North America 
would be willing to concentrate themselves in one of 
the states, and transform it into a German state." 
For different reasons Wisconsin would appear to be 
most particularly indicated. 

As early as 1849, the Germans commenced to 
organize emigration to Brazil through a private 
society of Hamburg {Hamburger Kolonisationverein), 
which bought from the Prince de Joinville, brother- 
in-law of Dom Pedro, vast territories in the state of 
Santa Catharina. There the German colonization 
in Brazil began. It soon extended to the neighbour- 
ing states of Parana and Rio Grande do Sul. There 
are now about three hundred and fifty thousand 

47 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Germans, forming two per cent, of the population. 
In no district are they more than fifteen per cent. 
However, in Rio Grande, there is a territory of two 
hundred kilometres in which the German language 
is almost wholly spoken; and a chain of German 
colonies binds Sao Leopoldo to Santa Cruz. 

Among the Pan-Germanists, the three states 01 
southern Brazil have been regarded as a zone par- 
ticularly reserved for German expansion. The 
colonial congress of 1902 at Berlin expressed a formal 
desire that hereafter German emigration be directed 
towards the south of Brazil. An amendment to 
include Argentina was rejected. The decree of 
Prussia, forbidding emigration to Brazil, was revoked 
in 1 896 in so far as it was a question of the three states 
of Parana, Santa Catharina, and Rio Grande do Sul. 

It has not been very many years since diplomatic 
incidents arose between Brazil and Germany over 
fancied German violation of Brazilian territory by 
the arrest of sailors on shore. But Germany has not 
entertained serious hope of getting a foothold in 
South America. Brazil has increased greatly in 
strength, and there is to-day in South America a 
tacit alliance between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile 
to support the American Monroe Doctrine. Ger- 
many found, when she was trying to buy a West India 
island from Denmark, that she had to reckon not 
only with Washington, but also with Buenos Ayres, 
Rio, and Santiago. 

Finding herself so thoroughly hemmed in on all 
sides, in the New World and in the Old World, by 
alliances and accords directed against her overseas 

48 



THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY 

political expansion, modern Germany has repeated 
the history of the Jews. Deprived of some senses, 
one develops extraordinarily others. Deprived of 
civil and social rights for centuries, the Jews de- 
veloped the business sense until to-day their wealth 
and influence in the business world are far beyond the 
proportionate numbers of their race. Deprived of 
the opportunity to administer and develop vast 
overseas territories, the Germans have turned to 
intensive military development at home and exten- 
sive commercial development abroad, until to-day 
they are the foremost military Power in Europe, and 
are threatening British commercial supremacy in 
every part of the globe. 

The German counterpart of the British and French 
and Russian elements that are directing the destinies 
of vast colonies and protectorates is investing its 
energy in business. During the past generation, the 
German campaign for the markets of the world has 
been carried on by the brightest and best minds in 
Germany. There have been three phases to this 
campaign: manufacturing the goods, selling the 
goods, and carrying the goods. German manufac- 
tures have increased so greatly in volume and scope 
since the accession of the present Emperor that there 
is hardly a line of merchandise which is not offered 
in the markets of the world by German firms. 

Articles "made in Germany" may not be as well 
made as those of other countries. But their price 
is more attractive, and they have driven other goods 
from many fields. One sees this right in Europe in 
the markets of Germany's competitors and enemies. 
4 49 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Since the present war began, French and British 
patriots are hard put to it sometimes when they find 
that article after article which they have been accus- 
tomed to buy is German. In my home in Paris, the 
elevator is German, electrical fixtures are German, 
the range in my kitchen is German, the best lamps for 
lighting are German. I have discovered these things 
in the past month through endeavouring to have 
them repaired. Interest led me to investigate other 
articles in daily use. My cutlery is German, my 
silverware is German, the chairs in my dining-room 
are German, the mirror in my bathroom is German, 
some of my food products are German, and prac- 
tically all the patented drugs and some of the toilet 
preparations are German. Curiously enough, while 
my beer is French, my milk is German ! 

All these things have been purchased in the Paris 
markets, without the slightest leaning towards, or 
preference for, articles coming from the Fatherland. 
I was not aware of the fact that I was buying German 
things. They sold themselves, — the old combination 
of appearance, convenience, and price, which will sell 
anything. That I am unconsciously using German 
manufactured articles is largely due to the genius of 
the salesman. It is a great mistake to believe that 
salesmanship is primarily the art of selling the goods 
of the house you represent. That has been the 
British idea. It is today exploded. Is it because the 
same type as the Britisher who is devoting his brains 
and energy to solving the problems of inferior people 
in different parts of the world is among the Germans 
devoting his energies to German commerce in those 

5o 



THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY 

same places, that the Germans have found the fine 
art of salesmanship to be quite a different thing? 
It is studying the desires of the people to whom you 
intend to sell, finding out what they want to buy, 
and persuading your house at home to make and 
export those articles. From the Parisian and the 
Londoner, and the New Yorker down to the naked 
savage, the Germans know what is wanted, and they 
supply it. If the British university man is enjoying 
a position of authority and of fascinating perplexity 
in some colony, and feels that he has a share in shap- 
ing the destinies of the world, the German university 
man is not without his revenge. Deprived of one 
sense, has he not developed another — and a more 
practical one? 

The young German, brought up in an overpopu- 
lated country, unable to enter a civil service which 
will keep him under his own flag — and remember how 
intensely patriotic he is, this young German, just as 
patriotic as the young Frenchman or the young 
Britisher, — must leave home. He is not of the class 
from which come the voluntary emigrants. His ties 
are all in Germany: his love — and his move — all 
for Germany. So he becomes a German resident 
abroad, in close connection with the Fatherland, 
and always working for the interests of the Father- 
land. He goes to England or to France, where he 
studies carefully and methodically, as if he were to 
write a thesis on it (and he often does), the business 
methods of and the business opportunities among the 
people where he is dwelling. He is giving his life to 
put Deutschland ilber alles in business right in the 

5i 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

heart of the rival nation, and he is succeeding. Dur- 
ing October, 19 14, when they tried to arrest in the 
larger cities of England the German and Austrian 
subjects they had to stop — there was not room in the 
jails for all of them! And in many places business 
was paralyzed. 

In carrying the products of steadily increasing vol- 
ume to steadily growing markets, Germany has been 
sensible enough to make those markets pay for the 
cost of transport. Up to the very selling price, all 
the money goes to Germany. The process is simple : 
from German factories, by German ships, through 
German salesmen, to German firms, in every part of 
the world — beginning with London and Paris. 

Germany's merchant marine has kept pace with 
the development of her industry. Essen may be the 
expression of one side of modern Germany, which is 
said to have caused the European war. But one is 
more logical in believing that Hamburg and Bremen 
and the Kiel Canal have done more to bring on this 
war than the products of Krupp. During the last 
twenty-five years the tonnage of Germany's merchant 
marine has increased two hundred and fifty per cent., 
a quarter of which has been in the last five years, from 
iqo8-iqij. There are six times as many steamships 
flying the German flag as when Wilhelm II mounted 
the throne. In merchant ships, Germany stands 
today second only to Great Britain. The larger 
portion of her merchant marine is directed by great 
corporations. The struggle against Great Britain 
and France for the freight carrying of outside nations 
has been most bitter — and most successful. Before 

52 



THE " WELTPOLITIK " OF GERMANY 

the present war, there was no part of the world in which 
the German flag was not carried by ships less than ten 
years old. 

With the exception of Kiau-Chau, the colonies of 
Germany have never been of much practical value, 
except as possible coaling and wireless stations for the 
German fleet. But here also the opposition of her 
rivals has minimized their value. Walfisch Bay and 
Zanzibar have, as we have already said, lessened the 
strategical value of the two large colonies on either 
side of the African continent. In the division of the 
Portuguese colonies agreed to by Great Britain, it 
was "the mistress of the seas" who was to have the 
strategic places — not part of them, but all of them, 
the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira, and the Azores. 

As Germany's commerce and shipping have so 
rapidly developed, the seeking for opportunities to 
extend her political sovereignty outside of Europe 
has not been so much an outlook for industrial 
enterprise as the imperative necessity of finding 
naval bases and coaling stations in different parts of 
the world for the adequate protection of commerce. 
The development of the German navy has been the 
logical complement of the development of the Ger- 
man merchant marine. Germany's astonishing naval 
program has kept pace with the astonishing growth 
of the great Hamburg and Bremen lines. Germany 
has had exactly the same argument for the increase 
of her navy as has had Great Britain. Justification 
for the money expended on the British navy is that 
Great Britain needs the navy to protect her com- 
merce, upon which the life of the nation is dependent, 

53 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

and guarantee her food-supplies. The industrial 
evolution of Germany has brought about for her 
practically the same economic conditions as in Great 
Britain. In addition to the dependence of her 
prosperity upon the power of her navy to protect her 
commerce, Germany has felt that she must keep the 
sea open for the sake of guaranteeing uninterrupted 
food-supplies for her industrial population. It must 
not be forgotten that Germany is flanked on east and 
west by hereditary enemies, and has come to look 
to the sea as the direction from which her food 
supplies would come in case of war. 

This last factor of the Weltpolitik, the creation of a 
strong navy, must not be looked upon either as a 
provocation to Great Britain or as a menace to the 
equilibrium of the world. If it has brought Germany 
inevitably into conflict with Great Britain, it is 
because the navy is the safeguard of commerce. The 
Weltpolitik is essentially a Handelspolitik. The 
present tremendous conflict between Great Britain 
and Germany is the result of commercial rivalry. It 
is more a question of the pocket-book than of the 
sacredness of treaties, if we are looking for the cause 
rather than the occasion of the war. It has come in 
spite of honest efforts to bring Great Britain and 
Germany together. 

Lord Haldane, in February, 191 2, made a trip to 
Berlin to bring about a general understanding be- 
tween the two nations. But while there was much 
discussion of the question of the Bagdad Railway, 
Persian and Chinese affairs, Walfisch Bay, and the 
division of Africa, nothing came of it. On March 

54 



THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY 

1 8th, Mr. Churchill said to the House of Commons: 
"If Germany adds two ships in the next six years, we 
shall have to add four; if Germany adds three, we 
shall have to add six. Whatever reduction is made in 
the German naval program will probably be followed 
here by a corresponding naval reduction. The 
Germans will not get ahead of us, no matter what 
increase they make; they will not lose, no matter 
what decrease they make." This was as far as 
Great Britain could go. 

In the spring of 191 2, the British fleet was con- 
centrated in the North Sea, and an accord was made 
with France for common defensive action in the 
North Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. At the same 
time, during M. Poincare's trip to Petrograd, an 
accord was signed between France and Russia for 
common naval action in time of war. 

The Pan-Germanic movement in recent years has 
not been a tool of the Government, but rather a party, 
including other parties, banded together more than 
once to oppose the German Government in an hon- 
ourable attempt to preserve peace with the neigh- 
bours in the west. 

It is a tremendous mistake — and a mistake which 
has been continuously made in the French, British, 
and American press since the beginning of the war — 
to consider the Weltpolitik as an expression of the 
sentiments of the German Emperor and his officials. 
Since it was forced upon Bismarck against his will, 
Pan-Germanism has been a power against which the 
Emperor William II has had to strive frequently 
throughout his reign. For it has never hesitated to 

55 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

force him into paths and into positions which were 
perilous to the theory of monarchical authority. 
The Kaiser has resented the pressure of public opin- 
ion in directing the affairs of the Empire. Pan-Ger- 
manism has been a striking example of democracy, 
endeavouring to have a say in governmental policies. 
The Naval and Army Leagues, the German Colonial 
Society, and the Pan-Germanic Society are private 
groups, irresponsible from the standpoint of the 
Government. They have declared the govern- 
mental programs for an increase in armaments in- 
sufficient, and have bitterly denounced and attacked 
them from the point of view exactly opposite to that 
of the Socialists. The Pan-Germanic Society refused 
to recognize the treaty concluded between Germany 
and France after the Agadir incident. Said Herr 
Klaas at the Hanover Conference on April 15, 
1912: "We persist in considering Morocco as the 
country which will become in the future, let us hope 
the near future, the colony for German emigration." 
The same intractable spirit was shown in Dr. Pohl's 
address at the Erfurt Congress in September, 191 2. 
We hear much about the Kaiser and the military 
party precipitating war. A review of the German 
newspapers during the past few years will convince 
any fair-minded reader that German public opinion, 
standing constantly behind the Pan-Germanists, has 
frequently made the German Foreign Office act with 
a much higher hand in international questions than 
it would have acted if left to itself, and that German 
public opinion, from highest classes to lowest, is for 
this war to the bitter finish. // is the war of the 

56 



THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY 

people, intelligently and deliberately willed by them. 
The statement that a revolution in Germany, led 
by the democracy to dethrone the Kaiser or to get 
him out of the clutches of the military party, would 
put an end to the war, is foolish and pernicious. 
For it leads us to false hopes. It would be much 
nearer the truth to say that if the Kaiser had not 
consented to this war, he would have endangered his 
throne. 

The principle of the Weltpolitik, imposed upon 
European diplomacy by the German nation in the 
assembling of the Conference of Algeciras, was that 
no State should be allowed to disturb the existing 
political and territorial status quo of any country 
still free, in any part of the world, without the consent 
of the other Powers. This Weltpolitik would have 
the natural effect, according to Karl Lamprecht, in 
his Zur Jilngsten Deutschen Vergangenheit, of endan- 
gering a universal and pitiless competition among 
the seven Great Powers in which the weakest would 
eventually be eliminated. 



57 



CHAPTER III 
THE "BAGDADBAHN" 

IN the development of her Weltpolitik, the most 
formidable, the most feasible, and the most 
successful conception of modern Germany has 
been the economic penetration of Asiatic Turkey. 
She may have failed in Africa and in China. But 
there can be no doubt about the successful beginning, 
and the rich promise for the future, of German en- 
terprises in the Ottoman Empire. 

The countries of sunshine have always exercised 
a peculiar fascination over the German. His litera- 
ture is filled with the Mediterranean and with Islam. 
From his northern climate he has looked southward 
and eastward back towards the cradle of his race, 
and in imagination has lived over again the Cru- 
sades. As long as Italy was under Teutonic political 
influence, the path to the Mediterranean was easy. 
United Italy and United Germany were born at 
the same time. But while the birth of Italy threat- 
ened to close eventually the trade route to the 
Mediterranean to Germany, the necessity of a trade 
route to the south became more vital than ever to the 
new German Confederation from the sequences of 
the union. 

58 



THE " BAGDADBAHN" 

When her political consolidation was completed 
and her industrial era commenced, Germany began 
to look around the world for a place to expand. 
There were still three independent Mohammedan 
nations — Morocco, Persia, and Turkey. In Morocco 
she found another cause for conflict with France than 
Alsace-Lorraine. In Persia and Turkey, she faced 
the bitter rivalry of Russia and Great Britain. 

The rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire, and the 
fact that its sovereign was Khalif of the Moslem 
world, led German statesmen to believe that Con- 
stantinople was the best place in the world to centre 
the efforts of their diplomacy in the development of 
the Weltpolitik. Through allying herself with the 
Khalif, Germany would find herself able to strike 
eventually at the British occupation of India and 
Egypt, and the French occupation of Algeria and 
Tunis, not only by joining the interests of Pan-Islamism 
and Pan-Germanism, but also by winning a place in 
Morocco opposite Gibraltar, a place in Asia Minor 
opposite Egypt, and a place in Mesopotamia opposite 
India. 

The certainty of economic success helped to make 
the political effort worth while, even if it came to 
nothing. For Asia Minor and Mesopotamia are 
countries that have been among the most fertile and 
prosperous in the whole world. They could be so 
again. The present backward condition of Asia 
Minor and Mesopotamia is due to the fact that these 
countries have had no chance to live since they came 
under Ottoman control, much less to develop their 
resources proportionately to other nations. The 

59 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

natives have been exploited by the Turkish officials 
and by foreign holders of concessions. Frequently 
concessions have been sought to stop, not to further, 
development. If there have been climatic changes 
to account for lack of fertility in Asia Minor, this 
is largely due to deforestation. Ibn Batutah, the 
famous Moorish traveller of the first half of the four- 
teenth century, and Shehabeddin of Damascus, his 
contemporary, have left glowing accounts of the 
fertility and prosperity of regions of Asia Minor, now 
hopelessly arid, as they existed on the eve of the 
foundation of the Ottoman Empire. Not only have 
all the trees been cut down, but the roots have been 
torn up for fuel ! One frequently sees in the markets 
of Anatolian towns the roots of trees for sale. The 
treatment of trees is typical of everything else. The 
country has had no chance. In Mesopotamia, the 
new irrigation schemes are not innovations of the 
twentieth century, but the revival of methods of 
culture in vogue thousands of years before Christ. 

The Romans and Byzantines improved their in- 
heritance. The Osmanlis ruined it. 

In addition to sunshine and romance, political 
advantages, and prospects of making money, another 
influence has attracted the Germans to the Ottoman 
Empire. There is a certain affinity between German 
and Osmanli. The Germans have sympathy with 
the spirit of Islam, as they conceive it to be interpreted 
in the Turk. They admire the yassak of the Turk, 
which is the counterpart of their verboten. The von 
Moltke who later led Prussia to her great victories 
had at the beginning of his career an intimate know- 

60 



THE "BAGDADBAHN" 

ledge of the Turkish army. He admired intensely 
the blind and passive obedience of the Turk to au- 
thority, his imperturbability under misfortune and 
his fortitude in facing hardship and danger. "Theirs 
not to reason why: theirs but to do and die" is a 
spirit which German and Turk understand, and show, 
far better than Briton, with all due respect to Tenny- 
son. A Briton may obey, but he questions all the 
same, and after the crisis is over he demands a 
reckoning. Authority, to the Anglo-Saxon, rests in 
the body politic, of which each individual is an 
integral — and ineffaceable — part. 

The Turkish military and official cast is like that 
of the Germans in three things: authority rests in 
superiors unaccountable to those whom they com- 
mand; the origin of authority is force upholding 
tradition ; and the sparing of human life and human 
suffering is a consideration that must not be enter- 
tained when it is a question of advancing a political 
or military end. I have seen both at work, and have 
seen the work of both; so I have the right to make 
this statement. For all that, I have German and 
Turkish friends, and deep affection for them, and 
deep admiration for many traits of character of both 
nations. The trouble is that the people of Germany 
and the people of Turkey allow their official and 
military castes to do what their own instincts would 
not permit them to do. The passivity of the Turk is 
natural: it is his religion, his background, and his 
climate. The passivity of the German is inexcusable- 
He will not exorcise the devil out of his own race. It 
must be done for him. 

61 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

In 1888, a group of German financiers, backed by 
the Deutsche Bank, which was to have so powerful a 
future in Turkey, asked for the concession of a rail- 
way line from Ismidt to Angora. The construction 
of this line was followed by concessions for extension 
from Angora to Caesarea and for a branch from the 
Ismidt-Angora line going south-west from Eski Sheir 
to Konia. The extension to Cassarea was never 
made. That was not the direction in which the 
Germans wanted to go. The Eski Sheir- Konia spur 
became the main line. The Berlin-Bagdad-Bassorah 
"all rail route" was born. The Germans began to 
dream of connecting the Baltic with the Persian Gulf. 
The Balkan Peninsula was to revert to Austria- 
Hungary, and Asia Minor and Mesopotamia to Ger- 
many. The south Slavs and the populations of the 
Ottoman Empire would be dispossessed (the philoso- 
pher Haeckel actually prophesied this in a speech 
in 1905 before the Geographical Society of Jena). 
Russia would be cut off from the Mediterranean. 
This was the Pan-Germanist conception of the 
Bagdadbahn. 

From the moment the first railway concession was 
granted to Germans in Asia Minor, which coincided 
with the year of his accession, Wilhelm II has been 
heart and soul with the development of German 
interests in the Ottoman Empire. His first move in 
foreign politics was to visit Sultan Abdul Hamid 
in 1889, when he was throwing off the yoke of Bis- 
marck. This visit was the beginning of an intimate 
connection between Wilhelmstrasse and the Sublime 
Porte which has never been interrupted — excepting 

62 



THE " BAGDADBAHN " 

for a very brief period at the beginning of the First 
Balkan War. The friendship between the Sultan 
and the Kaiser was not in the least disturbed by the 
Armenian massacres. The hecatombs of Asia Minor 
passed without a protest. In fact, five days after the 
great massacre of August, 1896, in Constantinople, 
where Turkish soldiers shot down their fellow-citizens 
under the eyes of the Sultan and of the foreign 
ambassadors, Wilhelm II sent to Abdul Hamid for 
his birthday a family photograph of himself with the 
Empress and his children. 

In 1898, the Kaiser made his second voyage to 
Constantinople. This voyage was followed by the 
concession extending the railway from Konia to the 
Persian Gulf. It was the beginning of the Bagdad- 
bahn in the official and narrower sense. After this 
visit of the Kaiser to Abdul Hamid, the pilgrimage 
was continued to the Holy Land. At Baalbek, there 
is a stone of typically German taste, set in the wall of 
the great temple, to commemorate the visit of the 
man who dreamed he would one day be master of the 
modern world. If this inscription seems a sacrilege, 
what name have we for the large gap in the walls of 
Jerusalem made for his triumphal entry to the Holy 
City? The great Protestant German Church, whose 
corner-stone was laid by his father in 1869, was 
solemnly inaugurated by the Kaiser. As solemnly, 
he handed over to Catholic Germans the title to land 
for a hospital and religious establishment on the road 
to Bethlehem. Still solemnly, at a banquet in his 
honour in Damascus, he turned to the Turkish Vali, 
and declared: "Say to the three hundred million 

63 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Moslems of the world that I am their friend." To 
prove his sincerity he went out to put a wreath upon 
the tomb of Saladin. 

Wilhelm II at Damascus is reminiscent of Na- 
poleon at Cairo. Egypt and Syria and Mesopotamia 
have always cast a spell over men who have dreamed 
of world empires; and Islam, as a unifying force for 
conquest, has appealed to the imagination of others 
before the present German Kaiser. I have used the 
word "imagination" intentionally. There never has 
been any solidarity in the religion of Mohammed; 
there is none now; there never will be. The idea of 
community of aims and community of interests is 
totally lacking in the Mohammedan mind. Solidar- 
ity is built upon the foundation of sacrifice of self 
for others. It is a virtue not taught in the Koran, 
nor ever developed by any Mohammedan civiliza- 
tions. The failure of all political organisms of 
Mohammedan origin to endure and to become strong 
has been due to the fact that Mohammedans have 
never felt the necessity of giving themselves for the 
common weal. The virility of a nation is in the 
virile service of those who love it. If there is no 
willingness to serve, no incentive to love, how can a 
nation live and be strong? 

The revelation of Germany's ambition by the 
granting of the concession from Konia to the Persian 
Gulf, and the application of the German financiers 
for a firman constituting the Bagdad Railway Com- 
pany, led to international intrigues and negotiations 
for a share in the construction of the line through 
Mesopotamia. It would be wearisome and profitless 

64 



THE "BAGDADBAHN" 

to follow the various phases of the Bagdad question. 
Germany did not oppose international participation 
in the concession. The expense of crossing the Tau- 
rus and the dubious financial returns from the desert 
sections influenced the Germans to welcome the 
financial support of others in an undertaking that 
they would have found great difficulty in financing 
entirely by their own capital. The Bagdadbahn con- 
cession was granted in 1899: the firman constituting 
the company followed in 1903. 

Russia did not realize the danger of German 
influence at Constantinople, and of the eventualities 
of the German "pacific penetrations" in Asia Minor. 
She adjusted the Macedonian question with Emperor 
Franz Josef in order to have a free hand in Man- 
churia, and she made no opposition to the German 
ambitions. She needed the friendly neutrality of 
Germany in her approaching struggle with Japan. 
Once the struggle was begun, Russia found herself 
actually dependent upon the goodwill of Germany. 
It was not the time for Petrograd to fish in the 
troubled waters of the Golden Horn. 

The situation was different with Great Britain. 
The menace of the German approach to the Persian 
Gulf was brought to the British Foreign Office just 
long enough before the Boer crisis became acute for a 
decision to be made. Germany had sent engineers 
along the proposed route of her railway. She had 
neglected to send diplomatic agents ! 

The proposed — in fact the only feasible — terminus 
on the Persian Gulf was at Koweit. Like the Sultan 
of Muscat, the Sheik of Koweit was practically inde- 

65 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

pendent of Turkey. While showing deference to the 
Sultan as Khalif , Sheik Mobarek resisted every effort 
of the Vali of Bassorah to exercise even the sem- 
blance of authority over his small domain. In 1899, 
Colonel Meade, the British resident of the Persian 
Gulf, signed with Mobarek a secret convention which 
assured to him "special protection, " if he would make 
no cession of territory without the knowledge and con- 
sent of the British Government. The following year, 
a German mission, headed by the Kaiser's Consul 
General at Constantinople, arrived in Koweit to 
arrange the concession for the terminus of the Bag- 
dadbahn. They were too late. The door to the 
Persian Gulf was shut in the face of Germany. 

Wilhelm II set into motion the Sultan. The 
Sublime Porte suddenly remembered that Koweit 
was Ottoman territory, and began to display great 
interest in forcing the Sheik to recognize the fact. 
A Turkish vessel appeared at Koweit in 1901. But 
British warships and British bluejackets upheld the 
independence of Koweit! Since the Constitution of 
1908, all the efforts of the Young Turks at Koweit 
have been fruitless. Germany remains blocked. 

British opposition to the German schemes was not 
limited to the prevention of an outlet of the Bagdad- 
bahn at Koweit. Since 1798, when the East India 
Company established a resident at Bagdad to spy 
upon and endeavour to frustrate the influence of the 
French, just beginning to penetrate towards India 
through the ambition of Napoleon to inherit the 
empire of Alexander, British interests have not failed 
to be well looked after in Lower Mesopotamia. 

66 



THE " BAGDADBAHN " 

After the Lynch Brothers in i860, obtained the right 
of navigating on the Euphrates, the development 
of their steamship lines gradually gave Great Britain 
the bulk of the commerce of the whole region, in the 
Persian as well as the Ottoman hinterland of the 
Gulf. In 1895, German commerce in the port of 
Bushir was non-existent, while British commerce 
surpassed twelve million francs yearly. In 1905, the 
Hamburg-American Line established a service to 
Bassorah. British merchants began to raise the 
cry that if the Bagdadbahn appeared the Germans 
would soon have not only the markets of Mesopo- 
tamia but also that of Kermanshah ! The Lynch 
Company declared that the Bagdadbahn would ruin 
their river service, and their representations were 
listened to at London, despite the absurdity of their 
contention. The Lynches were negotiating with 
Berlin also. This mixture of politics and commerce 
in Mesopotamia is a sordid story, which does not 
improve in the telling. 

The revolution of 1908 did not injure the German 
influence at Constantinople as much as has been 
popularly supposed. The Germans succeeded dur- 
ing the first troubled year in keeping in with both 
sides through the genius of Baron Marschall von 
Bieberstein, in spite of the Bosnia-Herzegovina affair. 
Germany was fortunately out of the Cretan and 
Macedonian muddles, in which her rivals were hope- 
lessly entangled. Mahmud Shevket pasha was al- 
ways under German influence, and the Germans had 
Enver bey, "hero of liberty," in training at Berlin. 
German influence at Constantinople succeeded also 

67 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

in withstanding the strain of the Tripolitan War, 
although it grew increasingly embarrassing as the 
months passed to be Turkey's best friend and at the 
same time the ally of Italy ! During the first dis- 
astrous period of the war of the Balkan Allies against 
Turkey, it seemed for the time that the enemies of 
Germany controlled the Sublime Porte. But the 
revolver of Enver bey in the coup d'etat of January, 
1913, brought once more the control of Turkish 
affairs into hands friendly to Germany. They have 
remained there ever since. 

Germany strengthened her railway scheme, and 
her hold on the territories through which it was to 
pass, by the accord with Russia at Potsdam in 19 10. 
The last clever attack of British diplomacy on the 
Bagdadbahn was successfully met. In tracing the 
extension of the railway beyond Adana, it was sug-. 
gested to the Department of Public Works that the 
cost of construction would be greatly reduced and 
the usefulness of the line increased, if it passed by 
the Mediterranean littoral around the head of the 
Gulf of Alexandretta. Then the control of the rail- 
way would have been at the mercy of the British 
fleet. When the "revised" plans went from the 
Ministry of Public Works to the Ministry of War, it 
was not hard for the German agents to persuade the 
General Staff to restore the original route inland 
across the Amanus, following the old plan agreed 
upon in the time of Abdul Hamid. More than that, 
the Germans secured concessions for a branch line 
from Aleppo to the Mediterranean at Alexandretta, 
and for the construction of a port at Alexandretta. 

68 



THE "BAGDADBAHN" 

The Bagdadbahn was to have a Mediterranean 
terminus at a fortified port, and Germany was to have 
her naval base in the north-east corner of the Medi- 
terranean, eight hours from Cyprus and thirty-six 
hours from the Suez Canal! This was the revenge 
for Koweit. 

A month before the Servian ultimatum, Germany 
had contracted to grant a loan to Bulgaria, one of the 
conditions of which was that Germany be allowed 
to build a railway to the Mgean across the Rhodope 
Mountains to Porto Laghos, and to construct a port 
there, six hours from the mouth of the Dardanelles. 
There was a panic in Petrograd. 

The events in Turkey since the opening of the 
war are too recent history and as yet too little under- 
stood to dwell upon. But the reception accorded to 
the Goeben and Breslau at the Dardanelles, their 
present* anomalous position in "closed waters" in 
defiance of all treaties, the abolition of the foreign 
post-offices, the unilateral decision to abrogate the 
capitulations — all these straws show in which direc- 
tion the wind is blowing on the Bosphorus. A suc- 
cessful termination of the German campaign in 
France, which at this writing seems most improbable 
(in spite of the fact that the Germans are at Com- 
piegne and their aeroplanes pay us daily visits), 
would certainly draw Turkey into the war — and to 
her ruin. 

On the other hand, the German reliance upon 
embarrassing the French and British in their Moslem 
colonies through posing as the defenders of Islam 
and Islam's Khalif has not been well-founded. On 

•October, 1914. 69 



THE NEW MAP OP EUROPE 

the battlefield of France, thousands of followers of 
Mohammed from Africa and Asia are fighting loyally 
under the flags of the Allies. The Kaiser, for all his 
dreams and hopes, has not succeeded in getting a 
single Mohammedan to draw his sword for the com- 
bined causes of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Islamism. 
Have the three hundred million Moslems forgotten 
the declaration of Damascus? 

In seeking for the causes of the present conflict, it 
is impossible to neglect Germany in the Ottoman 
Empire. As one looks up at Pera from the Bos- 
phorus, the most imposing building on the hill is the 
German Embassy. It dominates Constantinople. 
There has been woven the web that has resulted in 
putting Germany in the place of Great Britain to 
prevent the Russian advance to the Dardanelles, 
in putting Germany in the place of Russia to threaten 
the British occupation of India and the trade route 
to India, and in putting Germany in the place of 
Great Britain as the stubborn opponent of the com- 
pletion of the African Empire of France. The most 
conspicuous thread of the web is the Bagdadbahn. 
In the intrigues of Constantinople, we see develop 
the political evolution of the past generation, and the 
series of events that made inevitable the European 
war of 1914. 



70 



CHAPTER IV 
ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR 

IN 1904, an accord was made between Great Bri- 
tain and France in regard to colonial policy in 
northern Africa. Great Britain recognized the 
" special" interests of France in Morocco in exchange 
for French recognition of Great Britain's "special" 
interests in Egypt. There was a promise to defend 
each other in the protection of these interests, but 
no actual agreement to carry this defence beyond 
the exercise of diplomatic pressure. The accord 
was a secret one. Its exact terms were not known 
until the incident of Agadir made necessary its 
publication in November, 191 1. 

But that there was an accord was known to all the 
world. Germany, who had long been looking with 
alarm upon the extension of French influence in 
Morocco, found in 1905 a favourable moment for 
protest. Russia had suffered humiliation and defeat 
in her war with Japan. Neither in a military nor a 
financial way was she at that moment a factor to 
be reckoned with in support of France. Great 
Britain had not recovered from the disasters to her 
military organization of the South African campaign. 
Her domestic politics were in a chaotic state. The 

7i 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Conservative Ministry was losing ground daily in 
bye elections; the Irish question was coming to the 
front again. 

German intervention in Morocco was sudden and 
theatrical. On March 31, 1905, a date of far-reach- 
ing importance in history, Emperor William entered 
the harbour of Tangier upon his yacht, the Hohen- 
zollern. When he disembarked, he gave the cue to 
German policy by saluting the representative of the 
Sultan, with peculiar emphasis, as the representative 
of an independent sovereign. Then, turning to the 
German residents in Morocco who had gathered to 
meet him, he said: "I am happy to greet in you the 
devoted pioneers of German industry and commerce, 
who are aiding in the task of keeping always in a 
high position, in a free land, the interests of the 
mother country." 

The repercussion of this visit to Tangier in France 
and in Great Britain was electrical. It seemed to be, 
and was, a direct challenge on the part of Germany 
for a share in shaping the destinies of Morocco. It 
was an answer to the Anglo-French accord, in which 
Germany had been ignored. Great Britain was in no 
position to go beyond mere words in the standing 
behind France. France knew this. So did Ger- 
many. After several months of fruitless negotia- 
tions between Berlin and Paris, on June 6th, it was 
made plain to France that there must be a conference 
on the Moroccan question. 

M. Delcasse, at that time directing with consum- 
mate skill and courage the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
urged upon the Cabinet the necessity for accepting 

72 



ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR 

Germany's challenge. But the Cabinet, after hear- 
ing the sorrowful confessions of the Ministers of 
War and Navy, and learning that France was not 
ready to fight, refused to accept the advice of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. M. Delcasse resigned. 
A blow had been struck at French prestige. 

For six months the crisis continued in an acute 
stage. The chauvinistic — or shall we say, patriotic? 
— elements were determined to withstand what they 
called the Kaiser's interference in the domestic affairs 
of France. But France seemed isolated at that mo- 
ment, and prudence was the part of wisdom. M. 
Rouvier declared to the Chamber of Deputies on 
December 16th : " France cannot be without a Moroc- 
can policy, for the form and direction which the evolu- 
tion of Morocco will take in the future will influence 
in a decisive manner the destinies of our North Afri- 
can possessions." France agreed to a conference, but 
won from Germany the concession that France's 
special interests and rights in Morocco would be 
admitted as the basis of the work of the conference. 

On January 17, 1906, a conference of European 
States, to which the United States of America was 
admitted, met to decide the international status of 
Morocco. For some time the attitude of the Ger- 
man delegates was uncompromising. They main- 
tained the Kaiser's thesis as set forth at Algiers: the 
complete independence of Morocco, and sovereignty 
of her Sultan. But they finally yielded, and ac- 
knowledged the right of France and Spain to organize 
in Morocco an international police. 

The Convention was signed on April 7th. It 

73 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

provided for: (i) police under the sovereign authority 
of the Sultan, recruited from Moorish Moslems, and 
distributed in the eight open ports; (2) Spanish and 
French officers, placed at his disposal by their govern- 
ments, to assist the Sultan ; (3) limitation of the total 
effective of this police force from two thousand to 
two thousand five hundred, of French and Spanish 
officers, commissioned sixteen to twenty, and non- 
commissioned thirty to forty, appointed for five 
years; (4) an Inspector General, a high officer of 
the Swiss army, chosen subject to the approval of 
the Sultan, with residence at Tangier; (5) a State 
Bank of Morocco, in which each of the signatory 
Powers had the right to subscribe capital; (6) the 
right of foreigners to acquire property, and to build 
upon it, in any part of Morocco; (7) France's ex- 
clusive right to enforce regulations in the frontier 
region of Algeria and a similar right to Spain in the 
frontier region of Spain; (8) the preservation of the 
public services of the Empire from alienation for 
private interests. 

Chancellor von Billow's speech in the Reichstag 
on April 5, 1906, was a justification of Germany's 
attitude. It showed that the policy of Wilhelm- 
strasse had been far from bellicose, and that Ger- 
many's demands were altogether reasonable. The 
time had come, declared the Chancellor, when 
German interests in the remaining independent 
portions of Africa and Asia must be considered by 
Europe. In going to Tangier and in forcing the 
conference of Algeciras, Germany had laid down the 
principle that there must be equal opportunities for 

74 



ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR 

Germans in independent countries, and had demon- 
strated that she was prepared to enforce this principle. 

When one considers the remarkable growth in 
population, and the industrial and maritime evolu- 
tion of Germany, this attitude cannot be wondered 
at, much less condemned. Germany, deprived by 
her late entrance among nations of fruitful colonies, 
was finding it necessary to adopt and uphold the 
policy of trying to prevent the pre-emption, for the 
benefit of her rivals, of those portions of the world 
which were still free. 

Neither France nor Spain had any feeling of 
loyalty toward the Convention of Algeciras. How- 
ever much may have been written to prove this 
loyalty, the facts of the few years following Algeciras 
are convincing. After 1908, Spain provoked and 
led on by the tremendous expenditures entailed 
upon her by the Riff campaigns began to consider 
the region of Morocco in which she was installed as 
exclusively Spanish territory. French writers have 
expended much energy and ingenuity in proving 
the disinterestedness of French efforts to enforce 
loyally the decisions of Algeciras. But they have 
explained, they have protested, too much. There 
has never been a moment that France has not dreamt 
of the completion of the vast colonial empire in 
North Africa by the inclusion of Morocco. It has 
been the goal for which all her military and civil 
administrations in Algeria and the Sahara have been 
working. To bring about the downfall of the 
Sultan's authority, not only press campaigns were 
undertaken, but anarchy on the Algerian frontier 

75 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

was allowed to go on unchecked, until military 
measures seemed justifiable. 

In a similar way, the German colonists of Morocco 
did their best to bring about another intervention 
by Germany. Their methods were so despicable 
and outrageous that they had frequently to be dis- 
avowed officially. In 1910, the German Foreign 
Office found the claims of Mannesmann Brothers 
to certain mining privileges invalid, because they 
did not fulfil the requirements of the Act of Alge- 
ciras. But the Mannesmann mining group, as 
well as other German enterprises in Morocco, were 
secretly encouraged to make all the trouble they 
could for the French, while defending the authority 
of the Sultan. The Casablanca incident is only one 
of numerous affronts which the French were asked 
to swallow. 

Great Britain had her part, though not through 
official agents, in the intrigues. There is much 
food for thought in the motives that may, not with- 
out reason, be imputed to the publication in the 
Times of a series of accounts on Moroccan anarchy, 
and on Muley Hafid's cruelties. 

In the spring of 191 1, it was realized everywhere 
in Europe that the Sultan's authority was even less 
than it had been in 1905. The Berber tribes were 
in arms on all sides. In March, accounts began to 
appear of danger at Fez, not only to European resi- 
dents, but also to the Sultan. The reports of the 
French Consul, and the telegrams of correspondents 
of two Paris newspapers, were most alarming. On 
April 2d, it was announced that the Berber tribes 

76 



ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR 

had actually attacked the city and were besieging 
it. Everything was prepared for the final act of the 
drama. 

A relief column of native troops under Major 
Bremond arrived in Fez on April 26th. The very 
next day, an urgent message for relief having been 
received from Colonel Mangin in Fez, Colonel Bru- 
lard started for the capital with another column. 
Without waiting for further word, a French army 
which had been carefully prepared for the purpose, 
entered Morocco under General Moinier. On May 
2 1 st, Fez was occupied by the French. They found 
that all was well there with the Europeans and with 
the natives. But, fortunately for the French plans, 
Muley Hafid's brother had set himself up at Mequi- 
nez as pretender to the throne. The Sultan could 
now retain his sovereignty only by putting himself 
under the protection of the French army. Morocco 
had lost her independence ! 

Germany made no objection to the French expedi- 
tionary corps in April. She certainly did not expect 
the quick succession of events in May which brought 
her face to face with the fait accompli of a strong 
French army in Fez. As soon as it was realized at 
Berlin that the fiction of Moroccan independence 
had been so skilfully terminated, France was asked 
"what compensation she would give to Germany 
in return for a free hand in Morocco." The pour- 
parlers dragged on through several weeks in June. 
France refused to acknowledge any ground for com- 
pensation to Germany. She maintained that the 
recent action in Morocco had been at the request 

77 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

of the Sultan, and that it was a matter entirely 
between him and France. 

Germany saw that a bold stroke was necessary. 
On July 1st, the gunboat Panther went to Agadir, 
a port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. To Great 
Britain and to France, the dispatch of the Panther 
was represented as due to the necessity of protecting 
German interests, seeing that there was anarchy in 
that part of Morocco. But the German news- 
papers, even those which were supposed to have 
official relations with Wilhelmstrasse, spoke as if 
a demand for the cession of Mogador or some 
other portion of Morocco was contemplated. The 
Chancellor explained to the Reichstag that the 
sending of the Panther was "to show the world 
that Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed 
to one side." 

But in the negotiations through the German 
Ambassador in Paris, it was clear that Germany 
was playing a game of political blackmail. The Ger- 
man Foreign Office shifted its claims from Morocco 
to concessions in Central Africa. On July 15th, 
Germany asked for the whole of the French Congo 
from the sea to the River Sanga, and a renunciation 
in her favour of France's contingent claims to the 
succession of the Belgian Congo. The reason given 
to this demand was, that if Morocco were to pass 
under a French protectorate, it was only just that 
compensation should be given to Germany else- 
where. France, for the moment, hesitated. She 
definitely refused to entertain the idea of compensa- 
tion as soon as she had received the assurance of the 

78 



ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR 

aid of Great Britain in supporting her against the 
German claims. 

On July ist, the German Ambassador had noti- 
fied Sir Edward Grey of the dispatch of the Panther 
to Agadir "in response to the demand for protection 
from German firms there," and explained that 
Germany considered the question of Morocco re- 
opened by the French occupation of Fez, and thought 
that it would be possible to make an agreement with 
Spain and France for the partition of Morocco. 
On July 4th, Sir Edward Grey, after a consultation 
with the Cabinet, answered that Great Britain could 
recognize no change in Morocco without consulting 
France, to whom she was bound by treaty. The 
Ambassador then explained that his Government 
would not consider the reopening of the question in 
a European conference, that it was a matter directly 
between Germany and France, and that his overture 
to Sir Edward Grey had been merely in the nature 
of a friendly explanation. 

Germany believed that the constitutional crisis 
in Great Britain was so serious that the hands of 
the Liberal Cabinet would be tied, and that they 
would not be so foolhardy as to back up France at 
the moment when they themselves were being so 
bitterly assailed by the most influential elements of 
the British electorate on the question of limiting 
the veto power of the House of Lords. It was in 
this belief that Germany on July 15th asked for 
territorial cessions from France in Central Africa. 
Wilhelmstrasse thought the moment well chosen, 
and that there was every hope of success. 

79 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

But the German mentality has never seemed to 
appreciate the frequent lesson of history, that the 
British people are able to distinguish clearly between 
matters of internal and external policy. Bitterly 
assailed as a traitor to his country because he ad- 
vocates certain changes of laws, a British Cabinet 
Minister can still be conscious of the fact that his 
bitterest opponents will rally around him when he 
takes a stand on a matter of foreign policy. This 
knowledge of admirable national solidarity enabled 
Mr. Lloyd George on July 21st, the very day on 
which the King gave his consent to the creation of 
new peers to bring the House of Lords to reason, at 
a Mansion House banquet, to warn Germany against 
the danger of pressing her demands upon France. 
The effect, both in London and Paris, was to unify 
and strengthen resistance. It seemed as if the Pan- 
ther's visit to Agadir had put Germany in the unen- 
viable position of having made a threat which she 
could not enforce. 

But the ways of diplomacy are tortuous. Through- 
out August and September, Germany blustered and 
threatened. In September, several events hap- 
pened which seemed to embarrass Russia and tie 
her hands, as in the first Moroccan imbroglio of 
1905. For Premier Stolypin was assassinated at 
Kiev on September 14th; the United States de- 
nounced its commercial treaty with Russia on ac- 
count of the question of Jewish passports; and the 
Shuster affair in Persia occupied the serious atten- 
tion of Russian diplomacy. Had it not been for 
the splendidly loyal and scrupulous attitude of the 

80 



ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR 

British Foreign Office towards Russia in the Persian 
question, Germany might have been tempted to 
force the issue with France. 

German demands grew more moderate, but were 
not abandoned. For members of the House of 
Commons, of the extreme Radical wing in the Liberal 
party, began to put the British Government in an 
uncomfortable position. Militarism, entangling al- 
liances with a continental Power, the necessity for 
agreement with Germany, — these were the subjects 
which found their way from the floor of the House 
of Commons to the public press. A portion of the 
Liberal party which had to be reckoned with be- 
lieved that Germany ought not to have been left 
out of the Anglo-French agreement. So serious 
was the dissatisfaction, that the Government deemed 
it necessary to make an explanation to the House. 
Sir Edward Grey explained and defended the action 
of the Cabinet in supporting the resistance of France 
to Germany's claims. The whole history of the 
negotiation was revealed. The Anglo-French agree- 
ment of 1904 was published for the first time, and 
it was seen that this agreement did not commit 
Great Britain to backing France by force of arms. 

Uncertainty of British support had the influence 
of bringing France to consent to treat with Germany 
on the Moroccan question. Two agreements were 
signed. By the first, Germany recognized the 
French protectorate in Morocco, subject to the 
adhesion of the signers of the Convention of Alge- 
ciras, and waived her right to take part in the nego- 
tiations concerning Moroccan spheres of influence 
6 81 



THE NEW MAP OP EUROPE 

between Spain and France. On her side, France 
agreed to maintain the open door in Morocco, and 
to refrain from any measures which would hinder 
the legitimate extension of German commercial and 
mining interests. By the second agreement, France 
ceded to Germany certain territories in the southern 
and eastern Cameroons, in return for German 
cessions. 

There was a stormy Parliamentary and newspaper 
discussion, both in France and Germany, over these 
two treaties. No one was satisfied. The treaties 
were finally ratified, but under protest. 

In France, the Ministry was subject to severe 
criticism. There was also some feeling of bitter- 
ness — perhaps a reaction from the satisfaction over 
Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech — in the 
uncertainty of Great Britain's support, as revealed 
by the November discussions in the House of Com- 
mons. This uncertainty remained, as far as French 
public opinion went, until Great Britain actually 
declared war upon Germany in August, 1914. 

In Germany, the Reichstag debates revealed the 
belief that the Agadir expedition had, on final ana- 
lysis, resulted in a fiasco. An astonishing amount 
of enmity against Great Britain was displayed. It 
was when Herr Heydebrand made a bitter speech 
against Great Britain, and denounced the pacific 
attitude of the German Government, in the Reichs- 
tag session of November 10th, that the Crown Prince 
made public his position in German foreign policy 
by applauding loudly. 

The aftermath of Agadir, as far as it affected 

82 



ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR 

Morocco, resulted in the establishment of the French 
Protectorate, on March 30, 1912. The Sultan 
signed away his independence by the Treaty of Fez. 
Foreign legations at Fez ceased to exist, although 
diplomatic officials were retained at Tangier. France 
voted the maintenance of forty thousand troops in 
Morocco "for the purposes of pacification." The 
last complications disappeared when, on November 
27th, a Franco-Spanish Treaty was signed at Ma- 
drid, in which the Spanish zones in Morocco were 
defined, and both states promised not to erect forti- 
fications or strategic works on the Moroccan coast. 
But the aftermath of Agadir in France and Ger- 
many has been an increase in naval and military 
armaments, and the creation of a spirit of tension 
which needed only the three years of war in the 
Ottoman Empire to bring about the inevitable clash 
between Teuton and Gaul. Taken in connection 
with the recent events in Alsace and Lorraine, and 
the voting of the law increasing military service in 
France to three years, the logical sequence of events 
is clear. 



83 



CHAPTER V 
THE PASSING OF PERSIA 

THE weakness of the Ottoman Empire and of 
Morocco served to bring the colonial and 
commercial aspiration of Germany into con- 
flict with other nations of Europe. The recent 
fortunes of Persia, the third — and only other — 
independent Mohammedan state, have also helped 
to make possible the general European war. 

The first decade of the twentieth century brought 
about in Persia, as in Turkey, the rise of a constitu- 
tional party, which was able to force a despotic 
sovereign to grant a constitution. The Young 
Persians had in many respects a history similar to 
that of the Young Turks. They were for the most 
part members of influential families, who had been 
educated in Europe, or had been sent into exile. 
They had imbibed deeply the spirit of the French 
Revolution from their reading, and had at the same 
time developed a narrow and intense nationalism. 
But to support their revolutionary propaganda, 
they had allied themselves during the period of dark- 
ness with the Armenians and other non-Moslems. 
As Salonika, a city by no means Turkish, was the 
foyer of the young Turk movement, so Tabriz, 

84 



THE PASSING OF PERSIA 

capital of the Azerbaidjan, a city by no means 
Persian, was the centre of the opposition to Persian 
despotism. 

Young Turks, Young Persians, Young Egyptians, 
Young Indians, and Young Chinese have shown to 
Europe and America the peril — and the pity — of our 
western and Christian education, when it is given to 
eastern and non-Christian students. They are born 
into the intellectual life with our ideas and are 
inspired by our ideals, but have none of the back- 
ground, none of the inheritance of our national 
atmosphere and our family training to enable them 
to live up to the standards we have put before them. 
Their disillusionment is bitter. They resent our 
attitude of superiority. They hate us, even though 
they feign to admire us. Their jealousy of our 
institutions leads them to console themselves by 
singling out and forcing themselves to see only the 
weak and vulnerable points in our civilization. 
Educated in our universities, they return to their 
countries to conspire against us. The illiterate and 
simple Oriental, who has never travelled, is fre- 
quently the model of fidelity and loyalty and af- 
fection to his Occidental master or friend. But no 
educated non-Christian Oriental, who has travelled 
and studied and lived on terms of equality with 
Europeans or Americans in Europe or America, can 
ever be a sincere friend. The common result of 
social contact and intellectual companionship is that 
he becomes a foe, — and conceals the fact. Famil- 
iarity has bred more than contempt. 

The Young Persians would have no European 

85 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

aid. They waited, and suffered. Finally, after a 
particularly bad year from the standpoint of finan- 
cial exactions, the Moslem clergy of the North were 
drawn into the Young Persia movement. A revolu- 
tion, in which the Mohammedan mullahs took part, 
compelled the dying Shah, Muzaffereddin, to issue 
a decree ordering the convocation of a medjliss (com- 
mittee of notables) on August 5, 1906. This impro- 
vised Parliament, composed only of delegates of the 
provinces nearest the capital, drafted a constitution 
which was promulgated on New Year's Day, 1907. 
The following week, Muzaffereddin died and was 
succeeded by his son, Mohammed Ali Mirza, a 
reactionary of the worst type. 

Mohammed Ali had no intention of putting the 
Constitution into force. A serious revolution broke 
out in Tabriz a few weeks after his accession. He 
was compelled to acknowledge the Constitution 
granted by his father. In order to nullify its effect, 
however, the new Shah called to the Grand Vizierate 
the exiled Ali Asgar Khan, whom he believed to be 
strong enough to overrule the wishes of the Parlia- 
ment. The Constitutionalists formed a society of 
fedavis to prevent the return to absolutism. At their 
instigation, Ali Asgar Khan was assassinated. The 
country fell into an anarchic state. 

Constitutional Persia, as much because of the 
inexperience of the Constitutionalists as of the ill- 
will of the Shah, was worse off than under the despot- 
ism of Muzaffereddin. There was no money in the 
treasury. The peasants would not pay their taxes. 
One can hardly blame them, for not a cent of the 

86 



THE PASSING OF PERSIA 

money ever went for local improvements or local 
government. Throughout Persia, even in the cities, 
life was unsafe. The Persians, no more than the 
Turks, could call forth from the ranks of their enthu- 
siasts a progressive and fearless statesman of the 
type of Stambuloff or Venizelos. In their Parlia- 
ment they all talked at once. None was willing to 
listen to his neighbour. It may have been because 
there was no Mirabeau. But could a Mirabeau 
have overcome the fatal defects of the Mohammedan 
training and character that made the Young Persians 
incapable of realizing the constitutionalism of their 
dreams? Every man was suspicious and jealous of 
his neighbour. Every man wanted to lead, and none 
to be led. Every man wanted power without respon- 
sibility, prestige without work, success without 
sacrifice. 

It was at this moment that one of the most signi- 
ficant events of contemporary times was helped to 
fruition by the state of affairs in Persia. Great 
Britain and Russia, rivals — even enemies — in west- 
ern and central Asia, signed a convention. Their 
conflicting ambitions were amicably compromised. 
Along with the questions of Afghanistan and Thibet, 
this accord settled the rivalry that had done much 
to keep Persia a hotbed of diplomatic intrigue like 
Macedonia ever since the Crimean War. 

In regard to Persia, the two Powers solemnly 
swore to respect its integrity and its independence, 
and then went on to sign its death warrant, by agree- 
ing upon the question of "the spheres of influence." 
In spite of all sophisms, this convention marked the 

87 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

passing of Persia as an independent state. Persia is 
worse off than Morocco and Egypt. For one master 
is better than two! 

Here enters Germany. For many years German 
merchants had looked upon Persia as they looked 
upon Morocco and Turkey. Here were the legiti- 
mate fields for commercial expansion. Probably 
there were also dreams of political advantages to 
be gained later. In their dealings with the three 
Moslem countries that were still "unprotected" 
when they inaugurated their Weltpolitik, the Germans 
had been attentive students of British policy in the 
days of her first entry into India and to Egypt. 
There were many Germans who honestly believed 
that their activities in these independent Moslem 
countries would only give them "their place under 
the sun," and a legitimate field for the overflow of 
their population and national energy, but that it 
would also be a distinct advantage to the peace of 
the world. Great Britain and Russia and France 
had already divided up between them the larger 
part of Asia and Africa. In the process, Great 
Britain had recently come almost to blows with both 
her rivals. If Germany stepped in between them, 
would this not prevent a future conflict? But the 
rivals "divided up." Germany was left out in the 
cold. It is not a very far cry from Teheran and 
Koweit and Fez to Liege and Brussels and Antwerp. 
Belgium is paying the bill. 

The Anglo- Russian convention of August 31, 
1907, was the first of three doors slammed in Ger- 
many's face. The Anglo-French convention of May 

88 



THE PASSING OF PERSIA 

8, 1904, had been an attempt to do this. But by 
Emperor William's visit to Tangiers in 1905, Ger- 
many got in her foot before the door was closed! 
In Persia there was no way that she could in- 
tervene directly to demand that Great Britain and 
Russia bring their accord before an international 
congress. 

Germany began to work in Persia through two 
agencies. She incited Turkey to cross the frontier 
of the Azerbaidjan, and to make the perfectly reason- 
able request that the third limitrophe state should 
be taken into the pourparlers which were deciding 
the future of Persia. Then she sent her agents 
among the Nationalists, and showed them how ter- 
rible a blow this convention was to their new consti- 
tutionalism. Just at the moment when they had 
entered upon a constitutional life, Great Britain 
and Russia had conspired against their independence, 
went the German thesis. 

If only there had been a sincerity for the Consti- 
tution in the heart of the Shah, and an ability to 
establish a really constitutional regime in the leaders 
of Young Persia, the Anglo-Russian accord might 
have proved of no value. But — unfortunately for 
Persia and for Germany — the Shah, worked upon 
skilfully by Russian emissaries and by members of 
his entourage, who were paid by Russian gold, at- 
tempted a coup oVetat against the Parliament in 
December, 1907. He failed to carry it through. 
With a smile on his lips and rage in his heart, he once 
more went through the farce of swearing to be a good 
constitutional ruler. But in June, 1908, he succeeded 

89 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

in dispersing the Parliament by bombarding the 
palace in which it sat. 

It would be wearisome to go into the story of the 
revolts and anarchy in all parts of Persia in 1908 
and 1909. After a year of righting and Oriental 
promises, of solemn oaths and the breaking of them, 
the constitutionalists finally drove Mohammed Ali 
from Teheran in July, 1909. The Shah saved his 
life by taking refuge in the Russian legation. A 
few days later, he took the road to exile. He has 
since reappeared in Persia twice to stir up trouble 
in the north. On both occasions, it was when the 
Russians were rinding it hard to justify their con- 
tinued occupation of the northern provinces. 

Mohammed Ali was succeeded by his son Ali 
Mirza, a boy of eleven years, who was still too young 
to be anything more than a mere plaything in the 
hands of successive regents. 

The civil strife in Persia gave Great Britain and 
Russia the excuse for entering the country. In 
accord with Great Britain, Russia sent an expedition 
to occupy Tabriz on April 29, 1909. Later, Russian 
troops occupied Ardebil, Recht, Kazvin, and other 
cities in the Russian sphere of influence. Owing to 
the anarchy in the south during 1910, Great Britain 
prepared to send troops "to protect the safety of the 
roads for merchants." This was not actually done, 
for conditions of travel slightly ameliorated. But 
Persia has rested since under the menace of a British 
occupation. 

Every effort made to bring order out of chaos in 
Persia has failed. Serious attempts at financial 

90 






THE PASSING OF PERSIA 

reform were undertaken by an American mission, 
under the direction of a former American official 
in the Philippine Islands. This mission failed, and 
only increased the humiliation of the Persian Govern- 
ment. The American Treasurer- General had more 
zeal than common sense. He failed to recognize 
the fact that the Anglo-Russian accord of 1907 was 
more than a mere bit of writing. The sphere of 
influence had become far from imaginary. One 
day in the summer of 191 1, I was walking along the 
Galata Quay in Constantinople. I heard my name 
called from the deck of a vessel just about to leave 
for Batum. Perched on top of two boxes containing 
typewriters, was a young American from Boston, 
who was going out to help reform the finances of 
Persia. I had talked to him the day before concern- 
ing the extreme delicacy and difficulty of the task 
of the mission whose secretary he was. But his 
refusal to admit the political limitations of Oriental 
peoples made it impossible for him to see that con- 
stitutional Persia was any different, or should be 
treated any differently, from constitutional Massa- 
chusetts. From the sequel of the story, it would 
seem that the chief of the mission had the same 
attitude of mind as his secretary. The American 
Treasurer- General was dismissed because he refused 
to accept the reality of the Anglo-Russian accord. 

When Germany saw that the Russian troops had 
entered northern Persia with the consent of Great 
Britain, and had come to stay, there was nothing 
for her to do but to treat with Russia. 

In November, 19 10, when the Czar was visiting 

9i 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

the Kaiser, Russian and German ministers exchanged 
views concerning the ground upon which Germany 
would agree to the fait accompli of Russia's exclusive 
political interests in Northern Persia, and the Russian 
military occupation. Satisfactory bases were found 
for an agreement between Russia and Germany 
concerning their respective interests in Persia and 
Asiatic Turkey. The Accord of Potsdam, as it is 
called, was made in the form of a note presented by 
the Russian Government to Germany, and accepted 
by her. Russia declared that she would in no way 
oppose the realization of the project of the Bagdad 
railway up to the Persian Gulf, and that she would 
construct to the border of Persia a railway to join a 
spur of the Bagdad railway from Sadije to Khanikin. 
In return for this, Germany was to promise not to 
construct railway lines outside of the Bagdad railway 
zone, to declare that she had no political interest 
in Persia, and to recognize that "Russia has special 
interests in Northern Persia from the political, 
strategic, and economic points of view." The Ger- 
man Government was to abandon any intention of 
securing a concession for a trans-Persian railway. 
On the other hand, Russia promised to maintain in 
Northern Persia the "open door," so that German 
commercial interests should not be injured. 

The accord between Russia and Germany was 
badly received everywhere. France feared that 
Germany was trying to weaken the Franco-Russian 
alliance. Great Britain did not look with favour 
upon a recognition by Russia of German interests 
in Asiatic Turkey. The Sublime Porte felt that 

92 



THE PASSING OF PERSIA 

Russia and Germany had shown a disregard for the 
elementary principles of courtesy in discussing and 
deciding questions that were of tremendous import- 
ance to the future of Turkey without inviting the 
Sublime Porte to take part in the negotiations. 
Turkey in the Potsdam accord was ignored as com- 
pletely as Morocco had been in the Algeciras Con- 
vention and Persia in the Russo-British accord. 

The Potsdam stipulations brought prominently 
before Europe the possible significance of Germany's 
free hand in Anatolian and Mesopotamian railway 
constructions. It also aroused interest in the pos- 
sibility of an all-rail route from Calais to Calcutta, 
in which all the Great Powers except Italy would 
participate. 

The trans-Persian and all other railway schemes 
in Persia came to nothing. Between 1872 and 1890 
twelve district railway projects had received con- 
cessions from the Persian Government. One of 
these, the Reuter group, actually started the con- 
struction of a line from the Caspian Sea to the Persian 
Gulf. A French project for a railway from Trebizond 
to Tabriz had gained powerful financial support. 
All these schemes were frustrated by Russian diplo- 
macy. In 1890, Russia secured from the Persian 
Government the exclusive right for twenty-one years 
to construct railways in Northern Persia. Needless 
to say, no lines were built. Russia had all she could 
do with her trans-Siberian and trans-Caucasian 
schemes. But she deliberately acted the dog in 
the manger. By preventing private groups from 
building railways in Persia which she would not 

93 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

build herself, Russia has retarded the economic pro- 
gress, and is largely responsible for the financial, mili- 
tary, and administrative weakness, of contemporary 
Persia. By the accords of 1907 with Great Britain 
and 191 1 with Germany, Russia secured their con- 
nivance in still longer continuing this shameful 
stagnation. To this day no railroad has been built 
in the Shah's dominions. 

Just a month before the outbreak ot the European 
war, the boy Shah of Persia was solemnly crowned 
at Teheran. It was an imposing and pathetic cere- 
mony. The Russians and British saw to it that 
full honour should be given to the sovereign of 
Persia. The pathos of the event was in the fact 
that the Russian and British legations at Teheran 
paid the expenses of the coronation. The Shah 
received his crown from the hands of his despoilers. 
A similar farce was enacted a little while before in 
Morocco. Turkey alone of Moslem nations remains. 

The last effort of Persia to shake off the Russian 
octopus was made on October 8, 19 14, when Russia 
was requested once more to withdraw her troops from 
the Azerbaidjan. The Russian Minister at Teheran, 
without going through the form of referring the 
request to Petrograd, answered that the interests 
of Russia and other foreign countries could be safe- 
guarded only by the continued occupation. To this 
response his British colleague gave hearty assent. 

The importance of the passing of Persia is two- 
fold. It shows how in one more direction Germany 
found herself shut out from a possible field of expan- 
sion. Through the weakness of Persia, Great Britain 

94 



THE PASSING OP PERSIA 

and Russia, after fifty years of bitter struggle, were 
able to come to a satisfactory compromise. It was 
in Persia that their animosity was buried, and that 
co-operation of British democracy and Russian 
autocracy in a war against Germany was first en- 
visaged. The failure of the Persian constitutional 
Government was a tremendous blow to Germany. 
It strengthened the bases of the Triple Entente. 
For the events of 1908 and 1909 put the accord to 
severe test, and proved that it was built upon a 
solid foundation. The agony of one people is often 
the joy of another. Has Persia suffered vicariously 
that France may be saved? 



95 



CHAPTER VI 
THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES* 

WHEN Russia, Austria, and Prussia parti- 
tioned Poland at the end of the eighteenth 
century, there were at the most six million 
Poles in the vast territory stretching from the Baltic 
nearly to the Black Sea. Of these a large number, 
especially in Eastern Prussia and in Silesia, had 
already lost their sense of nationality. Poland was 
a country of feudal nobles, whose inability to group 
under a dynasty for the formation of a modern 
state, made the disappearance of the kingdom an 
inexorable necessity in the economic evolution of 
Europe, and of ignorant peasants, who were indiffer- 
ent concerning the political status of the land in 
which they lived. 

To-day there are twenty million Poles. Although 
they owe allegiance to three different sovereigns, 
they are more united than ever in their history. 
For their national feeling has developed in just the 
same way that the national feeling of Germans and 
Russians has developed, by education primarily, 
and by that remarkable tendency of industrialism, 

*This chapter has not been written without giving consideration 
to the Russian point of view. There is an excellent book on Russia 
since the Japanese War (from 1906 to 191 2) by Peter Polejaieff. 

96 



THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 

which has grouped people in cities, and brought 
them into closer association. This influence of city 
life upon the destinies of Poland comes to us with 
peculiar force when we realize that since the last 
map of Europe was made Warsaw has grown from 
forty thousand to eight hundred thousand, Lodz 
from one thousand to four hundred thousand, Posen 
from a few hundreds to one hundred and fifty 
thousand, Lemberg and Cracow from less than ten 
thousand to two hundred thousand and one hundred 
and fifty thousand respectively. These great cities 
(except Lodz, which Russia foolishly allowed to be- 
come an outpost of Pan-Germanism in the heart of a 
Slavic population, are the foyers of Polish nationalism. 
The second and third dismemberments of Poland 
(1793 and 1795) were soon annulled by the Napo- 
leonic upheaval. The larger portion of Poland 
was revived in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The 
Congress of Vienna, just one hundred years ago, 
made what the representatives of the partitioning 
Powers hoped would be a definite redistribution of 
the unwelcome ghost stirred up by Napoleon. Poz- 
nania was returned to Prussia, and in the western 
end of Galicia a Republic of Cracow was created. 
The greater portion of Poland reverted to Russia, 
not as conquered territory, but as a separate state, of 
which the Czar assumed the kingship and swore to 
preserve the liberties. The unhappiness, the unrest, 
the agitation, among the Poles of the Muscovite 
Empire, just as among the Finns, came from the 
breaking of the promises by Russia to Europe when 
these subjects of alien races were allotted to her. 
7 97 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

The story of modern Poland is not different from 
that of any other nationalistic movement. A sense 
of nationality and a desire for racial political unity 
are not the phenomena which have been the under- 
lying causes of the evolution of Europe since the 
Congress of Vienna. In Italy, in Germany, in 
Poland, in Alsace-Lorraine, in Finland, among the 
various races of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
the Balkan Peninsula, as well as in Turkey and 
Persia, the underlying cause of political agitation, 
of rebellions and of revolutions has been the desire 
to secure freedom from absolutism. Nationalism 
is simply the tangible outward manifestation of the 
growth of democracy. There are few national move- 
ments where separatism could not have been avoided 
by granting local self-government. Mixed popula- 
tions can live together under the same government 
without friction, if the lesser races are granted social, 
economic, and political equality. But nations that 
have achieved their own unity and independence 
through devotion to a nationalistic movement have 
shown no mercy or wisdom with smaller and less fortu- 
nate races under their domination. The very methods 
that European statesmen have fondly believed were 
necessary for assimilation have proved fatal to it. 

The Polish question, as we understand it to-day, 
has little connection with the Polish revolutions of 
1830 and of 1863. These movements against the 
Russian Government were conducted by the same 
elements of protest against autocracy that were at 
work in the larger cities and universities throughout 
Europe during the middle of the nineteenth century. 

98 



THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 

Nationalism was the reason given rather than the 
cause that prompted. The revolutions were un- 
successful because they were not supported by the 
nation. The mass of the people were indifferent to 
the cause, just as in other countries similar revolu- 
tions against despotism failed for lack of real support. 
The apathy of the masses has always been the bul- 
wark of defence for autocracy and reactionary poli- 
cies. Popular rights do not come to people until 
the masses demand them. Education alone brings 
self-government. This is the history of the evolution 
of modern Europe. 

The Poles as a nation began to worry their parti- 
tioned in the decade following the last unsuccess- 
ful revolution against Russia. To understand the 
contemporary phases of the Polish question, it is 
necessary for us to follow first its three-fold develop- 
ment, as a question of internal policy in Russia, 
Germany, and Austria. Only then is its significance 
as an international question clear. 

THE POLES SINCE 1 864 IN RUSSIA 

The troubles of Russia in her relationship to the 
Poles have come largely from the fact that the distinc- 
tion between Poland proper, inhabited by Poles, and 
the provinces which the Jagellons conquered but 
never assimilated, was not grasped by the statesmen 
who had to deal with the aftermath of the revolu- 
tion. What was possible in one was thought to be 
possible in the other. What was vital in one was 
believed to be vital in the other. In the kingdom 

99 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

of Poland, as it was bestowed upon the Russian 
Czar by the Congress of Vienna, there were massed 
ten million Poles who could be neither exterminated 
nor exiled. Nor was there a sound motive for at- 
tempting to destroy their national life. The king- 
dom of Poland was not an essential portion of the 
Russian Empire, and was not vitally bound to 
the fortunes of the Empire. So unessential has the 
kingdom of Poland been to Russia, and so fraught 
with the possibilities of weakness to its owner, that 
patriotic and far-sighted Russian publicists have 
advocated its complete autonomy, its independence 
or its cession to Germany. Because it was limi- 
trophe to the territories occupied by the Poles of the 
other partitioners, there was constantly danger of 
weakening the defences of the empire and of inter- 
national complications. Through failing to treat 
these Poles in such a way that they would be a loyal 
bulwark against her enemies, Russia has done irre- 
parable harm to herself as well as to them. 

The Polish question in Lithuania, Podolia, and 
the Ukraine was a totally different matter. These 
provinces had been added to Russia in her logical 
development towards the west and the south-west. 
Their possession was absolutely essential to the ex- 
istence of the Empire. Their population was not 
Polish, but Lithuanian, Ruthenian, and Russian. 
From the Baltic to the Black Sea, the acquisition 
of these territories made possible the entrance of 
Russia into the concert of European nations. They 
had been conquered by Poland during the period of 
her greatness, and had naturally been lost by her 

ioo 



THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 

when she became weak. In these portions of Greater 
Poland, the Poles were limited to the landowning 
class, and to the more prosperous artisans in the 
cities and villages. They were the residue of an 
earlier conquering race that had never assimilated 
the country. They had abused their power, and 
were heartily disliked. These provinces were vital 
to Russia, and she was able to carry out the policy 
of uprooting the Poles. Their villages were burned, 
their fortunes and their lands confiscated, the landed 
proprietors deported to Siberia, and others so cruelly 
persecuted that, when their churches and schools 
were closed and they found themselves forbidden to 
speak their language outside of their own homes, 
they emigrated. In Lithuania, the Lithuanian lan- 
guage was also proscribed. The Russians had no 
intention of blotting out a Polish question in order 
to make place for a Lithuanian one. 

Where the Poles were few in number, these meas- 
ures, which were exactly the same as the Poles had 
employed themselves in the same territories several 
centuries before, were successful. The peasants 
were glad to see their traditional persecutors get a 
taste of their own medicine. It was not difficult 
to make these provinces Russian. They have 
gradually been assimilated into the Empire. In all 
fairness, one can hardly condemn the Russian point 
of view, as regards the Poles in Lithuania, Podolia, 
and the Ukraine. Only youthful Polish irredentists 
still dream of the restoration of the Empire of the 
Jagellons. 

In the kingdom of Poland, the situation was 

IOI 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

entirely different. This huge territory had been 
given to Russia by the Congress of Vienna upon the 
solemn assurance that it was to be governed as a 
separate kingdom by the Romanoffs. There was 
no thought in the Congress of Vienna of the disap- 
pearance of the Poles as a separate nationality from 
the map of Europe. But the autonomy of Poland 
was suppressed after the rebellion of 1830. 

After the rebellion of 1863, Russia tried to as- 
similate the kingdom of Poland as well as the 
Polish marches. The repression was so severe 
that Polish nationalism was considered dead. 
The peasants had been indifferent to the move- 
ment. Not only had they failed to support it, but 
they had frequently shown themselves actually hos- 
tile to it. 

It was because the nobles and priests were be- 
lieved to be leaders of nationalistic and separatist 
movements, not only in Poland but in other allo- 
geneous portions of the composite Empire, that 
Czar Alexander II emancipated the serfs. The 
policy of every autocratic government, when it 
meets the first symptoms of unrest in a subject race, 
is to strike at their church and their aristocracy. 
The most efficient way to weaken the power of the 
nobles is to strengthen the peasants. Alexander 
himself may have been actuated by motives of pure 
humanity, but his ministers would never have allowed 
the ukase to be promulgated, had they not seen in it 
the means of conquering the approaching revolution 
in Poland. For the moment it was an excellent 
move, and accomplished its purpose. The Polish 

102 



THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 

peasants were led to believe that the Czar was their 
father and friend and champion against the exactions 
of the church and landowner. Was not their emanci- 
pation proof of this? 

But in the long run the emancipation of the serfs 
proved fatal to Russian domination in Poland. For 
the advisers of Alexander had not realized that free- 
men would demand and attend schools, and that 
schools, no matter how careful the surveillance and 
restrictions might be, created democrats. Demo- 
crats would seize upon nationalism to express their 
aspiration for self-government. The emancipation 
of the serfs, launched as a measure to destroy Poland, 
has ended in making it. Emancipation created 
Polish patriots. It was a natural and inevitable 
result. The artificial aid of a governmental perse- 
cution helped and hastened this result. The Irish- 
man expressed a great truth when he said that there 
are things that are not what they are. 

A flock of hungry Russian functionaries descended 
upon Poland in 1864. They took possession of all 
departments of administration. The Polish lan- 
guage was used in courts only through an interpreter, 
and was forbidden as the medium of instruction 
in schools. No Polish signs were tolerated in the 
railways or post-offices. In the parts of the kingdom 
where there were bodies of the Lithuanians, their 
nationalism was encouraged, and they were shown 
many favours, in contradiction to the policy adopted 
towards the Lithuanians of Lithuania. Catholics 
who followed the Western Rite were forced to join 
the national church. There was a clear intention 

103 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

to assimilate as much as possible the populations of 
the border districts of Poland. 

After thirty years of repression, Russia had made 
no progress in Poland. In 1897, Prince Imeretinsky 
wrote to the Czar that the policy of the Government 
had failed. Polish national spirit, instead of dis- 
appearing, had spread remarkably among the peas- 
ant classes. The secret publication and importation 
of unauthorized journals and pamphlets had multi- 
plied. The number of cases brought before the 
courts for infraction of the "law of association," 
which forbade unlicensed public gatherings and 
clubs, had so increased that they could not be heard. 
Heavy fines and imprisonment seem to have had no 
deterring effect. 

Could Russia hope to struggle against the tenden- 
cies of modern life? Free press and free speech are 
the complement of education. When men learn to 
read, they learn to think, and can be reached by 
propaganda. When men increase in prosperity, 
they begin to want a voice in the expenditure of the 
money they have to pay for taxes. When men come 
together in the industrial life of large cities, they 
form associations. No government, no system of 
spies or terrorism, no laws can prevent propaganda 
in cities. From 1864 to 1914, the kingdom of Poland 
has become more Polish than ever before in her 
history. Instead of a few students and dreamers, 
fascinated by the past glories of their race, instead of 
a group of landowners and priests, thinking of their 
private interests and of the Church, there is awak- 
ened a spirit of protest against Russian des- 

104 



THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 

potism in the soul of a race become intelligently 
nationalistic. 

The issue between Russia and her Poles has be- 
come clearer, and for that reason decidedly worse, 
since the disastrous war with Japan. The Poles 
have demanded autonomy in the fullest sense of the 
word. The Russians have responded by showing 
that it is their intention to destroy Poland, just as 
they intend to destroy Finland. There is an analogy 
between the so-called constitutional regimes in Rus- 
sia and Turkey. In each Empire, the granting of a 
constitution was hailed with joy by the various races. 
These races, who had been centres of agitation, dis- 
loyalty, and weakness, were ready to co-operate with 
their governments in building up a large, broad, 
comprehensive, national life upon the principles of 
liberty, equality, and fraternity. But in both Em- 
pires, the dominant race let it soon be understood 
that the Constitution was to be used for a destructive 
policy of assimilation. In the Ottoman Empire, 
the Constitution was a weapon for destroying the 
national aspirations of subject races. In Russia 
it has been the same. 

After the Russo-Japanese War, Czar Nicholas 
and his ministers had their great opportunity to 
profit by the lessons of Manchuria. But the grant- 
ing of a constitution was a pure farce. Blind to 
the fact that the enlightened Poles were interested 
primarily in political reforms, and in securing equity 
and justice for the kingdom of Poland, instead of for 
the advancement of a narrow and theoretical nation- 
alistic ideal, the Russians repulsed the proffered 

105 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

loyalty of the Poles to a free and constitutional 
Russian Empire. In the second Duma, Dmowski and 
other Polish deputies unanimously voted the sup- 
plies for strengthening the Russian army. They 
stated that the Poles were willing to cast their lot 
loyally and indissolubly with constitutional Russia. 
Were they not brethren, and imbued with the same 
Pan-Slavic idea? Was it not logical to look to Russia 
as the defender of all the Slavs from Teutonic 
oppression? 

But Poland, like Finland, was to continue to be 
the victim of Russian bureaucracy and of an intoler- 
ant nationalism which the Russians were beginning 
to feel as keenly and as arrogantly as the Prussians. 
Is the Kaiser, embodying the evils of militarism, 
more obnoxious and more dangerous to civilization 
than the Czar, standing for the horrors of bureau- 
cratic despotism and absolutism? Have not the 
Armenian massacres, ordered from Constantinople, 
and the Jewish pogroms, ordered from Petrograd, 
associated Christian Czar with Mohammedan Sultan 
at the beginning of the twentieth century? 

The first deliberate violation of the integrity of 
the kingdom of Poland was sanctioned by the Russian 
Duma in the same session in which it approved 
violation of Russian obligations to Finland. A law 
separating Kholm from the kingdom of Poland was 
voted on July 6, 1912. The test of the law declared 
that Kholm was still to be regarded as a portion of 
the kingdom of Poland, but to be directly attached 
to the Ministry of the Interior without passing by 
the intermediary of the Governor- General of Warsaw; 

106 



THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 

and to preserve the Polish adaptation of the Code 
Napoleon for its legal administration, but to have 
its court of appeal at Kief. 

The elections of 191 3 from the kingdom of Poland 
to the Duma gave a decided setback to the party of 
Dmowski, who had so long and so ably pled for a 
policy of Pan-Slavism through accommodation with 
Russia. The law concerning Kholm had been the 
response of the Duma to Dmowski's olive branch. 
The moderates were discredited. But the failure 
of the radical nationalists to conciliate the Jewish 
element caused their candidates to lose both at 
Warsaw and Lodz. 

The birth of an anti-Semitic movement has been 
disastrous to Polish solidarity during recent years. 
The Polish nationalists suspected the Jews of work- 
ing either for German or Russian interests. They 
were expecially bitter against the Litvak, or Lithua- 
nian and south Russian Jews, who had been forced 
by Russia to establish themselves in the cities of 
Poland. Poland is one of the most important pales 
in the Empire. The Jewish population is one-fifth 
of the total, and enjoys both wealth and education 
in the cities. Their educated youth had been cour- 
ageous and forceful supporters of Polish nationalism. 
Before the Russian intrigues of the last decade and 
the introduction of these non-Polish Jews, there had 
never been a strong anti-Semitic feeling in Poland. 
The Polish protests against the encroachment of 
the Russians upon their national liberties have been 
greatly weakened by their antagonism to the Jews. 
The anti-Semitic movement, which has carried away 

107 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

both the moderate party of Dmowski and the radical 
nationalists, as was expected, has played into the 
hand of Russia. 

The Muscovite statesmen, while endeavouring to 
use the Balkan Wars for the amalgamation of south 
Slavic races under the wing of Russia against Austria 
have treated the Poles as if they were not Slavs. 
During 1913 and the first part of 1914, the policy 
of attempting to russianize the Poles has proved 
disastrous to their feeling of loyalty to the Empire. 
The government announced definitely that the 
kingdom of Poland would be "compensated" for the 
loss of Kholm by a law granting self-government to 
Polish cities. This promise has not been kept. 
The municipal self-government project presented to 
the Duma was as farcical in practical results as 
all democratic and liberal legislation which that 
impotent body has been asked to pass upon. 

THE POLES SINCE 1 867 IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

The disappearance of Austria from Germany after 
the battle of Sadowa led to the organization of a 
new state, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. We must 
divorce in our mind the Austria before 1867 from 
the Austria-Hungary of the Dual Monarchy. The 
political situation changed entirely when Austrians 
and Hungarians agreed to live together and share 
the Slavic territories of the Hapsburg Crown. Austria 
no longer had need of her Galicians to keep the 
Hungarians in check. But there was equally 
important work for them to do. 

108 



THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 

The Austrians have always treated the Poles very- 
well. Galicia, which had been Austria's share in 
the partition of Poland, was given local self-govern- 
ment, with its own Diet, and proper representation 
in the Austrian Reichsrath. Poles were admitted in 
generous numbers to the functions of the Empire. 

The Polish nationalists of Russia and Prussia feel 
very bitter about the indifference of the Galicians 
to the nation at large — or rather in captivity. They 
claim that the lack of national feeling among the 
Austrian Poles is due to the fact that they have 
been bribed by the Austrians to desert not only 
their brethren of Russia and of Prussia, but also 
their fellow-Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
I have heard this criticism ably and feelingly pre- 
sented, but I do not think it just. Since national 
aspirations are awakened and sustained by the effort 
to secure political equality and justice, the enjoy- 
ment of these takes away need or desire to plot 
against the Government. The Poles of Austria are 
like the French of Canada. Their nationalism is 
literary and religious in character. There is no 
reason for its being anti-governmental. 

Of late years, however, there has been a national 
Polish agitation in Galicia. It is directed not against 
the Government, but against the Ruthenians, who, 
to the number of three millions — nearly forty per 
cent, of the total population — inhabit the eastern 
section of Galicia. This local racial conflict, which 
has strengthened rather than weakened the attach- 
ment of the Poles to the Vienna Government, arose 
after the introduction of universal suffrage, when 

109 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

eastern Galicia began to send in large numbers 
Ruthenian deputies to the Galician Diet and to the 
Austrian Parliament. 

On April 12, 1908, Count Potocki was assassinated 
by a Ruthenian student, whose death sentence was 
commuted to twenty years' imprisonment. With 
the complicity of wardens, the assassin escaped from 
jail after three years. There has never been peace 
between the Poles and the Ruthenians since that 
time. After serious disorders at the University of 
Lemberg, where the Ruthenian students were treated 
disgracefully, Polish and Ruthenian leaders tried 
to find common ground for reconciliation in Decem- 
ber, 191 1. The Ruthenians demanded electoral 
reform with greater representation, and the creation 
of a Ruthenian university. The imperial govern- 
ment communicated to the representatives of the 
two nationalities the project of a decree of public 
instruction in Galicia in January, 1913. The project 
was a marvel of ingenuity. A Ruthenian university 
was to be established after four years, but if by 
October 1, 191 6, the law voting credits for it was 
not yet passed, a special school for Ruthenians 
would be attached to the University of Lemberg, 
until their own university was a reality. The teach- 
ing of the Ruthenian language would cease in the 
University of Lemberg when this "special school" 
was inaugurated. The Ruthenians were suspicious 
of a trick in the project. They could not understand 
its vagueness. It looked as if they would be giving 
up their present rights in the University of Lemberg, 
limited as they were, for an uncertainty. Why was 

no 



THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 

no definite date for opening specified, or indication 
given of the new university's location? Would it 
be maintained by Galicia with a budget appropria- 
tion in proportion to the taxes paid by Ruthenians? 

The Ruthenian question in Galicia has been cited 
here to show how there are wheels within wheels 
in the complex questions of nationalities. European 
racial questions seem to follow the law of the animal 
world. The littlest animals are eaten by little 
animals, who in turn serve as food for larger animals. 
Nations which have suffered most cruelly from race 
persecution are generally themselves relentless and 
fanatical when the power to persecute is in their 
hands. 

The Ruthenian question shows also how Poles 
and Austrians work together, and are content with 
the mutual advantages of their union. I have never 
met an Austrian Pole, who lived in Galicia and had 
a settled profession or business there, who was not 
a loyal — even ardent — supporter of the Hapsburg 
Monarchy. Austrian Poles are dismayed as they 
face the terrible dilemma of union with Russia or 
Germany. 

THE POLES SINCE 1870 IN GERMANY 

Germany, like Russia, has had a twofold Polish 
question: The acquisition of Polish territory on 
either side of the Vistula to the Baltic Sea was as 
essential to the creation of a strong Prussian kingdom 
as was the acquisition of Pomerania. The portion 
of Poland which, before the partition, cut off eastern 

in 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

from western Prussia was fully as much German as 
Polish, — in fact more so. It became German by 
logical and natural conquest in the course of Prussia's 
evolution. 

The situation was different in Poznania. This 
territory of the later partition reverted to Prussia 
at the Congress of Vienna. In 1815, its population 
was only twenty per cent. German. For fifty years 
the process of Germanization went on naturally — 
in no way forced. When the German Empire was 
formed, nearly half of Poznania was German. Many 
of the leading Poles had lost their sense of Polish 
nationality. They had become German in language 
and in culture. How many families there are in 
Prussia whose Polish origin is betrayed only by their 
names! 

But the Germanized Poles, for the most part, 
retained their religion. The notorious Kulturkampf 
of Bismarck aroused again the sense of nationality 
which had been lost, not only among the prosperous 
Poles of Poznania, but even of Silesia. Only the 
bureaucratic classes were unaffected by this renais- 
sance of nationalism awakened by revolt against 
religious persecution. 

Just after the formation of the Empire, when 
Prussia needed all her strength and force to preserve 
her hegemony in the new confederation and to lead 
modern Germany in the path of progress and civili- 
zation, on either side of her kingdom she had to cope 
with nationalist movements of Danes and of Poles. 
But she did not fear to undertake also the assimila- 
tion of Alsace and Lorraine ! 

112 



THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 

Since the Kulturkampf, the Polish renaissance in 
Prussia has thrived in spite of persecution. As in 
Russia, the Polish language was banished, Polish 
teachers were transferred to schools in other parts 
of the Empire, and about forty thousand Poles of 
Russian and Austrian nationality were expelled from 
the country. The persecution has been carried on 
in the schools, in the army, and in the church. 
School children have been forbidden to pray in the 
Polish language. Two unconstitutional laws have 
been passed by the Prussian Diet. The first of these 
forbade the Poles to speak Polish in public gatherings. 
The second, sanctioned by the Landtag on March 
8, 1908, authorized the Government to expropriate 
land owned by Poles for the purpose of selling it to 
Germans. 

The Prussian scheme for getting rid of the Poles 
was to drive them from their lands and instal German 
colonists. Private enterprise was first tried. A 
"colonization society" was formed, with a large 
capital, and given every encouragement by Prussian 
officialdom. But economic laws are not controlled 
by politics. The colonists were boycotted. Enor- 
mous sums of money were lost in wasted crops. The 
farms of the colonists had to be resold by the sheriff, 
and were' bought in by Poles. To discourage the 
buying back of the German farms, a law was passed 
forbidding Poles to build upon land acquired by them 
after the date of the colonization society's failure. 
The Poles got around this law most cleverly. If one 
goes into Poznania to-day, he will see farmhouses, 
barns, dairies, stables — even chicken-coops — on 

8 113 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

wheels. The people live in glorified wagons. They 
do not build. Will there be a law now against 
owning wagons? 

When the failure of private enterprise was demon- 
strated, the Prussian Government announced its 
intention of applying the law of expropriation "for 
the use of the commission of colonization." This 
was in October, 1912. At the beginning of 1913, the 
Polish deputies to the Reichstag brought before their 
colleagues of all Germany the question of the expro- 
priation of Polish lands in Prussia. They asked the 
representatives of a supposedly advanced and consti- 
tutional nation what they thought of this injustice. 
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg tried to keep the 
question from being debated. He argued with 
perfect reason that it was a purely internal Prussian 
matter, which the Imperial Parliament was incom- 
petent to discuss. But the Catholic centre and the 
Socialist left combined to vote an order of the day 
allowing the discussion of the Polish lands question. 

In the history of the German confederation, it was 
the first time that an imperial chancellor had received 
a direct defiance. This vote is mentioned here to show 
how Prussian dealings with the Poles, just as with 
Alsace-Lorraine, have tended to weaken the purely 
Prussian substructure of the German confedera- 
tion, and to arouse a dangerous protest against 
Prussian hegemony. Contempt for the elementary 
principles of justice has been the key-note of Chan- 
cellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's career. His mental- 
ity is typical of that of German bureaucracy — no, 
more than that, of German statesmanship. It is 

114 



THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 

possible to have sympathy with German national 
aspirations, but not with the methods by which 
those aspirations are being interpreted to the world. 
To show how little regard he had for parliamentary 
opinion in the German confederation, the Chancel- 
lor forced through the Prussian Landtag, on April 
22, 19 1 3, only three months after his rebuke from the 
Reichstag, an infamous law, voting one hundred 
and twenty-five million marks for German coloniza- 
tion in Prussian Poland. Shortly before the Euro- 
pean war broke out, another unconstitutional law was 
passed, which makes possible the arbitrary division 
of large landed properties owned by Poles. 

THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF THE POLISH QUESTION 

During the war with Japan, the Czar and the 
Kaiser understood each other perfectly on the 
Polish question. The neutrality of Germany was 
essential to Russia at that time. The Russians owe 
much to Germany for her benevolent attitude of those 
trying days. The Poles have since paid the bill. 

As in Prussia, the Poles of Russia have seen their 
liberties menaced more than ever before during the 
past decade, and have had to struggle hopelessly 
against a policy of ruthless extermination. If on the 
one hand the Prussian persecution is more to be 
condemned because Germany asks the world to 
believe that she is an enlightened, constitutional 
nation, and "the torch-bearer of civilization," while 
Russia is admittedly reactionary and still half- 
barbarous, on the other hand there is less excuse for 

115 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

the Russian persecution of the Poles. For in Russia 
it is not Teuton against Slav, but Slav against Slav. 

Germany and Russia have had the common inter- 
est of fellow-criminals in their relation to the Polish 
nation. Russia has not hesitated to co-operate with 
Germany through diplomatic and police channels in 
riveting more securely the fetters of the Poles. Her 
championship of the south Slavs against Teutonic 
aggression has been supposedly on the grounds of 
"burning love for our brothers in slavery, in whose 
veins runs the same blood as ours." The sham and 
hypocrisy of this attitude is revealed when we con- 
sider the fact that Russia has never protested to 
Germany against the treatment of the Poles of 
Poznania, nor shown any inclination to treat with 
equity her own Poles. Here are ' ' brothers in slavery ' ' 
nearer home. There is ground for suspicion that 
her interest in the south Slavs has been purely be- 
cause they are on the way to Constantinople and 
the Mediterranean. One who reads the recent 
history of Russia stultifies himself if he allows him- 
self to believe that Russia has entered into the present 
war to defend Servia from Austrian aggression 
through any love for or humanitarian interest in the 
Servians. If Russia gets the opportunity, will her 
treatment of Servian national aspirations be any 
different from that of Austria-Hungary? When we 
try to answer this question, let us think of Bulgaria 
after 1878 (the last "war of liberation") and of 
Poland in iqi 4. 

On August 16, 1914, when I read the proclamation 
of Czar Nicholas to the partitioned Poles, promising 

116 



THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 

to restore administrative autonomy to the kingdom 
of Poland, and posing as the liberator of Poles now 
under the yoke of Austria and of Prussia, it was hard 
to be enthusiastic. For the Jews of Odessa and Kief, 
and the Finns of Helsingfors, rise up to add their 
cry of warning to the bitter comments of Polish 
friends. Only two years ago I saw in those cities 
subjects of the Czar suffering cruelly from fanaticism 
and broken promises, and deprived of that which is 
now being held out as bait to the Poles, and as a sop 
to Russia's Allies. 

Austria-Hungary has been able to use the Russian 
treatment of Poland as a means of strengthening 
her own hold on the border regions of the Empire. 
It was at the instigation of Ballplatz that the Gali- 
cian deputies, on December 16, 191 1, made a motion 
in the Reichsrath, inviting the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs "to undertake steps among the Powers who 
signed the conventions at Vienna in 18 15 to assure 
the maintenance of the frontiers of the kingdom of 
Poland, of which Russia, in violation of her inter- 
national obligations, was threatening the integrity. 
For the separation of Kholm from Poland is an attack 
upon Polish historic and national consciousness." 
It was tit for tat with the two Eastern Powers. 
Russia burned with indignation for the feelings of 
Servia when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. Austria-Hungary burned with in- 
dignation for the feelings of her own loyal Polish 
subjects, when Russia separated Kholm from Poland. 
Both had violated international treaties. Russia 
had no genuine interest in the Servians, and Austria 

117 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

none in the Poles. They merely seized upon weapons 
with which to attack each other. 

It is a mystery how French and British public 
opinion, always so traditionally favourable to down- 
trodden races, and especially to the Poles, can hail 
the Russian entry into Lemberg as a "victory for 
civilization." To the Austrian Poles, the coming of 
the Cossacks is as the coming of the Uhlans to the 
Belgians. They look upon the Russian invasion of 
Galicia as a calamity to their national life. Fight- 
ing with the Austrian s are thirty thousand young 
Poles who call themselves Sokols (falcons). Their 
organization is something like the German Turnverein, 
but more purely military. The Poles of Austria- 
Hungary are a unit against Russia. 

One can make no such positive statement about 
the attitude of the Poles of the other two partition- 
ers. They have little hope of any amelioration of 
their lot from a change of masters through the present 
war. As I write, the thunder of German cannon is 
heard at Warsaw, and the unhappy kingdom of 
Poland is the centre of conflict between Russia and 
Germany. The Poles are fighting on both sides, 
and Polish non-combatants are suffering from the 
brutality of both "liberating " armies. The situation 
is exactly expressed by a Polish proverb which is the 
fruit of centuries of bitter experience: Gdzie dwoch 
pandw sie, bije, chlop w skur§, dostaje — "When two 
masters fight, the peasant receives the blows." 



118 



CHAPTER VII 
ITALIA IRREDENTA 

IRREDENTISM grew inevitably out of the deci- 
sions of the Congress of Vienna, whose members 
were subjected to two influences in making a 
new map of Europe. The first consideration, so 
common and so necessary in all diplomatic arrange- 
ments, was that of expediency. The second con- 
sideration was to prevent the rise of liberalism and 
democracy. The decisions on the ground of the 
first consideration were made under the pressure 
and the play and the skill of give and take by the 
representatives of the nations who fondly believed 
that they were making a lasting peace for Europe. 
The decisions on the ground of the second considera- 
tion were guided by the idea that the checking of 
national aspirations was the best means of preventing 
the growth of democracy. 

The decisions of Vienna, like the later modifica- 
tions of Paris and Berlin, could not prevent the 
development of the national movements which have 
changed the map as it was rearranged after the 
collapse of the Napoleonic regime. 

During the past hundred years, ten new states 
have appeared on the map of Europe: Greece, 

119 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Belgium, Servia, Italy, the German Confederation, 
Rumania, Montenegro, Norway, Bulgaria, and — 
possibly — Albania. With the exception of Albania 
(and is this the reason why we have to qualify its 
viability by the word possibly ?) , all of these states 
have appeared upon the map against the will of, and 
in defiance of, the concert of the European Powers. 
They have all, again with the exception of Albania, 
been born through a rise of national consciousness 
preceded and inspired by a literary and educational 
revival. The goal has been democracy. None of 
them, in achieving independence, has succeeded 
in including within its frontiers all the territory 
occupied by people of the same race and the same 
language. Irredentism is the movement to secure the 
union with a nation of contiguous territories inhabited 
by the same race and speaking the same language. It is 
the call of the redeemed to the unredeemed, and of 
the unredeemed to the redeemed. 

If we were to regard the present unrest in Europe 
and the antagonism of nations from the standpoint 
of nationalism, we could attribute the breaking out 
of contemporary wars to five causes : the desire of 
nations to get back what they have lost, illustrated 
by France in relationship to Alsace-Lorraine; the 
desire of nations to expand according to their legiti- 
mate racial aspirations, illustrated by the Balkan 
States in relationship to Turkey and Austria-Hun- 
gary, and Italy in relationship to Austria-Hungary; 
the desire of nations to expand commercially and 
politically because of possession of surplus popula- 
tion and energy, illustrated by Germany in her 

120 



ITALIA IRREDENTA 

Weltpolitik; the desire of nations to prevent the 
commercial and political expansion of their rivals, 
illustrated by Great Britain and Russia; and the 
desire of nations to stamp out the rise of national 
movements which threaten their territorial integrity, 
illustrated by Austria-Hungary and Turkey. 

The irredentism of the Balkan States led, first, to 
their war with Turkey; second, to their war with 
each other; and third, to Servia becoming the direct 
cause of the European war. The aspirations of 
none have been satisfied. Rumanian irredentism has 
stood between Rumania and the Triple Alliance. 
The irredentism of Italy has not yet led to anything, 
but it is so full of significance as a possible factor in 
bearing upon and changing the whole destinies of 
Europe during the winter of 1914-1915, that it can- 
not be overlooked in a study of contemporary national 
movements and wars. 

The entrance of Italy into an alliance with the 
Teutonic Powers of Central Europe was believed by 
her statesmen to be an act of self-preservation. 

The opposition of the French clerical party to the 
completion of the unification of Italy during the last 
decade of the Third Empire destroyed whatever 
gratitude the Italian people may have felt for the 
decisive aid rendered to the cause of Italian unity at 
Solferino. On the part of the moving spirits of Young 
Italy, indeed, this gratitude was not very great. 
For the first great step in the unification of Italy 
had been accompanied by a dismemberment of the 
territories from which the royal house of Piedmont 
took its name. Young Italy felt that the French 

121 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

had been paid for their help against Austria, and 
paid dearly. The cession of his birthplace, at the 
moment when the nation for which he had suffered 
so terribly and struggled so successfully came into 
being, hurt Garibaldi more than the French bullets 
lodged in his body eight years later at Men tana. 
When the French look to-day with joy upon Italian 
irredentism as the hopeless barrier between Italy 
and Austria-Hungary, they should not forget that, 
even though fifty years have passed, Italian irre- 
dentism includes also Savoy and Nice. 

After the Franco-German War, there were two 
tendencies in the policy of the Third Republic to 
prevent an understanding between France and 
Italy. The first of these was the recurrence in 
France of the old bitter clericalism of the Empire. 
Italy feared that French soldiers might again come 
to Rome. The second was the antagonism of France 
to the budding colonial aspirations of Italy. When 
France occupied Tunis, Italy felt that she had been 
robbed of the realization of a dream, which was hers 
by right of history, geography, and necessity. 

So Italy joined the Triple Alliance. It is argued 
with reason in France that the alliance of Teuton and 
Latin was unnatural. Since Italy had become wholly 
Guelph to realize its unity, why this sudden return to 
Ghibellinism? The alliance of Italy with Germany 
and Austria-Hungary, however, was not more para- 
doxical than the alliance of increasingly democratic 
and socialistic and anti-clerical France with mediae- 
val Russia. The reasons dictating the alliance were 
practically the same. 

122 



ITALIA IRREDENTA 

But there was this difference. Italy entered into 
an alliance with a former enemy and oppressor, who 
was still holding certain unredeemed territories of 
the united Italy as it had existed in the minds of the 
enthusiasts of the middle of the nineteenth century. 

Too many books have been written about the 
distribution of populations in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire to make necessary going into the details here 
of the Italian populations of the Austrian Tyrol and 
of the Austrian provinces at the north of the Adriatic 
Sea. The Tyrolese Italians are undoubtedly Italian 
in sympathies and characteristics. But is their 
union with Italy demanded by either internal 
Italian or external European political and economic 
considerations more than would be the union with 
Italy of the Italian cantons of the Swiss confederation? 

Italian irredentism in regard to the Adriatic lit- 
toral is a far more serious and complicated problem. 
One is struck everywhere in the Adriatic, even as 
far south as Corfu, by the Italian character of the 
cities. Cattaro, Ragusa, Spalato, Zara, Fiume, 
Pola, and Trieste, all have an indefinable Italian 
atmosphere. It has never left them since the 
Middle Ages. It is in the buildings, however, rather 
than in the people. One hesitates to attribute even 
to the people of Fiume and Trieste Italian char- 
acteristics in the narrower sense of the word. On 
the Dalmatian coast, the Slavic element has won all 
the cities. In Fiume and Trieste, it is strong enough 
to rob these two cities of their distinctive Italian 
character. One's misgivings concerning the claims 
of Italian irredentists grow when he leaves the cities. 

123 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

There are undoubtedly several hundred thousands 
of Italians in this region. Italian is the language of 
commerce, and on the Austrian-Lloyd and Hungaro- 
Croatian steamship lines, Italian is the language of 
the crews. But the people who speak Italian are 
not Italians, in every other case you meet, nor do 
they resemble Italians. Why is this? 

Nationality, in the twentieth century, has a mental 
and civic, rather than a physical and hereditary 
basis. We are the product of our education and of the 
political atmosphere in which we live. This is why 
assimilation is so strikingly easy in America, where 
we place the immigrant in touch with the public 
school, the newspaper, and the ballot. Just as the 
Italians and Germans and French of Switzerland are 
Swiss, despite their differences of language, so the 
Italians of the Adriatic littoral are the product of 
the dispensation under which they have lived. Un- 
like the Alsatians, they have never known politi- 
cal freedom and cultural advantages in common 
with their kin across a frontier forcibly raised to cut 
them off; unlike the Poles, they have not been com- 
pelled to revive the nationalism of an historic past 
as a means of getting rid of oppression; unlike the 
Slavs of the Balkans, their national spirit has not 
been called into being by the tyranny of a race alien 
in civilization and ideals, because alien in religion. 

I have among my clippings from French news- 
papers during the past five years a legion of 
quotations from Vienna and Rome correspondents, 
concerning the friction between Austria-Hungary and 
Italy, and between the Italian-speaking population 

124 



ITALIA IRREDENTA 

of Austria and the Viennese Government, over the 
question of distinct Italian nationality of Austro- 
Hungarian subjects. There have been frontier inci- 
dents; there have been demonstrations of Austrian 
societies visiting Italian cities and Italian soc- 
ieties visiting Trieste; there has been much discus- 
sion over the creation of an Italian Faculty of Law 
at the University of Vienna, and the establishment 
of an Italian University at Trieste or Vienna; and 
there have been occasional causes of friction between 
the Austrian Governor of Istria and the Italian 
residents of the province. But the general impres- 
sion gained from a study of the incidents in question, 
and the effort to trace out their aftermath, leads to 
the conclusion that these irredentist incidents have 
been magnified in importance. A clever campaign 
of the French press has endeavoured to detach 
Italian public opinion from the Triple Alliance by 
publishing in detail, on every possible occasion, any 
incident that might show Austrian hostility to the 
Italian "nation." 

In 1844, Cesare Balbo, in his Speranze <T Italia, a 
book that is as important to students of contempo- 
rary politics as to those of the Risorgimento, set forth 
clearly that the hope of Italy to the exclusion of 
Austria from Lombardy and Venetia was most 
reasonably based upon the extension of the Austrian 
Empire eastward through the approaching fall of the 
Ottoman Empire. Balbo was a man of great vision. 
He looked beyond the accidental factors in the mak- 
ing of a nation to the great and durable considera- 
tions of national existence. He grasped the fact 

125 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

that the insistence of the Teutonic race upon hold- 
ing in subjection purely Italian territories, and its 
hostility to the unification of the Italian people, was 
based upon economic considerations. Lombardy 
and Venetia had been for a thousand years the path- 
way of German commerce to the Mediterranean. 
If Austria, Balbo argued, should fall heir to a portion 
of the European territories of the Ottoman Empire, 
she would have her outlet to the Mediterranean more 
advantageously than through the possession of 
Lombardy and Venetia. Once these Ottoman terri- 
tories were secured, Austria would be ready to cede 
Lombardy and Venetia to a future united Italy. 

After the unity of Italy had been achieved, and 
Austria had been driven out of Lombardy and 
Venetia, she did receive compensation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and, just as Balbo predicted, there 
was born the Austrian ambition to the succession of 
Macedonia. That this ambition has not been realized, 
and that Russia was determined to prevent the attempt 
to revive it, explains the A ustro-Hungarian willingness 
to fight Russia in the summer of 1914. 

Austria and Hungary, from the very beginning 
of their existence as a Dual Monarchy, have been 
caught in the vise between Italian irredentism and 
Servian irredentism. They have not been able to 
secure their outlet through Macedonia to the ^Egean 
Sea. They have been constantly threatened by their 
neighbours on the south-east and south-west with 
exclusion altogether from the Adriatic, their only 
outlet to the Mediterranean. 

From the economic point of view, one cannot 

126 



ITALIA IRREDENTA 

but have sympathy with the determination of the 
Austrians and Hungarians to prevent the disaster 
which would certainly come to them, if the aspira- 
tions of Italian and Servian irredentism were 
realized. The severity of Hungary against Croatia 
and the oppression of the Servians in Bosnia-Herze- 
govina and Dalmatia by Austria have been dictated 
by the same reasons which led England and Scotland 
to attempt to destroy the national spirit of Ireland 
for so many centuries after they had robbed her of 
her independence. They could not afford to have 
their communications by sea threatened by the 
presence and growth of an independent nation, 
especially since this nation was believed to be 
susceptible to the influence of hereditary enemies. 
It has been fortunate for Austria-Hungary that 
the claims of the irredentists at the head of the 
Adriatic have overlapped and come into conflict in 
almost the same way that the claims of Greece and 
Bulgaria have come into conflict in Macedonia. 
From time immemorial, the Italian and Greek 
peoples, owing to their position on peninsulas, have 
been seafaring. Consequently, it is they who have 
developed the commercial life of ports in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Everywhere along the littoral of the 
^gean and the Adriatic, Greeks and Italians have 
founded and inhabited, up to the present day, the 
chief ports. But, by the same token, those engaged 
in commercial and maritime occupations have never 
been excellent farmers, shepherds, or woodsmen. 
So, while the Italians and Greeks have held the 
predominance in the cities of the littoral, the hinter- 

127 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

land has been occupied by other races. Just as the 
hinterland of Macedonia is very largely Bulgarian, 
the hinterland of the upper end of the Adriatic is very 
largely Slavic. Just as the realization of the dreams 
of Hellenic irredentists would give Greece a narrow 
strip of coast line along European Turkey to Con- 
stantinople, with one or two of the larger inland 
commercial cities, while the Slavs would be cut off 
entirely from the sea, the realization of the dreams of 
Italian irredentists would give to Italy the ports and 
coast line of the northern end of the Adriatic, with no 
hinterland, and the Slavs, Hungarians, and Germans 
an enormous hinterland with no ports. 

Italian irredentism, in so far as the Tyrol goes, is 
not unreasonable. But its realization in Istria and 
the Adriatic littoral is impracticable. Our modern 
idea of a state is of people living together in a political 
union that is to their economic advantage. Only 
the thoughtless enthusiasts could advocate a change 
in the map of Europe by which fifty million people 
would be cut off from the sea to satisfy the national 
aspirations of a few hundred thousand Italians. 

The Italian Society Dante Alighieri has gotten into 
the hands of the irredentists, and, before the Tripoli- 
tan conquest, was successful in influencing members 
of Parliament to embarrass the Government by 
interpellations concerning the troubles of Italians 
who are Austrian subjects. This society has advo- 
cated for Italy the adoption of a law so modifying 
the legislation on naturalization that Italians who 
emigrate can preserve their nationality even if they 
acquire that of the countries to which they have gone. 

128 



ITALIA IRREDENTA 

It was a curious anticipation of the famous Article 
XXV, of the German Citizenship Law of 1914. In 
191 1, a Lombard deputy tried to raise the old cry 
of alarm concerning German penetration into Italy, 
and emphasized the necessity of the return to the 
policy of the Ghibelline motto, " Fuori i Tedeschi" 
— "Expel the Germans." 

Italian statesmen, however, have never given seri- 
ous attention to the claims of the irredentists. The 
late Marquis di San Giuliano deplored their senseless 
and harmful manifestations. In trying for the 
impossible, and keeping up an agitation that tended 
to make friction between Italy and Austria-Hungary, 
he pointed out that they harmed what were the real 
and attainable Italian interests. 

The antagonism between Italy and Austria- 
Hungary has had deeper and more logical and justi- 
fiable foundation than irredentism. The two nations 
have been apprehensive each about allowing the 
other to gain control of the Adriatic. Up to 1903, 
Spezzia was the naval base for the whole of Italy. 
Since that time, Tarento has become one of the first 
military ports, important fortifications have been 
placed at Brindisi, Bari, and Ancona, and an elaborate 
scheme has been drawn up for the defence of Venice. 
The Venetians have been demanding that Venice 
become a naval base. 

Italian naval and maritime activity having in- 
creased in the Adriatic, there has naturally been more 
intense opposition and rivalry between the two 
Adriatic Powers over Albania. The spread of 
Austro-Hungarian influence has been bitterly fought 
9 129 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

by the Italian propaganda. This problem was 
becoming a serious one for the statesmen of the two 
nations while Albania was still under Turkish rule. 
Since, at the joint wish of Italy and Austria-Hungary, 
Albania has been brought into the family of European 
nations, the question of the equilibrium of the 
Adriatic has only become more unsettled. For free 
Albania turned out to be a fiasco. 

If the relations between Austria-Hungary, fighting 
for life, and her passive ally of the Triple Alliance 
have become more strained since the European war 
began, let it be hoped for the future stability of 
Europe that it has not been because Italian irredent- 
ism has gained the upper hand at Rome. For if 
Italy were to intervene in the war for the purpose of 
taking away from Austria-Hungary the Adriatic 
littoral inhabited by Italians, she would be menacing 
her own future, and that of Switzerland as well. To 
entertain the hope of taking and keeping Trieste 
would be folly. 



130 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES 

THE River Danube and the Straits leading from 
the Black Sea to the JEgean Sea have been 
the waterways of Europe whose fortunes have 
had the greatest influence upon the evolution of 
international relations during the last half century. 
The control of these two waterways, as long as the 
Ottoman Empire remained strong, was not a ques- 
tion of compelling interest to Europe. It was only 
when the decline of the Ottoman power began to 
foreshadow the eventual disappearance of the empire 
from Europe that nations began to think of the vital 
importance of the control of these waterways to the 
economic life of Europe. 

There is an extensive and interesting literature on 
the history of the evolution of international law in its 
relationship to the various questions raised by the 
necessarily international control of the Danube and 
the Dardanelles. In a book like this, an adequate 
statement of the history and work of the Danube 
Commission, and of the various diplomatic negotia- 
tions affecting the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, 
their freedom of passage, their fortifications, their 

131 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

lighthouses, and their life-saving stations, cannot be 
attempted. It is my intention, therefore, to treat 
these great waterways only in the broader aspect of 
the important part that the questions raised by them 
have played in leading up to the gigantic struggle 
which foreshadows a new political reconstruction of 
the world. 

The Danube is navigable from Germany all the 
way to the Black Sea. On its banks are the capitals 
of Austria, Hungary, and Servia. It traverses the 
entire Austro-Hungarian Empire, forms a natural 
boundary between Austria and Servia, Rumania 
and Bulgaria, and then turns north across Rumania 
to separate for a short distance Rumania and Russia 
before finally reaching the Black Sea. 

The volume of traffic on the Danube has increased 
steadily since the Crimean War. It has become the 
great path of export for Austrian and Hungarian 
merchandise to the Balkan States, Russia, Turkey, 
and Persia, and for Servian, Bulgarian, and Ruman- 
ian products to Russia and Turkey. The passenger 
service on the Danube has kept pace with the com- 
petition of the railways. Eastward, it is frequently 
quicker, cheaper, and more convenient than the rail- 
way service. You can leave Vienna or Buda-Pesth 
in the evening, and reach Buda-Pesth or Belgrade in 
the morning. From Belgrade to the Hungarian and 
Rumanian frontier towns, the Danube furnishes the 
shortest route. From Bulgaria to Russia, the Danube 
route, via Somovit and Galatz to Odessa, is in many 
ways preferable to the through train service. It is by 
spending days on the Danube that I have come to 

132 



THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES 

realize how vital the river is to freight and passenger 
communications between Austria-Hungary, the Bal- 
kan states, and Russia. Travel gives life and mean- 
ing to statistics. The Danube interprets itself. 

The Congresses of Paris and Berlin considered 
carefully the entrance of the Danube question into 
international life through the enfranchisement of the 
Balkan States. International laws, administered by 
an international commission, govern the Danube. 
It is a neutral waterway. Problems, similar to those 
of the Scheldt, have arisen, however, in the present 
war between Austria-Hungary and Servia. If Ru- 
mania and Bulgaria should join in the European war, 
no matter on which side they should fight, the whole 
Danube question would become further complicated. 
When war actually breaks out, the rulings of inter- 
national law concerning neutrality are invariably 
violated. States act according to their own interests. 

In its larger European aspect, the Danube, as an 
international waterway, is dependent upon the Dar- 
danelles. Were Rumania to close the navigation of the 
Danube, or were she to preserve its neutrality, she 
would only be preventing or assisting the commerce 
of the riverain states with the Black Sea. Unob- 
structed passage to the outside world for Danube 
commerce depends upon the control of the outlet 
from the Black Sea to the ^Egean Sea. The Hun- 
garian and Servian peasant looks beyond his own 
great river to the narrow passage from the Sea of 
Marmora. The question of the Danube is sub- 
ordinated to the question of the Dardanelles. 

That the passage from the Black Sea to the outside 

133 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

world remain open and secure from sudden stoppage 
or constant menace is of vital importance to the 
riverain Danube states, Austria-Hungary and Servia, 
to the states bordering the Black Sea, Russia, Ru- 
mania, and Turkey, and to Persia, whose nearest 
communications with Europe are by way of the Black 
Sea. Austria-Hungary, however, has another outlet 
through the Adriatic, Servia is pressing towards the 
Adriatic and the ^Egean, Bulgaria has recently 
secured an ^Egean littoral, Persia is dependent upon 
Russia, and Turkey holds the straits. There remain 
Russia and Rumania, to whom the question of the 
Dardanelles is a matter of life and death. 

The international position of Rumania is most 
unfortunate. She must make common cause with 
Germanic Europe or with Turkey to prevent her 
only waterway to the outside world from falling into 
the hands of Russia, or she must ally herself with 
Russia, and, by adding Bukovina and Transylvania, 
increase her numbers to the point where she can hope 
to resist the tide of Slavs around her. In discussing 
the neutrality of Rumania, the French and British 
press have given too much emphasis to the loyalty of 
King Carol for the Hohenzollern family, of which 
he was a member, as the cause of the failure of Ru- 
mania to join the enemies of the Germanic Powers, 
and to the hope that the death of the sovereign who 
made Rumania may result in a favourable change 
in the policy of the Bukarest Cabinet. The new 
sovereign, King Ferdinand, is also a Hohenzollern. 
The hesitation of Rumania has not been, and is not, 
primarily because of the family ties of her rulers. 

134 



THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES 

The Rumanians in Hungary may call for union with 
their enfranchised brethren, just as the Italians in 
Austria may call for union with the Italians who 
were liberated in 1859 and 1866. But is irredentism 
the only factor in influencing the policy of Italy and 
Rumania? For Rumania, at least, the hope of acquir- 
ing Transylvania and Bukovina in the international 
settlement following the war is offset by the appre- 
hension of seeing Russia at the Dardanelles. 

The Dardanelles has been the scene of struggles for 
commercial supremacy since the days of the Pelo- 
ponnesian wars. It was in the Dardanelles that 
the great battle was fought which brought about the 
downfall of Athenian hegemony. It was over the 
question of fortifying the island of Tenedos that 
Venice and Genoa in the latter half of the fourteenth 
century fought the war during which the Genoese 
occupation of Chioggia nearly caused the destruction 
of Venice. Then came the Ottoman occupation to 
put a stop to international jealousies until modern 
times. 

The political development of Russia from Moscow 
has been a consistent forward march towards ocean 
waterways. There have been six possible outlets for 
Russia, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the White Sea, 
the Yellow Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Adriatic. 
At different periods of her history, Russia has ex- 
pended her efforts continuously in these various 
directions. To reach the Baltic, Peter the Great 
built Petrograd. One has to stand on the Kremlin 
on a beautiful summer day and look out over the 
sacred city of the Russians to grasp the fulness of 

135 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

the sacrifice and the marvellous daring of the man 
who abandoned Moscow to build another capital on 
piles driven into dreary salt marshes. It was for the 
sea and contact with the outside world! To reach 
the Pacific Ocean, Russia patiently conquered the 
former empire of the Mongols, steppe by steppe, and 
when she thought the moment of realization had 
arrived, did not hesitate to throw a band of steel 
across the continent of Asia. To reach the Persian 
Gulf, she crossed the Caucasus and launched her 
ships upon the Caspian Sea. To reach the Black 
Sea, she broke the military power of the houses of 
Jagello and Osman, building laboriously upon the 
ruins of Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Is it to 
reach the Adriatic that her forces are now before 
Przemysl? 

In spite of her struggles through three centuries, 
Russia is still landlocked. The ice is an insur- 
mountable barrier to freedom of exit from the White 
Sea, her only undisputed outlet. Japan has arisen to 
shatter the dreams of the future of Port Dalny, and 
make useless the sacrifices to gain the Pacific. The 
control of Germany to the exit from the Baltic Sea 
has been strengthened in recent years by the con- 
struction and fortification of the Kiel Canal. The 
Persian Gulf has been given up by the accord of 1907 
with Great Britain. There has remained what has 
always been the strongest hope, and the one for the 
realization of which Russia has made consistent 
and stupendous efforts. 

Radetsky, in his memoirs, has summed up the 
attitude of Russia towards the Ottoman Empire in 

136 



THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES 

words that give the key to the whole Eastern Ques- 
tion during the past century : 

"Owing to her geographical position, Russia is 
the national and eternal enemy of Turkey. . . . 
Russia must therefore do all she can to take posses- 
sion of Constantinople, for its possession alone will 
grant to her the necessary security and territorial 
completeness." 

Three times during the nineteenth century Russia 
endeavoured to destroy the Ottoman Empire in 
Europe so that she might gain control of the exit to 
the JEgean Sea. In 1828, her armies reached 
Adrianople, and half a century later the suburbs of 
Constantinople. In both instances, especially the 
second, it was the opposition of Great Britain that 
forced Russia to make peace without having attained 
her end. In 1854, France and Italy joined Great 
Britain in the invasion of the Crimea to preserve 
"the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." In 1856, 
at the Congress of Paris, Russia saw the western 
Powers uphold the principle that the Czar had no 
right to sovereignty even on the Black Sea, a half of 
which his ancestors had wrested from the Turks. It 
was no use for Russia to plead that she had "special 
interests" in her own territorial waters. The Black 
Sea was neutralized. The expression " selon nos 
convenances et inter Ms" was understood by Great 
Britain to refer only to British interests! It was by 
right of might that Russia was held in check. In 
1870, Bismarck purchased the neutrality of Russia 
in his war against France by agreeing to Russia's 

137 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

denunciation of the Paris treaty clauses which held 
her impotent in the Black Sea. But again, in 1878, 
Great Britain interfered to bottle up Russia. Since 
then the Russian navy has been a prisoner in the 
Black Sea. Will it continue to be so after the war of 
1914? 

Just when Ottoman power was receding, the rapid 
development of steam power began to make southern 
Russia the bread basket of Europe. Steam machinery 
increased the yield of these vast and rich lands, steam 
railways enabled the farmers to send their harvests to 
Black Sea ports, and steamships made possible the 
distribution of the harvests throughout Europe. I 
used to live on the Bosphorus, and from my study 
window I could see every day the never-ceasing pro- 
cession of grain ships of all nations going to and com- 
ing from the Black Sea. In May, 1912, when the 
Dardanelles was closed for a month during the 
Italian war, two hundred steamships lay at anchor in 
the harbour of Constantinople. 

Another influence whose importance cannot be 
overestimated has constantly turned the eyes of 
Russians towards Constantinople. Slavs are ideal- 
ists. For an ideal one makes sacrifices that material 
considerations do not call forth. To the Russians, 
Constantinople isTsarigrad, the city of the Emperor. 
It is from Constantinople that the Russians received 
their religion. Their civilization is imbued with the 
spirit of Byzantium. Just as one sees in the Polish 
language the influence of Latin in the construction of 
the sentence, one sees in the kindred Russian tongue 
the influence of Greek. I have frequently been struck 

138 



THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES 

with the close and vital relationship between Con- 
stantinople and Russia during the period of the 
development of the Russian nation. Now that 
Russia seems to be entering upon a period of national 
awakening, the sentiment is bound to be irresistible 
among the Russians that they are the rightful inheritors 
of the Eastern Empire, eclipsed for so many centuries 
by the shadow of Islam and now about to be born again. 

On a July evening in 1908, when the constitutional 
revolution in Turkey was beginning to occupy the 
attention of Europe, I sat with my wife in the winter 
garden of the Grand Hotel in Paris. We were listen- 
ing to a charming and intelligent Russian gentleman 
explain to us the aims of the political parties in the 
Duma of 1907. A waiter came to tell us that our 
baggage was ready. "Where are you going?" asked 
the Russian. "To Constantinople," we answered. 
An expression of wistful sadness or joy — you can 
never tell which it is meant to be with a Russian — 
came across his face. "Constantinople!" he mur- 
mured, more to himself than to us : "This revolution 
will fail. You will see. For we must come into our 
own." 

The political aspect of the question of the Darda- 
nelles has changed greatly since Great Britain and 
France fought one war with Russia, and Great 
Britain stood ready to fight a second, in order to 
prevent this passage from falling into Russian hands. 

Almost immediately after the crisis of San Stefano 
and the resulting revision of the Russo-Turkish 
treaty at Berlin, the interests of Great Britain were 
diverted from the north-east to the south-east Medi- 

139 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

terranean. She decided that her permanent route 
to India was through the Suez Canal, and made it 
secure by getting possession of the majority of the 
shares of the Canal and by seizing Egypt. The 
Bulgarians began to show themselves lacking in the 
expected docility towards their liberator. British 
diplomats realized that they had been fearing what 
did not happen. They began to lose interest in the 
Dardanelles. This loss of interest in the question 
of the straits as a vital factor in their world interests 
has grown so complete in recent years that Russia 
has no reason to anticipate another visit of the 
British fleet to Besica Bay if — I refrain from pro- 
phesying. It is safe to say, however, that London 
has forgotten Mohammed Ali, the Crimea, and 
the Princes' Islands, while the traditions of Unkiar 
Skelessi are still dominating the foreign policy of 
Petrograd. 

For, while the future of the Dardanelles has come 
to mean less to Great Britain, it means more than 
ever before to Russia. Russia has been turned back 
from the Pacific. The loss of Manchuria in the war 
with Japan caused her once again to cast her eyes 
upon the outlet to the Mediterranean. To the in- 
crease in her wheat trade has been added also the 
development of the petroleum trade from the Cau- 
casus wells. Since the agreement for the partition of 
Persia with Great Britain in 1907, and the mutual 
"hands off" accord with Germany at Potsdam in 
1910, the expectations of a brilliant Russian future 
for northern Persia and the Armenian and Kurdish 
corner of Asiatic Turkey have been great. 

140 



THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES 

Since the Congress of Berlin, Germany has come 
into the place of Great Britain as the enemy who 
would keep Russia from finding the JEgean Sea. 
The growth of German interests at Constantinople 
and Asia Minor has become the India — in anticipa- 
tion — of Germany. When Russia, after her ill-fated 
venture in the Far East, turned her efforts once more 
towards the Balkan peninsula, it began to dawn upon 
her that the Drang nach Oesten might prove a menace 
to her control of the Dardanelles, fully as great as 
was formerly the British fetish of the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire to keep open the route to India. 
Diplomacy endeavoured to ward off the inevitable 
struggle. But the Balkan wars created a new situa- 
tion that broke rudely the accords of Skierniewice and 
Potsdam. Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and 
Germany in Asia Minor became the nightmare of 
Russia. 



141 



CHAPTER IX 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND HER SOUTH 
SLAVS 

IT has often been predicted in recent years that 
the union between Austria and Hungary would 
be broken by internal troubles. Hungary has 
been credited with desiring to cut loose from Austria. 
The frequent and serious quarrels between the mem- 
bers of the Dual Monarchy have caused many a 
wiseacre to shake his head and say, "The union 
will not outlive Franz Josef!" But the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire has been founded upon sound 
political and economic principles, which far trans- 
cend a single life or a dynasty. Austrians and 
Hungarians may be unwilling yoke-fellows. But 
they know that if they do not pull together, they 
cannot pull at all. They have too many Slavs 
around them. 

The principle upon which Austrians and Hungari- 
ans have founded a Dual Monarchy is the old Latin 
proverb, divide et impera. In the Empire, Austrians 
and Hungarians are in the minority. In each king- 
dom, by dividing the Slavs cleverly between them, 
they hold the upper hand. The German race is, 

142 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SOUTH SLAVS 

therefore, the dominant race in Austria, and 
the Hungarian race is the dominant race in 
Hungary. 

If one looks at the map, and studies the division 
of the Empire, he will readily see that it is much 
more durably constructed than he would have reason 
to believe from statistics of the population. The 
Slavic question in the Dual Monarchy is not how 
many Slavs of kindred races are to be found in 
Austria-Hungary, but how they are placed in re- 
lationship to each other and to neighbouring states. 
It is a question of geography rather than of cen- 
sus. The student needs a map instead of columns 
of figures. 

In only one place is the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
archy very weak, and that is in the south. The sole 
port for the thirty millions of Austria is Trieste. 
To reach Trieste one passes through a belt of Slavic 
territory, and Trieste itself is more Italian than 
German. The sole port of Hungary is Fiume. To 
reach Fiume one passes through a belt of Slavic 
territory, and there are hardly any Hungarians in 
Fiume itself. The Slavs which cut off Fiume from 
Hungary and the Slavs of the Dalmatian coast and 
of all Bosnia and Herzegovina belong to the same 
family. They speak practically the same language 
as the Servians and Montenegrins. 

The Hungarians, then, have exactly the same 
interest as the Austrians in every move that has 
been made since the proclamation of the constitution 
of Turkey to prevent the foundation of a strong 
independent Servian State on the confines of the 

143 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Austro-Hungarian Empire, and to prevent the 
Slavs from reaching the Adriatic Sea. 

Austria has not been necessarily influenced in her 
attitude towards the Balkan problem by Germany. 
Although her Drang nach Oesten is frequently inter- 
preted as a part of the Pan-Germanic movement, the 
Germans of Austria have needed no German senti- 
ment and no German prompting to arrive at their 
point of view in regard to the Balkan nationalities. 
It must be clearly kept in mind that the Convention 
of Reichstadt in 1876, which was the beginning of 
Austria's consistent policy towards the Balkan 
peninsula, was signed before the alliance with Ger- 
many; that it was the conception of a Hungarian 
statesman, and that the occupation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina had nothing whatever to do with Pan- 
Germanism. It was a measure of self-protection to 
prevent these remote provinces of Turkey from form- 
ing a political union with Servia, should the Russian 
arms, intervening on behalf of the south Slavs 
against Turkey, prove successful. The extension of 
sovereignty over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 was 
to prevent the constitutional regime from trying to 
weaken the hold of Austria-Hungary upon these 
provinces. Austria-Hungary certainly would have 
preferred the more comfortable status of an occu- 
pation to the legal adoption of a Reichsland. But 
she could take no chances with the Young Turks. Her 
military occupation of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar was 
inspired as much by the necessity of preventing the 
union of Montenegro and Servia as by the desire to 
provide for a future railway extension to Salonika. 

144 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SOUTH SLAVS 

Hungary has had to grapple with two Balkan 
problems, the rise of Rumania and the rise of Servia. 
She has had within her kingdom several million 
Rumanian subjects and several million South Slavic 
subjects. Most of her Rumanians, however, have 
been separated from Rumania from the natural 
barrier of the Carpathian mountains, and have not 
found their union with Hungary to their disadvant- 
age. For the Rumanians of Hungary enjoy through 
Buda-Pesth and Fiume a better outlet to the markets 
of the world, and a cheaper haul, than they would 
find through Rumania. They have benefited greatly 
by their economic union with Hungary. It is not 
the same with the Croatians. They are situated 
between Buda-Pesth and the Adriatic. They have 
a natural river outlet to the Danube. They are 
not separated by physical barriers from their broth- 
ers of race and language in Servia, Bosnia, and Dal- 
matia. Were they to separate from Hungary, they 
would not find their economic position in any way 
jeopardized. 

Many South Slavs have advocated a trialism 
to replace the present dualism. They have 
claimed that the. most critical problems of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire could be solved in this 
way. Added to Hungary and Austria, there could 
be a Servian kingdom, perhaps enlarged by the 
inclusion of independent Servia and Montenegro, 
whose crown could be worn by the Hapsburg 
ruler. 

But this solution has never found favour, simple 
and attractive though it sounds on first sight, with 

145 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

either Hungarians or Austrians. For it would mean 
the cutting off of both kingdoms from the sea. The 
Hungarians would be altogether land-locked, and 
surrounded on all sides by alien races. Austria 
would be forced into hopeless economic dependence 
upon Germany. The Germans of Austria and the 
Hungarians of Hungary have felt that their national 
existence depended upon keeping in political sub- 
jection the South Slavs, and upon repressing merci- 
lessly any evidences of Italian irredentism upon the 
littoral of the Adriatic. Italian irredentism is treated 
in another place. The repression of national aspir- 
ations among the South Slavs, which interests us 
here, has been the corner-stone of Austro-Hungarian 
policy in the Balkans. For Hungary it has also 
been an internal question in her relationship with 
Croatia. 

The Serbo-Croatian movement in southern Hun- 
gary has been repressed by Hungary with the same 
bitterness and lack of success that have attended the 
attempts to stifle national aspirations elsewhere in 
Europe. No weapon has been left unused in fight- 
ing nationalism in Croatia. Official corruption, 
bribery, manipulation of judges, imprisonment with- 
out trial, military despotism, gerrymandering, electo- 
ral intimidation, — this has been for years and is 
still, the daily record in Croatia. If there were a 
Slavic Silvio Pellico, the world would know that the 
ministers of the aged Franz Josef are not very differ- 
ent from the ministers of the young Franz Josef, who 
crushed the Milanese and tracked Garibaldi like a 
beast. Radetzkys and Gorzkowskis are still wearing 

146 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SOUTH SLAVS 

Austrian livery. To Austria and Hungary, Salonika 
and Macedonia may have been the dream. But 
Trieste, Fiume, and Dalmatia have always been 
the realities. If Hungary took her heel off the 
neck of the Croatians, Buda-Pesth might become 
another Belgrade and Hungary another Servia, 
land-locked with no other outlet than the Danube. 
This does not excuse, but it explains. In this 
world the battle is to the strong. The survival of 
the fittest is a historical as well as a biological 
fact. 

In spite of their juxtaposition, the Serbo-Croats 
have never been able to unite. There have been 
more reasons for this than their political separa- 
tion. They are divided in religion. The Servians 
are Orthodox, and the Croatians and Dalmatians 
Catholic. In Bosnia and Macedonia, the race 
adhered to both confessions, though in majority 
Orthodox, and has also a strong Mohammedan 
element. The Orthodox Servians of Servia use the 
Cyrillic alphabet, and the Catholic Croatians and 
Dalmatians of Austria- Hungary the Latin alphabet. 

Until the recent Balkan Wars, the Croatians and 
Dalmatians considered themselves a much superior 
branch of the race to the Servians. They have cer- 
tainly enjoyed a superior education and demonstrated 
a superior civilization. The probable reason for this 
is that they did not have the misfortune to be for 
centuries under the Ottoman yoke. The Croatians 
have never been willing to play the understudy to 
the Servians. Agram has considered itself the centre 
of the Serbo-Croat movement rather than Belgrade. 

147 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

It is a far more beautiful and modern city than 
Belgrade. Few cities of all Europe of its size can 
equal Agram for architecture, for municipal works, 
and for keen, stimulating intellectual life. Its uni- 
versity is the foyer of Serbo-Croat nationalism and 
of risorgimento literature. It was here that the 
one Roman bishop of the world, who dared to speak 
openly in the Vatican Council of 1870 against the 
doctrine of papal infallibility and remain within the 
Church, gave to his people the prophetic message 
that nationality transcended creeds. Here also an- 
other Catholic priest taught the oneness of Ser- 
vians and Croatians in language and history, and 
proved by scholarly research which is universally 
admired, that Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia 
formed a triune kingdom, whose juridic union 
with the Austro-Hungarian Empire was wholly 
personal connection with the Hapsburg Crown, 
and had never been subjection to the Magyar. 
The Hungarians, during the past few years of bit- 
terest persecution at Agram, have not been able to 
drive away the ghosts of Strossmayer and Racki. 
In Croatia, the pen has proved mightier than the 
sword. 

Until recently, Austria-Hungary has not felt 
uneasy about the relationship between the Cro- 
atians and the Servians of the independent king- 
dom. But there has never been a minute since 
the annexation of 1908 that the statesmen of the 
Ballplatz have not been nervous about the Servian 
propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To keep 
Catholic Croatians and Orthodox Servians in an- 

148 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SOUTH SLAVS 

tagonism with each other and with the Moslems, 
to prevent the education and economic emancipa- 
tion of the Orthodox peasants, and to introduce 
German colonists and German industrial enter- 
prises everywhere, has been the Austro-Hungarian 
program. 

Vienna has used the Catholic Church and the 
propaganda of Catholic missions for dividing the 
Orthodox Servians in Bosnia from their Croatian 
brothers of the Catholic rite. Missionaries give 
every encouragement to Servians to desert the 
Orthodox Church. In the greater part of Bosnia, 
the Government has made it absolutely impossible 
for a child to receive an education elsewhere than in 
the Catholic schools. There are only two hundred 
and sixty-eight schools supported by the Govern- 
ment, of which one-tenth are placed in such a way 
that they serve exclusively other populations. The 
Bosnian budget provides four times as much money 
for the maintenance of the gendarmerie as for public 
schools. 

Moslem law provides that all conquered land be- 
longs to the Khalif . He farms it out in annual, life, 
or hereditary grants. In the Ottoman conquest of 
the Balkan Peninsula, the territories acquired were 
granted to successful soldiers on a basis which pro- 
vided for a feudal army. The feudal proprietors, or 
beys, left the land to the peasants who occupied it, 
in consideration of an annual rental of a third of the 
yield of the land. The peasants had in addition to 
pay their tenth to the tax collectors of the Sultan. 
In territories that were on the borders of the Ottoman 

149 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Empire, like Bosnia and Albania, the lands were 
largely retained by their former proprietors, who 
became Moslems. So the landed aristocracy re- 
mained indigenous. 

The lot of the peasants in Bosnia, who were 
largely Orthodox Servians was not intolerable under 
Turkish rule, except when Moslem fanaticism was 
aroused by Christian separatist propaganda. Austria- 
Hungary claimed, however, that her occupation of 
the province was a measure dictated by humanity 
to ameliorate the lot of the enslaved Christians. 
But the Austrian administration has accomplished 
just the opposite. The new government from the 
beginning supported its authority upon the Moslem 
landowners, upon whose good- will they were de- 
pendent to prevent the awakening of national 
feeling among the peasants. Vienna was more 
complacent in overlooking abuses of the beys 
than had been Constantinople. For the Turks 
held their beys in check when exactions grew too 
bad. The Sublime Porte was afraid of giving an 
excuse for Christian intervention. But the Aus- 
trians encouraged the exactions of the beys in order 
to keep in abject subjection the Servian peasant 
population. 

From the first moment of the Austro-Hungarian 
occupation, the peasants found that they would no 
longer enjoy undisturbed possession of their lands. 
The exodus of Mohammedan Bosnians, who, as we 
have seen elsewhere, were urged to follow the Otto- 
man flag, gave the Germans the opportunity of 
settling colonists on the vacated lands. This process 

150 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SOUTH SLAVS 

of colonization was afterwards pursued to the detri- 
ment of the indigenous Christian population. Ernest 
Haeckel, the great philosopher, once said in a lecture 
at Jena that "the work of the German people to 
assure and develop civilization gives it the right to 
occupy the Balkans, Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopo- 
tamia, and to exclude from these countries the races 
actually occupying them which are powerless and 
incapable." This statement, publicly made before 
a body of distinguished German thinkers, reveals the 
real ulterior ideal of the Drang nach Oesten. Pro- 
fessor Wirth, dealing specifically with present possi- 
bilities, stated that the policy of Austria-Hungary 
in Bosnia must be to keep the peasantry in slavery 
and, as much as possible, to encourage them by 
oppression to emigrate. The reason given for 
this was: "To render powerful the Bosnian peas- 
ant is to render powerful the Servian people, which 
would be the suicide of Germany" Can we not see 
from this how public sentiment in Germany has 
stood behind the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to 
Servia? 

From 1890 to 19 14, the theory of Haeckel and the 
advice of Wirth have been followed by the Austrian 
functionaries in Bosnia. No stone has been left 
unturned to drive the peasants from their lands. 
Right of inheritance has been suppressed, a tax col- 
lector has been introduced between the bey and 
his peasants, the taxes have been raised in many 
cases arbitrarily to the point where the peas- 
ants have been compelled to abandon their land. 
To German immigrants have been given com- 

151 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

munal lands which were necessary to the peasants 
for pasturage and the forests where their swine fed 
on acorns. 

The population of Bosnia hardly surpasses thirty- 
five inhabitants to the kilometre. The total popu- 
lation is about two millions, of whom eight hundred 
thousand are Orthodox, six hundred thousand Mos- 
lem, and five hundred thousand Catholic. But 
practically all of this population — except one hundred 
thousand who are Jews, Protestants, and other 
German immigrants — is Servian or Servian-speaking. 
There are thirty-five Germans, as opposed to one 
million eight hundred thousand Slavs. And yet 
German is the language of the administration, and 
the only language of the railways and posts and tele- 
graphs, which in Bosnia have not ceased to be under 
the control of the military government. Many 
functionaries after thirty years of service in Bosnia 
do not know the language of the country. Two 
German newspapers are supported at the ex- 
pense of the public budget to attack indigenous 
elements. In German schools, pupils are taught 
the history of Germany, but in Slavic schools the 
history of the south Slavs is excluded from the 
curriculum. There are fourteen schools for ten 
thousand Germans, and one school for every six 
thousand Slavs. 

In the administration of Bosnia, only thirty-one 
out of three hundred and twenty-two functionaries 
are Servians, only twelve out of one hundred and 
twenty-five professors of lyceums, only thirty-one 
out of two hundred and thirty-seven judges and 

152 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SOUTH SLAVS 

magistrates. And yet the Orthodox Servians form 
forty-four per cent, of the population. The young 
Bosnians who have graduated from the Austro- 
Hungarian universities find themselves excluded from 
public life. Turning to commercial life, they find 
eighty per cent, of the large industries controlled by 
German capital and managed exclusively by Ger- 
mans. Turning to agriculture, they find economic 
misery and hopeless ignorance among the peasants 
of their race, and every effort made by the Govern- 
ment to prevent the bettering of their lot. Turning 
to journalism and public speaking to work for their 
race, they find an unreasoning censorship and a law 
against assemblies. As one of them expressed it 
to me, "We must either cease to be Slavs or become 
revolutionaries. ' ' 

Did Austria-Hungary need to look to Servian 
propaganda, to influences from the outside, to find 
the cause of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand? 
Political assassinations were not new in the south 
Slavic provinces of the monarchy. A young Bosnian 
student attempted to assassinate the Governor of 
Bosnia at Sarajevo on June 6, 1910, at the time of 
the inauguration of the Bosnian Sabor (Diet). Two 
years later the royal commissioner in Croatia was 
the object of an attempt at assassination by a 
Bosnian at Agram. In September of the same 
year, a Croatian student shot at the Ban of Cro- 
atia. The same Ban, Skerletz, was attacked 
again at Agram by another young Croatian on 
August 18, 1 91 3. These assassinations preceded 
those of the Archduke and his wife. They 

153 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

were all committed by students of Austro-Hun- 
garian nationality. Only the last one had ever 
been in Servia. 

In theory, Bosnia has had since February 20, 1910, 
a constitution with a deliberative assembly. But 
the Sabor can discuss no projects of law that have 
not been proposed by the two masters. Once voted, 
a law has to pass the double veto of Vienna and Buda- 
Pesth. As if this were not enough, the Viennese 
bureaucracy has so arranged the qualification of the 
electorate and the electoral laws that the suffrage 
does not represent the country. Then, too, the 
constitution decides arbitrarily that the membership 
of the Sabor must be divided according to religions, 
one Jew, sixteen Catholics, twenty-four Moslems, 
and thirty-one Orthodox. The Government has 
reserved for itself the right of naming twenty mem- 
bers! The constitution provides for individual 
liberty, the inviolability of one's home, liberty of the 
press and speech, and secrecy of letters and tele- 
grams. This enlightened measure of the Emperor 
was heralded to the world. But of course there 
was the joker, Article 20. Vienna held the highest 
card! In case of menace to the public safety, all 
public and private rights may be suspended by a 
word from Vienna. Public safety always being 
menaced in Bosnia, the constitution is perpetually 
suspended. The Government even goes as far as 
to prosecute deputies for their speeches in Parlia- 
ment. Newspapers are continually censored. Their 
telegraphic news from Vienna and Buda-Pesth is 
suppressed without reason. Particularly severe 

154 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SOUTH SLAVS 

fines — sometimes jail sentences — are passed upon 
offending journalists. 

Is it necessarily because of instigation and pro- 
paganda from Belgrade that of the three Ser- 
vian political parties in Bosnia two (the Narod 
and the Otachbina) are closely allied to the 
Pan-Servian Society Narodna Obrana, and that 
these two parties openly support the separatist 
movement? 

In Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Croatia in 1914 the 
bureaucracy of Vienna has been engaged in the 
same process of repression and police persecution 
as in Italy during the half century from 181 5 
to the liberation of Italy. The local constitu- 
tions have been suspended everywhere. Why 
have the Austrians, in spite of the lessons of the 
beginning of the present reign, dared to tempt 
providence in exactly the same way after the Golden 
Jubilee? 

The victories of the Allies in the Balkans were a 
terrible blow to Austria-Hungary. Not only was 
her dream of reaching the ^Egean Sea through the 
sandjak of Novi Bazar and Macedonia shattered 
by the Greek occupation of Salonika, but the aggran- 
dizement of Servia, caused by a successful war, 
threatened to have a serious effect upon the 
fortunes of the Empire. The appearance of the 
Servians on the Adriatic would mean really the 
extension of Russian influence through Bulgaria 
and Servia to the Austrian and Italian private 
lake, and would cut off Austria for ever from 
her economic outlet to the ^Egean. But there 

i55 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

was more than this to cause alarm both in 
Austria and in Hungary. Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, and Dalmatia — would they remain loyal 
to the Empire, if once they came under the spell 
of the idea of Greater Servia? Leaving Russia 
entirely out of the calculation, an independent, 
self-reliant, and enlarged Servia, extending towards 
the Adriatic and ^Egean Seas, if not actually reach- 
ing it, — would it not be, as Professor Wirth declared, 
"the suicide of Germany"? The statesmen of the 
Hohenzollern and Hapsburg Empires determined 
that it should not occur. 

From the very moment that the Servian armies 
drove the Turks before them, Austria-Hungary 
began to act the bully against Servia. The Aus- 
trian consuls at Prisrend and Mitrovitza were 
made the first cause of Austrian interference. 
It was pretended that Herr Prochaska had been 
massacred and mutilated at Prisrend, and that 
the life of Herr Tahy had been threatened so 
that he was forced to flee for safety from Mi- 
trovitza. A formal inquest showed that the first 
of these consuls was safe, and that the trouble 
had been merely a discussion between Servian 
officers and Herr Prochaska over some fleeing 
Albanians who had taken refuge in the consulate. 
In the other case, there seemed to be no ground 
at all for complaint. But on January 15, 191 3, 
the Servians acceded to the demand of Austria 
that the reparation be granted for the Prisrend 
incident. A company of Servian soldiers saluted 
the Austro-Hungarian flag as Consul Prochaska 

156 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SOUTH SLAVS 

solemnly raised it. This incident seems too petty 
to mention, but in that part of the world and at 
that moment we thought it very serious. For it 
showed how anxious Austria-Hungary was to pick 
a quarrel with Servia in the midst of the Balkan 
War. 

Two other incidents of an even more serious 
character immediately followed. Servia refused 
the Austrian demand that Durazzo be evacuated, 
supporting herself upon the hope that Russia would 
intervene. During December and January, deluded 
by unofficial representatives of Russian public sen- 
timent and by demonstrations against Austria- 
Hungary in Moscow and Petrograd, Servia held out. 
It was only when she saw that Russian support was 
not forthcoming that she withdrew from Durazzo. 
The international situation during January, 1913, 
was similar to that during July, 19 14, and the cause 
of the crisis was practically the same. In both 
cases Servia backed down, but the second time 
Austria-Hungary and Germany determined to 
provoke the war which they believed would be 
the end of Servia and the destruction of Rus- 
sia's power to influence the political evolution of 
Balkan Peninsula. 

After Durazzo, it was Scutari. Servia for the 
third time bowed before the will of Austria. 

The next move against Servia was the annexa- 
tion on May 12, 191 3, of the little island of Ada- 
Kaleh on the Danube, which had curiously enough 
remained Turkish property after the Treaty of 
Berlin. It had actually been forgotten at that time. 

157 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

This island, situated in front of Orsova, would have 
given Servia a splendid strategic position at the 
mouth of the river. Austria-Hungary anticipated 
the Treaty of London. 

It was to reduce Servia that secret encouragement 
was given to Bulgaria to provoke the second Balkan 
war. There is no doubt now as to the r61e of the 
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Sofia in allowing 
this crisis to be precipitated. 

Had Germany been willing to stand behind her 
at Bukarest, Austria-Hungary would have prevented 
the signing of the treaty between the Balkan States 
by presenting an ultimatum to Servia. But Ger- 
many did not seem to be ready. The reason com- 
monly given that Emperor William did not want to 
embarrass King Carol of Rumania, a prince of his 
own house, and his brother-in-law, the King of 
Greece, does not seem credible. In view of the 
events that have happened since, the signing of the 
Treaty of Bukarest is a mystery not yet cleared up. 

The second Balkan war acted as a boomerang to 
Austria-Hungary. It increased tremendously the 
prestige of Servia abroad, and the confidence of the 
Servians in themselves. The weakness of the 
Turkish armies in the first Balkan war had been 
so great that Servia herself has hardly considered 
it a fair test of her military strength. To have 
measured arms successfully with Bulgaria was 
worth as much to Servia as the territory that she 
gained. 

We have seen how strained were the relationships 
of Austria-Hungary as separate kingdoms and to- 

158 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SOUTH SLAVS 

gether as an empire in their relationship with their 
south Slavic subjects. The Croatians, the Dalma- 
tians, and a major portion of the inhabitants of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were Servian in language and 
sympathies. They had never thought of political 
union with Servia, the petty kingdom which had 
allowed its rulers to be assassinated, and which 
seemed to be insignificant in comparison with the 
powerful and brilliant country of which they would 
not have been unwilling, if allowed real self-govern- 
ment, to remain a part. But a large and glorified 
Servia, with an increased territory and a well-earned 
and brilliant military reputation — would this prove 
an attraction to win away the dissatisfied subjects 
of the Dual Monarchy? 

Austria-Hungary by the annexation of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina had taken to herself more Servians in a 
compact mass than she could well assimilate. They 
were not scattered and separated geographically 
like her other Slavic subjects. It was a danger from 
the beginning. After the Balkan wars, it became 
an imminent peril. 

The death sentence of Servia was decided by the 
statesmen of Austria- Hungary and Germany the 
moment their newspapers brought to them the 
story of the battle of Kumonova. 

I shall never forget my presentiment when I heard 
on June 29, 1914, down in a little Breton village, 
that a Bosnian student had celebrated the anniver- 
sary of the battle of Kossova by assassinating the 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The incident for 
which Austria was waiting had happened. There 

159 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

came back to me the words of Hakki Pasha, 
"If Italy declares war on Turkey, the cannon 
will not cease to speak until all Europe is in con- 
flagration." 



1 60 



CHAPTER X 
RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 

IN the latter half of the nineteenth century, the 
peace of Europe was twice disturbed, and ter- 
rible wars occurred, over the question of the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Since it is still 
the same question which has had most to do — directly 
at least — with bringing on the general European 
war of 1 9 14, it is important to consider what has 
been, since the Treaty of Berlin, the very heart of 
the Eastern question in relation to Europe, the 
rivalry of races in Macedonia. 

When the European Powers, following the lead 
of Great Britain intervened after the Russo-Turkish 
War of 1877-78 to annul the Treaty of San Stefano, 
they frustrated the emancipation from Moslem rule 
of the Christian populations in Macedonia. A Bal- 
kan territorial and political status quo was decided 
upon by a Congress of the Powers at Berlin in 1878. 
In receiving back Macedonia, Turkey solemnly 
promised to give equal rights to her Christian sub- 
jects. In taking upon themselves the terrible re- 
sponsibility of restoring Christians to Turkish rule, 
the Powers assumed at the same time the obligation 
to watch Turkey and compel her to keep her promises. 
11 161 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

The delegates of the Powers brought to the Con- 
gress of Berlin a determination to solve the problems 
of South-eastern Europe, according to what they 
believed to be the personal selfish interests of the 
nations they represented. From the beginning of 
the Congress to the end, there was never a single 
thought of serving the interests of the people whose 
destinies they were presuming to decide. They 
compromised with each other ' ' to preserve the peace 
of Europe." This formula has always been inter- 
preted in diplomacy as the getting of all you can 
for your country without having to fight for it ! 

Practically every provision of the Treaty of Berlin 
has been disregarded by the contracting parties 
and by the Balkan States. The policy of Turkey in 
this respect has not been different from that of the 
Christian Powers. Great Britain and France, as 
their colonial empires increased, ignored the obli- 
gations of the treaty which they had signed, because 
they feared the effect upon their commercial and 
colonial interests overseas, were they to press the 
Khalif . The only effective pressure would have been 
force of arms. When popular sympathy was stirred 
to the depths by the cruelty of Abdul Hamid's op- 
pression and massacres, successive Britain and French 
Cabinets washed their hands of any responsibility to- 
wards the Christians in Turkey. Pan-Islamism was 
their nightmare. They had an overwhelming fear 
of arousing Mohammedan sentiment against them 
in their colonies. Germany refused to hold Abdul 
Hamid to his promises, because she wanted to curry 
favour with him to get a foothold in Asiatic Turkey. 

162 



RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 

Russia and Austria, the Powers most vitally inter- 
ested in the Ottoman Empire, because they were its 
neighbours, were agreed upon preserving the Sultan's 
domination in the Balkan Peninsula, no matter how 
great the oppression of Christians became. Neither 
Power wanted to see the other increase in influence 
among the Balkan nationalities. 

The centres of intrigue were Bulgaria, Albania, 
Thrace, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, 
the portions of the Peninsula which had been refused 
emancipation by the Congress of Berlin. Bulgaria 
worked out her own emancipation. She refused 
the tutelage of Russia, annexed Eastern Rumelia in 
defiance of the Powers in 1885, and proclaimed her 
independence in 1908. The fortunes of Albania 
have been followed in another chapter. Thrace was 
too near Constantinople, the forbidden city, too 
unimportant economically, and too largely Moslem 
in population to be coveted by the Balkan States. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, administered by Austria- 
Hungary since 1878, were annexed in defiance of 
treaty obligations in 1908. The principal victim 
of the mischief done by the Congress of Berlin was 
Macedonia. 

The future of Macedonia has been the great 
source of conflict between Austria-Hungary and 
Russia, and between the Balkan States. At Athens, 
Sofia, Belgrade, Bukarest, and Cettinje, the diplo- 
mats of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, from 
the morrow of the Berlin Congress to the eve of the 
recent Balkan Wars, played a game against each 
other, endeavouring always to use the Balkan States 

163 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

as pawns in their sordid strife. Turkey was backed 
by France and England, whenever it suited opportune 
diplomacy to do so. Austria-Hungary was backed 
by Germany, who at the same time did not hesitate 
to play a hand with the Turks. Russia has always 
stood more or less alone in the Balkan question, 
even after the conclusion of the alliance with France. 
Except at Cettinje, Italian activity in this diplomatic 
game has never been particularly marked. 

What has been the object of the game? This is 
difficult to state categorically. Aims have changed 
with changing conditions. For example, during the 
five years immediately following the Congress of 
Berlin, British diplomacy was directed strenuously 
towards keeping down emancipated Bulgaria, and 
towards preventing the encroachment of Servia in 
the direction of the Adriatic and the i^Egean. But 
when she saw that Bulgaria had refused to be the 
tool of Russia, and when her problem of the trade 
route of India had been solved by the buying up of 
the majority of shares in the Suez Canal and the 
occupation of Egypt, Great Britain championed 
Bulgaria and sustained her in the annexation of 
Eastern Rumelia. British policy remained anti- 
Servian for thirty years. There was more in the 
withdrawal of the British Legation from Belgrade 
than disapproval of a dastardly regicide. But the 
moment British commerce began to fear German 
competition, and an accord had been made with 
Russia to remove causes of conflict, the British press 
began to change its tone towards Servia. What a 
miracle has been wrought in the decade since "an 

164 



RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 

immoral race of blackguards, with no sense of national 
honour" has become "that brave and noble little 
race, spirited defenders of the liberties of Europe!" 
I quote these two sentiments from the same news- 
papers. If Premier Asquith is sincere in his belief 
that this present war is to defend the principle of 
the sanctity of treaties, will he insist, when peace is 
concluded, that Servia make good her oath to Bul- 
garia, and Russia her international treaty obliga- 
tions in regard to the kingdom of Poland? Great 
Britain is the least of the offenders when it comes 
to diplomatic cant and hypocrisy. For the British 
electorate has a keen sense of justice, and an intel- 
ligent determination that British influence shall be 
exerted for the betterment of humanity. Cabinets 
must reckon with this electorate when they decide 
questions of foreign policy. 

But we do not want to lose ourselves in a maze of 
diplomatic intrigue, which it is fruitless to follow, 
even if we could. We must limit ourselves to an 
exposition of the ambitions of Austria-Hungary and 
of the Balkan States to the possession of this coveted 
province. 

Since the creation of modern Italy, the great Ger- 
man trade route to the Mediterranean has been 
changed. The influence in Teutonic commercial 
evolution of the passing of Lombardy and Venetia 
from the political tutelage of a thousand years has 
been of tremendous importance, for the connection 
between Germany and Italy had always been vital. 
It was the first Napoleon who broke this connection. 
It was the third Napoleon who nullified the effort 

165 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

of the Congress of Vienna to re-establish it. United 
Italy gave a new direction to Teutonic expansion. 
United Germany gave to it a new impulsion. The 
Drang nach Oesten was born. 

By the Convention of Reichstadt in 1876, Austria- 
Hungary secured from Russia the promise of the 
Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
return for her neutrality in the "approaching war 
of liberation" of Russia against Turkey. In order 
to liberate some Slavs, Russia changed the subjection 
of others. The Convention of Reichstadt is really 
the starting-point of the quarrel which has grown 
so bitterly during the last generation between Austria 
and Russia over the Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula. 
Russia paid dearly for a "free hand" with Turkey 
in 1877. She is paying still. 

In her attitude towards the Balkans, Austria has 
had three distinct aims: the prevention of a Slavic 
outlet to the Adriatic, the realization of a German 
outlet to the ^Egean, and the effectual hindrance of 
the growth in the Balkans of a strong independent 
south Slavic state, which might prove a fatal attrac- 
tion to her own provinces of Croatia and Dalmatia. 
It was this triple consideration that led her to the 
occupation and annexation of Bosnia and Herzego- 
vina, and to the policy of hostility to Servia, which 
is developed in another chapter. Desiring to possess 
for herself the wonderful port of Salonika on the 
^Egean Sea, to reach which her railroads would have 
to cross Macedonia, the policy of Austria-Hungary 
towards Macedonia has been consistently to en- 
deavour to uphold the semblance of Turkish author- 

166 



RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 

ity, and at the same time to make that authority 
difficult to uphold though the exciting of racial 
rivalry among Greece, Servia, Bulgaria, Rumania, 
and Albania in this turbulent country. Turkey and 
Austria met on the common ground of "keeping the 
pot boiling," although with a different aim. By 
keeping the pot boiling, Turkey thought that her 
sovereignty was safe, while Austria hoped that 
when Turkey and the Balkan States had worn them- 
selves out, each opposing the other, she could step in 
and capture the prize. 

Turkey and Austria-Hungary, then, conspired to- 
gether to create as many points of conflict as possible 
among the Macedonians of different races. The 
most devilish ingenuity was constantly exercised in 
stirring up and keeping alive the hatred of each 
race over the other. While frequently aroused to 
the point of making perfunctory protests, the other 
nations of Europe, with the exception of Russia, 
let Austria and Turkey do as they pleased, just as 
Turkey was allowed a free hand in massacring the 
Armenians. The laissez faire policy of the Powers 
was a denial of their treaty obligations. 

It was only when the Balkan States awoke to the 
realization of the fact that they were regarded as 
mere pawns upon the chequer board of world politics, 
to be sacrificed without compunction by the Euro- 
pean Powers whenever it was to their interest, that 
they buried differences for a moment, and worked 
out their own salvation. If the Balkan Wars have 
brought the present terrible disaster upon Europe, 
it is no more than the contemptible diplom- 

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THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

acy of self interest and mutual jealousy could 
expect. 

Why was the Austro-Turkish policy possible, and 
why did it succeed for a whole generation? 

The Ottoman Empire was founded in the Balkan 
peninsula by rulers whose military genius was coupled 
with their ability to use one Christian population 
against the other. The Osmanlis never fought a 
battle in which the Balkan Christians did not give 
valuable assistance in forging the chains of their 
slavery. The Osmanlis conquered the Balkan peo- 
ples by means of the Balkan peoples. They kept 
possession of the country just as long as they could 
pit one chief against another, and then, when national 
feeling arose, one race against another. 

Gradually, in the portion of the Balkans where 
one race was predominant, nationalities began to 
form states, which secured independence as soon 
as they demonstrated the possibility of harmony. 
Greece was the first, and was followed by Servia. 
Moldavia and Wallachia united into the principality 
of Rumania. Last of all came Bulgaria. After 
having gained autonomy, independence was only 
a matter of form. But in the central portion of the 
Balkan Peninsula, from the Black Sea to the ^Egean, 
through Thrace, Macedonia, and Albania, the sover- 
eignty of Turkey, restored by the Treaty of Berlin, 
was able to endure. For the people were mixed up, 
race living with race, and in no place could the 
Christians of any one race claim that the country 
was wholly theirs. 

As emancipated Greeks, Servians and Bulgarians 

1 68 



RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 

formed independent states, they looked towards 
Macedonia as the legitimate territory for expansion. 
But here their claims, both historically and racially, 
overlapped. Greece regarded Macedonia as entirely 
Hellenic. Had it not always been Greek before the 
Osmanlis came, from the days of Philip of Macedon 
to the Paleologi of the Byzantine Empire? The 
Servians, on the other hand, invoked the memory 
of the Servian Empire of Stephen Dushan, who in 
the fourteenth century, on the eve of the Ottoman 
conquest, was crowned "King of Romania" at 
Serres. It was from the Servians and not from the 
Greeks, that the Osmanlis conquered Macedonia in 
the three battles of the Maritza, Tchernomen, and 
Kossova. The Bulgarians invoked the memory of 
their mediaeval domination of Macedonia and Thrace. 
It was by the Bulgarians that northern Thrace was 
defended against the Ottoman invasion; a Bulgarian 
prince was the last independent ruler of central 
Macedonia; and long before the ephemeral Servian 
Empire of Stephen Dushan, the Bulgarian Czars 
were recognized from Tirnova to Okrida. This 
latter city, in fact, was the seat of the autonomous 
Bulgarian patriarchate in the Middle Ages. 

These historical claims, to us of western Europe, 
would have only a sentimental value. They had 
been forgotten by the subject populations of Euro- 
pean Turkey for many centuries. The first revival 
of political ambitions was that of Hellenism. Modern 
Greece, divorcing itself from the impossible and 
pagan dream of a restoration of classic Greece, with 
Athens as its capital, which had been woven for it 

169 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

by western European admirers during the first half 
century of its liberation, began to take stock of its 
Byzantine and Christian heritage during the latter 
part of the reign of Abdul Aziz. The new Hellenism, 
as the prestige of the Ottoman Empire decreased, 
took the definite form of a determination to succeed 
the Ottoman Empire, as it had preceded it, with 
Constantinople as capital. 

The Greeks believed themselves to be the unifying 
Christian race of the Balkan Peninsula. They had 
a tremendous advantage over the Slavs, because the 
ecclesiastical organization, to which all the Christians 
of the Balkan Peninsula owed allegiance, was in their 
hands. When Mohammed the Conqueror entered 
Constantinople, he gave to the Patriarch of the East- 
ern Church the headship of the Balkan Christians. 
The spirit of Moslem institutions provides for no 
other form of government than a theocracy. Reli- 
gion has always been to the Osmanli the test of 
nationality. The Christians formed one millet, or 
nation. This millet was Greek. During all the 
centuries of Ottoman subjection, the Balkan Christ- 
ians owed allegiance to the Greek Patriarchate. 
Whatever their native tongue, the language of the 
Church and of the schools was Greek. 

Unfortunately for Hellenism, the new Greek 
aspirations came into immediate conflict with the 
renaissance of the Bulgarian nation. Russia had 
long been encouraging, for the purposes of Pan- 
Slavism, the awakening of a sense of nationality in 
the south Slavs. Her agents had been long and 
patiently working among the Bulgarians. But they 

170 



RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 

overshot their mark. When Bulgarian priests and 
the few educated men of the peasant nation turned 
their attention to their past and their language, it 
was not the idea of their kinship with the great Slavic 
Power of eastern Europe that was aroused, but the 
consciousness of their own particular race. Bulgaria 
had been great when Russia was practically un- 
known. Bulgaria could be great once more, when, 
by the disappearance of Ottoman rule, the Bulgarian 
Empire of the Middle Ages would be born again in 
the Balkans. 

One can readily appreciate that the first necessity 
of Bulgarian renaissance was liberation from the Greek 
Church. Russia strenuously opposed this separatist 
agitation. What she wanted was a Slavic movement 
within the bosom of the Greek Orthodox Church, 
which, if bitterly persecuted by the Patriarchate, 
would throw the south Slavs upon the Russian Synod 
for protection, or, if tolerated, would give Russia a 
powerful voice in the councils of the Orthodox Church 
in the Ottoman Empire. But the Bulgarians had 
progressed too far on the road of religious separation 
from the Greeks to be arrested by their Russian 
godfather. It was a prophecy of the future inde- 
pendent spirit of the Bulgarian people, which Beacons- 
field and Salisbury unfortunately failed to note, 
that the Bulgarians determined to go the length 
of uniting with Rome in order to get free from 
Phanar. Another Uniate sect would have been born 
had Russia not yielded. With bad grace, her Ambas- 
sador obtained from Sultan Abdul Aziz the firman 
of March n, 1870, creating the Bulgarian Exarchate. 

171 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

The cleverness of the Bulgarians outwitted the 
manoeuvre made to have the seat of the Exarchate 
at Sofia. The Greeks realized that a formidable 
competitor had entered into the struggle for Mace- 
donia. From that moment there has been hatred 
between Greek and Bulgarian. In spite of the treaty 
of Bukarest, the end of the struggle is not yet. The 
policy and ambition of the modern state are dictated 
by strong economic reasons, of which sentimental 
aspirations are only the outward expression. If 
wars and the treaties that follow them were guided 
by honest confession of the real issues at stake, how 
much easier the solution of problems, and how much 
greater the chances of finding durable bases for 
treaties! The whole effort of Bulgaria in Macedonia 
may be explained by the simple statement that the 
Bulgarian race has been seeking its natural, logical, 
and inevitable outlet to the ^Egean Sea. 

During the middle of the nineteenth century, 
Servian national aspirations were directed toward 
Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
Servians thought only in terms of the west. It was 
the foundation of the Austro-Hungarian dual mon- 
archy in 1867, followed by the Austrian occupation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the sandjak of Novi 
Bazar, that led Servia to enter into the struggle for 
Macedonia. 

As soon as Russia saw that she could not control 
Bulgaria, she began to favour a Servian propaganda 
in the valley of the Vardar. Russian intrigues at 
Constantinople led to the suppression of the Bul- 
garian bishoprics of Okrida, Uskub, Kuprulii (Veles) 

172 



RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 

and Nevrokop. Bulgaria secured the restoration of 
these bishoprics through the efforts of Austria-Hun- 
gary and Great Britain. The story of Macedonia 
is full of instances like this of intrigue and counter 
intrigue by European Powers at the Sublime Porte. 
Combinations of interests changed sometimes over 
night. Is it any wonder that the Turks grew to 
despise the European alliances, and to laugh at 
every "joint note" of the Powers in relation to 
Macedonia? 

Austria-Hungary opposed the Russian aid given 
to Servia by introducing a new racial propaganda. 
Ever since the Roman occupation there had been a 
small, but widely diffused, element in the population 
of Macedonia, which retained the Roman language, 
just as the Wallachians and Moldavians north of the 
Danube had done. Diplomatic suggestion at Buka- 
rest succeeded in interesting Rumania in these 
Kutzo-Wallachians, as they came to be called. 
Rumania did not have a common boundary with 
European Turkey. But her statesmen were quick 
to see the advantage of having "a finger in the pie" 
when the Ottoman Empire disappeared from Europe. 
So Rumania became protector of the Kutzo-Walla- 
chian. The Sublime Porte gladly agreed to recog- 
nize this protectorate. The development of a 
strong Rumanian element in Macedonia would help 
greatly to preserve Turkish sovereignty. For Ruma- 
nia could have no territorial aspirations there, and 
would look with disfavour upon Rumania being 
swallowed up by Greece, Servia, or Bulgaria. An- 
other propaganda, well financed, and encouraged 

173 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

by the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Governments 
was added to the rivalry of races in Macedonia. 

We cannot do more than suggest these intrigues. 
After 1885, the Macedonian question became gradu- 
ally the peculiar care of the two "most interested" 
Powers. There was little to attract again interna- 
tional attention until the question of Turkey's 
existence as a state was brought forward in a most 
startling way by the repercussion throughout the 
Empire of the Armenian massacres of 1893-96. 
By refusing to intervene at that time, the Powers, who 
fondly thought that they were acting in the interest of 
the integrity of the Empire, were really contributing 
to its further decline. 

Elsewhere we have spoken of the Cretan insur- 
rection of 1896 and the train of events that followed 
it, ending in the formation of the Balkan alliance to 
drive Turkey out of Europe. Here we take up the 
other thread which leads us to the Balkan Wars. 
Bulgaria, remembering the happy result of her own 
sufferings from the massacres of twenty years before, 
was keen enough to see in the Asiatic holocausts of 
the "Red Sultan" a sign of weakness instead of a 
show of strength. The statesmen of the European 
Powers had not acted to stop the massacres of the 
Armenians. But their indecision and impolitic ir- 
resolution was not an expression of the sentiments 
of the civilized races whom they represented. The 
time was ripe for an insurrection in Macedonia. 
Public opinion in Europe would sustain it. The 
movement was launched from Sofia. 

From that moment, Turkish sovereignty was 

i74 



RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 

doomed. Turkey did not realize this, however. 
Instead of adopting the policy of treating with 
Bulgaria, and giving her an economic outlet to the 
^Egean Sea, the Sublime Porte was delighted with 
the anticipation of a new era of racial rivalry in 
Macedonia. For it knew that Bulgaria's efforts 
to secure Macedonian autonomy would be opposed 
by Servia and Greece. In fact, the Greeks were so 
alarmed by the Bulgarian activity that immediately 
after their unhappy war with Turkey they gave 
active support to the Turks in putting down the 
Bulgarian rebels. The services of the Greek Patri- 
archate were particularly valuable to Turkey at this 
time. 

Nor did Austria-Hungary and Russia appreciate 
the significance of the Bulgarian movement. In 
1897, they signed an accord, solemnly agreeing that 
the status quo be preserved in the Balkan peninsula. 
Russia was anxious for this convention with Austria. 
For the moment all her energies were devoted to 
developing the policy in the Far East that was to 
end so abruptly eight years later on the battlefield 
of Mukden. Austria-Hungary was delighted to 
have the solution of the Macedonian problem de- 
layed. She felt that every year of anarchy in European 
Turkey would bring her nearer to Salonika. The 
Drang nach Oesten was to be made possible through 
the strife of Servian, Bulgarian, and Greek. 

The moment was favourable for the Bulgarian 
propaganda. Russia was too much involved in 
Manchuria to help the Servians. The Greeks had 
lost prestige with the Macedonians by their easy 

175 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

and humiliating defeat at the hands of Turkey. 
Gathering force with successive years, and supported 
by the admirably laid foundation of the Bulgarian 
ecclesiastic and scholastic organizations throughout 
Macedonia, the Bulgarian bands gradually brought 
the vilayets of Monastir, Uskub, and Salonika into 
a state of civil war. In 1901 and 1902, conditions 
in Macedonia were beyond description. But the 
Powers waited for some new initiative on the part 
of Austria-Hungary and Russia. 

Emperor Franz Josef and Czar Nicholas met at 
Miirszteg in the autumn of 1903. Russia, more and 
more involved in Manchuria, and on the eve of her 
conflict with Japan, found no difficulty in falling in 
with the suggestion of the Austrian Foreign Secre- 
tary that the two Powers present to the signers of 
the Treaty of Berlin a program of "reforms" for 
Macedonia. Europe received with delight this new 
manifestation of harmony between Austria-Hungary 
and Russia. 

In 1904 the "Program of Miirszteg" was imposed 
upon Turkey by a comic-opera show of force on the 
part of the Powers. An international gendarmerie 
was their solution of the Macedonian problem. 
Different spheres were mapped out, and allotted to 
officers of the different Powers. Germany refused 
to participate in this farce, just as she had refused 
to participate in "protecting" Crete. 

The international "pacification" failed in Mace- 
donia for the same reasons that it had failed in 
Crete, and was to fail a third time ten years later in 
Albania. // was a compromise between the Powers, 

176 



RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 

dictated by considerations which had nothing whatever 
to do with the problem of which it was supposed to be 
the solution. This is the story of European diplomacy 
in the Near East. 

From the very moment that Turkey found herself 
compelled to accept the policing of Macedonia by 
European officers, she set to work to make their task 
impossible. Hussein Hilmi pasha was sent to 
Salonika as Governor. An accord was quickly 
established between him and the Austro-Hungarian 
agents in Macedonia. Where the Bulgarians were 
weak, the Turks and the Austrian emissaries en- 
couraged the Bulgarian propaganda. Where the 
Greeks were weak, Hellenic bands were allowed 
immunity. Where the Servians were weak, the 
Servian propaganda made great strides with the con- 
nivance of the Government. The European gen- 
darmerie was powerless to struggle against Turkish, 
Austro-Hungarian, and Balkan intrigues. The cor- 
respondence of the European officers and consuls, 
and of journalists who visited Macedonia during 
this period, makes interesting reading. Their point 
of view is almost invariably that of their surround- 
ings. It depended upon just what part of Mace- 
donia one happened to be in, or the company in which 
one travelled, whether a certain nationality were 
"noble heroes suffering for an ideal" or "blood- 
thirsty ruffians." Why are so many writers who 
pretend to be impartial observers like chameleons? 

Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria were alike guilty of 
subsidizing bands of armed men, who imagined that 
they were fulfilling a patriotic duty in brutally 

177 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

forcing their particular nationality upon ignorant 
peasants, most of whom did not know — or care — to 
what nation they belonged. There was little to 
choose between the methods and the actions of the 
different bands. Everywhere pillage, incendiarism, 
and assassination were the order of the day. When 
Christian propagandists let them alone, the poor 
villagers had to endure the same treatment from 
Moslem Albanians and from the Turkish soldiery. 
In order to give the "reforms" of the Program of 
Miirszteg a chance, Athens, Sofia, and Belgrade 
ostensibly withdrew their active support of the 
bands. But the efforts of the Powers had still not 
only the secret bad faith of Austria- Hungary and 
Turkey to contend with, but also the determination 
of the Macedonians themselves not to be "reformed " 
d Veuropeenne, that is to say, d la turque. The 
powerful Bulgarian "interior organization" in 
Macedonia kept up the struggle in the hope that the 
continuation of anarchy would bring the Powers to 
see that there was no other solution possible of the 
Macedonian question than the autonomy of Mace- 
donia under a Christian governor. Greeks and 
Servians opposed the project of autonomy, however, 
because they knew that it would result eventually 
in the reversion of Macedonia to Bulgaria. The 
history of Eastern Rumelia would be repeated. In 
considering the Macedonian problem, it must never 
be forgotten that the great bulk of the population of 
Macedonia is Bulgarian, in spite of all the learned 
dissertations and imposing statistics of Greek and 
Servian writers. But the difficulty is that this 

178 



RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 

Bulgarian population is agricultural. In the cities 
near the sea and all along the seacoast from Salonika 
to Dedeagatch the Greek element is predominant. 
No geographical division of Macedonia can be made, 
viable from the economic point »of view, which 
satisfies racial claims by following the principle of 
preponderant nationality. 

After her disasters in the Far East, Russia began 
to turn her attention once more to the Near East. 
A reopening of the Macedonian question between 
Austria-Hungary and Russia was imminent when 
the Young Turk revolution of July, 1908, upset all 
calculations, and brought a new factor into the prob- 
lem of the future of European Turkey. Austria- 
Hungary boldly challenged — more than that, defied 
— Russia by annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this 
action she was backed by Germany. Russia and 
France were not ready for war. Great Britain and 
Italy, each involved in an internal social revolution 
of tremendous importance, could not afford to risk 
the programs of their respective cabinets by em- 
barking upon uncertain foreign adventures. 

The Balkan States were left to solve the Mace- 
donian problem by themselves. Their solution was 
the Treaty of Bukarest. The success of Servia in 
planting herself in the valley of the Vardar, and in 
occupying Monastir, is the result of the struggle of 
races in Macedonia. It is the direct, immediate 
cause of the European War of 1914. 



179 



CHAPTER XI 

THE YOUNG TURK REGIME IN THE 
OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

NO event during the first decade of the twentieth 
century was heralded throughout Europe with 
so great and so sincere interest and sympathy 
as the bloodless revolution of July 24, 1908, by which 
the regime of Abdul Hamid was overthrown and the 
constitution of 1876 resuscitated. 

Although the world was unprepared for this event, 
it was not due to any sudden cause. For twenty 
years the leaven of liberalism had been working in 
the minds of the educated classes in the Ottoman 
Empire. Moslems, as well as Christians, had been 
in attendance in large numbers at the American, 
French, Italian, and German schools in Turkey, and 
had gone abroad to complete their education. Just 
as in Italy and in Germany, Young Turkey had come 
into existence through contact with those free institu- 
tions in the outside world which other races enjoyed, 
had been emancipated from superstition and from the 
stultifying influences of religious formalism, and had 
grown, in the army, to numbers sufficient to dictate 
the policy of the Government. 

From the beginning of his reign, Abdul Hamid had 

180 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

done all in his power to prevent the growth of the 
liberal spirit. The result of thirty years, in so far 
as civil officials of the Government were concerned, 
had been the stamping out of every man who com- 
bined ability with patriotism and devotion to an 
ideal. The best elements had taken the road to 
death, to imprisonment, or to exile, so that from the 
palace down to the humblest village, the Turkish 
civil service was composed of a set of men absolutely 
lacking in independence and in honour, and devoted 
to the master who ruled from Yildiz. But in the 
army, this same policy, though attempted, had not 
wholly succeeded. A portion at least of the officers 
received an education; many of them, indeed, had 
been sent abroad to Germany and to France in order 
to keep abreast with the development of military 
science, so essential to the very existence of Turkey. 
In the army, then, hundreds of officers of high 
character and high ideals were able to avoid the fate 
which had come to other educated Moslems in 
Turkey. They learned to love their country, and 
with that love came a sense of shame for the results 
of the despotism under which they existed. To have 
lived in Paris or in Berlin was enough to make them 
dissatisfied; to have visited Cairo or Alexandria, 
Sofia or Bukarest or Athens, and to have contrasted 
the conditions of life in these cities, recently their 
own, with Constantinople, Salonika, and Smyrna, was 
sufficient. 

It is impossible in the limits of this book to tell 
how this bloodless revolution was planned by exiles 
abroad and officers at home. It was successful, as 

181 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

well as bloodless, because the army refused to obey 
the orders of the Sultan. To save his life and his 
throne, Abdul Hamid was compelled to resuscitate 
the constitution which he had granted, and then 
suppressed, at the beginning of his reign. 

We who lived through those dream days of the 
beginning of the new regime will never forget the 
sense of joy of an emancipated people. The spy 
system was abolished, newspapers were allowed to 
tell the truth and express their own opinions, pass- 
ports and teskeres (permissions to travel from one 
point to another within the Empire) were declared 
unnecessary, bakshish was refused at the custom 
house and police station. Moslem ulema and Chris- 
tian clergy embraced each other in public, rode 
through the streets in triumph in the same carriages, 
and harangued the multitudes from the same plat- 
form in mosque and church. A new era of Liberty, 
Fraternity, and Equality, they said, had dawned for 
all the races in Turkey. The Sultan was the father, 
Turkey the fatherland, barriers and disabilities of 
creed and race had ceased to exist. It seemed in- 
credible, but these scenes were really happening 
from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf. 

Optimism, hope for the future, was so strong that 
one had not the heart to express very loudly his 
belief that no real revolution was ever bloodless, that 
no real change in political and social life of the people 
could come in a single day or as a result of an official 
document. No one could think of anything else but 
the constitution, which had broken the chains for 
Moslem and Christian alike, the constitution which 

182 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

was going to restore Turkey to its lawful place 
among the nations of Europe, the constitution which 
was to heal the sick man and solve the question of the 
Orient. In Smyrna, in Constantinople, in Beirut, 
and in Asia Minor, I heard the same story over and 
over again. But there was always the misgiving, the 
apprehension for the future, from which the foreigner 
in Turkey is never free. It seemed too good to be 
true ; it was too good to be true. It was against the 
logic of history. The most wonderful constitution 
that the world has ever known is that of England. 
It does not exist on paper; there is no need for a 
document. It is good, and it has endured, because 
it has been written in blood, in suffering, and in the 
agony of generations, on the pages of eight centuries 
of history. Could Turkey hope to be free in a day? 
The first test of the constitution came, of course, 
with the election and composition of the Parliament. 
The election was held quietly, in some parts of the 
Empire secretly even, and when the Parliament as- 
sembled at Constantinople, one began to see already 
the handwriting on the wall. For its composition 
was in no way in accordance with the distribu- 
tion of population in the Empire. The Turk — and 
by the Turk I mean the composite Moslem race 
which has grown up through centuries of inter- 
marriage and forcible conversion — had always been 
the ruling race. With the establishment of a con- 
stitutional regime, the Young Turks did not mean to 
abdicate in favour of Moslem Arabs or Christian 
Greeks and Armenians. They had "arranged" the 
elections in such a way that they would have in the 

183 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Parliament a substantial majority over any possible 
combination of other racial elements. 

One cannot but have sympathy with the natural 
feeling of racial pride which is inborn in the Turks. 
A race of masters, — who could expect that they 
would be willing to surrender the privileges of cen- 
turies? But they forgot that a constitutional regime 
and the principles of Liberty, Equality, and Frater- 
nity must necessarily imply the yielding of their 
unique position in the Empire. The Turk, as a race, 
is composed of two elements, a ruling class of land- 
owners and military and civil officials, arrogant 
though courteous, corrupt though honest in private 
life, parasitical though self-respecting, and a peasant 
class, hopelessly ignorant, lacking in energy, initia- 
tive, ambition, aspirations, and ideals. The great 
bulk of the Turkish element in the Empire looked 
with the indifference of ignorance and the hostility 
of jealous regard for their unique position in the 
community upon the granting of a constitution. I 
doubt if five per cent, of the Turkish population of 
the Empire has ever known what a constitutional 
regime means, or cared whether it exists or not. 

There remains the five per cent. Of these the 
great bulk belong either to the corrupt official class, 
whose subjection to the tyranny of Yildiz Kiosk had 
totally unfitted them for service under the new 
regime on which they were entering, and the land- 
owners, whose wealth was dependent upon the 
unequal privileges that the law allowed to them as 
Moslems, and whose interests were totally at vari- 
ance with the spirit of the constitution. There are 

184 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

left small groups of younger army officers and of 
professional men, who had been educated in foreign 
schools or by foreign teachers in Turkey and abroad. 
They were, for the most part, either without the 
knowledge of any other metier than the army, or, 
if civilian, unfitted by training and experience for 
governmental executive and administrative work. 
Consequently from the very beginning, the genuine 
Young Turks who were honest in their idealism had 
to make a compact with the higher army officers and 
with corrupt civil officials of Abdul Hamid. When 
the real Young Turks controlled the Cabinet, their 
disasters were those of theorists and visionaries. 
When they yielded the control of affairs to men more 
experienced than they, it was simply the renewal of 
the tyranny of Abdul Hamid. It was because these 
two elements were united in the firm resolution to 
keep the control in the hands of Moslem Turks, that 
the constitutional regime in Turkey has gone from 
Scylla to Charybdis without ever entering port. 

From the very beginning, thoughtful men pointed 
out that there was only one way of salvation and of 
liberal evolution for the Ottoman Empire. That was 
an honest and sincere co-operation with the Christian 
elements of the Empire, and with the Arabic and 
Albanian Moslem elements. Fanaticism and racial 
pride prevented the Young Turks from adopting the 
sole possible way of establishing the constitutional 
regime. From the very beginning, then, they failed, 
and it is their failure which has plunged Europe into 
the series of wars that has ended in the devastation of 
unhappy Belgium, so far remote from the cause and 

185 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

so innocent of any part in the events which brought 
upon her such terrible misfortunes. One could write 
a whole book upon the events of the first five years of 
constitutional government in Turkey and could show, 
beyond a shadow of a doubt, how from the very 
beginning there was no honest and loyal effort made 
to apply even the most rudimentary principles of 
constitutional government. Despotism means the 
subjection of a country to the will of its rulers. 
Constitutionalism means the subjection of the rulers 
to the will of the country. The Young Turks, em-7 
bodied in the "Committee of Union and Progress,' 
merely continued the despotism of Abdul Hamid. 
They were far worse than Abdul Hamid, however, 
for they were irresponsible and unskilled. One 
handling the helm, knowing how to steer, might have 
kept the ship of state afloat, all the more easily, 
perhaps, because the waters were so troubled. Many 
hands, none knowing where or how to go, steered the 
Ottoman Empire to inevitable shipwreck. 

Although the vicissitudes of various Cabinets and 
Parliaments can have place in our work only so far 
as they have a direct bearing on foreign relations, 
there are six matters of internal policy which must be 
mentioned in order to explain how rapidly and surely 
the Ottoman Empire went to its destruction; the 
treatment of Armenians before and after the Adana 
massacres; the attempt to suppress the liberties of 
the Orthodox Church; the Cretan question, ending 
in the Greek boycott; the Macedonian policy; the 
Albanian uprisings ; and the lack of co-operation and 
sympathy with the Arabs. 

1 86 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

THE ARMENIANS AND THE ADANA MASSACRES 

Among the various races of the Ottoman Empire, 
none was more overcome with joy at the proclama- 
tion of the constitutional regime than the Armenian. 
Scattered everywhere throughout the Empire, and 
in no region an element of preponderance, the Ar- 
menians had always made themselves felt in the 
commercial and intellectual life of Turkey far out of 
proportion to their numerical strength. They ap- 
preciated and understood, best of all the Christian 
populations, the significance of constitutional govern- 
ment. Honestly applied, it meant more to them 
than to any other element of the Empire. 

In the first place, the burden of Turkish and Mos- 
lem oppression had fallen most heavily on them. 
It was not only the massacres of 1894 to 1896, 
horrible as they were, which had put the Armenians 
in continual fear for their lives ; it was the centuries- 
old petty persecution, from which they believed they 
were now to be freed. Turkish officialdom had 
grown rich in extorting the last farthing from the 
Armenians. Only those who had seen this persecu- 
tion and extortion can realize how large a part it 
played in the daily life of the Armenians, and how 
continuous and rich a source of revenue it was to the 
official Turk. For every little service the official ex- 
pected his fat fee, always charging up to the limit 
his victim was able to pay. You could not carry on 
your business, you could not build a house, you could 
not enlarge or alter or repair your shop, you could 
not get a tax on your harvest estimated, you could 

187 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

not travel even from one village to another for the 
purpose of business or pleasure or study, without 
paying the officials. Very frequently between the 
local Turkish official and the Armenian stood a 
middle man who must also be paid for the purpose of 
carrying the fee or bribe to the official in charge. 
How people could have lived under such a regime 
and have prospered, is beyond the comprehension of 
the Occidental. Nothing speaks so eloquently for the 
business acumen of the Armenian race, as well as for 
devotion to the religion of its fathers. 

Naturally, the Armenians expected that the 
constitution would bring to them a complete relief 
from economic repression, as well as from the terrors 
of massacre. They were led to believe this by the 
Young Turks who had so long plotted the overthrow 
of Abdul Hamid's despotism. During the campaign 
from 1 890- 1 908, the Young Turks needed the money 
and the brains of Armenians in the larger centres of 
population where they had their foyers, and in the 
cities abroad where they lived in exile. It cannot be 
doubted that there were among the Young Turks 
during the period when they had to keep alive their 
ideals in the fire of hope, an honest intention to give 
the Armenians a share in the regeneration of the 
Ottoman Empire. But, as soon as they realized their 
ambitions, racial and religious fanaticism came to 
them with such force that they forgot the brilliant 
promises as well as the affectionate intercourse of the 
days of suffering and struggle. 

In the second place, Armenians, unlike the Greeks, 
the Macedonians, and the Arabs, had, as a race, no 

188 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

separatist tendencies. They were not looking to- 
wards another state to come and redeem them. 
They feared Russia. They were too scattered to 
hope to form, by the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, 
a state of their own. They loved the land in which 
they lived with all the passion of their nature. In 
many regions, Turkish was their native tongue. 
They were industrious tillers of the soil, as well as 
merchants. The Sultan could have had no more 
loyal subjects than these, had he so desired. 

Although the composition of the new Parliament 
chosen in October, 1908, and of the first constitu- 
tional Cabinet, was a prophecy of how they were to 
be left out in the cold, the Armenians were through- 
out that winter, when the constitution was new, firm 
and loyal, as well as intelligent, supporters of re- 
generated Turkey. The wish was father to the 
thought. For them there was no longer the barrier 
of race and creed. All were Osmanlis, and willing to 
lose their identity in the politically amalgamated 
race. The reign of Abdul Hamid was a nightmare, 
quickly forgotten. The future was full of hope. If 
only the Young Turks had realized what a tremen- 
dous influence the Armenians could have played in 
the creation of New Turkey, if only they had been will- 
ing to use these allies, we might have been able to write 
a different history of the past few years in Europe. 

But the awakening was to be cruel. It came in a 
region of the Empire that never before experienced 
the horrors of a general massacre, where Christians 
felt not only at ease, but on friendly terms with their 
Moslem neighbours. 

189 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

On April 14, 1909, on a morning when the sun had 
risen upon the peaceful and happy city of Adana, out 
of a clear sky came the tragedy which was the be- 
ginning of the end of the Ottoman Empire. Without 
provocation, the Moslem population began to attack 
and kill the Christians. The Governor of the pro- 
vince and his military officials not only did nothing 
whatever to stop the bloodshed, but they actu- 
ally handed out arms and munitions to the blood- 
frenzied mob of peasants, who were pouring into the 
city. For three days, killing, looting, and burning of 
houses were aided by the authorities. The massacres 
spread west through the great Cilician plain to 
Tarsus, and east over the Amanus Range into north- 
ern Syria, as far as Antioch, where the followers 
of Jesus were first called Christians. The world, 
horrified by the stories which soon made their way 
to the newspapers, realized that the "bloodless re- 
volution" had not regenerated Turkey. The blood 
had come at last, and without the regeneration! 
The Great Powers sent their warships to Mersina, 
the port of Tarsus and Adana. Even from the 
distant United States came two cruisers, under 
pressure, over six thousand miles. 

In the meantime, events of great importance, but 
not of equal significance in the future of Turkey, 
were taking place at Constantinople. On the eve of 
the first Adana massacre, Abdul Hamid, having 
corrupted the soldiers of the Constantinople garrison, 
set in motion a demonstration against the constitu- 
tion. The soldiers shot down their officers in cold 
blood, marched to Yildiz Kiosk, and demanded of the 

190 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

Sultan the abolition of the constitution, which they 
declared was at variance with the Sheriat, the sacred 
law of Islam. Abdul Hamid gladly consented. Popu- 
lar sympathy in Constantinople and throughout the 
Empire was with the Sultan, as far as the object of 
the revolution went. But the way in which it was 
brought about made it impossible for the Sultan to 
remain within the pale of civilization. Of all nations, 
none relied on its army more than Turkey. Were 
the assassination of the officers to go unpunished, the 
disintegration of the Empire necessarily followed. So 
the military hierarchy, "Old" Turks as well as 
"Young," rose against the Sultan. The army 
corps in Salonika under the command of Mah- 
mud Shevket pasha, marched against the capital 
and with very little resistance mastered the mu- 
tiny of the Constantinople garrison. Abdul Hamid 
was deposed, and sent into exile at the Villa Ala- 
tini at Salonika. His brother, Reshid Mohammed, 
came to the throne, under the title of Moham- 
med V. 

As soon as the Young Turks found themselves 
again in control of the situation, even before the 
proclamation of the new Sultan, they sent from 
Beirut to Adana a division of infantry to "re-estab- 
lish order." These regiments disembarked at Mer- 
sina on the day Mohammed V ascended the throne, 
April 25th. Immediately upon their arrival in Adana 
they began a second massacre which was more 
horrible than the first. Thousands were shot and 
burned, and more than half the city was in ruins. 
This second massacre occurred in spite of the fact 

191 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

that a dozen foreign warships were by this time 
anchored in the harbour of Mersina. 

It is impossible to estimate the losses of life and 
property in the vilayets of Cilicia and northern Syria 
during the last two weeks of April, 1908. Not less 
than thirty thousand Armenians were massacred. 
The losses of property in Adana alone were serious 
enough to cause the foremost fire insurance company 
in France to fight in the courts for two years the 
payments of its claims. But it is not in the realm of 
our work to follow out the local aftermath of this 
terrible story. We are interested here only in its 
bearing on the fortunes of the Empire and of Europe. 

From the very beginning, the Young Turks, now 
re-established in Constantinople with a Sultan of 
their own creation, and having nothing more to fear 
from the genius and bad will of Abdul Hamid, pro- 
tested before Europe that the massacres were due 
to the old regime and that they had been arranged 
by Abdul Hamid, whose deposition cleared them of 
responsibility. But the revelations of the New York 
Herald, the Tribuna of Rome, and the Berliner Tage- 
blatt, translated and reprinted in the British, French, 
and Russian press, were so moving that it was 
necessary for the Young Turks to send special com- 
missions to the capitals of Europe to counteract 
the impression of these articles. 

Europe was willing to accept the explanation of 
the Constantinople Cabinet, and to continue its 
faith, though shaken, in the intentions of the Young 
Turks to grant to the Christians of Turkey the 
regime of equality and security of life and property 

192 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

which the constitution guaranteed. Even the Ar- 
menians, terrible as this blow had been, were also 
willing to forgive and forget. But the condition of 
forgiveness, and the proof of sincerity of the declara- 
tions of the Young Turks, both to the outside world 
and to the Armenians, would be the punishment of 
those who had been guilty of this most horrible blot 
upon the civilization of the twentieth century. This 
was to be the test. 

The Court-Martial, sent to Adana from Constan- 
tinople after the new Sultan was established upon 
the throne and the Young Turks were certain of their 
position, had every guarantee to enable it to do its 
work thoroughly and justly. It was not influenced 
or threatened. There was, however, no honest in- 
tention to give decisions impartially and in accord- 
ance with the facts that the investigation would 
bring forth. The methods and findings of the Court- 
Martial were a travesty of justice. Its members 
refused absolutely to go to the bottom of the massa- 
cre, and to punish those who had been guilty. I 
happen to be the only foreign witness whose deposi- 
tion they took. They refused to allow me to testify 
against the Vali and his fellow-conspirators. The 
line of conduct had been decided before their arrival. 
The idea was to condemn to death a few Moslems 
of the dregs of the population, who would probably 
have found their way to the gallows sooner or later 
any way. With them were to be hanged a number 
of Armenians, whose only crime was that they had 
defended the lives and honour of their women and 
children. The Vali of Adana, who had planned the 
13 193 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

massacre and had carried it out, and two or three 
Moslem leaders of the city who had co-operated with 
him and with the military authorities in the effort 
to exterminate the Armenians, were not even sent to 
prison. No testimony against them was allowed to 
be brought before the Court-Martial . They went 
into exile "until the affair blew over." 

When a future generation has the prospective to 
make researches into the downfall of the Young Turk 
constitutional regime in Turkey, they will probably 
find the beginning of the end in the failure to punish 
the perpetrators of the Adana massacres. For this 
was a formal notification to the Christians of Turkey 
that the constitutional regime brought to them no 
guarantees of security, or justice, but, on the other 
hand, made their position in the Empire even more 
precarious than it had been under the despotism of 
Abdul Hamid. After Adana, the Armenian popula- 
tion became definitely alienated from the constitu- 
tional movement, and was convinced that its only 
hope lay in the absolute disappearance of Turkish 
rule. 

THE ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS THE LIBERTIES OF 
THE ORTHODOX CHURCH 

When Mohammed the Conqueror entered Con- 
stantinople in 1453, he showed a wise determination 
to continue the policy of his predecessors by pre- 
serving the independence of the Orthodox Church. 
For he knew well that the success of the Osmanlis had 
been due to religious toleration, and that no durable 
empire could be built in Asia Minor and the Balkan 

194 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

Peninsula by a Moslem government, unless the 
liberties of the Christian inhabitants were assured 
through the recognition of the Greek patriarchate. 
The first thing that Mohammed did was to seek out 
the Greek patriarch, and confirm him in his position 
as the political, as well as the religious, head of 
Christian Ottoman subjects. 

Islam is a theocracy. The spirit of its government 
is inspired by the sacred law, the Sheriat, based upon 
the Koran and the writings of the earliest fathers of 
Islam. Down to the smallest details, the organiza- 
tion of the state, of the courts of justice, and of the 
social life of Mohammedan peoples, is influenced by 
ecclesiastical law, and by the power of the Church. 
As this law does not provide for the inclusion of non- 
Moslem elements either in the political or social life 
of the nation, it has always been evident that people 
of another religion, within the limits of a Moslem 
state, can exist only if they have an ecclesiastical 
organization of their own, with well-defined liberties, 
privileges, and safeguards. 

This principle was recognized by the Osmanlis for 
over five hundred years; even the most despotic of 
sultans never dreamed of abandoning it. There 
might be persecutions, there might be massacres, 
there might be even assassination of patriarchs, but, 
until the Young Turk regime, no Ottoman ministry 
ever dreamed of destroying the organism which had 
made possible the life of Moslem and Christian under 
the same rule. 

The thesis of the Young Turks was, from a theo- 
retical standpoint, perfectly sound and just. They 

195 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

said that ecclesiastical autonomy was necessary under 
a despotism, but that it had ceased to have a raison 
d'etre under a constitutional government. The con- 
stitution guaranteed equal rights, irrespective of 
religion, to all the races of the Empire. Therefore 
the Greek Church must resign its prerogatives of a 
political nature, for they were wholly incompatible 
with the idea of constitutional government. 

Many foreigners, carried away by the reasonable- 
ness of this argument, severely condemned the 
Orthodox Church for continuing to resist the en- 
croachments of the new Government upon its secular 
privileges — secular in both senses of the word. They 
attributed the attitude of the Greek ecclesiastics 
to hostility to the constitution, to the reactionary 
tendency of every ecclesiastic organization, and to 
selfish desire to hold firmly the privileges which 
enabled them to keep in their clutches the Greek 
population of Turkey, and continue to enjoy the 
prestige and wealth accruing to them from these 
privileges. Such criticism only revealed ignorance 
of history and a lack of appreciation of the real 
issue at stake. 

No ecclesiastical organization can, under a con- 
stitutional government, continue indefinitely to be a 
state within a state, and to enjoy peculiar privileges 
and immunities. But the application of the consti- 
tution must come first. It must enter into the life 
of the people. It must become the vital expression 
of their national existence, evolved through genera- 
tions of testing and experimenting. The constitu- 
tion is finally accepted and supported by a nation 

196 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

when, and because, it has been found good and has 
come to reflect the needs and wishes of the people. 
Then, without any great trouble, the ecclesiastical 
organization will find itself gradually deprived of 
every special privilege. For the privileges will have 
become an anachronism. 

But, just as in the establishment of the constitu- 
tion, in their attitude toward the Greek Church the 
Young Turks acted as if the work of generations in 
other countries could be for them, in spite of their 
peculiarly delicate problems and the differences in 
creed involved, the act of a single moment. This 
mentality of the half -educated, immature visionary 
has been shown in every one of the numerous sense- 
less and disastrous decisions which have brought the 
Ottoman Empire so speedily to its ruin. 

The Greek Church resisted bitterly every move of 
the Young Turks to bring about the immediate 
millennium. The patriarch was a man of wide ex- 
perience, of sound common sense, and of undaunted 
courage. Backed by the Lay Assembly, which has 
always been an admirable democratic institution of 
the Orthodox Church, he refused to give up realities 
for chimeras. With all its privileges and all its 
power, it had been hard enough for the Orthodox 
Church to protect the Greek subjects of Turkey. 
The patriarch did not intend to surrender the safe- 
guards by which he was enabled to make tolerable 
the life of his flock for illusory and untested guar- 
antees. Let the constitution become really the 
expression of the will of the people of Turkey, let it 
demonstrate the uselessness of any safeguards for 

197 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

protecting the Christians from Moslem oppression, 
let the era of liberty and equality and fraternity 
actually be realized in the Ottoman Empire, and 
then the Church would resign its privileges. For 
they would be antiquated, and fall naturally into 
desuetude. But in constitutions, as in other things, 
the proof of the pudding is in the eating. 

What the Young Turks attempted to do was to 
destroy the privileges of the Orthodox Church, on the 
ground that these privileges were a barrier to the 
assimilation of the races in the Empire. Americans, 
above all nations, have deep sympathies for, and well 
justified reasons for having faith in, the policy of 
assimilation. Have not the various races of Europe, 
different in religion and in political and social cus- 
toms, passed wonderfully through the crucible of 
assimilation on American soil? But by assimilation 
the Young Turks meant, not the amalgamation of 
races, each co-operating and sharing in the building 
up of the fatherland, as in America, but the complete 
subjection and ultimate disappearance of all other 
elements in the Empire than their own. They in- 
tended, from the very first days of the constitutional 
regime, to make Turkey a nation of Turks. Theirs 
was the strong, virile race, into which the other races 
would be fused. Turkey was weak, they declared, 
because it was the home of a conglomeration of 
peoples. If Turkey was to become like the nations 
of Europe, these different nationalities must be de- 
stroyed. To destroy them, the Government had first 
to aim at the foyer of national life, the ecclesiastical 
hierarchies. 

198 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

I have talked with many a zealous Young Turk. 
What I have written here is not only the logical 
interpretation of the facts; it is also the faithful 
expression of the ideas of the most earnest and in- 
telligent Turkish partisans of the new regime. They 
pointed out, with perfect logic, that this process had 
gone on in every European country, and that it was 
the only way in which a strong nation could be built. 
So far they were right. But, aside from the fact 
that in Europe this political and social evolution had 
taken centuries, there was also the working of the 
law of the survival of the fittest. In European na- 
tions it had been the element, always composite, 
which deserved to live, that formed the nucleus of a 
nationality. The whole root of the question in 
Turkey was, were the Young Turks justified in 
believing that the Turk was this element? 

There is not space to discuss the reasons for the 
supremacy of the Osmanli in the Ottoman Empire. 
Up to the eighteenth century, the Osmanli was un- 
doubtedly the "fittest" element. For the past two 
hundred years, the continued domination of Turk 
and the continued subjection of Christian popula- 
tions, in Turkey, has been due to causes outside of 
the Empire. The Turk has remained the ruling race. 
But is he still the fittest? One may examine the 
different elements of the Ottoman Empire, and 
measure them by the tests of civilization. From the 
intellectual standpoint, from the business standpoint, 
from the administrative standpoint, the Turk is 
hardly able to sustain his claim to continue to be, in 
a twentieth-century empire, the element which can 

199 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

hope to assimilate Greek, Armenian, Albanian, Slav, 
and Arab. He is less fit than any of the others, 
especially than the Greek and Armenian in intellec- 
tual and business faculties, and than the Albanian in 
administrative faculties. There remains, then, as his 
sole claim to dominate the other races, his physical 
superiority. By history and by legend, he is the 
fighting man and rules by right of conquest and 
force. 

It was always the sane — and only safe — policy of 
the Turks to keep Christians out of the army. They 
saw to it that the metier of arms remained wholly to 
the Moslems. In spite of the increasing wealth and 
education of the Christian elements of the Empire, 
the ascendancy was preserved to the Turk through 
the army. But at what a sacrifice! By reason of 
military service, the Turkish peasant has been kept 
in economic and intellectual serfdom, while his 
Christian neighbour progressed. The Turkish popu- 
lation has actually decreased, and the ravages of 
garrison life, due to dyspepsia and syphilis, have 
diminished fearfully the physical vigour of the race. 
By the same token, the upper classes, knowing only 
the life of army officers, have been removed from the 
necessity of competing in the world for position and 
success. Can manhood be formed in any other mould 
than that of competition, where the goal is achieve- 
ment, and is reached only by continued effort of will 
and brain? The upper class Turk is a parasite, and, 
like all parasites, helpless when that upon which he 
feeds is taken from him. 

The attack of the Young Turk party upon the 
200 







. (S T 




THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

Greek Church failed. The patriarch refused to sur- 
render his privileges. The Greek clergy and the 
Lay Council held out under persecution and threats. 
In October, 1910, when the Lay Council met in 
Constantinople, its members were arrested, and 
thrown into jail. In Macedonia and Thrace, in the 
^gean Islands, along the coast of Asia Minor, the 
bishops and clergy suffered untold persecutions. 
Some were even assassinated. I shall never forget a 
memorable interview I had with Joachim III, during 
that crisis. His Holiness untied with trembling 
fingers the dossier of persecutions, which contained 
letters and sworn statements from a dozen dioceses. 
"They treat us like dogs!" he cried. "Never under 
Abdul Hamid or any Sultan have my people suffered 
as they are suffering now. But we are too strong for 
them. We refuse to be exterminated. I see all 
Europe stained with blood because of these crimes." 
How prophetic these words as I record them now! 

The Turk could not hope to assimilate the Greek 
by peaceful methods, because he was his intellectual 
inferior. When he planned to use force, the Balkan 
Alliance was formed. The battle of Lule Burgas 
took away from the Turk his last claim to fitness as 
dominant race. He could no longer fight better than 
Christians. The first Balkan War gave the coup de 
grace to the final — and has it not been all along the 
only? — argument for Turkish racial supremacy. 

THE CRETAN QUESTION AND THE GREEK BOYCOTT 

The island of Crete had long been to Turkey, in 
relation to Greece, what Cuba had been to Spain, in 

201 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

relation to the United States. In both cases, and 
about the same time, wars of liberation broke out. 
But Greece was not as fortunate in her efforts for the 
emancipation of an enslaved and continually rebel- 
lious population as was the United States. Powerless 
and humiliated, after the war of 1897, Greece could 
no longer hope to have a voice, by reason of her own 
force, in the direction of Cretan affairs. Crete be- 
came the foundling of European diplomacy. 

Together with the declaration of Bulgarian in- 
dependence, and the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina by Austria-Hungary, the Young Turks had to 
face a decree of the Cretan assembly to the effect 
that Crete was indissolubly united to the kingdom of 
Greece. The Young Turks could do nothing against 
Bulgaria. For the ceremony of Tirnovo had been 
no more than the de jure sanction of a de facto con- 
dition. The only cause for conflict, the question 
of the railroads in eastern Rumelia, was solved 
by Russian diplomacy. Against Austria-Hungary a 
boycott was declared. It resulted in a few success- 
ful attempts to prevent the landing of mails and 
freights from Austrian steamers, and in the tear- 
ing up of several million fezes which were of Aus- 
trian manufacture. These, by the way, were soon 
replaced by new fezes from the same factories. The 
Sublime Porte settled the Bosnia-Herzegovina ques- 
tion by accepting a money payment from Austria- 
Hungary. 

All the rancour resulting from these losses and 
humiliation, all the vials of wrath, were poured upon 
the head of Greece. The Cretan question became 

202 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

the foremost problem in European diplomacy. The 
Cretans stubbornly refused to listen to the Powers, 
and decided to maintain their decision to belong to 
Greece. But Greece was threatened with war by 
Turkey, if she did not refuse to accept the annexation 
decree voted by the Cretans themselves. In order to 
prevent Turkey from attacking Greece, the Powers 
decided to use force against the Cretans. Turkey, 
not satisfied with the efforts of the Powers to preserve 
the Ottoman sovereignty and Ottoman pride in 
Crete, demanded still more of Greece. She asked that 
the Greek Parliament should not only declare its 
disinterestedness in Crete, but should take upon it- 
self the obligation to maintain that disinterestedness 
in the future. 

To go into all the tortuous phases of the Cretan 
question up to the time of the Balkan War would 
make this chapter out of proportion; and yet Crete, 
like Alsace-Lorraine, has had a most vital in- 
fluence upon the present European war. The 
one point to be emphasized here is, that to 
bring pressure to bear upon Greece in defining her 
attitude toward Crete, the Young Turks decided 
to revive the commercial boycott which they had 
used against Austria. I have seen from close range 
the notorious Greek boycott of 1910 to 1912. It was 
far more disastrous to the Turks than to the Greeks 
of Turkey. It threatened so completely, however, the 
economic prosperity of Greece, which is a commercial 
rather than an agricultural country, that it forced 
Greece into the Balkan Alliance much against her 
will, for the sake of self-preservation. 

203 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

If this boycott had been carried on against the 
Greeks of Greece alone, it would not have affected 
vitally the prosperity of the Greeks in the Ottoman 
Empire. Their imports come from every country, 
and for their exports the freight steamers of all the 
European nations competed. But it was directed 
also against the Greeks who were Ottoman subjects. 
In Salonika, Constantinople, Trebizond, Smyrna, 
and other ports, commerce was entirely in the hands 
of Greeks. They owned almost every steamer 
bearing the Ottoman flag. They owned the cargoes. 
They bought and sold the merchandise. The Young 
Turks, working through the hernials or longshoremen 
and the boatmen who manned the lighters, — all 
Turks and Kurds, — succeeded in tying up absolutely 
the commerce of Ottoman Greeks. The Greek 
merchants and shippers were ruined. It was urged 
cleverly that this was the chance for Moslems to get 
the trade of the great ports of Turkey into their own 
hands. The Government encouraged them by buy- 
ing and maintaining steamship lines. But the Turks 
had no knowledge of commerce, no money to buy 
goods, and no inclination to do the work and accept 
the responsibilities necessary for successful commer- 
cial undertakings. The result was that imports were 
stopped, prices went up, and the Moslems were hurt 
as much as, if not more than, the Christians. After 
several voyages, the new government passenger 
vessels were practically hors de combat. There was 
no longer first, second, and third class. Peasants 
squatted on the decks and in the saloons. Filth 
reigned supreme, and hopeless confusion. No 

204 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

European could endure a voyage on one of these 
steamers, and no merchant cared to entrust his 
shipments to them. 

The boycott died because it was a hopeless under- 
taking. For many months, the Government lost 
heavily through the falling off in the custom house 
receipts. The labouring class (almost wholly Mos- 
lems) of the seaports suffered terribly, as our labour- 
ing class suffers during a prolonged strike. The 
boycott was removed, Greeks were allowed to re- 
sume their business, so essential for the prosperity 
of the community, and, as is always the case in 
Turkey, everything worked again in the same old 
way. 

But, just as the failure to punish the perpetrators 
of the Adana massacre alienated definitely and 
irrevocably the sympathy and loyal support of the 
Armenian element from the constitutional regime, 
so the boycott, iniquitous and futile, lost to the 
Young Turks the allegiance of the Greeks of the 
Empire. Already alarmed by the attack upon 
the liberties of the patriarchate, the Greeks began 
to look to Greece for help; and, in the islands of the 
^Egean and in Macedonia, the hope was strong that 
a successful war might put an end to what they were 
suffering. 

The Greeks of Turkey are not free from the univer- 
sal characteristic of human nature. You can perse- 
cute and browbeat a man, you can bully him and do 
him physical injury, you can refuse him a share in 
the government and put him in an inferior social 
position, and he will continue to endure it. But, 

205 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

rob him of the chance of making a livelihood, and he 
will commence to conspire against the government. 
A man's vital point is his pocket-book. That vital 
point the Young Turks threatened by their boycott. 

THE YOUNG TURKS AND THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM 

It was at Salonika that the Young Turk move- 
ment first gained its footing in the Ottoman Empire, 
and until the loss of European Turkey, after the 
disastrous war with the Balkan States, Salonika 
continued to be the centre of the "Committee of 
Union and Progress. " Its congresses were always 
held there. From Salonika the third army corps 
went forth to suppress, in April, 1909, the counter- 
revolution in Constantinople. To the Young Turks, 
Salonika seemed the safest place in all the Ottoman 
dominions for the imprisonment of Abdul Hamid. 
Many of the leading members of the party were 
natives of Macedonia. In fact, it was because the 
Young Turks saw clearly that European Turkey 
would soon be lost to the Empire, unless there was 
a regeneration, that they precipitated in 1908 the 
revolution which had so long been brewing. 

It is natural, then, that the Macedonian problem 
should be the first and uppermost of all the many 
problems that had to be solved in the regenera- 
tion of Turkey. The " Committee of Union and Pro- 
gress" saw that immediate action must be taken to 
strengthen Ottoman authority, so severely shaken 
since the war with Russia, in the European vilayets. 

We have already shown in a previous chapter how 
206 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

the struggle of races in European Turkey had made 
Macedonia the bloody centre of Balkan rivalry, and 
had reduced the vilayets of Uskub and Salonika to 
anarchy. 

Up to the coming of the constitutional regime, 
there had been a very strong element in Macedonia, 
principally Bulgarian, which saw — oh, how prophetic- 
ally ! — that the liberation of Macedonia from Turkish 
rule would endanger, rather than aid, the propa- 
ganda for eventual Bulgarian hegemony in the 
Balkan Peninsula. These Bulgarians, wise in their 
day and generation beyond their emancipated 
brethren, advocated the intervention of Bulgarian 
arms, not to secure independence, but autonomy. 
They felt that by the creation, for a period of years, 
of an autonomous province of Macedonia under the 
suzerainty of the Sultan, the felicitous history of 
Eastern Rumelia would repeat itself. 

The Young Turks decided to solve the Macedon- 
ian problem by strengthening the Moslem element 
in every corner of the vilayets of Salonika and Uskub. 
The means of doing this were at hand. After the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkish 
agents began to work among the Moslem popula- 
tion in these countries to induce them to emigrate 
and come under the dominion of the "Padishah," as 
the Sultan is called by his faithful subjects. They 
were brought in and settled, with the help of the 
Government, in those districts of Macedonia where 
the Moslem element was weak. This was a repeti- 
tion of the policy of Abdul Hamid after the Congress 
of Berlin, when, in Eastern Rumelia and Thrace, 

207 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

to oppose the Bulgarians Circassians from the lost 
Caucasus were settled, and to oppose the Servians 
Albanian emigration into old Servia and the Sand- 
jak of Novi Bazar was encouraged. 

In addition to this, the Young Turks decided to 
secure the loyalty of their Christian subjects in 
European Turkey by abolishing the karadj (head tax) 
which exempted Christians from military service. 
Bulgarians, Greeks, and Servians were summoned to 
serve in the Ottoman army. 

The first of these measures should never have been 
adopted. The bitter experience of former years 
should have taught the Young Turks the lesson 
that emigration of this nature not only tended to 
arouse religious fanaticism, but also introduced an 
element, ignorant and unruly, and wholly worthless 
from the economic point of view. It has often been 
recorded that Moslems, prompted to the sacrifice of 
abandoning everything for their love of remaining 
Turkish subjects, have made these "treks" after the 
unsuccessful wars of Turkey of their own initiative. 
Nothing is farther from the truth. There has nc /er 
been an exodus of this sort which has not been due 
to the instigation of political agents. From the very 
fact that large industrious and influential Moslem 
elements have remained and prospered under Rus- 
sian, Bulgarian, and Austrian rule, it can be inferred 
that those who yielded to the solicitation of Turkish 
agents were the undesirable Moslem element, who, 
never having acquired anything where they were, 
had nothing to lose by making a change. If one 
excepts a certain portion of the Circassians, the 

208 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

statement may well be made that these emigrants — 
muhadjirs they are called in Turkish — are an element 
forming the lowest dregs of the population, as worth- 
less and shiftless as the great majority of the Jews 
whom the Zionist movement has attracted to Pales- 
tine. More than this, the muhadjirs have been 
fanatical and lawless, and it is they whose massacres 
of Christians have invariably ended in irretrievable 
ui ■■'.•' -r for Turkey. 

In Macedonia, the muhadjirs, in conjunction with 
the Albanian Moslem immigrants, were responsible 
for the succession of massacres in 1912, such as those 
of Ishtip and Kotchana, which helped to bring about 
the Balkan alliance. The same thing is happening 
to-day in the coast towns of Asia Minor and Thrace, 
where the brutality and blood lust of the muhadjirs 
since 1913 will eventually cause another attack of 
Greece upon Turkey. 

The second policy — that of enrolling Christians in 
the army — was recorded, back in the days of the first 
attempt at the emancipation of Christians, the Tan- 
zimat of 1839, as a measure which would ameliorate 
their lot and bring about equality. The idea was 
splendid, but its application was impracticable. Otto- 
man Christians are so wholly incompatible, from their 
social and educational background, with Ottoman 
Moslems, that they cannot be placed in the army, 
in mixed regiments, without incurring humiliation, 
degradation, and persecution of the most cruel sort. 

The only way in which Christians could be called 
to serve in the Ottoman army would have been the 
formation, at first, of separate regiments, where the 
14 209 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

soldiers would enjoy immunity from persecution. 
When this reform was made, there should have been 
also a provision from the very first, that the ranks of 
officers be recruited from the Christian elements in 
the Empire, in proportion to their numerical strength. 
But with both Christians and Jews, obligatory army 
service was used from the beginning — it is still used 
today — as a means of extorting money from those 
who could pay, and terrorizing and reducing to 
slavery those who could not raise the forty pounds 
required for exemption. Even if there were no reli- 
gious fanaticism, even if it were not necessary for 
Christians of intelligence to serve in an army wholly 
officered by Moslems, the terrible and criminal condi- 
tions of service which they were called upon to suffer 
would have justified the Christians in adopting every 
possible measure to avoid military service. 

Throughout the Empire, intelligent Christians 
who could not purchase their freedom from this 
obligation preferred exile to military service. From 
1909 to 1914, Turkey has lost hundreds of thousands 
of its best young blood. 

The result in Macedonia of the coming of the 
muhadjirs and the taking of Christians for the 
army, was that the Macedonians abandoned their 
advocacy of autonomy, under the suzerainty of the 
Sultan, and looked to the Balkan States for freedom 
from Turkish rule. 

THE ALBANIAN UPRISINGS 

Albania was never fully conquered by the Osmanlis. 
Like the Montenegrins, the Albanians were always 

210 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

able to resist the extension of Turkish authority in 
their mountains. Not only did the nature of the 
country favour them, but their proximity to the 
Adriatic, and their ability to call at will for Italian 
and Austrian help, made it advisable for the Supreme 
Porte to compromise with them. Many Albanians, 
including principally, as in Bosnia, the landowning 
families, were converted to Mohammedanism, and 
attached themselves to the fortunes of Turkey. 
Without ever giving up their local independence, 
these renegade Albanians became the most loyal and 
efficient supporters of Ottoman authority outside of 
Albania. 

Turkey has gained much from the Albanians. Her 
higher classes, endowed with extreme intelligence and 
physical activity, have been the most valuable civil 
and military officials that the Government has ever 
enjoyed. Because they were Moslems, they were 
able to take high positions in the army and govern- 
ment service. It is one of the most remarkable facts 
of Ottoman history that the great majority of the 
really great statesmen and soldiers of the Empire, 
if not of Christian ancestry, have been, and still are, 
Albanians. In strengthening the Turkish domination 
in the European provinces, after the period of decline 
set in, the Albanians have been indispensable. Their 
emigration from their mountains into Epirus, Old 
Servia, the valley of the Vardar, and the coast towns 
of Macedonia checked for a long time the conspira- 
cies and rebellions of the Christian elements. 

The Sultans of Turkey and their counsellors have 
always recognized the value of the Albanians. In 

211 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

return for their great services to the Empire, they 
were allowed to retain their local privileges. This 
meant independence, in reality, rather than auton- 
omy. They gave what taxes they pleased, or none. 
Military service was rendered upon their own terms. 
Christian Albanians, as well as Moslem, have pre- 
ferred Ottoman sovereignty to any other. They have 
never thought of independence, because this would 
have brought them responsibilities and dangers 
from which, under the fetish of "the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire," they were free. So they resisted 
every effort of Italian, Austrian, Slav, and Greek to 
weaken their allegiance to the Sultan. Turkey also 
allowed them to remain under the mediaeval condi- 
tions in which they lived back in the fourteenth 
century. They wanted neither railways, roads, nor 
ports. Among all the subjects of the Sultan, the 
Albanians were best satisfied with the absolute lack 
of progress under Moslem rule. These are the 
reasons why the majority of Albanians want to 
return once more to the fold of Turkey. 

The Young Turks were no more felicitous in their 
treatment of the Albanians than of the Greeks and 
Armenians. Without any consideration of the pe- 
culiar problems involved, they decided immediately, 
tackling every problem at once, that Albania must 
be civilized and that Ottoman sovereignty must work 
there in exactly the same way as in any other part of 
the Empire. Albanians must render military service, 
and submit to being sent wherever the authorities at 
Constantinople decided. Local independence must 
cease. Taxes must be paid regularly. When the 

212 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

Albanians resisted, as they did immediately, an 
army was sent to pacify the country. 

One cannot but sympathize with the principle laid 
down by the Minister of the Interior at Constan- 
tinople, that the central authority must be recognized 
and that the only way to stamp out the Albanian 
anarchy was to disarm the population. But the 
Young Turks knew no other way of doing this than 
by force. They did not realize that anarchy and 
lawlessness disappear only with education and 
economic progress. Instead of starting to "civilize" 
the Albanians by establishing schools and opening 
up the country with railways, they sent rapid-firing 
guns. In the summer of 1909, the rebellion was 
stamped out with ruthless cruelty by the burning of 
villages, the destruction of crops, and the seizing of 
cattle. Such measures were a very poor argument 
for the Albanian to induce him to comply with the 
disarmament decree. Under ordinary circumstances 
an Albanian would rather lose his leg than his gun. 
Under these circumstances, he preferred risking his 
life to giving up what he considered his only means 
of defence. 

Every year the Albanian rebellion broke out afresh. 
Every year the Young Turks exhausted the strength 
and spent the resources of their armies in European 
Turkey against the invulnerable mountains of 
Albania. After every "pacification," Albania'^ in 
arms was just as certain each May as the coming 
again of summer. 

In 191 2, when affairs were in a critical state as 
regards the Christian neighbours, the Cabinet in 

213 



THE NEW MAP OP EUROPE 

Constantinople was once more engaged in the hope- 
less task of subduing Albanian opposition. The 
Albanians, however, seemed to gain strength rather 
than lose it. In September, 1912, I was in Uskub 
just four weeks before the Balkan War broke out. 
The Albanian chieftains were there, having made a 
truce for Ramazan (the sacred month of the Moslem 
fasting). They said to me that the next year, if the 
Turks did not stop persecuting them, they would 
take their army to Constantinople. Others were 
to get ahead of them, and they were to win their 
independence without having to fight the Turks 
again. The poor showing of the Turkish arms against 
the Greeks and Servians is very largely due to the 
exhaustion which had come to them through con- 
tinuous and unsuccessful attempts to get the better 
of the Albanian uprisings. The Balkan States knew 
how severely the western Macedonian army had 
suffered in July and August, 1912. It was one of the 
considerations which decided them to strike at that 
moment. 

THE TREATMENT OF THE ARABIC ELEMENT 

In Asiatic Turkey there are supposed to be about 
eight million Arabic-speaking inhabitants. These 
figures may be an exaggeration, for no census has 
ever been taken. But the vilayets are occupied 
almost exclusively by Arabs and races speaking 
Arabic. They form a half of the Empire's dominions 
in Asia, starting with the Taurus and Amanus ranges, 
south through Syria to Arabia and east and south- 
east through Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf. 

214 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

These large stretches of territory were never 
thoroughly conquered by the Turks. They did not 
settle there in the way they had done in the Balkan 
Peninsula, outside of Albania and Montenegro, and 
in Asia Minor. The race from whom they had taken 
their religion and from whom they soon absorbed 
whatever culture and art they can be said to possess, 
was never assimilated by the Turks. Their simple 
warrior and herdsman language was enriched by 
Arabic substantives, as Anglo-Saxon was enriched 
by the Latin gotten through the Normans and 
through the Church. But there was no racial fusion. 

Only in appearance did Turkish officialdom and 
the authority of the Sultan ever get a real hold over 
the Arabs. By habit they came to respect the Sultan 
as Khalif. The allegiance which they gave him as 
ruler was altogether without value — a pure matter of 
form. An aggressive pasha found it easy to detach 
Egypt from Turkish rule. It was conglomerate 
populations and a lack of natural boundaries for 
forming states that prevented the other Arabic 
portions of the Ottoman Empire from following 
Egypt. In Arabia proper, and in the larger portion 
of Mesopotamia, up to the present day, the Arabs 
have been as independent of the Sublime Porte as 
have been the Albanians. 

In the reign of Abdul Hamid, when the idea of the 
Pan-Islamic movement was conceived, the import- 
ance of joining the sacred cities of Medina and Mecca 
more closely with the Turkish Empire was recognized. 
French interests were building a railway across the 
Lebanon Mountains to Aleppo and Damascus. The 

215 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Germans had launched their project for the Bag- 
dadbahn. Abdul Hamid decided to create a railway- 
directly under government control, from Damascus 
to Medina and Mecca. For the first time since they 
were joined to the Ottoman Empire, the Arabic 
provinces saw themselves in prospective connec- 
tion with the capital. It had been for a long time 
easier and quicker to go from Constantinople to the 
United States or to China than to Bagdad or to 
Mecca. The railways would have one of two results : 
either the Arabs would be brought more closely 
into connection with the Empire, or they would be 
definitely alienated from it. 

The Arabic question stood thus when the constitu- 
tion was re-established in 1908. There are many 
Arabs among the Young Turks, but these, like the 
Slavs in the military and official service of Austria- 
Hungary, have been definitely alienated from their 
own nationality. Here was the opportunity to bring 
into sympathy with the constitutional movement the 
millions of Arabic-speaking subjects of the Sultan, 
who formed the most numerous Moslem element in 
the Empire. But the Young Turks were no more 
tactful in the treatment of the Arabs, who were 
mostly of their own religion, than of the Greeks and 
Armenians. In the first Parliament, they were 
almost as unfair to Moslem Arabs as to Christians. 
In the apportionment of places in the Cabinet, the 
Arabs were ignored. It is true that some Cabinet 
members, some high officials both in the military and 
civil administration, and some members of the inner 
council of the Committee of Union and Progress 

216 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

were of Arabic origin. But they must be counted 
practically as Turks, for they had lived so long away 
from their own country and their people that they 
had lost all Arabic sympathies. Some who were 
called Arabs were in reality members of the old 
Turkish families, who in Mesopotamia, as in Syria 
and Egypt, had received large tracts of land at the 
time of the conquest, and had always been Turks by 
interests and by atmosphere. The younger national- 
istic Arabic element, educated, and living by pro- 
fessional or business interests in cities of the Arabic 
portion of the Empire, were from the very beginning 
ignored. 

Two things soon became evident. In the first 
place, the Young Turks tried to impose their language 
in local administration as the sole official language 
of the Empire. In many places in Syria and Mesopo- 
tamia, civil officials, even in the courts of justice, 
were appointed without a knowledge of the language 
of the people among whom they had to serve. In 
the Balkans and in Asia Minor, where there were so 
many races and so many tongues, the Turks were 
acting reasonably and sensibly in imposing their own 
language as a medium for the transaction of gov- 
ernment business, but in vilayets which were wholly 
Arabic speaking, the foisting of the Turkish language 
upon the people could be likened to a bastard child 
endeavouring to rule the branch of his family from 
which he had received his best and purest blood. 
Before a year had passed, the educated, intellectual 
Arabs were wholly out of sympathy with the new re- 
gime. Many of them began to dream of the revival of 

217 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

the Arabian khalifate, and looked to the nationalistic 
movement in Egypt as the seed from which their 
Pan-Arabic tree would some day grow. Others, 
older and less sentimental, did not hesitate to express 
a desire to see British or French sovereignty extended 
over Syria and Mesopotamia. 

In the second place, among the quasi-independent 
tribes of the Syrian hinterland, and of the Arabian 
peninsula, the attempt of the Turks to destroy their 
privileges ended in the same way as it had done in 
Albania. From 1908 up to the outbreak of the Bal- 
kan War, millions of treasure and thousands of the 
best soldiers of the Empire were lost in fruitless 
efforts to realize the aspirations of the Young Turks. 
We cannot even enumerate these rebellions. They 
were as perennial as the Albanian uprisings, and as 
disastrous to the Turkish army. In Arabia, rebellious 
Arabs treated with the Italians. In Syria, beyond 
the Jordan, they made a practice of tearing up the 
tracks and burning the stations of the Hedjaz rail- 
way. In Mesopotamia, they refused to respond to 
the obligation of military service. 

This incomplete summary of the Young Turk 
regime in the Ottoman Empire has been given to 
throw light upon the collapse of the constitutional 
regime and of the military reputation of Turkey. I 
have refrained from going into a discussion of party 
politics, of intrigues, and of the bickerings of Parlia- 
ment. Enough has been told to show that the 
constitutional regime was marked for failure from 
the beginning for three reasons : There was no honest 

218 



THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 

attempt to bring together the various races of the 
Empire in a common effort for regeneration. The 
Young Turks, having no statesmen among their 
leaders, depended upon untrained men and upon 
those Abdul Hamid had trained in sycophancy and 
despotism. In spite of the heroic and able efforts 
of the German military mission and the British naval 
mission, no progress was made in reforming the only 
force by which the Young Turks could have held in 
respect and obedience the Sultan's own subjects, as 
well as those foreign nations who were looking for the 
opportunity to dismember the Empire. 

If the hopes of the true friends of Turkey had been 
realized, if only the constitution had been applied, 
if only there had been the will to regenerate Turkey, 
all the wars of the past few years, including the one 
which is now shaking Europe to its foundations, 
would have been avoided. 



219 



CHAPTER XII 
CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 

ON November 19, 1910, the Cretan General 
Assembly made a stirring appeal "to the four 
Great Powers who are protectors of the island, 
to the two great Powers of Central Europe, to the 
great Republic of the New World, to the liberal and 
enlightened press of two Continents, and in general 
to all Christians, in favour of the rights of the Cretan 
people which it represents, — rights acquired and 
made legal by so many sacrifices and sufferings." 
The Cretans definitely included the United States 
and the American press in this manifesto. They 
wanted the American people to become acquainted 
with what was known to the chancelleries of Europe 
as "the Cretan question." For one fifth of the 
Cretans have members of their families in America. 
There are few hamlets in the island into which the 
spirit and influence of "the great Republic of the 
New World" has not penetrated. 

A review of the relationship between Crete and 
the European Powers is as necessary in trying to 
throw light upon the events which led up to the war 
of 1 9 14 as is the exposition of the later phases of the 
Albanian question. It helps us to grasp the attitude 

220 



CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 

of the Powers towards Turkey in the years immedi- 
ately after the proclamation of the constitution, the 
tremendous power of Hellenism under the wise and 
skilful guidance of a statesman such as M. Venizelos 
has proved himself to be, the importance of the 
Cretan question in precipitating the Balkan Wars, 
and the impotence of European diplomacy to pre- 
serve the status quo, and decide ex cathedra the de- 
stinies of countries like Crete and Macedonia, whose 
emancipated kinsfolk had acquired the spirit of the 
soldiers who sang: 

"As Christ died to make men holy, let us die to 
make men free. " 

A century ago, Crete was cut off from the outside 
world. It had been for two hundred and fifty years 
under the Turks, who took a peculiar pride in the 
island from the fact that it was their last great 
conquest. Its Christian inhabitants, although form- 
ing the majority of the population, lived, or rather 
existed, under the same hopeless conditions as pre- 
vailed throughout Turkey. In the sea-coast towns 
the Christians prospered better than the Moslems, 
owing to their aptitude for commerce; but the bulk 
of the Christian population was in abject slavery to 
the Turkish beys, who were the great landowners. 

The Greek war of liberation was shared in by the 
Cretans, who lent valuable aid to their brethren of 
the mainland. They endured all the sufferings of 
the war, but reaped none of its rewards. It is quite 
possible that they might have thrown off the Turkish 
yoke at that favourable moment had it not been for 

221 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

the astute policy of the Turks, who, seeing the 
danger of losing Crete, handed it over to Mehemet 
Ali in 1 830 as a reward for Egyptian aid in the Greek 
war and compensation for the ships destroyed at 
Navarino. With the downfall of Mehemet Ali's 
schemes of conquest in 1840, the island reverted to 
Turkey. At this time the Powers could easily have 
united Crete with Greece, but deliberately sacrificed 
the Cretans to their commercial rivalries. 

Turkey never succeeded in gaining her former 
ascendancy in Crete. Insurrection after insurrec- 
tion was drowned in blood. During two generations 
the Turks sent into the unhappy island successive 
armies, whose orgies of cruelty and lust are better 
left undescribed. But the tortures of hell could not 
extinguish the flames of liberty. Every few years the 
Cretans would rise again and repay blood with blood 
until they were overwhelmed by Anatolian soldiers, 
of whom Turkey possesses an unlimited supply. 

At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the Greeks pled, 
with much force, for the privilege of annexing Crete. 
As we read them to-day, the arguments of M. Dely- 
annis are a prophecy. The Powers put Crete back 
under Ottoman control, subject to a reformed con- 
stitution called the Pact of Helepa, which provided a 
fairly good administration, if a capable and sincere 
governor were chosen. Everything went well until 
Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1889 practically annulled 
the solemn agreement he had made by appointing 
a Moslem Governor- General, and reducing the repre- 
sentation in the General Assembly in such a way 
that the Moslem minority in the island came into 

222 



CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 

power again. It would be fruitless to go into the 
complex history of the next seven years during which 
the lawlessness of former times was revived. 

Christian refugees fled to Greece and carried the 
tale of their sufferings. A massacre in Canea in 
February, 1897, engineered by Turkish officers fresh 
from similar work in Armenia, had such a reper- 
cussion in Greece that King George would have lost 
his throne had he remained deaf to the popular 
demand that aid be sent to the Cretans. Greek 
soldiers crossed to the stricken island. This meant 
war with Turkey. In a few weeks Greece was over- 
whelmed in Thessaly, and the Powers were compelled 
to intervene. Much ridicule has been cast upon 
Greece for her impotence in the war of 1897. Her 
defeat was a foregone conclusion, and she was 
severely blamed for having jeopardized the peace 
of Europe just as the Balkan States are being 
blamed to-day. 

But there are times when a nation simply has to 
fight. So it was with Greece in 1897. In exactly 
similar circumstances, but with conditions less serious 
and an issue not so long outstanding or so vital to 
national well-being, the United States a year later 
declared war on Spain. There was great similarity 
between the Cretan situation in 1897 and that of 
1 91 2 in Crete and Macedonia. Refugees, crossing 
the borders and telling unspeakable tales to their 
brothers of blood and religion, were continually 
before the eyes of the Bulgarians and Servians and 
Montenegrins and Greeks since the proclamation of 
the constitution in 1908. Each nationality suffered 

223 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

by massacres in Macedonia which were followed by 
no serious punishment. 

Even though defeated in 1897, Greece forced the 
hand of the Powers and of Turkey. Crete was given 
autonomy, and placed under the protection of Italy, 
Great Britain, France, and Russia, who occupied the 
principal ports of the island. For a year and a half 
they searched for a "neutral" governor for the Cre- 
tans. The Turkish troops, however, remained at 
Candia, leaving the rest of the island to the revolu- 
tionaries. It was not until the British were attacked 
in the harbour of Candia, and their Vice-Consul 
murdered, that the Powers moved. But, as at 
Alexandria in 1882, it was a bluff admiral and not the 
diplomats who settled the status of the island. The 
Turkish troops were compelled to withdraw, and 
the Powers were told that they would either have to 
appease the Cretans by some encouragement of their 
aspirations or conquer the island by force. A way 
out of the dilemma was found in the appointment of 
Prince George of Greece as High Commissioner of 
the protecting Powers in Crete. 

Here is where the Powers, if they had at that time 
any intention of "preserving the rights of Turkey" 
in Crete, made the first of their blunders. To call the 
son of the King of Greece to the chief magistracy of 
an island which had so long aspired to political union 
with Greece was, in the eyes of the people, a direct 
encouragement to their aspirations. How could they 
think otherwise? The Turkish Cretans, too, re- 
garded this step as the end of Ottoman sovereignty, 
for they emigrated in so great a number that soon the 

224 



CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 

Moslem population was reduced to ten per cent. 
Prince George's appointment, made in December, 
1898, was for three years, but really lasted eight. 
In 1906 he withdrew because he had become hope- 
lessly involved in party politics, and had "backed 
the wrong horses." 

Now comes the second blunder, unless the Powers 
were preparing Crete for union with Greece. They 
sent a letter to the King of Greece, asking him to 
appoint a successor to his son! Let me quote from 
the exact wording of this letter : 

"The protecting Powers, in order to manifest 
their desire to take into account as far as possible 
the aspirations of the Cretan people, and to recog- 
nize in a practical manner the interest which His 
Hellenic Majesty must always take in the pros- 
perity of Crete, are in accord to propose to His 
Majesty that hereafter, whenever the post of High 
Commissioner of Crete shall become vacant, His 
Majesty, after confidential consultations with the 
representatives of the Powers at Athens, will desig- 
nate a candidate capable of exercising the mandate 
of the Powers in this island. ..." 

Turkey naturally protested against the change in 
the status quo which such a step implied, and pointed 
out that it was a virtual destruction even of the 
suzerainty of the Sultan. The Powers, however, did 
not object to the publication of their note to the King 
of Greece in the newspapers of Crete. M. Zaimis, a 
former prime minister of Greece, was appointed High 
Commissioner. The island had its own flag and 
postage stamps, and laws identical with those of 
is 225 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Greece. Cretan officers in Greek uniform com- 
manded the militia and constabulary of the island. 
Turkey treated Crete as a foreign country. For this 
statement there is no more conclusive proof than the 
records of the custom-houses at Smyrna and Salonika 
which show that Cretan products were subjected to 
the same duties as were applied to all foreign imports. 

It would seem, then, that Crete was in practically 
the same position as Eastern Roumelia in 1885, or, in 
fact, as Bulgaria herself. Nothing was more natural 
than that the establishment of a constitutional regime 
in Turkey should lead to a proclamation of union 
with Greece. The motives which led to this action 
were identical with those which Austria-Hungary put 
forth as an explanation of her annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The Cretans quite justly feared 
that the Young Turks would repudiate the obliga- 
tions assumed by Abdul Hamid, and endeavour to 
bring Crete back into the Turkish fold. At the 
moment Turkey was so engrossed in the question of 
the Austrian annexation and the Bulgarian declara- 
tion of independence and seizure of the railways in 
Eastern Roumelia that she contented herself with a 
formal protest against the action of the Cretan 
Assembly. 

What did the Powers do? Turkey, at the moment, 
could have done nothing had they recognized the 
union with Greece. But they did not want to go that 
far. On the other hand, they did not want to offend 
Greece and the Cretans. They made no threats, and 
took no action, although their troops were in the 
island. Inaction and indecision were made worse by 

226 



CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 

the following note, which was sent by the four 
Consuls at Candia to the self-appointed provisional 
government : 

"The undersigned, agents of France, Great 
Britain, Italy, and Russia, by order of their re- 
spective governments, have the honour of bringing 
to the knowledge of the Cretan government (sic) 
that the protecting Powers consider the union of 
Crete to Greece as depending upon the assent of 
the Powers who have contracted obligations with 
Turkey. Nevertheless they would not refuse to 
envisage with kindly and sympathetic interest the 
discussion of this question with Turkey, if order is 
maintained in the island and if the safety of the 
Moslem population is secured." 

That diplomatic sanction would sooner or later be 
given to the action of the Cretans, if they showed 
their ability to preserve order in the island and treat 
the Moslems well, is an altogether justifiable inter- 
pretation of this note of the Powers. Otherwise 
would they not have protested against the illegality 
of the provisional government, and have forbidden 
the Cretan authorities to promulgate their decrees 
in the name of King George? Although the High 
Commissioner had disappeared, and the Cretans were 
running the island just as if the annexation were an 
assured fact, the Powers, far from protesting, an- 
nounced their intention of withdrawing their troops 
of occupation ! 

What were their intentions concerning Crete, and 
what was their understanding of the status quo at the 
moment of withdrawal? This question they did not 

227 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

answer then, nor did they answer it afterwards. 
They simply withdrew from the island without 
stating what legal power was to succeed them. This 
was in the summer of 1909. M. Venizelos, then 
Prime Minister of Crete, asked the Powers to state 
definitely their intentions. He said that he did not 
wish to run counter to the orders of the Powers, but 
that he would have to raise the flag of Greece over 
the island when their troops left, unless they for- 
mally forbade him to do so. With admirable clear- 
ness and irrefutable logic he pointed out to the 
Powers that the only other alternative would be 
anarchy. But the Powers, pressed by their am- 
bassadors at Constantinople, were afraid to assent to 
annexation. They were equally averse to taking the 
opposite course. So they contented themselves with 
giving M. Venizelos "friendly counsels" not to hoist 
the Greek flag. The result was the ludicrous spec- 
tacle of the cutting down of the Greek flag by marines 
landed from eight warships. It was like a scene 
from a comic opera, and M. Venizelos must have 
formed then the opinion which every succeeding 
action of the Powers strengthened and to which he 
gave expression after the Balkan War was declared, — 
that the Powers were "venerable old women. " 

Crete now began to be menaced by the insensate 
chauvinism of the Young Turks, who thought they 
could avenge the loss of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
Bulgarian declaration of independence by destroy- 
ing the autonomy of Crete and re-establishing the 
authority of the Sultan in this island which had been 
repudiating the Ottoman government for eighty 

228 






CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 

years. In the spring of 1910, the Tanine, at that 
time official organ of the Committee of Union and 
Progress, laid down five points as the minimum which 
the Porte would accept in the definite and permanent 
solution of the status of Crete : 

"i. Formal recognition of the rights of the Sul- 
tan. 

"2. The right of the Sultan to name the Gover- 
nor-General of the island among three Cretan can- 
didates elected by the General Assembly. 

"3. The right of the sheik-ul-islam to name the 
religious chiefs of the Cretan Moslems. 

"4. Establishment in the Bay of Suda of a coal- 
ing-station for the Ottoman fleet, and the main- 
tenance there of a permanent stationnaire like the 
stationnaires of the embassies at Constantinople. 

"5. Restriction of the rights of the Cretan 
government in the matter of conclusion of treaties 
of commerce and agreements with foreign powers." 

What the "rights of the Sultan " might be were not 
specified then, nor have they been since: but articles 
four and five were enough to throw the whole of Crete 
into a state of wildest excitement. The Turks, after 
having lost the island, were trying to win it back. 

Left to themselves (as they had every reason to 
believe) the Cretans convoked the National Assem- 
bly for April 26, 19 10. The Assembly was opened 
in the name of George I., King of the Hellenes. 
The Moslem deputies immediately presented a 
protest in which they rejected the sovereignty of 
Greece over Crete. The deputies were then asked 
to take the oath of allegiance in the name of King 
George. A second petition was presented by the 

229 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Moslem deputies, declaring that, as the Sultan of 
Turkey held "sovereign rights" in the island, they, 
in the name of their Moslem constituents, protested 
against such an action. They refused to take the 
oath. Should they be excluded from the Assembly, 
or be allowed to sit without taking the oath? 

Instead of insisting on the admission of the Moslem 
deputies, the Powers again gave "friendly counsels." 
Once more M. Venizelos pleaded that they speak out 
their mind in the matter of the legal status of the 
island. The diplomats "temporized" again, and the 
warships reappeared to assure to the Moslem depu- 
ties " their lawful rights. " When M. Venizelos could 
get no statement from the Powers as to the grounds 
upon which these "lawful rights" rested, he saw that 
all hope of help from the Powers was over, and that 
he was only wasting his time. Like Cavour, when he 
turned with disgust from his efforts to interest the 
Powers and had the inspiration, Italia faro da se, 
the Cretan leader abandoned the antechamber of the 
chancelleries. While the Powers still sought a modus 
vivendi for Crete, M. Venizelos made one. From that 
moment the Balkan War was a certainty. 

The Young Turk Cabinet, arrogant and drunk 
with the success of their boycott against Austria- 
Hungary, and at the same time knowing that they 
must turn public attention away from the loss of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, began to press the Powers 
for the restoration in Crete of the status quo as it had 
existed before the diplomatic blunders I have out- 
lined above, and, in addition, for the coaling station 
and for control over Crete's foreign relations. At 

230 



CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 

the same time, they demanded of the Athens Cabinet 
that Greece renounce formally, not only for the 
present but also for the future, any intention of annex- 
ing Crete. The Young Turks represented that public 
opinion in Turkey was so wrought up over the Cretan 
question that war with Greece would certainly follow. 
To illustrate to the Powers and to Greece the force 
of this public opinion, a widespread boycott against 
everything Greek in Turkey was started. This 
economic warfare is described in another chapter. 
In some parts of Turkey the boycott has never ceased. 

There is no doubt that this boycott was one of 
the very most important factors in bringing on the 
Balkan War. For it taught the Greeks, who were 
continually being bullied and threatened with an 
invasion in Thessaly, the imperative necessity of 
reconciliation with Bulgaria by a compromise of rival 
claims in Macedonia. 

Thinking that he could serve his country better in 
Greece than in Crete, M. Venizelos posed his candi- 
dacy to the Greek Chamber in the summer of 1910. 
Seemingly he was abandoning Crete to its fate, 
and he had to bear many unjust reproaches from 
his fellow-countrymen. His wonderful personality 
and extraordinary political genius soon brought him 
to the front in Greece. The Cretan revolutionary 
became Prime Minister of Greece. Steadfast in his 
purpose he began to negotiate with the other Balkan 
States and with Russia. He was able to accomplish 
the impossible. The war with Turkey is largely his 
personal success. No statesman since Bismarck has 
had so brilliant a triumph. 

231 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

In 1910, M. Venizelos took the step which was the 
turning point in his career and in the history of Greece. 
Firmly persuaded that Crete could be annexed to 
Greece only by Greece proving herself stronger than 
Turkey, and not by diplomatic manoeuvres, he de- 
cided to desert Cretan politics, and enter the larger 
sphere open to him at Athens. It was easy to secure 
a seat in the Greek Parliament, but that was the 
only easy part about it. When one considered the 
fickle character of the Greek people in their politics, 
the selfish narrowness and bitter prejudices of their 
leaders, the inefficiency of the army and navy, whose 
officers had been ruined by political activity, the 
emptiness of the treasury, the unpopularity of the 
royal family, and the general disorder throughout 
the country, it seems incredible that M. Venizelos 
should have been willing to assume the responsibility 
of government, let alone succeed in his self-imposed 
task. Had you asked the leading statesmen of 
Europe five years ago what country presented the 
most formidable and at the same time most hopeless 
task for a Premier, there would have been unanimity 
in selecting Greece. 

But for Eleutherios Venizelos there was no diffi- 
culty which could not be overcome. It is the nature 
of the man to refuse to see failure ahead. "If one 
loves to work, and works for love," he has declared, 
"failure does not exist." 

Called to be Prime Minister in August, 19 10, M. 
Venizelos began to reform everything in sight. His 
first step was to endow Greece with a new constitu- 
tion, whose most important changes were a Council of 

232 



CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 

State, chosen for life and irremovable, to act as a 
Senate (Greece has single-chamber government), 
legalizing the state of siege, sanctioning the employ- 
ment of foreigners in the service of the Government, 
fixing twenty-four hours as the maximum delay for 
bringing one who had been arrested before a magis- 
trate, forbidding the publication of uncensored news 
relative to military and naval operations in time of 
war, establishing free, obligatory primary instruction, 
excluding from Parliament directors in corporations, 
and facilitating the expropriation of property for 
public purposes. I have given enough to show the 
practical character of the new constitution. 

Although strongly urged to do so, both by the 
King and by the political leaders, M. Venizelos re- 
fused to turn his Constituent Assembly into an ordi- 
nary Parliament, and proceed to the legislation made 
possible by the new constitution. Seeing clearly 
that durable and effective ministerial power could be 
derived only from the people and supported only by 
their intelligent good-will, he balked the intrigues of 
the politicians, and overcame the dynastic fears of 
the King. The Constituent Assembly was dissolved. 
M. Venizelos went before the people, travelling 
everywhere and explaining his program for the re- 
formation of the country. The result was a tri- 
umph such as no man has ever received in modern 
Greece. In November, 1910, followers of M. Venize- 
los were returned in so overwhelming a majority 
that he could afford to ignore the Athenian politicians 
who saw in him a menace to their personal rule, their 
sloth, and their "graft." 

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THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Since that day M. Venizelos has been the idol of 
Greece. Never has trust in public man been more 
amply justified. Every administration of the State 
was completely transformed within eighteen months. 
Even to outline what M. Venizelos has accomplished 
reads like a fairy tale. Only those who knew the 
Greece before his arrival and are able to contrast it 
with the Greece of today can appreciate the im- 
mensity of his labours and the radical character of the 
changes he has made. I cannot dwell on the talent 
shown by this Cretan in matters of financial reform. 
But his military and naval reforms, and his foreign 
policy, have been so important in making possible 
the Balkan alliance and its successes that they 
cannot be passed over. 

M. Venizelos, when he first came to Athens, saw 
what was the matter with the Greek military and 
naval establishments. Like Peter the Great and 
the Japanese, he realized that the Greeks must 
learn from Europe by submitting to European 
teachers. To persuade his fellow-countrymen, who 
have a very exalted opinion of their own ability 
(the Greeks are always sure they were born to com- 
mand, without first having learned to obey!), that 
they must not only call in foreign advisers, but must 
submit to their authority, has been the most Hercu- 
lean of the tasks this great man set before him. 
Article three of the new constitution had authorized 
the appointment of foreigners as officers of the 
Government and given them temporarily Hellenic 
citizenship. From England was asked a naval 
mission, from France a military mission, and from 

234 



CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 

Italy officers to reorganize the gendarmerie. In 
Greece the foreign officers were able to accomplish 
more in eighteen months than the foreign "advisers" 
of Turkey had accomplished in many long years. 
This is no assertion of personal opinion. The facts 
of the Balkan War speak for themselves. Why is 
this? In Turkey, the foreign teachers have never 
been given any real authority, and have seen every 
effort they put forth nullified by the insouciance, 
self-sufficiency, and cursed apathy of the Turk. The 
Greeks, on the contrary, "became as little children," 
and lo! a miracle was wrought! 

When foreigners who visited Greece within recent 
years read about the successes of the Crown Prince 
at Salonika and Janina, the assassination of King 
George, the mourning of the Greek people, and the 
hearty acclamation of King Constantine, the national 
hero, they could think back to less than four years 
ago when the Crown Prince was practically banished 
from Greece, after having been dismissed from his 
command in the army by a popular uprising, and 
when the portrait of the King was removed from 
every coffee-house in Athens. What is the cause of 
the complete revulsion in public feeling towards the 
dynasty? It is due to the common sense of M. 
Venizelos. He saw that the present dynasty was 
necessary for Greece, and that the Crown Prince 
must come back and take command of the army. 
In defiance of public opinion, he insisted on this 
point. This attitude was a bitter disappointment to 
many who imagined that M. Venizelos would be 
anti-dynastic in his policy. As a result of his 

235 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

success in reconciling the Greeks with their sovereign 
and his family, the sympathies of Russia and Ger- 
many and Great Britain were not alienated from the 
Greek people, as was rapidly becoming the case. 
Emperor William especially, whose sister is wife of 
the new Greek King, was so delighted with the success 
of M. Venizelos in rehabilitating his brother-in-law 
that he asked the Greek Premier to visit him at 
Corfu. 

This visit of the former Cretan revolutionary to 
the German Emperor in April, 191 2, was hardly 
commented upon by the European press. But epoch- 
making words must have been spoken in the villa 
Achilleion, for immediately after that visit the semi- 
official German press began to prepare the public for 
the events which were to take place in the Balkans. 
The eloquence and remorseless logic which had 
carried the day among Cretan insurgents and Greek 
electors was not lost on the "war-lord of Europe." 
Emperor William carried back to Berlin the convic- 
tion that no diplomacy could outwit the Greek 
Premier's determination that Turkey should dis- 
appear from Crete and Macedonia. 

I do not think I am exaggerating in saying that 
when the Young Turks, by their insensate chauvin- 
ism, caused M. Venizelos to despair of saving Crete 
through Crete itself, they signed their own death- 
warrant. If they had refrained from their boycott 
and let Crete alone, would M. Venizelos have gone to 
Greece? I think not. It is one of those strange 
coincidences of history that on the very day when 
Mahmud Shevket pasha, in the Ottoman Parliament, 

236 



CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 

declared that if Greece did not make a public state- 
ment to the effect that she had no intention at any 
time to extend her sovereignty over Crete, a million 
Turkish bayonets would gleam upon the plains of 
Thessaly, Eleutherios Venizelos was quietly leaving 
Crete for Athens. 

To bring together Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, and 
Montenegro into an alliance which would drive the 
Turk out of Europe was in the mind of M. Venizelos 
as far back as the summer of 1909, when he saw the 
international fleet at Canea land marines to cut down 
the Greek flag which he had raised. It became an 
obsession with him. It was possible, because he 
believed it was possible. But no one else regarded 
it as more than an idle dream. The rare friends to 
whom M. Venizelos vaguely hinted that such an 
alliance was the only way of solving the Balkan 
question called it the " acme of absurdity. " I quote 
the words of an eminent diplomat to whom this 
solution was mentioned. At the opening of the 
Italian War, when I suggested to the Turkish Grand 
Vizier that such an alliance was possible, he looked 
at me pityingly, and said, "The questions you ask 
display your ignorance of conditions in this part of 
the world. My time is too valuable to discuss such 
an impossible hypothesis. Go to Hussein Hilmi 
pasha, and ask him if he thinks the Greeks and Bul- 
garians could ever unite." Hussein Hilmi pasha 
referred me to every single book that has ever been 
written about the Macedonian question. "I do not 
care which you read," said the ex- Governor- General 
of Macedonia, "they all tell the same story. " 

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THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

But M. Venizelos was not asking himself, "Can I 
do it?" but, "How shall I do it?" Once more he saw 
clearly. The pan-Hellenic national ideal must be 
given up. Greece must content herself with Epiros, 
the ^Egean Islands, Crete, and a slice of Macedonia 
west of the Vardar — possibly including Salonika, if 
the army proved as victory-winning as those of 
Bulgaria and Servia. Everything else must be left 
to Bulgaria and Servia. When first proposed to the 
leaders of Greece, this proposition seemed so pre- 
posterous that M. Venizelos was accused of being a 
traitor to Hellenism. He is still denounced by the 
fanatics, after all that he has accomplished. But 
patiently he built up his argument, using all his 
magnetism and his eloquence to convince his col- 
leagues. He showed how Greece was being constantly 
humiliated and menaced by the chauvinism of the 
Young Turks, how the boycott was ruining Greek 
shipping, how Crete itself would gradually get to 
like independence better than union with Greece, 
and how inevitable it was that the Slavs should in 
the course of time come to possess Thrace and Mace- 
donia. "Instead of sacrificing everything to Bul- 
garia, " he maintained, " this is our only chance to get 
any part of European Turkey. We must give up our 
ideal, because it is impracticable. With Bulgaria, we 
can crush Turkey. Without Bulgaria, Turkey will 
crush us. And if Bulgaria helps, we must pay the 
price." It may be years — not until archives are 
open to historians and memoirs of present actors are 
published — before everything is clear concerning the 
formation of an alliance which was as great a surprise 

238 



CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 

to Europe as it was to Turkey. But the famous 
telegram which M. Gueshoff, Prime Minister of 
Bulgaria, addressed to his colleagues at Athens after 
the first successes of the war were won, is sufficient 
testimony to the essential part played by M. Veni- 
zelos in forming the coalition. 

After M. Venizelos left Crete, a last blunder made 
the protecting Powers the laughing-stock of Europe. 
The Cretans elected deputies to the Greek Chamber, 
and the warships of the Powers played hide-and-seek 
with small Cretan craft in a fruitless endeavour to 
prevent the chosen deputies from proceeding to 
Athens. This move was altogether unnecessary, for 
they had not yet learned the matchless worth of their 
opponent. M. Venizelos, knowing that Greece and 
her new allies were not yet ready for war with Turkey, 
"tipped off" both the Cretans and the leaders in the 
Greek Parliament that they would have to wait one 
or two years longer. But, to satisfy the hoi polloi 
on the one hand and the diplomats on the other, a 
little comedy was enacted before the Parliament 
House in Athens which threw wool over everybody's 
eyes. 

As soon as he saw that war was inevitable and that 
his allies were ready, M. Venizelos admitted the 
Cretan deputies. Europe was face to face with a 
fait accompli. The Cretan and Macedonian ques- 
tions were settled by war. The hand of Turkey and 
the diplomats was forced. 

Now we see the importance of the Cretan question. 
The Balkan War could have been avoided by a 
courageous and straightforward policy of efficient 

239 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

protection of Christians who lived under the Ottoman 
flag. It is because the Powers did not fulfil the obli- 
gations of the Treaty of Berlin, and sacrificed Cretans 
and Bulgarians and Servians and Greeks to the 
furthering of their commercial interests at Con- 
stantinople, that all Europe is now stained with 
blood. By flattering the Turk and condoning his 
crimes, the Powers succeeded in destroying the "in- 
tegrity of the Ottoman Empire," which they pro- 
fessed to uphold. In trying to be the friends of the 
Turk they proved his worst enemies. 

The Cretan question is a commentary upon the 
utter futility of insincere and procrastinating 
diplomacy. 



240 



CHAPTER XIII 
THE WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 

SINCE the days when Mazzini, looking beyond 
the almost irrealizable dream of Italian unity, 
said in his Paris exile, "North Africa will be- 
long to Italy," a new Punic conquest has been the 
steadfast hope of the Italians. France had already 
started her conquest of Algeria when Mazzini spoke, 
and was mistress of the richest portion of the 
southern Mediterranean littoral before the Italian 
unification was completed. Late though they were 
in the race, the Italians began to try to realize their 
dream by sending thousands of colonists to Egypt and 
to Tunis. But the events of the years 1881-1883 in 
these two countries, consummated by the Conven- 
tion of London in 1885, gave Egypt to England 
and Tunis to France. Italy was too weak at the 
time to protest, and Germany had not yet begun to 
develop her weltpolitik. 

For some years Italian colonial aspirations were 
directed towards Somaliland and Abyssinia. The 
battle of Adowa in 1896 was a death-blow to the 
hopes of founding an Italian empire of Erythrea. 
Ten years ago Giolitti received a portfolio in the 
Zanardelli ministry, and ever since then there has 
16 241 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

been a new Cato at Rome, crying "Tripoli must be 
taken." By the Franco-Italian protocol of 1901, 
it was agreed that if France should ever extend her 
protectorate over Morocco, Italy should have the 
Tripolitaine and Barca, with the Fezzan as a hinter- 
land. This "right" of Italy was recognized at the 
international conference of Algeciras in 1906, and 
has since been accepted in principle by the European 
cabinets. 

During the past decade Italy quietly prepared to 
seize Tripoli, — peacefully, if possible, and if not, by 
force. Had Italy been ready, Turkey would have 
lost Tripoli in the autumn of 1908, when Bulgaria 
declared her independence and Austria annexed 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Internal politics made a 
bold stroke impossible at that favourable moment. 

To accomplish her purpose, Italy worked along 
two lines. She tried to make her economic position 
so strong in Tripoli that the country would virtually 
belong to her and be exploited by her without any 
necessity for a change in its political status, until 
Arabs and Berbers, choosing between prosperity 
under Italy and poverty under Turkey, would of 
their own accord expel the Turks. Foreseeing a pos- 
sibility of failure in this plan, she at the same time 
prepared for a forcible occupation of the country. 

Immediately after the Anglo-Boer War, the Italian 
Ministries of War and Marine began to make a study 
of the question of transporting troops and landing 
them under the cover of a fleet. Tourists who were 
in Italy during the summer of 1904 will remember the 
famous dress rehearsal of the Tenth Army Corps. 

242 



WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 

Some six thousand men, completely provided with 
horses, ammunition, artillery, and provisions, were 
embarked in eleven hours. The convoy put to sea, 
escorted by a squadron of battleships and torpedo- 
boats, in two columns of five transports each. De- 
spite a heavy swell, these troops and all their stores 
were landed in the Bay of Naples in sixteen hours. 
I wonder if many who were watching and applauding 
on that memorable day understood why Italy was 
practising so assiduously landing from transports, — 
and under the protection of the fleet. For what war 
was she preparing in time of peace? In 1907, the 
Minister of Marine announced in the Italia Militare 
that Italy could send seventy thousand troops upon 
a distant expedition oversea and one hundred and 
fourteen thousand for a short journey not exceeding 
two nights at sea! 

The peaceable conquest of Tripoli was cleverly 
conceived, and has been faithfully tried. Branches 
of the Banco di Roma were established at Tripoli 
and Benghazi, and, for the first time since the days 
of Imperial Rome, a serious attempt was made to 
develop the agricultural and commercial resources 
of the country. The natives were encouraged in 
every enterprise, and managed in such a way that 
they became — in the vicinity of the seaports and 
trading-posts, at least — dependent for their liveli- 
hood upon the Banco di Roma. Italian steamship 
lines, heavily subsidized, maintained regular and 
frequent services between Tunis and Tripoli and 
Benghazi and Derna and Alexandria. The more 
enterprising natives travelled for a few piastres to 

243 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Alexandria, and the object-lesson of contrast was 
left without words to work its effect upon them. 
The admirable Italian parcel post system — one of 
the most successful in Europe — extended its opera- 
tions into the hinterland and captured the ostrich 
feather trade. The Italians began to talk of making 
secure the routes to Ghadames and Ghat and Mur- 
zuk, and of establishing for the interior postal and 
banking facilities that these regions could never 
hope to have under Turkish administration. Rail- 
ways were contemplated as soon as they could be 
financed entirely by Italian capital. 

The Italian schemes were working beautifully 
when the birth of New Turkey in the revolution of 
July, 1908, changed the whole situation. The indo- 
lent and corrupt officials of the vilayet of Tripoli and 
sandjak of Benghazi, whose attention had been 
turned from Italian activities by Italian gold pieces, 
were replaced by members of the Union and Progress 
party. These new officials, owing to their utter in- 
experience and their sense of self-esteem, may have 
been no better than the old ones; probably they 
proved as inefficient, for executive power is not in- 
herent in the Turkish character. But they were men 
who had passed through the fire of persecution and 
suffering for love of their fatherland, and the renais- 
sance of Turkey was the supreme thing in their lives. 
Their patriotism and enthusiasm knew no bounds. 
Their ambitions for Turkey may have been far in 
advance of their ability to serve her. But criticism 
is silent before patriotism which has proved its 
willingness to sacrifice life for country. 

244 



WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 

One can imagine the feelings of the Young Turks 
when they saw what Italy was doing. It is easy 
enough to say that they should have immediately 
reformed the administration of the country and given 
to the Tripolitans an efficient government. Reform 
does not come in a twelvemonth, and the Young 
Turks had to act quickly to prevent the loss of 
Tripoli. They took the only means they had. They 
began to thwart and obstruct every Italian enterprise, 
to extend the military frontiers of Tripoli into the 
Soudan, to bring all the Moslem tribes of Africa into 
touch with the Constantinople khalifate. 

Italy saw her hopes being destroyed as other 
colonial hopes had been destroyed one after the other. 
Representations at Constantinople were without 
effect. The more her ambassador tried, the more he 
realized the hopelessness of his case. Surely it was 
a fruitless diplomatic task to persuade Young Turkey 
that her officials in Tripoli and Benghazi should be 
forbidden to hinder the onward march of Italian 
"peaceable conquest." The Italian economic fabric 
in Tripoli, so carefully and so patiently built, seemed 
to be for nothing. Austria-Hungary had begun the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by the annexa- 
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. No Power 
had successfully protested, much less the helpless 
Turks. So Italy began to prepare her coup. 

The crisis could not be precipitated. Italian public 
opinion, wary of colonial enterprises since the terrible 
Abyssinian disaster, and opposed to the imposition 
of fresh taxes, had to be carefully prepared to sustain 
the Ministry in a hostile action against Turkey. 

245 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

In January, 191 1, the Italian press began to pub- 
lish articles on Tripoli, dilating upon its economic 
value and its vital importance to Italy, if she were 
to hold her place among the great Powers of Europe. 
Every little Turkish persecution — and there were 
many of them — was made the subject of a first-page 
bit of telegraphic news. The Italian people were 
worked up to believe that not only in Tripoli, but 
elsewhere, the Young Turks were showing their con- 
tempt for Italian officials and for the Italian flag. 
An Italian sailing vessel was seized at Hodeidah in 
the Red Sea; the incident was magnified. An Ameri- 
can archaeological expedition was granted a concession 
in Tripoli; a similar concession had been refused to 
Italian applicants. The newspapers pretended that 
the Americans were really prospecting for sulphur 
mines, whose development would mean disaster to 
the great mines in Sicily! French troops reached 
the Oasis of Ghadames ; the hinterland of Tripoli was 
threatened by the extension of French sovereignty 
into the Sahara. At this moment the reopening of 
the Morocco question by the Agadir incident gave 
Italy the incentive and the encouragement to show 
her hand. 

In September, the press campaign against the 
Turkish treatment of Italians in Tripoli became daily 
and violent. Signor Giolitti succeeded in getting all 
parties, except the extreme Socialists, to promise their 
support. 

It was not until the last moment that the Sublime 
Porte realized the danger. On September 26th, the 
Derna, a transport, arrived at Tripoli, with much- 

246 



WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 

needed munitions of war. There had been a shame- 
ful neglect to keep up the garrisons in the Afri- 
can provinces, and when it was too late — as is so 
often the case at Constantinople — there dawned 
the realization that the provinces were practically 
without defence. 

On September 27th, the first of the series of ulti- 
matums which have brought all Europe into war was 
delivered to the Sublime Porte. Italy gave Turkey 
forty-eight hours to consent to the occupation of 
Tripoli, with the proviso of the Sultan's sovereignty 
under the Italian protectorate, and the payment of an 
annual subsidy into the Ottoman Treasury. In Italy, 
two classes were mobilized, General Caneva em- 
barked his troops upon transports that had already 
been prepared, and the Italian fleet proceeded to 
Tripoli. 

The Turks did not believe that there would be war. 
On the afternoon of September 29th, the Grand 
Vizier, as far-seeing in his understanding of interna- 
tional affairs as he was blind in grasping what was 
best for Turkey's interests, told me that he was sure 
Italy would hesitate before entering upon a war that 
would be the prelude to the greatest catastrophe that 
the world has ever known. "Italy will not draw the 
sword," he declared, "because she knows that if she 
does attack us, all Europe will be eventually drawn 
into the bloodiest struggle of history, — a struggle 
that has always been certain to follow the destruction 
of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." Hakki 
pasha was right, except in one important particular. 
Perhaps Italy did know what an attack upon Turkey 

247 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

would eventually lead to. But two hours after my 
conversation with the Grand Vizier, he received a 
declaration of war. 

Simultaneously with the news of the declaration 
of war, Constantinople learned that the first shots 
had already been fired. Without waiting for any 
formalities, the Italian fleet had attacked and sunk 
Turkish torpedo-boats off Preveza at the mouth of 
the Adriatic. The Turkish fleet had just left Beirut 
to return to Constantinople, and for three days it was 
feared that the Italians would follow up their offen- 
sive by destroying the naval power of Turkey. They 
did not do so, although it would have been an easy 
victory. For it was the hope of the Giolitti Cabinet 
that there would be no real war. 

The attack at Preveza had a double purpose of 
preventing the torpedo-boats from interfering with 
the Italian commerce, and of striking terror into the 
hearts of the Turks. The Italians did not want to 
widen the breach and draw upon themselves the 
hatred and enmity of Turkey by sinking her navy. 
Such an action would make difficult the negotiations 
which they still hoped to pursue. It was not war 
against the people of Turkey that they had declared ; 
that was a mere form. What they wanted was a 
pretext for seizing Tripoli. So naval and military 
operations were directed not against Turkey, but 
against the coveted African provinces. Considera- 
tions of international diplomacy, also, dictated this 
policy. 

The Italian warships opened fire upon Tripoli on 
September 30th. On October 26. and 3d, the forts 

248 



WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 

were dismantled and the garrison driven out of the 
city by the bombardment. On October 5th, Tripoli 
surrendered. The expeditionary corps disembarked 
on the nth. The next transports from Italy went 
farther east. Derna capitulated on the 8th, but a 
heavy sea prevented the troops from landing until 
the 1 8th. General Ameglio took Benghazi at the 
point of the bayonet on October 19th. Horns was 
occupied on the 21st. 

The Turks and Arabs attempted to retake Tripoli 
on October 23d. While the Italian soldiers were in 
the trenches they were fired upon from behind by 
Arabs who were supposed to be non-combatants. 
Discovery of the assailants was practically im- 
possible, because many clothed themselves like 
women and hid their faces by veils. The Italians 
had to repress this move from the rear with ruthless 
severity. They did what any other army would 
have done under the circumstances, for their safety 
depended upon putting down the enemy that had 
arisen in their rear. Failure to act quickly and 
severely would have encouraged a revolution in the 
city and its suburbs. Horror was excited throughout 
the world by the highly coloured stories of this re- 
pression. Details of Italian cruelty were emphasized. 
No effort was made to explain impartially the provo- 
cation which had led to this killing. There was an 
unconscious motive in these stories to embarrass 
Italy in her attempt to build a colonial empire, just 
exactly as there had been in the time of the Abys- 
sinian War in 1896. The American Consul at Tripoli 
has assured me that the correspondents who were 

249 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

guests at the time of the Italian army did not give 
the facts as they were. 

The French and English newspaper campaign 
against Italy was as violent as it had been against 
Austria in 1908, at the time of the first violation of 
Ottoman territorial integrity. Attempts were made 
to denounce the high-handed act of piracy of which 
Italy had been guilty, and to poison the public mind 
against the Italian army. It is significant to note 
this attitude of the press of the two countries, which 
are now so persuasively extending the olive branch 
to Italy. Great Britain and France were alarmed 
over the menace to the "equilibrium" of the Medi- 
terranean. This is why they did not hesitate to 
denounce unsparingly the successful effort of Italy to 
follow in their own footsteps! The tension between 
France and Italy was illustrated by the vehement 
newspaper protests against the Italian use of the 
right of search for contraband on French ships. Italy 
was taken to task for acting in exactly the same way 
that France has since acted in arresting Dutch ships 
in August and September, 19 14. 

The attempt of October 23d failed, in spite of the 
conspiracy behind the lines. A second attempt on 
the 26th was equally unsuccessful. On November 
6th, the garrison of Tripoli started to take the offen- 
sive. But progress beyond the suburbs of the city 
was found to be impossible. 

A decree annexing the African provinces of Turkey 
was approved by the Italian Parliament on Novem- 
ber 5th. The Italian "adventure," as those who 
looked upon Italy's aggression with unfriendly eyes 

250 



WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 

persisted in calling it, was now shown to be irrevoca- 
ble. Turkey's opportunity to compromise had passed. 

In Tripoli, as well as in the other cities, it took the 
whole winter to make the foothold on the coast secure. 
From November 27th to March 3d, Enver bey made 
three attempts to retake Derna. From November 
28th to March 12th, six assaults of Turks and Arabs 
were made upon Benghazi. The Italian positions 
at Horns were not secure until February 27th. Italy 
was practically on the defensive everywhere. 

Hakki pasha found himself compelled to resign 
when the war was declared. In fact, he considered 
himself fortunate not to be assassinated by army 
officers, who declared that he had been negligent to 
the point of treason in laying Turkey open to the 
possibility of being attacked where and when she was 
weakest. Said pasha became Grand Vizier — he had 
held the post six times under Abdul Hamid. Five 
members of the former Cabinet, including Mahmud 
Shevket pasha, remained in office. 

The first appearance of Said pasha's Cabinet be- 
fore Parliament is a scene that I shall never forget. 
No pains had been spared to make it a brilliant spec- 
tacle. The Sultan was present during the reading 
of his speech from the throne. Everyone expected 
an important pronouncement. The speech of Said 
pasha was typically Turkish. Instead of announcing 
how Turkey was to resist Italy, he gave it to be 
understood in vague language that diplomacy was 
going to save the day once more, and that Turkey 
was secure because the preservation of her territorial 
integrity was necessary for Europe. 

251 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

The action of Italy, however, had upset the calcu- 
lations of the Young Turks in the game they were 
trying to play in European diplomacy. It was their 
dream — more than that, their belief — that Turkey 
held the balance of power between the two great 
groups of European Powers. They thought that the 
destinies of Europe were in their hands. I heard 
Mahmud Shevket pasha say once that "the million 
bayonets of Turkey would decide the fortunes of 
Europe." Turkey was essentially mixed up in the 
European imbroglio. But it was the absence of 
those million bayonets, of which Mahmud Shevket 
pasha boasted, that changed the fortunes of Europe. 
The military weakness of the Ottoman Empire has 
brought us to the present catastrophe. 

The embarrassment of the Young Turks was that 
Italy belonged to the Triple Alliance, and that Ger- 
many, while professing deep and loyal friendship, 
stood by and saw Turkey attacked by her ally, Italy, 
just as she had stood by in 1908, when the other 
partner of the Triple Alliance had annexed Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Those who had based their hopes 
of Turkey's future upon the pan-Germanic move- 
ment had a bitter awakening. In what sense could 
Wilhelm II be called "the defender of Islam"? 

I attended sessions of Parliament frequently during 
the five weeks between the outbreak of the war and 
the passing of the decree by which the African pos- 
sessions of Turkey were annexed to the kingdom of 
Italy. Before this step had been taken by Italy, 
there was a possibility of saving the situation. But 
the Turks, instead of presenting a united front to the 

252 



WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 

world, and finding ways and means of making a 
successful resistance against Italy, wasted not only 
the precious month of October, when there was still 
a way out, but also the whole winter that followed. 
In November, the opposition in the House and 
Senate formed a new party which they called the 
"Entente Liberale. " The principal discussions in 
Parliament were about whether the Hakki pasha 
Cabinet should be tried for high treason, and whether 
the Chamber of Deputies could be prorogued by the 
Sultan without the consent of the Senate. The 
opposition grew so rapidly that the Committee of 
Union and Progress induced the Sultan to dissolve 
Parliament on January 18, 19 13. 

The new elections were held at the end of March. 
Throughout the Empire they were a pure farce. The 
functionaries of the Government saw to it that only 
members of the Committee of Union and Progress 
were returned. While the Young Turks were play- 
ing their game of parties, anarchy was rife in differ- 
ent parts of the Empire. The " Interior Organization" 
had been revived in Macedonia. The Albanians, 
who had been left entirely out of the fold in the new 
elections, were determined to get redress. In Arabia, 
the neutrality of Iman Yahia in the war with Italy 
was purchased only by the granting of complete 
autonomy. It was the surrender of the last vestige 
of Turkish authority in an important part of Arabia. 
Said Idris, the other powerful chief in the Yemen, 
refused to accept autonomy, and continued to harass 
the Turkish army. 

The Committee of Union and Progress was not 
253 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

allowed to enjoy long its fraudulent victory. In the 
army an organization which called itself "The Mili- 
tary League for the Defence of the Country" was 
formed, and received so many adhesions that Mah- 
mud Shevket pasha was compelled to leave the Minis- 
try of War on July ioth, and Said pasha the Grand 
Vizirate eight days later. Ghazi Mukhtar pasha 
accepted the task of forming a new Cabinet. The 
Unionist Parliament refused to listen to his program. 
So he secured from the Sultan a second prorogation 
of Parliament on August 5th. The weapon the 
Unionists had used was turned against them. 

While Turkey showed herself absolutely incapable 
of making any military move to recover the invaded 
provinces or to punish the invader, Italy had none 
the less a difficult problem to face. A few Turkish 
officers had succeeded in organizing among the Arabs 
of Tripoli and Benghazi a troublesome resistance. 
General Caneva went to Rome at the beginning of 
February, and told the Cabinet very plainly that it 
would take months to get a start in Africa, and years 
to complete the pacification of the new colonies, 
unless the Turks consented to withdraw the sup- 
port of their military leadership and to cease their 
religious agitation. 

The question was, how could Turkey be forced to 
recognize the annexation decree of November 5 th? 
The Italian fleet could not be kept indefinitely, at 
tremendous expense and monthly depreciation of the 
value of the ships, under steam. The Turkish fleet 
did not come out to give battle, so the Italians were 
immobilized at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Ital- 

254 



WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 

ian commerce in the Black Sea and eastern Medi- 
terranean was at a standstill. Upon Italian imports 
into Turkey had been placed a duty of one hundred 
per cent. Where, outside of Tripoli, was the pressure 
to be exercised? 

Premier San Giuliano had promised before the war 
started that he would not disturb political conditions 
in the Balkan peninsula. The alliance with Austria- 
Hungary made impossible operations in the Adriatic. 
But it was clear that something must be done. Pub- 
lic opinion in Italy had been getting very restless. 
It did not seem to the Italians that the considerations 
of international diplomacy should stand in the way 
of finishing the war. Were they to burden them- 
selves with heavy taxes in order to spare the feelings 
of the Great Powers? Had Russia hesitated in the 
Caucasus? Had Great Britain hesitated in Egypt? 
Had Austria hesitated in Bosnia-Herzegovina? 

As a sop to public opinion, and also as a feeler to 
see how the move would be taken by the other 
Powers, the Cabinet decided upon direct action 
against Turkey. The fleet appeared before Beirut 
on February 24th, and sank two Turkish warships 
in the harbour. It was not exactly a bombardment 
of the city, but many shells did fall on the 
buildings and on the streets near the quay. Neither 
Turkey nor Europe paid much attention to this 
demonstration. In April, Italy had come to the 
point where she felt that she must cast all scruples 
to the winds. A direct attack upon Turkey was 
decided. Italy, at this writing the only neutral 
among the Great Powers of Europe, took the action 

255 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

which brought Balkan ambitions to a ferment, and 
caused the kindling of the European conflagration. 
Her declaration of war on Turkey and the annexa- 
tion of Tripoli inevitably led to this. On April 18th 
Admiral Viala bombarded the forts of Kum Kale at 
the Dardanelles, and on the same day the port of 
Vathy in Samos. Four days later Italian marines 
disembarked on the island of Stampali. On May 
4th, Rhodes was invaded, a battle occurred in the 
streets of the town, and the Turks withdrew to 
the interior of the island. They were pursued, and 
surrendered on the 17th. Ten other islands at the 
mouth of the ^Egean Sea were occupied. 

A demonstration at Patmos for union with Greece 
was vigorously repressed. Italy protested her good 
faith in regard to the islands. But the dismember- 
ment of the Ottoman Empire, arrested at San Stef- 
ano in 1878, had begun again. 

Turkey responded to the bombardment of Kum 
Kale by closing the Dardanelles, and to the occupa- 
tion of Rhodes by attempting to expel from Turkey 
all Italian residents. The expulsion decree, however, 
was carried out with great humanity and considera- 
tion by the Turks. During the Italian War and 
also the Balkan War, Turkish treatment of sub- 
jects of hostile states living in Ottoman territory 
was highly praiseworthy. The Christian nations of 
Europe would today do well to follow their example ! 

The closing of the straits lasted for a month. It 
disturbed all Europe. Never before has the question 
of the straits been shown to be so vital to the world. 
From April 18th to May 18th. over two hundred 

256 






WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 

merchant vessels of all nations were immobilized in 
Constantinople. It was a sight to be witness of once 
in a lifetime. For these ships were not lost in a maze 
of basins, docks, and piers. They lay in the stream of 
the Bosphorus and at the entrance to the Sea of 
Marmora. You could count them all from the 
Galata Tower. The loss to shipping was tremendous. 
Southern Russia is the bread basket of Europe. No 
European resident could remain unaffected by a 
closing of the only means of egress for these billions 
of bushels of wheat. Angry protests were in vain. 
Turkey reopened the straits only when assurance had 
been given to her that the attack of the Italian fleet 
would not be repeated. 

Little had been gained by Italy as far as hastening 
peace was concerned. She had done all that she 
could. Turkey still remained passive and unresisting, 
because she knew well that any vital action, such 
as the bombardment of Salonika or Smyrna, or the 
invasion of European Turkey by way of Albania or 
Macedonia, would bring on a general European war. 
Italy could not take this responsibility before history. 
So for months longer it remained a war without 
battles. Many Italian warships had not fired a 
single shot. 

During May, June, and July, the Italians pushed 
on painfully to the interior of Tripoli. There was 
no other way. In August, the Turkish resistance on 
the side of Tunis was finished. In September, a 
desperate attack of Enver bey against Derna was 
repulsed. The Italian forces were in a much better 
position than before. But the attacks of the Arabs 

17 257 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

were of such a character that they could not be 
suppressed by overwhelming numbers of trained 
men that the Italians could muster. It was a guerilla 
warfare with the oases of the desert as the back- 
ground. The Italians felt that the Arabs, if left to 
themselves, would soon tire of the conflict. For they 
were, after all, traders, and were dependent upon the 
outlets for their caravan trade which was now com- 
pletely in the hands of Italians. It was the mere 
handful of Turkish troops and Turkish officers who 
kept the Arabs stirred up to fight. 

As early as June, Italian and Turkish representa- 
tives met informally at Ouchy on Lac Leman to 
discuss bases for a solution of the conflict which had 
degenerated into an odd impasse. Italy was anxious 
to conclude peace for several reasons. Her com- 
merce was suffering. Her warships needed the dry- 
dock badly. While Turkey could no longer prevent 
the conquest of Tripoli and Benghazi, the absence 
of Turkish direction in keeping the tribesmen of the 
interior stirred up, and the cessation of the propa- 
ganda against the Italian occupation on the ground 
of religion, would help greatly in the pacification of 
the provinces. Since the Albanian revolution had 
assumed alarming proportions, Turkey also became 
anxious for peace. She was uncertain of Italy's 
attitude in case of an outbreak in the Balkans. Un- 
officially, Italy had let it be known that there was a 
limit to patience, and that the development of a 
hostile attitude by the Balkan States against Turkey 
would find her, in spite of Europe, in alliance with 
them against her. In reality, however, the Italian 

258 



WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 

ministers at the Balkan courts had all along done 
their best to keep Greece and Bulgaria from being 
carried away by the temptation to take advantage of 
the situation. This had been especially true in April 
and May, during the period of Italian activity in the 
^Egean. 

Turkey knew perfectly well, before the pourparlers 
at Ouchy, what were the Italian terms. In March, 
when the five other Powers had offered to mediate, 
Italy had laid down the following points : tacit recog- 
nition of the Italian conquest and withdrawal of the 
Turkish army from Africa ; recognition by the Powers, 
if not by Turkey, of the decree of annexation. Italy 
promised, if this were done, to recognize the Sultan 
as Khalif in the African provinces (this meant purely 
religious sovereignty) ; to respect the religious liberty 
and customs of the Moslem populations; to accord 
an amnesty to the Arabs; to guarantee to the Otto- 
man Public Debt the obligations for which the cus- 
toms-duties of Tripoli had been mortgaged; to buy 
the properties owned by the Ottoman Government ; 
to guarantee, in accord with the other Powers, the 
(future!) "integrity of the Ottoman Empire." Tur- 
key had refused these terms, in spite of the pressure 
of the Powers at the Sublime Porte. Then followed 
the loss of Rhodes and the other islands. 

The first pourparlers at Ouchy had been inter- 
rupted by the fall of Said pasha. They were resumed 
on August 12th by duly accredited delegates. After 
six weeks an accord was prepared, and sent to Con- 
stantinople. The ministry, although facing a war 
with the Balkan States, tried to prolong the negotia- 

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THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

tions. Italy then addressed an ultimatum on Octo- 
ber 1 2th. The Sublime Porte was doing its best to 
prevent war with the Balkan States. Italy was 
determined now to go to any length to wring peace 
from her stubborn opponent. For the Balkan storm 
was breaking, and she wanted to get her ambassador 
back to Constantinople to take part in the councils of 
the Great Powers. The continuance of a state of war 
with Turkey was never more clearly against her 
interests. When the ultimatum arrived, Turkey 
yielded. The preliminaries of Ouchy were signed on 
October 15th. 

There were two distinct parts to the Treaty of 
Lausanne, as it is generally called. In order to save 
the pride of Turkey, nothing was said in the text of 
the treaty about a cession of territory. Turkey was 
not asked to recognize the Italian conquest. The 
unofficial portion of the treaty consisted of a firman, 
granting complete autonomy to the African vilayet, 
and appointing a personal religious representative 
of the Khalif , with functions purely nominal ; and the 
promise of amnesty and good administration to the 
yEgean Islands. 

The text of the treaty provided for the cessation of 
hostilities ; the withdrawal of the Turkish army from 
Tripoli and Benghazi and the withdrawal of the 
Italian army from the islands of the JEgean; the 
resumption of commercial and diplomatic relations; 
and the assumption by Italy of Tripoli's share of the 
Ottoman Public Debt. 

Italy had no intention of fulfilling the spirit of 
the second clause of this treaty, which was that the 

260 



WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 

islands occupied by her be restored to Turkey. 
The text of the treaty provided that the recall of the 
Italian troops be subordinated to the recall of the 
Turkish troops from Tripoli. It was easy enough to 
quibble at a later time about the meaning of "Turk- 
ish. " As long as there was opposition to the Italian 
pacification, the opponents could be called Turkish. 
Italy said that the holding of the Dodecanese was a 
guarantee of Turkish good faith in preventing the 
continuance secretly of armed opposition to her 
subjugation of the new African colonies. As long as 
an Arab held the field against the Italian army, it 
could still be claimed that Turkey had not fulfilled 
her side of the promise in Article 2. At the moment, 
Turkey was quite willing to see the Italians stay in 
the southern islands of the ^Egean. For otherwise 
they would have inevitably fallen into the hands of 
the Greeks when the Balkan War broke out. 

Since the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, the 
Italians have remained in the Dodecanese. Not only 
that, but they have used their position in Rhodes to 
begin a propaganda of Italian economic influence in 
south-western Asia Minor. Before the present Euro- 
pean war, Italy might have found herself compelled 
to relinquish her hold on these islands. But now her 
advantageous neutrality has put into her hands the 
cards by which she can secure the acquiescence of 
Europe to the annexation of Rhodes. 

The outbreak of indignation in Turkey against 
Italy at the beginning of the war was even more 
vehement than that against Austria-Hungary when 
she had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. 

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THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Hussein Djahid bey, in the Tanine, wrote an edi- 
torial, in which he said: "Never shall we have any 
dealings with the Italians in the future. Never shall 
a ship bearing their flag find trade at an Ottoman 
port. And we shall teach our children, and tell them 
to teach their children, the reasons for the undying 
hatred between Osmanli and Italian as long as history 
lasts." Having read the same sort of a thing in 
1908, I was interested in seeing just how long the 
hatred would last. Just a year from the day war 
was declared, and this editorial appeared, the Italian 
ambassador returned on a warship to Constantinople, 
the Italian post offices opened, and all my Italian 
friends began to reappear. This is told here to illus- 
trate the fact that cannot be too strongly emphasized : 
there is no public opinion in Turkey. 

The chief importance of the year of "the war that 
was no war" is not in the loss of Tripoli. It is in the 
fact that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, 
secure since 1878, had been attacked by violence. 
The example given by Italy was to be followed by the 
Balkan States. What Europe had feared had come. 
This war was the prelude to Europe in arms. 



262 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN STATES 
AND TURKEY 

DURING the year 191 1 there had been a per- 
ceptible drawing together of the Balkan 
States in the effort to find a common ground 
for an offensive alliance against Turkey. The path 
of union was very difficult for the diplomats of the 
Balkan States to follow. It was clear to them in 
principle that they would never be able to oppose 
the policy of the Young Turks separately. They 
were not even sure whether their united armies 
could triumph over the large forces which the Ot- 
toman Empire was able to put in the field, and which 
were reputed to be well trained and disciplined. 
This reputation was sustained by the unanimous 
opinion of the military attaches of the Great Powers 
at Constantinople And then, there were the mutual 
antipathies to be healed, and the problem of the 
terrible rivalry in Macedonia, of which we have 
spoken before, to be solved. Most formidable of 
all, was the uncertainty as to the benefit to the 
different Balkan nations of a successful war against 
Turkey. 

It is impossible to explain here all the diplomatic 

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THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

steps leading up to the Balkan alliance against 
Turkey. They have been set forth, with much 
divergency of opinion, by a number of writers 
who were in intimate touch with the diplomatic 
circles of the Balkan capitals during the years imme- 
diately preceding the formation of the alliance. We 
must confine ourselves to a statement of the general 
causes which induced the Balkan States, against 
the better judgment of many of their wisest leaders, 
to form the alliance, and to declare war upon Turkey. 

Both Bulgaria and Greece had sentimental reasons ; 
the terrible persecution of the Christians of their 
own race in Macedonia seemed cause enough for 
war. But while Bulgaria had long held the thesis 
of Macedonian autonomy, which was sustained by 
the Bulgarian Macedonians themselves, Greece was 
afraid that the creation of such a regime would in 
the end prove an irrevocable blow to Hellenistic 
aspirations. It was well known to the Greeks that 
the population of Macedonia was not only largely 
Bulgarian, but aggressively so, and that its sense 
of nationality had been intelligently and skilfully 
awakened and fostered by the educational propa- 
ganda. Above all things Hellenism feared the 
Bulgarian schools. Under an autonomous regime 
their influence could not be combated. 

The possibility of the Balkan alliance was really 
in the hands of Greece. For it was recognized that 
no matter how large and powerful an army Bulgaria 
and Servia could raise, the co-operation of the Greek 
navy, which would prevent the use of the ^gean 
ports of the Macedonian littoral for disembarking 

264 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

troops from Asia, was absolutely essential to success. 
In spite of their fears for the future of Macedonia, 
the Greeks were converted to the idea of an alliance 
with the Slavic Balkan States to destroy the power 
of Turkey by the continual bullying of the Young 
Turks over Crete, and by the economic disasters 
from the boycott. It is not too much to say that 
the attitude of the Young Turks towards the Cretan 
questions, and their institution of the boycott, were 
two factors directly responsible for the downfall of 
the Empire. 

The visit of three hundred Bulgarian students to 
Athens in Easter week, 191 1, should have been a 
warning to Turkey of the danger which attended 
her policy of goading the Greeks to desperation. I 
was present on the Acropolis at the memorable re- 
ception given by the students of Athens to their 
guests from the University of Sofia, and remember 
well the peculiar political significance of the speeches 
of welcome addressed to them there. Later in the 
same year, Greece followed the example of the other 
Balkan States in sending her Crown Prince to Sofia 
to join in the festivities attendant upon the coming 
of age of Crown Prince Boris. 

Bulgaria was drawn into the Balkan alliance, and 
reluctantly compelled to abandon the policy of 
Macedonian autonomy, by the attitude of the Young 
Turks toward Macedonians. The settlement of 
immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the 
conscription for the Turkish army, led to reprisals 
on the part of Bulgarian bands. These were fol- 
lowed by massacres at Ishtib and elsewhere. In the 

265 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

first week of August, 1912, the massacre of Kotchana 
was for Bulgaria the last straw on the camel's back. 
I was in Sofia at the end of August when the national 
congress, called together wholly without the Govern- 
ment's co-operation, declared that war was a neces- 
sity. Seated one evening in the public garden at a 
cafe — if I remember rightly it was the 1st of Septem- 
ber — I heard from the lips of one of the influential 
delegates at this congress that public opinion in 
Bulgaria was so wholly determined to force war, that 
the King and the Cabinet would have to yield. 

In Servia and Montenegro, it had long been re- 
cognized that any opportunity to unite with Bul- 
garia and Greece to bring pressure to bear upon 
Turkey could not but be beneficial to these two 
kingdoms. There was the sandjak of Novi Bazar 
to be divided between Montenegro and Servia. 
There was the possibility of an outlet to the Adriatic. 
So far as Macedonia was concerned, if we believe 
that she was honest and sincere in the treaty of 
partition with Bulgaria, Servia was quite content 
with the idea of a possible annexation of Old Servia, 
and the opportunity to drive back the Moslem 
Albanians, who had been established on her frontiers 
under the Young Turk regime, and were ruthlessly 
destroying Slavs wherever they got the opportunity. 

One does not have any hesitation in declaring that 
the political leaders in power in the Balkan States 
at first hoped to avoid a war with Turkey. That 
they did not succeed in doing so was due to the pres- 
sure of public sentiment upon them. This public 
sentiment forced them to action. Every Balkan 

266 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

Cabinet would have fallen had the ministries re- 
mained advocates of peace. Over against the fear of 
the Turkish army, which (let me say it emphatically) 
was very strong among the military authorities in 
each of the Balkan States, was the feeling that the 
time was very favourable to act, and that chances 
of success in a common war against Turkey were 
greater in the autumn of 1912 than they would be 
later; for the Young Turks were spending tre- 
mendous sums of money on army reorganization. 
At that moment, they were coming to the end of a 
demoralizing war with Italy, and the Macedonian 
army had suffered greatly during the summer by 
the Albanian uprising. 

Early in September, Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and 
Montenegro decided that peace could be preserved 
only by the actual application, under sufficient 
guarantees, of sweeping reforms in Macedonia. 
They appealed to the Powers to sustain them in 
demanding for Macedonia a provincial assembly, a 
militia recruited within the limits of the province, 
and a Christian Governor. The Great Powers, as 
usual, tried to carry water on both shoulders. Blind 
to the fact that inaction and vague promises would 
no longer keep in check the neighbours of Turkey, 
they urged the Balkan States to refrain from "being 
insistent," and pointed out to Turkey the "ad- 
visability" of making concessions. The Turks did 
not believe in the reality of the union of the Balkan 
States. They could not conceive upon what grounds 
their neighbours had succeeded in forming an alli- 
ance. Neither the Balkan States nor Turkey had 

267 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

any respect for the threats or promises or offers of 
assistance of the Powers. 

In order to convince the Balkan States that they 
had better think twice before making a direct ulti- 
matum, the Turks organized autumn manoeuvres 
north of Adrianople, in which fifty thousand of the 
elite army corps were to take part. The answer of 
the Balkan States was an order for general mobili- 
zation issued simultaneously in the four capitals. 
This was on September 30th. The next day Turkey 
began to mobilize. All the Greek ships in the Bos- 
phorus and the Dardanelles were seized. Munitions 
of war, disembarked at Salonika for Servia, were 
confiscated. It was not until then that it began to 
dawn upon Turkey and her sponsors, the Great 
Powers, that the Balkan States meant business. 
The questions of reforms in Macedonia had been so 
long the prerogative of the Powers that they did not 
realize that the moment had come when the little 
Balkan States, whom they called "troublesome," 
were no longer going to be put off with promises. 
The absolute failure of concerted European diplo- 
macy to accomplish anything in the Ottoman Empire 
was demonstrated from the results in Macedonia, and 
also in Crete. 

So the Balkan States were not in the proper frame 
of mind to receive the joint note on the status quo, 
which will remain famous in the annals of European 
diplomacy as a demonstration of the futility of con- 
certed diplomatic action, when there is no genuine 
unity behind it. On the morning of October 8th, 
the ministers of Russia and Austria, acting in the 

268 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

name of the six "Great Powers," handed in at Sofia, 
Athens, Belgrade, and Cettinje, the following note: 

"The Russian and Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ments declare to the Balkan States: 

"i. That the Powers condemn energetically 
every measure capable of leading to a rupture of 
peace ; 

"2. That, supporting themselves on Article 23 
of the Treaty of Berlin, they will take in hand, 
in the interest of the populations, the realization 
of the reforms in the administration of European 
Turkey, on the understanding that these reforms 
will not diminish the sovereignty of His Imperial 
Majesty the Sultan and the territorial integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire; this declaration reserves, 
also, the liberty of the Powers for the collective 
and ulterior study of the reforms ; 

"3. That if, in spite of this note, war does 
break out between the Balkan States and the 
Ottoman Empire, they will not admit, at the end 
of the conflict, any modification in the territorial 
status quo in European Turkey. 

"The Powers will make collectively to the Sub- 
lime Porte the steps which the preceding declaration 
makes necessary." 

The shades of San Stefano, Berlin, Cyprus, 
and Egypt, Armenian massacres, Mitylene and 
Munsterberg, Bagdad railway, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Tripoli, and Rhodes, haunted this declaration, and 
made it impotent, honest effort though it was to 
preserve the peace of Europe. It was thirty-six 
years too late. 

For, one hour after it was delivered, the charge 
269 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

d'affaires of the Montenegrin legation at Constanti- 
nople, evidently as a result of an anticipation of a 
joint note from the Powers, left at the Sublime Porte 
the following memorable declaration of war: 

"In conformity with the authorization of King 
Nicholas, I have the honour of informing you that 
I shall leave Constantinople to-day. The Govern- 
ment of Montenegro breaks off all relations with 
the Ottoman Empire, leaving to the fortunes of 
arms of the Montenegrins the recognition of their 
rights and of the rights scorned through centuries 
of their brothers of the Ottoman Empire. 

"I leave Constantinople. 

"The royal government will give to the Ottoman 
representative at Cettinje his passports. 

"October 8, 1912. Plamenatz." 

There could no longer be any doubt of the trend 
of things. Inevitable result, this declaration of war, 
of the action of Italy one year before, just as the 
action of Italy harked back to Russian action in 
the Caucasus, British action in Egypt, Austrian 
action in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and French action 
in Morocco. Inevitable precursor, this declaration 
of war, of the European catastrophe of 1914. Who, 
then, is presumptuous enough to maintain that the 
cause is simple, and the blame all at one door? 
Europe is reaping in blood-lust what all the "Great 
Powers" have sown in land-lust. 

The chancelleries made strenuous efforts to nullify 
what their inspired organs called the "blunder," 
or the "hasty and inconsiderate action," of King 
Nicholas. There was feverish activity in Constan- 

270 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

tinople, and a continual exchange of conferences be- 
tween the embassies and the Sublime Porte. The 
ambassadors gravely handed in a common note, in 
which they offered to avert war by taking in hand 
themselves the long-delayed reforms. Had they 
forgotten the institution of the gendarmerie in 1903, 
and Hussein Hilmi pasha at Salonika? 

On this same day, the Montenegrin ex-minister 
at Constantinople, whose declaration of war had 
been so theatrical, was reported as having said at 
Bukarest on his way home, "Montenegro wants 
territorial aggrandizements, and will not give back 
whatever conquests she makes. We do not fear to 
cross the will of the Great Powers, for they do not 
worry us." These words express exactly the senti- 
ments of the other allies, both as regards their 
possible conquests and their attitude towards the 
dictum of the Powers. 

Events moved rapidly during the next ten days. 
On October 13th, the Balkan States responded to 
the Russo- Austrian note, thanking the Powers for 
their generous offices, but declaring that they had 
come to the end of their patience in the matter of 
Turkish promises for Macedonian reform, and were 
going to request of the Ottoman Government that 
it accord "without delay the reforms that have been 
demanded, and that it promise to apply them in 
six months, with the help of the Great Powers, and 
of the Balkan States whose interests are involved." 
This response was not only a refusal of mediation. 
It was an assertion, as the last words show, that the 
time had come when the Balkan States felt strong 

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THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

enough to claim a part in the management of their 
own affairs. 

Acting in accordance with this notification to the 
Powers, on October 14th, Servia, Greece, and Bul- 
garia demanded of Turkey the autonomy of the 
European provinces, under Christian governors; the 
occupation of the provinces by the allied armies while 
the reforms were being applied; the payment of an 
indemnity for the expenses of mobilization; the 
immediate demobilization of Turkey; and the pro- 
mise that the reforms would be effected within six 
months. The demand was in the character of an 
ultimatum, and forty-eight hours were given for a 
response. 

It was now evident that unless the Powers could 
compel the Balkan States to withdraw this sweeping 
claim, war would be inevitable. For no independent 
state could accept such a demand, and retain its self- 
respect. The representatives of Turkey at Belgrade 
and Athens were quite right in refusing to receive 
the note and transmit it to Constantinople. 

The Sublime porte did not answer directly the 
ultimatum of the allies. An effort was made to anti- 
cipate the Balkan claims, and get the Powers to 
intervene, by reviving the law of reform for the 
vilayets, which provided for the organization of 
communes and schools, the building of roads, and 
the limitation of military service to the vilayet or 
recruitment. But the fact that this law had been 
on the statute books since 1880, and had remained 
throughout the Empire a dead letter, gave little 
hope that it would be seriously applied now. 

272 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

On October 15th, righting began on the Serbo- 
Turkish frontier. The war had already brought 
about Turkish reverses at the hands of the Monte- 
negrins. Greece threw an additional defiance in the 
face of Turkey by admitting the Cretan deputies to 
the Greek legislative chamber. 

To gain time, for she was unprepared, and her 
mobilization progressing very slowly, Turkey made 
desperate efforts to delay the declaration of war by 
offering to treat at Sofia, on the basis of a cessation 
of Moslem immigration into Macedonia, and the 
suspension of enrolment of Christians in Moslem 
regiments. These points, as we have already shown, 
were the two principal reasons why the Bulgarians 
of Macedonia had changed their policy from auto- 
nomy to independence. But Bulgaria, feeling that 
cause for hesitation over a war of liberation had 
been removed by her secret partition treaty with 
Servia, remained obdurate. 

Then the Turkish diplomats turned their atten- 
tion to Athens, and tried to detach the Greeks from 
the alliance by agreeing to recognize the annexation 
of Crete to Greece, and promising an autonomous 
government for some of the JEgean Islands. This 
failed. But, to the very last, the Turks believed 
that Greece might stay out of the war. For this 
reason her representative at Athens was instructed 
to do all in his power to remain at his post, even if 
war were declared by the Sublime Porte on Bulgaria 
and Servia. 

Peace was hurriedly concluded with Italy at 
Ouchy on October 15th. On the 16th, when the 
is 273 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

forty-eight hours of the ultimatum had expired, and 
there was no answer from Turkey, every one expected 
a declaration of war from the allies. None came. 
On the 1 8th, to preserve her dignity, Turkey saw 
that she must be the one to act. It was no longer 
possible to wait until the allies were "good and 
ready"! She declared war on Bulgaria and Servia. 
Greece waited till afternoon to receive a similar 
declaration. None came. So Greece declared war 
on Turkey. 

THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR 

While the diplomats were still agitating and bluster- 
ing, while Turkey was procrastinating and trying 
to put off the evil day, and while the larger Balkan 
States were quietly completing their mobilization, 
Montenegro entered into action. On October 9th, 
the day following her declaration of war, the Mon- 
tenegrins entered the sandjak of Novi Bazar, and 
surrounded the frontier fortress of Berana. This 
was captured after six days of fighting. On the 
same day, Biepolje fell. Nearly one thousand 
prisoners, fourteen cannon, and a large number of 
rifles and stores were captured by the Montenegrins. 
In the meantime, two other Montenegrin columns 
had marched southward, reached San Giovanni di 
Medua, at the mouth of the Boyana, and cut Scutari 
off from the sea. Scutari was invested, but the 
Montenegrins, who had been able to put into the 
field scarcely more than thirty thousand men, found 
themselves mobilized for the entire winter. The 

274 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

great fortress of Tarabosh, a high mountain, towering 
over the town of Scutari and the lower end of the 
lake, was too strong for their forces and for their 
artillery. Inside the city of Scutari, it was the Al- 
banians fighting for their national life, and not the 
Turks, who organized and maintained the splendid 
and protracted resistance. 

The mobilization in the other Balkan States was 
not completed until the 18th, when the declaration 
of war was made on both sides. 

Most important of the foes of Turkey were the 
Bulgarians, whose military organization had for 
some years been attracting the admiration of all 
who had been privileged to see their manoeuvres and 
to visit their casernes. Bulgaria had been carefully 
and secretly preparing her mobilization long before 
the crisis became acute. I had the privilege of 
travelling in Bulgaria during the last two weeks of 
July, and of spending the month of August along 
the frontier between Thrace and Bulgaria. Every- 
where one could see the accumulation of the soldiers 
of the standing army already on war footing, and 
of military stores, at a number of different places. 
During August and September, every detail of the 
mobilization had been carefully arranged. When 
war was declared, Bulgaria had lour armies with 
a total effective of over three hundred thousand. 
Three of them were quickly massed on the frontier, 
fully equipped. No army has ever entered the field 
under better auspices. 

On the day of the declaration of war, the Czar 
Ferdinand issued a proclamation to his troops which 

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THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

clearly defined the issue. It was to be a war of 
liberation, a crusade, undertaken to free the brothers 
of blood and faith from the yoke of Moslem oppres- 
sion. In summing up, the Czar said: "In this 
struggle of the Cross against the Crescent, of liberty 
against tyranny, we shall have the sympathy of all 
those who love justice and progress." At the time, 
bitter criticism was directed against the Czar for 
having used words which brought out so sharply 
the religious issue. The proclamation of a crusade 
could bring forth on the other side the response of a 
djehad (holy war). This, above all things, was what 
the European Powers wished to avoid ; for they feared 
not only that it would make the war more bitter 
and more cruel between the opponents in the field, 
but that it would awaken a wave of fanaticism 
among the Moslems living under European control 
in Asia and in Africa. How many lessons will it 
need to teach Europe that the political menace of 
Pan-Islamism is a phantom, a myth! 

According to the plan adopted by the allied States, 
the offensive movement in Thrace, in which the bulk 
of the Turkish army would be met, was to be under- 
taken solely by Bulgaria. Only a Bulgarian army 
of secondary importance was to enter eastern Mace- 
donia, to protect the flank of the main Bulgarian 
army from a sudden eastward march of the Turkish 
Macedonian army. Its objective point, though not 
actually agreed upon, was to be Serres. 

The role of Servia and Greece, who in the general 
mobilization were expected to put about one hundred 
and fifty thousand troops each into the field, was 

276 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

to keep in check the Turkish army in Macedonia, 
and to prevent Albanian reinforcements from reach- 
ing the Turkish army in Thrace. In addition to 
this, Servia and Montenegro were expected to prevent 
the possible surprise of Austrian interference, while 
the fleet of Greece would perform the absolutely 
necessary service of preventing the passage of 
Turkish forces from Asia Minor to a Macedonian 
port. 

The allies expected a bitter struggle and, in 
Macedonia and Thrace at least, the successful op- 
position of a Turkish offensive, rather than the 
destruction of the Turkish armies. 

The mobilization in Turkey was described by 
many newspaper men who had come to Constanti- 
nople for the war in the most glowing terms. The 
efforts of Mahmud Shevket pasha to prepare the 
Turkish army for war were declared to be bearing 
splendid fruits in the first days of the mobilization. 
Wholly inaccurate accounts were written of the 
wonderful enthusiasm of the Turkish people for the 
war. Naturally, what even the residents of Con- 
stantinople saw at the beginning was the best foot 
front. We knew that tremendous sums had been 
expended for four years in bringing the army up to 
a footing of efficiency. We had seen with our own 
eyes the brilliant manoeuvres on the anniversary of 
the Sultan's accession in May, and on the anniver- 
sary of the Constitution in July. The work accom- 
plished by the German mission had cast its spell over 
us. We saw what we were expecting to see during 
the first days of the mobilization. The "snap 

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THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

judgments" of special correspondents have little 
value, other than freshness and naivete, except to 
readers even less informed than they are. But the 
East is a sphinx even to those who live there. After 
you have figured out, from what you call your 
"experience," what ought to happen, the chances 
are even that just the opposite comes true. In 
spite of the misgivings which had been awakened by 
a trip into the interior of Asia Minor, as far as Konia, 
during the third week of September, I believed that 
the Turkish army was going to give a good account 
of itself against the Bulgarians, whose spirit and 
whose organization I had had opportunity to see 
and admire during that very summer. 

Every one was mistaken. There were large bodies 
of splendidly trained and well-equipped troops in 
Thrace. Spick and span regiments did come over 
from garrison towns in Asia. We saw them fill 
the trains at Stambul and at San Stefano. But we 
over-estimated their number. The truth of the 
matter is that the trained and well-equipped forces 
of the Thracian army, officered by capable men, did 
not amount to more than eighty thousand. In 
retrospect, after going over carefully the position 
of the forces which met the Bulgarians, I feel that 
these figures can be pretty accurately established. 
But even these eighty thousand soldiers of the nizam 
(active army) could have done wonders in the Thra- 
cian campaign, if they had been allowed to go ahead 
to meet the Bulgarians, and to form the first line 
of battle. But this was not done. 

There are three time-honoured principles that 

278 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

cannot afford to be neglected at the beginning of a 
campaign. The army used for initial offensive action 
against the enemy should be composed wholly of 
soldiers in active service. The army should be 
concentrated to meet the attack, or to attack one 
opposing army first, leaving the others until later. 
Armies must be kept mobile, and not allow themselves 
to be trapped in fortresses. The fortresses in the 
portions of territory which may have to be abandoned 
temporarily to the invasion of the enemy may easily 
be overstocked with defenders, but never with 
provisions and munitions of war. In spite of the 
instructions of von der Goltz pasha, the Turks 
showed no regard for the first two, at least, of these 
elementary principles. The mobile army in Mace- 
donia, outside of the fortresses, was not recalled to 
Thrace, and redifs (reservists) were mixed with 
nizams (actives) in the first line of battle. The 
neglect of these principles was the direct cause of 
the Turkish disasters. 

After the nizams, most of whom were already in 
Thrace, came the redifs from Asia Minor. They 
arrived at Constantinople and at San Stefano in 
huge numbers, and without equipment. I saw many 
of them with their feet bound in rags. There were 
no tents over them or other shelter; there was no 
proper field equipment for them, and, even while 
they were patiently waiting for days to be forwarded 
to the front, they lacked (within sight of the mina- 
rets of Stambul!) bread to eat, shoes for their feet, 
and blankets to cover them at night. More than 
that, among them were many thousands who did 

279 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

not know how to use the rifles that were given to 
them, and who had not even a rudimentary military- 
education. In defensive warfare, as they proved 
at Adrianople and at Tchatalja, they could fight 
like lions. But for an offensive movement in the 
field the great majority of the redifs were worse 
than useless. 

The Turks were absolutely sure of victory. The 
press of the capital, on the day that war was de- 
clared , stated that the army of Thrace was composed 
of four hundred thousand soldiers, and that it was 
the intention to march direct to Sofia. Turkish 
officers of my acquaintance told me that they were 
all taking their dress uniforms in their baggage for 
this triumphal entry into Sofia, and that the invasion 
of Bulgaria would commence immediately. 

On the 19th of October, the Bulgarian army ap- 
peared in force at Mustafa Pasha, the first railway 
station after passing the Turkish frontier on the 
line from Sofia to Constantinople, and about eighteen 
miles north-west of Adrianople. It was the an- 
nounced intention of the Bulgarians to attack imme- 
diately the fortress of Adrianople, whose cannon 
commanded the sole railway line from Bulgaria into 
Thrace. Two of the Bulgarian armies were directed 
upon Adrianople, and the third army under General 
Dimitrieff received similar orders. In Bulgaria, 
as well as in Turkey, every one expected to see an 
attack upon Adrianople. Had not General Savoff 
declared openly that he would sacrifice fifty thou- 
sand men, if necessary, as the Japanese had done at 
Port Arthur, in order to capture Adrianople? 

280 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

A strict censorship was established in Bulgaria. 
No one, native or foreigner, who by chance saw just 
what the armies were doing, could have any hope 
of sending out the information. Postal and tele- 
graphic communications were in the hands of the 
military authorities. No one, who happened to be in 
the region in which the troops were moving forward, 
was allowed to leave by train, automobile, bicycle, 
or even on foot. Never in history has the world 
been so completely in the dark as to the operations 
of the army. But the attacks of the outposts of 
Adrianople, and the commencement of the bombard- 
ment of the forts, seemed to indicate the common 
objective of the three Bulgarian armies. Adrianople 
had the reputation of being one of the strongest 
fortresses in the world. This reputation was well 
justified. 

Some miles to the west of Adrianople, guarding 
the mountains of the south-eastern frontier of Bul- 
garia, was Kirk Kilisse, which was also supposed 
to be an impregnable position. Here the Ottoman 
military authorities had placed stores to form the 
base of supplies for the offensive military operation 
against Bulgaria. Shortly before the war, a branch 
railway from the sole line between Constantinople 
and Adrianople, going north from Lule Burgas, was 
completed. It furnished direct means of communi- 
cation between the capital and Kirk Kilisse. 

The General Staff at Constantinople wisely decided 
to leave in Adrianople only a sufficient garrison to 
defend the forts and the city. It was their inten- 
tion to send the bulk of their Thracian army north- 

281 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

west from Kirk Kilisse, using that fortress as a base, 
in order to cut off the Bulgarians from their supplies, 
and throw them back against the forts of Adrianople. 
In this way they intended to put the Bulgarians 
between two fires and crush them. Then they 
would commence the invasion of Bulgaria. The 
plan was excellent. If Turkey had actually had 
in the field a half million men well trained and well 
equipped, well officered and with a spirit of enthusi- 
asm, and — most important of all — properly fed, 
it is probable that the Bulgarians could have been 
held in check. But this army did not exist. The 
millions spent for equipment had disappeared — who 
knows where? There were not enough horses, even 
with the requisitions in Constantinople, for the 
artillery, and for the cavalry reserves. That meant 
that there were no horses at all for the commissary 
department. The only means of communication with 
the front was a single railway track. Roads had 
never been made in Thrace since the conquest. The 
artillery and the waggons had to be drawn through 
deep mud. 

Beyond the needs of the nizam (active) regiments, 
there were hardly any officers. The wretched masses 
of redifs (reservists) were without proper leadership. 
Not only was this all important factor for keeping 
up the morale of the soldiers lacking, but, from the 
moment they left Constantinople — even before that 
— there was insufficient food. Nor did the soldiers 
know why they were fighting. There was no enthu- 
siasm for a cause. The great mass of the civil popu- 
lation, if not, like the Christians, hostile to the army, 

282 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

was wholly indifferent. I do not believe there were 
ten thousand people in the city of Constantinople, 
who really cared what happened in Thrace. Since 
I have been in the midst of a mobilization in France, 
and have seen how the French soldiers are equipped 
for war and fed, and how they have been made to 
feel that every man, woman, and child in the nation 
was ready to make any sacrifice — no matter how 
great — for "the little soldiers of France," I feel more 
deeply the tragedy of the Turkish redifs. My wonder 
is that they were able to fight as bravely as they did. 
The world has no use for the government — for the 
"system" — which caused them to suffer as they did, 
and to give their lives in a wholly useless sacrifice. 

The story of the Thracian campaign I heard from 
the lips of many of those who had taken part in it, 
when the events were still fresh in their memory. 
It is fruitless to go into all the details, to discuss the 
strategy of the generals in command, and to give a 
technical description of the battles, and of the retreat. 
Turkish and Bulgarian officers, as well as a host of 
foreign correspondents, have published books on 
this campaign. Most of them hide the real causes 
of the defeat under a mass of unimportant detail, 
and seem to be written either to emphasize the 
writer's claim as a "first-hand" witness, to take to 
task certain generals, or to prove the superiority of 
French artillery, and the faultiness of German mili- 
tary instruction. When all these issues are cast to 
one side, the campaign can be briefly described. 

We have already anticipated the debacle of the 
military power of Turkey by giving the causes. 

283 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

This is not illogical. For these causes existed, and 
led to the inevitable result, before the first gun was 
fired. 

On October 19th, the Bulgarians began the invest- 
ment of Adrianople from the north and west. There 
was no serious opposition. The Turkish garrison 
naturally fell back to the protection of the forts, 
for the Turks had not planned to oppose, beyond 
Adrianople, the Bulgarian approach. The Ottoman 
advance-guard, composed of the corps of Constanti- 
nople and Rodosto, under the command of Abdullah 
and Mahmud Mukhtar pashas, was ordered to take 
the offensive north of Kirk Kilisse. They were to 
be followed by another army. This movement was 
intended to cut off the Bulgarians from their base 
of supplies, and throw them back on Adrianople. 
The remainder of the Turkish forces in Thrace were 
to wait the result of this movement. If the Bul- 
garians moved down the valley of the Maritza, 
leaving Adrianople, they would meet these imposing 
forces which covered Constantinople, and would 
have behind them the garrison of Adrianople, and 
the army of Abdullah and Mahmud Mukhtar 
threatening their communications. If they besieged 
Adrianople, the second army would take the offensive 
and the Bulgarians would be encircled. 

The outposts of the Turkish army came into 
contact with the Bulgarians on October 20th. Be- 
lieving that they had to do with the left of the army 
investing Adrianople, Mahmud and Abdullah decided 
to begin immediately their encircling movement. 
On the 2 1st and 22d, the two columns of the Turkish 

284 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

army were in fact engaged with the advance-guards 
of the first and second Bulgarian armies. But, in 
the meantime, General Dimitrieff and the third 
army (which they believed was on the extreme 
Bulgarian right, pressing down the Maritza to invest 
the southern forts of Adrianople) had quietly crossed 
the frontier almost directly north of Kirk Kilisse, 
and fell like a cyclone upon the Turks. The Turkish 
positions were excellent, and had to be taken at the 
point of the bayonet. From morning till night on 
October 23d, the Bulgarian third army captured 
position after position, without the help of their 
artillery, which was stuck in the mud some miles in 
the rear. In the evening, during a terrible storm, 
two fresh Bulgarian columns made an assault upon 
the Turkish positions. It was not until then that 
the Turks realized that they were fighting another 
army than that charged with the investment of 
Adrianople. A wild panic broke out among the 
redifs, who were mostly without officers. They 
started to retreat, and were soon followed by the 
remainder of the army. At Uskubdere, they met 
during the night reinforcements coming to their aid. 
Two regiments fired on each other, mutually mistak- 
ing the other for Bulgarians. The reinforcements 
joined in the disorderly retreat, which did not end 
until morning, when, exhausted and still crazed by 
fear, what remained of the Turkish army had reached 
Eski Baba and Bunar Hissar. 

The army was saved from annihilation by the 
darkness and the storm. For not only were the 
Bulgarians ignorant of the abandonment of Kirk 

285 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Kilisse, but, along the line where they knew the enemy 
were retreating, their cavalry could not advance in 
the darkness and mud, nor could their artillery shell 
the retreating columns. On the morning of the 
24th, when General Dimitrieff was preparing to 
make the assault upon Kirk Kilisse, he learned that 
the Turkish army had fled, and that the fortress 
was undefended. 

By the capture of Kirk Kilisse the Bulgarians 
gained enormous stores. They had a railway line 
open to them towards Constantinople. The only 
menace to a successful investment of Adrianople 
was removed. The victory, so easily purchased, 
was far beyond their dreams. But it would not 
have been possible had it not been for the willingness 
of the Bulgarian soldiers to charge without tiring 
or faltering at the point of the bayonet. The victory 
was earned, in spite of the Turkish panic. For the 
Bulgarian steel had much to do with that panic. 

As soon as he realized the extent of the victory 
of Kirk Kilisse, General Savoff ordered a general 
advance of the three Bulgarian armies. Only enough 
troops were left around Adrianople to prevent a sortie 
of the garrison. Notwithstanding the unfavourable 
condition of the roads, the Bulgarian armies moved 
with great rapidity. The cavalry in two days made 
reconnaissances on the east as far as Midia, and on 
the south as far as Rodosto. The main — and sole — ■ 
armies of the Turks were thus ascertained to be along 
the Ergene, and beyond in the direction of the capital. 
On the left, the third army of General Dimitrieff, 
not delaying at Kirk Kilisse, was in contact with the 

286 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

Turks at Eski Baba on the 28th. On the afternoon 
of the same day the Bulgarians drove the Turks 
out of the village of Lule Burgas, on the railway- 
to Constantinople, east of the point where the 
Dedeagatch- Salonika line branches off. 

For three days, October 29-31, the Turkish armies 
made a stand along the Ergene from Bunar Hissar 
to Lule Burgas. Since Gettysburg, Sadowa, and 
Sedan, no battle except that of Mukden has ap- 
proached the battle of Lule Burgas in importance, 
not only because of the numbers engaged, but also 
of the issue at stake. Three hundred and fifty 
thousand soldiers were in action, the forces being 
about evenly divided. For two days, in spite of the 
demonstration of Kirk Kilisse, the Turks fought 
with splendid courage and tenacity. Time and 
again the desperate charges of the Bulgarian in- 
fantry were hurled back with heavy loss. Not until 
the third day did the fighting seem to lean decisively 
to the advantage of the Bulgarians. Their artillery 
began to show marked superiority. From many 
points shells began to fall with deadly effect into the 
Turkish entrenchments. The Turks were unable 
to silence the murderous fire of the Bulgarian bat- 
teries. The soldiers, because they were starving, did 
not have it in them to attempt to take the most 
troublesome Bulgarian positions by assault. 

The retreat began on the afternoon of the 31st. 
On November 1st, owing to lack of officers and of 
central direction, it became a disorderly flight, a 
sauve qui peut. Camp equipment was abandoned. 
The soldiers threw away their knapsacks and rifles, 

287 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

so that they could run more quickly. The artillery- 
men cut the traces of their gun-wagons and am- 
munition-wagons, and made off on horseback. 
Everything was abandoned to the enemy. Nazim 
pasha, generalissimo, and the general staff, who had 
been in headquarters at Tchorlu, without proper tele- 
graphic or telephonic communication with the battle 
front, were drawn into the flight. The Turkish 
army did not stop until it had placed itself behind 
the Tchatalja line of forts, which protected the city 
of Constantinople. 

The battle of Lule Burgas marked more than the 
destruction of the Turkish military power and the 
loss of European Turkey to the Empire. It revealed 
the inefficiency of Turkish organization and adminis- 
tration to cope with modern conditions, even when 
in possession of modern instruction and modern 
tools. With the Turks, it is not a question of an 
ignorance or a backwardness which can be remedied. 
Total lack of organizing and administrative ability 
is a fault of their nature. Courage alone does not 
win battles in the twentieth century. 

The Bulgarians were without sufficient cavalry 
and mounted machine-guns to follow up their victory. 
The defeat of the Turks, too, had not been gained 
without the expenditure of every ounce of energy 
in the army that had in those three days won undying 
fame. The problem of pursuit was difficult. There 
was only a single railway track. Food and muni- 
tions for the large army had to be brought up. The 
artillery advanced painfully through roads hub- 
deep in mud. It took two weeks for the Bulgarian 

288 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

army to move from the Ergene to Tchatalja, and 
prepare for the assault of the last line of Turkish 
defence. 

An immediate offensive after Lule Burgas would 
have found Constantinople at the mercy of the 
victorious army. The two weeks of respite changed 
the aspect of things. For in this time the forts 
across the peninsula from the Sea of Marmora to 
the Black Sea were hastily repaired. They were 
mounted with guns from the Bosphorus defences, 
the Servian Creusots detained at Salonika at the 
beginning of the war, and whatever artillery could 
be brought from Asia Minor. The army had been 
reformed, the worthless, untrained elements ruth- 
lessly weeded out, and a hundred thousand of the best 
soldiers, among whom the only redifs were those 
who had come fresh from Asia Minor, and had not 
been contaminated by the demoralization of Kirk 
Kilisse and Lule Burgas, were placed behind the 
forts. The Turkish cruisers whose guns were able 
to be fired were recalled from the Dardanelles, and 
anchored off the end of the line on either side. 

On November 15th, the Bulgarians began to put 
their artillery in position all along the Tchatalja 
line from Buyuk-Tchekmedje on the Sea ol Marmora 
to Derkos Lake, near the Black Sea. At the same 
time, they entrenched the artillery positions by 
earthworks and ditches, working with incredible 
rapidity. For they had to take every precaution 
against a sudden sortie of the enemy. In forty- 
eight hours they were ready. 

The attack on the Tchatalja lines commenced 
19 289 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

at six o'clock on Sunday morning, November 17th, 
by machine-gun and rifle fire as well as by artillery. 
The forts and the Turkish cruisers responded. In 
the city and in the villages along the Bosphorus we 
could hear the firing distinctly. On the 17th and 
1 8th, the Bulgarians delivered assaults in several 
places. Near Derkos they even got through the 
lines for a short while. These were merely for the 
purpose of testing the Turkish positions, however. 
Several of the assaults were repulsed. The Bulga- 
rians suffered heavily on the 18th, when the first 
and only prisoners of the war were made. On the 
19th, the artillery fire grew less and less, and there 
were no further attacks. Towards evening it was 
evident that the Bulgarians had abandoned their 
advanced lines, and did not intend to continue the 
attack. No general assault had been delivered. 

It seems certain that General Savoff had in mind 
the capture of Constantinople on November 17th- 
Turkish overtures for peace, opened on the 15th, 
had been repulsed. Every preparation was made 
for the attempt to pierce Tchatalja. Why was 
the plan abandoned before it was actually proven 
impossible? Did General Savoff fear the risk of a 
reverse? Was he short of ammunition? Had the 
Turkish defence of the 17th and 18th been more 
determined than he had expected? Was it fear of a 
cholera epidemic among his soldiers? Or was the 
abandonment of the attempt to capture Constan- 
tinople, for that is what a triumph at Tchatalja 
would have meant, dictated by political reasons? 

Perhaps there was a shortage of ammunition. 
290 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

But it is impossible to believe that General Savoff 
ceased the attack because he feared a failure, or 
because he paused before the heavy sacrifice of life 
it would involve. The Bulgarians were too fresh 
from their sudden and overwhelming victories to 
be halted by the unimportant fighting of the 17th 
and 1 8th. They were not yet' aware of the terrible 
danger from cholera. 

At the time it was the common belief in Constan- 
tinople — I heard it expressed in a number of intel- 
ligent circles — that the Great Powers — in particular 
Russia — had informed Bulgaria that she should halt 
where she was. A second San Stef ano ! This seems 
improbable. Even in the moment of delirium over 
Lule Burgas, the Bulgarians had no thought of 
occupying permanently Constantinople. They knew 
that this would be a task beyond their ability as a 
nation to undertake. If there was a thought of 
entering Constantinople, it was to, satisfy military 
pride, and to be able to dictate more expeditiously 
and satisfactorily terms of peace. 

The real reason for the halt of Tchatalja, and 
the willingness to conclude an armistice, must be 
found in the alarm awakened in Bulgaria by the 
Servian and Greek successes. Greece had settled 
herself in Salonika, and the King and royal family 
had come there to live. Is it merely a coincidence 
that on November 18th the Servians captured 
Monastir, foyer of Bulgarianism in western Mace- 
donia, and on the following day, a telegram from Sofia 
caused the cessation of the Bulgarian attack upon 
Tchatalja? 

291 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

At Adrianople, a combined Bulgarian and Servian 
army, under the command of General Ivanoff, which 
had been hampered during the first month of opera- 
tions by the floods of the Maritza, and by daring 
sorties of the garrison, after receiving experienced 
reinforcements on November 226., began a deter- 
mined bombardment and narrow investment of the 
forts. Ten days later, a general attack was ordered, 
probably to hurry the Turks in the armistice nego- 
tiations. The investing army had made very little 
progress on December 2d and 3d, when the signing 
of the armistice caused a cessation of hostilities. 

But while the Bulgarians were vigorously pressing 
the attack upon Adrianople, they were inactive at 
Tchatalja. 

At the beginning of the Thracian campaign, a 
portion of the Turkish fleet started to attack the 
Bulgarian coast. The Bulgarians had only one 
small cruiser and six torpedo-boats of doubtful value. 
But their two ports, termini of railway lines, were 
well protected by forts. On October 19th, two 
Turkish battleships and four torpedo-boats appeared 
before Varna, and fired without effect upon the forts. 
Then they bombarded the small open port of Ka- 
varna, near the Rumanian frontier. On the 21st, 
they succeeded in throwing a few shells into Varna, 
but did not risk approaching near enough to do 
serious damage. This was the extent of the offensive 
naval action against Bulgaria. A short time later, 
the Hamidieh, which was stationed on the Thracian 
coast of the Black Sea to protect the landing of 
redifs from Samsun, was surprised in the night by 

292 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

Bulgarian torpedo-boats. Two torpedoes tore holes 
in her bow. She was able to return to Constanti- 
nople under her own steam, but had to spend ten 
weeks in dry-dock. The only service rendered by 
the Turkish fleet against the Bulgarians was the 
safeguarding of the transport of troops from Black 
Sea ports of Asiatic Turkey, and the co-operation 
at the ends of the Tchatalja lines during the Bul- 
garian assaults of November 17th and 18th. 

The Servian campaign was a good second to the 
astounding successes of the Bulgarians in Thrace. 
The third army entered the sandjak of Novi Bazar, 
so long coveted by Servia, and expelled the Turks 
in five days. A portion of this army next occupied 
Prisrend and Diakova, descended the valley of the 
Drin through the heart of northern Albania to 
Alessio, where it joined on November 19th the Mon- 
tenegrins, who were already at San Giovanni di 
Medua. On the 28th, they occupied Durazzo. The 
Servians had reached the Adriatic! 

While the third army was in the sandjak of Novi 
Bazar, the second Servian army crossed into Old 
Servia, passed through the plain of Kossova, where 
the Turks had destroyed the independence of Servia 
in 1389, and occupied Pristina on October 23d. This 
gave them control of the branch railway from Uskub 
to the confines of the sandjak. 

The flower of the Servian fighting strength was 
reserved for the first army under the command of 
Crown Prince Alexander. This force, considerably 
larger than the two other armies combined, mustered 
over seventy thousand. Its objective point was 

293 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Uskub, covering which was the strong Turkish army 
of Zekki pasha. Battle was joined outside of Kuma- 
nova on October 22d. After three days of fighting 
during which the Turkish cavalry was annihilated 
by the Servian artillery and the Servian infantry 
took the Turkish artillery positions at the point of 
the bayonet, the army of Zekki Pasha evacuated 
Kumanova. No attempt was made to defend 
Uskub, which the Servians entered on October 26th. 
The Turkish army retreated to Kuprulu on the 
Vardar, towards Salonika. When the Servians 
continued their march, Zekki pasha retreated to 
Prilip, where he occupied positions that could not 
well be shelled by artillery. After two days of 
continuous fighting, the Servians' bayonets dislodged 
the Turks. They withdrew to Monastir with the 
Servians hot upon their heels. 

Together with Kumanova, in which the bulk of 
Prince Alexander's forces did not find it necessary to 
engage, the capture of Monastir is the most brilliant 
feat of an army whose intrepidity, agility, and intel- 
ligence deserves highest praise. Into Monastir had 
been thrown the army of Tahsin pasha, pushed 
northward by the Greeks, as well as that of Zekki 
pasha, harried southward by the Servians. The 
Servians did not hesitate to approach the defences 
of the city on one side up to their arm-pits in water, 
while on the other side they scaled the heights domi- 
nating Monastir — heights which ought to have been 
defended for weeks without great difficulty. The 
Turks were compelled to withdraw, for they were at 
the mercy of the Servian artillery. They tried to 

294 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

retreat to Okrida, but the Servian left wing anti- 
cipated this movement. Only ten thousand escaped 
into Epirus. Nearly forty thousand Turks surren- 
dered to the Servians on November 18th. Monastir 
and Okrida were captured. The Turkish armies of 
Macedonia had ceased to exist. 

The Greeks were eager to wipe out the shame of 
the war of 1897. Fifteen years had wrought a great 
difference in the morale of the Greek army. A new 
body of officers, who spent their time in learning 
their profession instead of in discussing politics at 
cafe terr asses, had been created. The French mili- 
tary mission, under General Eydoux, had been 
working for several years in the complete reorgani- 
zation of the Greek army. I had the privilege at 
Athens of enjoying the hospitality of Greek officers 
in their casernes at several successive Easter festi- 
vals. Each year one could notice the progress. 
They were always ready to show you how the trans- 
formation of their artillery, and its equipment for 
mountain service as well as for field work, would 
make all the difference in the world in the " approach- 
ing" war with the Turks. The results were beyond 
expectations. What the Greeks had been working 
for was mobility. This they demonstrated they 
had learned. They had also an esprit de corps 
which, in fighting, made up for that they lacked 
of Slavic dogged perseverance. Neither in actual 
combat, nor in strategy, with the exception of Janina, 
were the Greeks put to the test, or called upon to 
bear the burden, of the Bulgarians and Servians. 
But, especially when we take into consideration the 

295 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

invaluable service of their fleet, there is no reason to 
belittle their part in the downfall of Turkey. If the 
effort had been necessary, they probably would have 
been equal to it. 

The Greeks sent a small army into Epirus. The 
bulk of their forces, following a sound military prin- 
ciple, were led into Thessaly by the Crown Prince 
Constantine. They crossed the frontier without 
resistance, fought a sharp combat at Elassona on the 
19th, in which they stood admirably under fire, and 
broke down the last Turkish resistance at Servia. 
The army of Tahsin pasha was thrown back upon 
Monastir. The battles of the next ten days were 
hardly more than skirmishes, for the Turkish stand 
was never formidable. At Yanitza, the only real 
battle of the Greek campaign was fought. The 
Turks fled. The way to Salonika was open. 

The battle of Yanitza (Yenidje-Vardar) was 
fought on November 3d. On October 30th, a Greek 
torpedo-boat had succeeded, in spite of the strong 
harbour fortifications, equipped with electric search- 
lights, and the mined channel, in coming right up 
to the jetty at Salonika during the night, and launch- 
ing three torpedoes at an old Turkish cruiser which 
lay at anchor there. The cruiser sank. On his 
way out to open sea, the commander of the torpedo- 
boat did not hesitate to fire upon the forts ! 

This daring feat, and the approach of the Greek 
army, threw the city into a turmoil of excitement. 
The people had been fed for two weeks on false 
news, and telegrams had been printed from day to 
day, relating wonderful victories over the Servians, 

296 




m* 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

Bulgarians, and Greeks. But the coming of the 
refugees, fresh thousands from nearer places every 
day, and the presence in the streets of the city of 
deserters in uniform, gave the lie to the " official" 
news. When the German stationnaire arrived from 
Constantinople, and embarked the prisoner of the 
Villa Allatini, ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, the most 
pessimistic suspicions were confirmed. 

Although he had thirty thousand soldiers, and 
plenty of munitions, Tahsin pasha, commandant of 
Salonika, did not even attempt to defend the city. 
He began immediately to negotiate with the advanc- 
ing Greek army. When the Crown Prince refused 
to accept any other than unconditional surren- 
der, and moved upon the city, Tahsin pasha yielded. 
Not a shot was fired. On November 9th, without 
any opposition, the Greek army marched into 
Salonika. 

In other places the Turks at least fought, even if 
they did not fight well. At Salonika their surrender 
demonstrated to what humiliation and degradation 
the arrogance of the Young Turks had brought a 
nation whose past was filled with glorious deeds of 
arms. 

The Bulgarian expeditionary corps for Macedonia, 
under General Theodoroff, had crossed the frontier 
on October 18th. Joined to it were the notorious 
bands of comitadjis under the command of Sandansky, 
who afterwards related to me the story of this march. 
General Theodoroff' s mission was to engage the 
portion of the Turkish Fifth Army Corps, which was 
stationed in the valleys of the Mesta and Struma, 

297 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

east of the Vardar, thus preventing it from assem- 
bling and making a flank movement against the main 
Servian or Bulgarian armies. The Bulgarians were 
greeted everywhere as liberators, and, although they 
were not in great numbers, the Turks did not try 
to oppose them. Soldiers and Moslem Macedonians 
together fled before them towards Salonika. 

When General Theodoroff realized the demoraliz- 
ation of the Turks, and heard how the Greeks were 
approaching Salonika without any more serious 
opposition than that which confronted him, he hur- 
ried his column towards Salonika. The Bulgarian 
Princes Boris and Cyril joined him. They were not 
in time to take part in the negotiations for the sur- 
render of the city. The cowardice of Tahsin pasha 
had brought matters to a climax on November 9th. 
But they were able to enter Salonika on the 10th, 
at the same time that Crown Prince Constantine 
was making his triumphal entry. Sandansky and 
his comitadjis hurried to the principal ancient church 
of the city, for over four hundred years the Saint 
Sophia of Salonika, and placed the Bulgarian flag 
in the minarets before the Greeks knew they had 
been outwitted. On the 12th, King George of 
Greece arrived to make his residence in the city 
that was to be his tomb. 

After the capture of Monastir, the Servians pressed 
on to Okrida, on November 23d, and from there into 
Albania to Elbassan, which they reached five days 
later. It was their intention to join at Durazzo 
the other column of the third Servian army, of whose 
march down the Drin we have already spoken. But 

298 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

the threatening attitude of Austria-Hungary neces- 
sitated the recall of the bulk of the Servian forces to 
Nish. This is the reason they were not able, at that 
stage of the war, to give the Montenegrins effective 
assistance against Scutari. 

The left wing of the Thessalian Greek army, after 
the capture of Monastir by the Servians, pursued 
towards Albania, the Turks who had escaped from 
Monastir. With great skill, they managed to pre- 
vent the Turks from turning north-west into the 
interior of Albania. After the brilliant and daring 
storming of the heights of Tchangan, what remained 
of the Turkish army was compelled to retreat into 
Epirus towards Janina. 

On October 20th, the Greek fleet under Admiral 
Koundouriotis appeared at the Dardanelles to offer 
battle to the Turks. Under the cover of the pro- 
tection of their fleet, the Greeks occupied Lemnos, 
Thasos, Imbros, Samothrace, Nikaria, and the 
smaller islands. The inhabitants of Samos had 
expelled the Turkish garrisons on their own initia- 
tive at the outbreak of the war. Mitylene was 
captured without great difficulty on November 21st. 
The Greeks landed at Chios on the 24th. Here the 
Turkish garrison of two thousand retired to the 
mountainous centre of the island, and succeeded in 
prolonging their resistance until January. When he 
saw that no help was coming from Asia Minor, whose 
shores had been in sight during all the weeks of 
combat and suffering, the heroic Turkish commander 
surrendered with one thousand eight hundred starv- 
ing men on January 3d. It was only because Italy, 

299 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

by a clause of the Treaty of Ouchy, still held the 
Dodecanese, that all of the JEgean Islands were 
not "gathered into the fold" by Greece. 

There had been less than six weeks of fighting. 
The Balkan allies had swept from the field all the 
Turkish forces in Europe. The Turkish armies 
were bottled up in Constantinople, Adrianople, 
Janina, and Scutari, with absolutely no hope of 
making successful sorties. Except at Constantinople, 
they were besieged, and could expect neither rein- 
forcements nor food supplies. The Greek fleet was 
master of the ^Egean Sea, and held the Turkish 
navy blocked in the Dardanelles. No new armies 
could come from Asiatic Turkey. This was the 
situation when the armistice was signed. The 
Ottoman Empire in Europe had ceased to exist. 
The military prestige of Turkey had received a 
mortal blow. 

THE ARMISTICE AND THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF 
LONDON 

The hopelessness of the outcome of the war with 
Italy, the dissatisfaction over the foolish and arbi- 
trary rule of its secret committees had weakened the 
hold of the "Committee of Union and Progress" over 
the army. Despite its success in the spring elections 
of 1912, its position was precarious. In July, Mah- 
mud Shevket pasha, who was suspected of planning 
a military pronunciamento , resigned the Ministry of 
War. The Grand Vizier, Said pasha, soon followed 
him into retirement. The Sultan declared that a 

500 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

ministry not under the control of a political party 
was a necessity. 

Ghazi Mukhtar pasha, after much difficulty, 
succeeded in forming a ministry, in which a distin- 
guished Armenian, Noradounghian effendi, was given 
the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The Unionist 
majority in the lower house of Parliament proved 
intractable. Its obstructionist tactics won for the 
Chamber of Deputies the name of the "comic opera- 
house of Fundukli. " (Fundukli was the Bosphorus 
quarter in which the House of Parliament was 
located.) With the help of the Senate, and the moral 
support of the army, the Sultan dissolved Parliament 
on August 5th. Only the menace of the Albanian 
revolution prevented the Committee from attempting 
to set up a rival Parliament at Salonika. This was 
the unenviable internal situation of Turkey at the 
opening of the Balkan War. 

The disasters of the Thracian campaign led to 
the resignation of the Ghazi Mukhtar pasha Cabinet. 
The aged statesman of the old regime, Kiamil pasha, 
was called for the eighth time to the Grand Vizirate. 
He retained Nazim pasha, generalissimo of the 
Turkish army, and Noradounghian effendi, in the 
Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs. The most 
influential of the Young Turks, who had opposed 
bitterly the peace with Italy and were equally deter- 
mined that no negotiations should be undertaken 
with the Balkan States, were exiled. Kiamil pasha 
saw clearly that peace was absolutely necessary. His 
long experience allowed him to have no illusions as 
to the possibility of continuing the struggle. Before 

301 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

the Bulgarian attack upon Tchatalja, he began 
pourparlers with General Savoff. After the repulse 
of November 17th and 18th, he was just as firm in his 
decision that the negotiations must be continued. 
He won over to his point of view the members of the 
Cabinet, and notably Nazim pasha. 

The conditions of the armistice, signed on Decem- 
ber 3d, were an acknowledgment of the complete 
debacle of the Turkish army. Bulgaria forced the 
stipulation that her army in front of Tchatalja 
should be revictualled by the railway which passed 
under the guns of Adrianople, while that fortress 
remained without food! Greece, by an agreement 
with her allies, refused to sign the armistice, but was 
allowed to be represented in the peace conference. 
The allies felt that the state of war on sea must 
continue, in order that Turkey should be prevented 
during the armistice from bringing to the front her 
army corps from Syria and Mesopotamia and Arabia ; 
while Greece, in particular, was determined to run 
no risk in connection with the JEgean Islands. The 
peace delegates were to meet in London. 

Orientals, Christian as well as Moslem, are famous 
for bargaining. Nothing can be accomplished with- 
out an exchange of proposals and counter-proposals 
ad infinitum. In the Conference of London, the 
demands of the allies were the cession of all European 
Turkey, except Albania, whose boundaries were not 
defined, of Crete, and of the islands in the JEgean 
Sea. A war indemnity was also demanded. Turkey 
was to be allowed to retain Constantinople, and a 
strip of territory from Midia on the Black Sea to 

302 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

Rodosto on the Sea of Marmora, and the peninsula 
of the Thracian Chersonese, which formed the 
European shore of the Dardanelles. The boundaries 
of Albania, and its future status, were to be decided 
by the Powers. 

I had a long conversation with the Grand Vizier, 
Kiamil pasha, on the day the peace delegates left 
for London. He was frank and unhesitating in the 
statement of his belief that Turkey could not con- 
tinue the war. He denounced unsparingly the 
visionaries who were clamouring for a continuance of 
the struggle. "It is because of them that we are in 
our present humiliating position," he said. " They 
cry out now that we must not accept peace, but they 
know well that we cannot hope to win back any por- 
tion of what we have lost. " 

There were a number of reasons why the position 
of Kiamil pasha was sound. First of all, the army 
organization was in hopeless confusion. Although the 
Bulgarians were checked at Tchatalja, the condi- 
tions on the Constantinople side of the forts was 
terrible. The general headquarters at Hademkeuy 
were buried in filth and mud. Although the army 
was but twenty-five miles from the city, there were 
days on end when not even bread arrived. Cholera 
was making great ravages. Soldiers, crazed from 
hunger, were shot dead for disobeying the order 
which forbade their eating raw vegetables. There 
were neither fuel, shelter, nor blankets. Winter was 
at hand. At San Stefano, one of the most beautiful 
suburbs of Stambul, in a concentration camp the 
soldiers died by the thousands of starvation fever. 

303 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

It was one of the most heart-rending tragedies of 
history. 

All the while, in the cafes of Pera, Galata, and 
Stambul, Turkish officers sat the day long, sipping 
their coffee, and deciding that Adrianople must not 
be given up. Even while the fighting was going on, 
when the fate of the city hung in the balance, I saw 
these degenerate officers by the hundreds, feasting at 
Pera, while their soldiers were dying like dogs at 
Tchatalja and San Stefano. This is an awful state- 
ment to make, but it is the record of fact. Notices 
in the newspapers, declaring that officers found in 
Constantinople without permission would be im- 
mediately taken before the Court-Martial, had 
absolutely no effect. 

The navy failed to give any account of itself to 
the Greeks, who were waiting outside of the Darda- 
nelles. Finally, on December 1 6th, after the people 
of the vicinity had openly cursed and taunted them, 
the fleet sailed out to fight. An action at long range 
did little damage to either side. The Turkish vessels 
refused to go beyond the protection of their forts. 
They returned in the evening to anchor. The mas- 
tery of the sea remained to the Greeks. " 

1 In this connection, it would be forgetting to pay tribute to a 
remarkable exploit to omit mention of the raid of the Hamidieh 
during the late winter. One Ottoman officer at least chafed under 
the disgrace of the inaction of the Ottoman navy. With daring and 
skill, Captain Reouf bey slipped out into the ^gean Sea on the 
American-built cruiser, the Hamidieh. He evaded the Greek block- 
aders, bombarded some outposts on one of the islands, and sank the 
auxiliary cruiser, the Makedonia, in a Greek port. The Hamidieh 
next appeared in the Adriatic, where she sank several transports, and 
bombarded Greek positions on the coast of Albania. The cruiser 

304 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

If the army and the navy were powerless, how about 
the people of the capital? From the very beginning 
of the war, the inhabitants of Constantinople, Mos- 
lem as well as Christian, displayed the most complete 
indifference concerning the fortunes of the battles. 
Even when the Bulgarians were attacking Tchatalja, 
the city took little interest. Buying and selling went 
on as usual. There were few volunteers for national 
defence, but the cafes were crowded and the theatres 
and dance-halls of Pera were going at full swing. The 
refugees came and camped in our streets and in the 
cemeteries outside of the walls. Those who did not 
die passed on to Asia. The wounded arrived, and 
crowded our hospitals and barracks. The cholera 
came. The soldiers starved to death at San Stefano. 
The spirit of Byzantium was over the city still. The 
year 19 13 began as 1453 had begun. 

The Government tried to raise money by a national 
loan. It could get none from Europe, unless it agreed 
to surrender Adrianople and make peace practically 
on the terms of the allies. An appeal must be made 
to the Osmanlis. For how could the war be resumed 
without money? There are many wealthy pashas 
at Constantinople. Their palaces line both shores of 
the Bosphorus. They spend money at Monte Carlo 

was next heard of at Port Said. She passed through the Suez Canal 
into the Red Sea for a couple of weeks, and then returned boldly 
into the Mediterranean, although Greek torpedo-boats were lying 
in wait. Captain Reouf bey ran again the gauntlet of the Greek 
fleet, and got back to the Dardanelles without mishap. This venture, 
undertaken without permission from the Turkish admiral, had no 
effect upon the war. For it came too late. But it showed what a 
little enterprise and courage might have done to prevent the Turkish 
debdcle, if undertaken at the beginning of the war. 

20 3°5 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

like water. They live at Nice, as they live at Con- 
stantinople, like princes — or like American million- 
aires! One of the sanest and wisest of Turkish 
patriots, a man whom I have known and admired, 
was appointed to head a committee to wait upon 
these pashas, many of them married to princesses of 
the imperial family, and solicit their contributions. 
The scheme was that the subscribers should advance 
five years of taxes on their properties for the pur- 
poses of national defence. The committee hired a 
small launch, and spent a day visiting the homes of 
the pashas. On their return, after paying the rental 
of the launch, they had about forty pounds sterling! 
Was it not two million pounds that was raised for the 
Prince of Wales Fund recently in London? Was 
not the French loan "for national defence," issued 
just before the present war, subscribed in a few hours 
forty-three times over the large amount of thirty-two 
million pounds asked for? 

In the face of these facts, the Young Turks were 
vociferous in their demand that the war be continued. 
Adrianople must not be surrendered ! Kiamil pasha 
decided to call a "Divan," or National Assembly, of 
the most important men in Turkey. They were 
summoned by the Sultan to meet at the palace of 
Dolma-Baghtche on January 22, 19 13. I went to see 
what would happen there. One would expect that 
the whole of Constantinople would be hanging on 
the words of this council, whose decision the Cabinet 
had agreed to accept. A half-dozen policemen at the 
palace gate, a vendor of lemonade, two street- 
sweepers, an Italian cinematograph photographer, 

306 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

and a dozen foreign newspaper men — that was the 
extent of the crowd. 

The Divan, after hearing the exposes of the Minis- 
ters of War, Finance, and Foreign Affairs, decided 
that there was nothing to discuss. The decision was 
inevitable. Peace must be signed. That night 
Kiamil pasha telegraphed to London to the Turkish 
commissioners, directing them to consent to the 
readition. of Adrianople and the other 1 fortresses 
which were still holding out, and to make peace at 
the price of ceding all the Ottoman territories in 
Europe beyond a line running from Enos on the 
^Egean Sea, at the mouth of the Maritza River, to 
Midia on the Black Sea. 

On the following day, January 23d, a coup d'etat 
was successfully carried out. 

Enver bey, the former "hero of liberty, " who had 
taken a daring and praiseworthy part in the revolu- 
tion of 1908, had been ruined afterwards by being 
appointed military attache of the Ottoman Embassy 
at Berlin. There was much that was admirable and 
winning in Enver bey, much that was what the 
French call "elevation of soul." He was a sincere 
patriot. But the years at Berlin, and the deadening 
influence of militarism and party politics mixed 
together, had changed him from a patriot to a politi- 
cian. He went to Tripoli during the Italian War, 
and organized a resistance in Benghazi, which he 
announced would be "as long as he lived." But it 
was a decision d la Turque. The Balkan War found 
him again at Constantinople — not at the front lead- 
ing a company against the enemy — but at Con- 

307 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

stantinople, plotting with the other Young Turks 
how they could once more get the reins of govern- 
ment in their hands. The decision of the Divan 
was the opportunity. Enver bey led a small band 
of followers into the Sublime Porte, and shot Nazim 
pasha and his aide-de-camp dead. The other mem- 
bers of the Cabinet were imprisoned, and the tele- 
phone to the palace cut. Enver bey was driven at 
full speed in an automobile to the palace. He 
secured from the Sultan a firman calling on Mahmud 
Shevket pasha to form a new Cabinet. The Young 
Turks were again in power. 

The bodies of Nazim pasha and the aide-de-camp 
were buried quickly and secretly. For one of Enver's 
companions, a man of absolutely no importance, who 
had been killed by defenders of Nazim, a great mili- 
tary funeral was held. 

Mahmud Shevket pasha, who had been living in 
retirement at Scutari since the war began, accepted 
the position of Grand Vizier. I heard him, on the 
steps of the Sublime Porte, justify the murder of 
Nazim pasha, on the ground that there had been the 
intention to give up Adrianople. The new Cabinet 
was going to redeem the country, and save it from a 
shameful peace. 

When the news of the coup d'etat reached London, 
it was recognized that further negotiations were 
useless. The peace conference had failed. 

THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR 

It is very doubtful if Mahmud Shevket, Enver, 
and their accomplices had any hope whatever of 

308 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

retrieving the fortunes of Turkish arms. They had 
prepared the coup d'etat to get back again into office. 
This could not be done without the tacit consent 
of the army. At the moment of the Divan the 
army was stirred up over the surrender of Adrianople. 
It was the moment to act. At any other time the 
army would not have acquiesced in the murder of its 
generalissimo. The Sultan's part in the plot was not 
clear. His assent was, however, immediately given. 
Living in seclusion, and knowing practically nothing 
of what was going on, he signed the firmans, accept- 
ing the resignation of the Kiamil pasha Cabinet and 
charging Mahmud Shevket with the formation of a 
new Cabinet, either by force or by playing upon his 
fears of what might be his own fate, should the agree- 
ment to surrender Adrianople lead to a revolution. 

On January 29th, the allies denounced the armis- 
tice, and hostilities reopened. The Bulgarians at 
Tchatalja had strongly entrenched themselves, and 
were content to rest on the defensive. They did not 
desire to capture Constantinople. But the Turks 
wanted to relieve Adrianople. The offensive move- 
ment must come from them. The Young Turks had 
killed Nazim pasha, they said, because they believed 
Adrianople could be saved. The word was now to 
Mahmud Shevket and Enver. Let them justify 
their action. 

Enthusiastic speeches were made at Constan- 
tinople. We were told that the army at Tchatalja 
had moved forward, and was going to drive the Bul- 
garians out of Thrace. The Turks did advance some 
kilometres, but, like their fleet at the Dardanelles, 

309 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

not beyond the protection of the forts! They did 
not dare to make a general assault upon the Bulgarian 
positions. The renewal of the war, as far as Tcha- 
talja was concerned, was a perfect farce. Every one 
in Constantinople knew that the army was not even 
trying to relieve Adrianople by a forward march 
from Constantinople. 

Enver bey, who realized that he must make 
some move to justify the coup d'etat of January 23d, 
gathered two army corps on the small boats which 
serve the Bosphorus villages and the Isles of Princes. 
It was his intention to land on the European shore of 
the Dardanelles, and take the Bulgarians in the rear. 
A few of his troops — the first that were sent — dis- 
embarked at Gallipoli, and, co-operating with the 
Dardanelles garrison, attempted an offensive move- 
ment against the Bulgarian positions at Bulair, 
which were bottling the peninsula. The attack 
failed ignominiously. For the Bulgarians, after 
dispersing the first bayonet charge by their machine- 
guns, were not content to wait for another attack* 
They scrambled over their trenches, and attacked 
the Turks at the point of the bayonet. The army 
broke, and fled. Some six thousand Turks were left 
on the field. The Bulgarian losses were trifling. On 
the same day, February 8th, and the following day, 
the rest of Enver bey's forces tried to land at several 
places on the European shore of the Sea of Marmora. 
For some reason that has never been explained, the 
Turkish fleet did not co-operate with Enver bey's 
attempted landings. Naturally the Turks were 
mowed down. At Sharkeuy it was simply slaughter. 

310 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

Three divisions were butchered. Those few who 
succeeded in getting foot on shore were driven into 
the sea and bayoneted. The two corps were prac- 
tically annihilated. 

After this exploit, Enver bey returned to Con- 
stantinople, and received the congratulations of the 
Grand Vizier whom he had created, by a murder, to 
redeem Turkey and recover Adrianople. 

The inability to advance at Tchatalja and at 
Bulair, and the failure to land troops on the coasts 
of Thrace, entirely immobilized the Turkish armies 
during the second period of the war. They were 
content to sit and watch the fall of the three fortresses 
of Janina, Adrianople, and Scutari. At the moment 
of the coup d'etat, I telegraphed that the whole miser- 
able affair was nothing more than a party move of 
the "outs " to oust the "ins. " The events confirmed 
this judgment. Mahmud Shevket pasha had no 
other policy than that of Kiamil pasha and Nazim 
pasha. He, and the Young Turk party, did abso- 
lutely nothing to relieve the situation. As soon as 
they thought they were safe from those who swore to 
avenge Nazim 's death, the}' began again negotiations 
for peace, and on exactly the same terms. 

In the meantime, the Greeks, who had not signed 
the armistice, decided that they must take Janina by 
assault. The worst of the winter was not yet over, 
but plans were made to increase the small Greek 
forces which had been practically inactive since the 
siege began. Janina had never been completely 
invested. When the Crown Prince arrived, he 
planned to capture the most troublesome forts, and 

3ii 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

from them to make untenable the formidable hills 
which commanded the city. The Greeks followed 
the plan with great skill and courage. Position after 
position was taken until the city was at the mercy 
of their artillery. During the night of March 5th, 
Essad pasha sent to Prince Constantine emissaries 
to surrender the city, garrison, and munitions of war 
without conditions. 

The Crown Prince returned to Salonika in triumph. 
A few days later, the assassination of King George 
made him King. From this time on, the diplomatic 
position of Premier Venizelos, in his endeavour to 
keep within bounds the military party which had the 
ear of the new King, became most difficult. Even his 
great genius could not prevent the rupture with 
Bulgaria. 

After the fall of Janina, the Bulgarian general staff 
realized that it was essential for them to force the 
capitulation of Adrianople, or to take the city by 
assault. As they had to keep a large portion of their 
army before Tchatalja and Bulair, it was decided 
that forty-five thousand Servians, with their siege 
cannon, should co-operate in the attack upon Adria- 
nople. It was afterwards given by the Servians as an 
excuse for breaking their treaty with Bulgaria, that 
they had helped in the fall of Adrianople. But it 
must be remembered that the Bulgarian army, by 
its maintenance of the positions at Tchatalja and 
Bulair, was rendering service not to herself alone but 
to the common cause of the allies. Greece and Servia 
will never be able to get away from the fact that 
Bulgaria bore the brunt of the burden in the first 

312 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

Balkan War, and that her services in the common 
cause were far greater than those of either of her 
allies. One cannot too strongly emphasize the point, 
also, that the capture and possession of Adrianople 
did not mean to Bulgaria either from the practical 
or from the sentimental standpoint what Salonika 
meant to the Greeks and Uskub to the Servians. 
The Servian contingent before Adrianople was not 
helping Bulgaria to do what was to be wholly to the 
benefit of Bulgaria. The Servians were co-operating 
in an enterprise that was to contribute to the success 
of their common cause. 

Adrianople had been closely invested ever since the 
battle of Kirk Kilisse. No army came to the relief 
of the garrison after the fatal retreat of October 24th. 
The Bulgarians had not made a serious effort to 
capture the city during the first period of the war. 
The armistice served their ends well, because each 
day lessened the provisions of the besieged. Inside 
the city Shukri pasha had done all he could to keep 
up the courage of the inhabitants. He himself was 
ignorant of the real situation at Constantinople. 
Perhaps it was in good faith that he assured the 
garrison continually that the hour of deliverance was 
at hand. By wireless, the authorities at Constan- 
tinople, after the coup d'etat especially, kept assuring 
him that the army was advancing, and that it was a 
question only of days. So, in spite of starvation and 
of the continual rain of shells upon the city, he 
managed to maintain the morale of his garrison. The 
allies finally decided upon a systematic assault of 
the forts on all sides of the city at once. In this way, 

313 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

the Turks were not able to use their heavy artillery 
to best advantage. Advancing with scissors, the 
Bulgarians and Servians cut their way through the 
tangle of barbed wire. On the 24th and 25th, the 
forts fell one after the other. Czar Ferdinand entered 
the city with his troops on March 26th. 

It was at the moment of this heroic capture, in 
which there was glory enough for all, that the clouds 
of trouble between Bulgaria and Servia began to 
appear on the horizon. Shukri pasha, following the 
old policy of the Turks, which had been so successful 
for centuries in the Balkan Peninsula, tried to surren- 
der to the Servian general, who was too loyal to 
discipline to fall into this trap. But the Servian 
newspapers began to say that it was really the Servian 
army who had captured the city, and that Shukri 
pasha recognized this fact when he sent to find the 
Servian commander. There was an unedifying duel 
of newspapers between Belgrade and Sofia, which 
showed that the material for conflagration was 
ready. 

In the second period of the war, the Servians gave 
substantial aid, especially in artillery, to the Mon- 
tenegrins, who had been besieging Scutari ever since 
October 15th. I went over the mountain of Tarabosh 
on horse with an Albanian who had been one of its 
defenders. He related graphically the story of the 
repeated assaults of the Montenegrins and Servians. 
Each time they were driven back before they reached 
those batteries that dominated Scutari and made 
impossible the entry to the city without their capture. 
The loss of life was tremendous. The bravery of the 

314 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

assailants could do nothing against the miles and 
miles of barbed wire. No means of stopping assault 
has ever proved more efficacious. The besiegers were 
unable to capture Tarabosh. So they could not enter 
the city. 

At the beginning of the war, Scutari was under 
the command of Hassan Riza pasha. In February, 
he was assassinated by his subordinate, Essad pasha, 
an Albanian of the Toptani family, who had been a 
favourite of Abdul Hamid, and had had a rather 
questionable career in the gendarmerie during the 
days of despotism. After the assassination of the 
Turkish commandant, it was for Albania and not for 
Turkey that Essad pasha continued the resistance. 
In March, Austria began to threaten the Montene- 
grins, and assure them that they could not keep the 
city. The story of how she secured the agreement of 
the Great Powers in coercing Montenegro is told in 
another chapter. Montenegro was defiant, and paid 
no attention to an international blockade. But on 
April 13th, the Servians, fearing international com- 
plications, withdrew from the siege. It was astonish- 
ing news to the world that after this, on April 22d, 
Essad pasha surrendered Scutari to the King of 
Montenegro, with the stipulation that he could 
withdraw with his garrison, his light artillery, and 
whatever munitions he might be able to take with 
him. 

The Ottoman flag had ceased to wave in any part 
of Europe except Constantinople and the Dardanelles. 
The war was over, whether the Young Turks would 
have it so or not. Facts are facts. 

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THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

THE TREATY OF LONDON 

Nazim pasha was assassinated on January 23d. 
The armistice was denounced on the 29th. On 
February 10th, Mahmud Shevket pasha began to 
sound the Great Powers for their intervention in 
securing peace. It was necessary, however, now that 
the war had been resumed, that the impossibility of 
relieving Adrianople be demonstrated, so that it 
might not continue to be a stumbling-block in re- 
opening the negotiations. The Great Powers were 
willing to act as mediators, but could not make any 
acceptable overture until after the fall of Janina and 
Adrianople. 

On March 23d, they proposed the following as 
basis for the renewal of the negotiations at London: 

"1. A frontier line from Enos to Midia, which 
would follow the course of the Maritza, and the 
cession to the Allies of all the territories west of 
that line, with the exception of Albania, whose 
status and frontiers would be decided upon by the 
Powers. 

"2. Decision by the Powers of the question of 
the ^Egean Islands. 

"3. Abandonment of Crete by Turkey. 

"4. Arrangement of all financial questions at 
Paris, by an international commission, in which 
the representatives of Turkey and the allies would 
be allowed to sit. Participation of the allies in the 
Ottoman Debt, and in the financial obligations of 
the territories newly acquired. No indemnity of 
war, in principle. 

"5. End of hostilities immediately after the 
acceptance of this basis of negotiations." 

316 



BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY 

Turkey agreed to these stipulations. The Balkan 
States, however, did not want to commit themselves 
to the Enos-Midia line "as definitely agreed upon," 
but only as a base of pourparlers. They insisted 
that the ^gean Islands must be ceded directly to 
them. They wanted to know what the Powers had 
in mind in regard to the frontiers of Albania. In the 
last place, they refused to relinquish the possibility 
of an indemnity of war. 

Notes were exchanged back and forth among the 
chancelleries until April 20th, when the Balkan States 
finally agreed to accept the mediation of the Powers. 
They had practically carried all their points, how- 
ever, except that of the communication of the 
Albanian frontier. Hostilities ceased. There really 
was not much more to fight about, at least as far 
as Turkey was concerned. 

It was a whole month before the second conference 
at London opened. The only gleam of hope that 
the Turks were justified in entertaining, when they 
decided to renew the war, had been the possible 
outbreak of a war between the Allies. If only the 
quarrel over Macedonia had come, for which they 
looked from week to week, they might have been 
able to put pressure on Bulgaria for the return of 
Adrianople, and on Greece for the return of the 
^Egean Islands. But the rupture between the Allies 
did not take place until after they had settled with 
Turkey. Why fight over the bear's skin until it was 
actually in their hands? 

The negotiations were reopened in London on 
May 20th. On May 30th, the peace preliminaries 

3i7 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

were signed. The Sultan of Turkey ceded to the 
Kings of the allied states his dominions in Europe 
beyond the Enos-Midia line. Albania, its status and 
frontiers, were intrusted by the Sultan to the sover- 
eigns of the Great Powers. He ceded Crete to the 
allied sovereigns, but left the decision as to the 
islands in the ^Egean Sea, and the status of Mount 
Athos, to the Great Powers. 

The war between the allies enabled Turkey to 
violate this treaty. They won back from Bulgaria, 
without opposition, most of Thrace, including Adri- 
anople and Kirk Kilisse. Later, treaties were made 
separately with each of the Balkan States. But, as 
it seems to be a principle of history that no territories 
that have once passed from the shadow of the Cres- 
cent return, it is probable that the Treaty of London 
will, in the end, represent the minimum of what 
Turkey's former subjects have wrested from her. 



3i8 



CHAPTER XV 
THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES 

TO those who knew the centuries-old hatred and 
race rivalry between Greece and Servia and 
Bulgaria in the Balkan Peninsula, an alliance 
for the purpose of liberating Macedonia seemed im- 
possible. The Ottoman Government had a sense of 
security which seemed to be justifiable. They had 
known how to keep alive and intensify racial hatred 
in European Turkey, and believed that they were 
immune from concerted attack because the Balkan 
States would never be able to agree as to the division 
of spoils after a successful war. 

The history of the ten years of rivalry between 
bands, which had nullified the efforts of the Powers 
to "reform" Macedonia by installing a gendarmerie 
under European control, had taught the diplomats 
that they had working against the pacification of 
Macedonia not only the Ottoman authorities, but 
also the native Christian population and the neigh- 
bouring emancipated countries. They were ready 
to believe the astute Hussein Hilmy pasha, Vali of 
Macedonia, when he said: "I am ruling over an 
insane asylum. Were the Turkish flag withdrawn, 

319 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

they would fly at each other's throats, and instead 
of reform, you would have anarchy." 

If the Balkan States had realized how completely 
and how easily they were going to overthrow the 
military power of Turkey, they probably would not 
have attempted it. This seems paradoxical, but 
it is true all the same. 

The Allies did not anticipate more than the hold- 
ing of the Ottoman forces in check and the occupa- 
tion of the frontiers and of the upper valleys of the 
Vardar and Struma. Greece felt that she would 
be rewarded by a slight rectification of boundary in 
Thessaly and Epirus, if only the war would settle 
the status of Crete and result in an autonomous 
regime for the ^Egean Islands. At the most, the 
Balkan States hoped to force upon Turkey the au- 
tonomy of Macedonia under a Christian governor. 
So jealous was each of the possibility of another's 
gaining control of Macedonia that this solution 
would have satisfied them more than the complete 
disappearance of Turkish rule. Both hopes and 
fears as to Macedonia were envisaged rather in 
connection with each other than in connection 
with the Turks. 

Between Servia and Bulgaria there was a definite 
treaty, signed on March 13, 1912, which defined 
future spheres of influence in upper Macedonia. 
But Greece had no agreement either with Bulgaria 
or Servia. 

The events of October, 1912, astonished the whole 
world. No such sudden and complete collapse of 
the Ottoman power in Europe was dreamed of. I 

320 



RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES 

have already spoken of how fearful the European 
Chancelleries were of an Ottoman victory. Had 
they not been so morally certain of Turkey's triumph 
they would never have sent to the belligerents their 
famous — and in the light of subsequent events ridi- 
culous — joint note concerning the status quo. 

But if the Great Powers were unprepared for the 
succession of Balkan triumphs, the allies were much 
more astonished at what they were able to accom- 
plish. Kirk Kilisse and Lule Burgas gave Thrace to 
Bulgaria. Kumanovo opened up the valley of the 
Vardar to the Servians, while the Greeks marched 
straight to Salonika without serious opposition. 

The victories of the Servians and Greeks, so easily 
won, were to the Bulgarians a calamity which over- 
shadowed their own striking military successes. 
They had spilled much blood and wasted their 
strength in the conquest of Thrace which they did 
not want, while their allies — but rivals for all that — 
were in possession of Macedonia, the Bulgaria irre- 
denta. To be encircling Adrianople and besieging 
Constantinople, cities in which they had only second- 
ary interest, while the Servians attacked Monastir 
and the Greeks were settling themselves comfort- 
ably in Salonika, was the irony of fate for those who 
felt that others were reaping the fruits for which they 
had made so great and so admirable a sacrifice. 

When we come to judge dispassionately the folly 
of Bulgaria in provoking a war with her comrades in 
arms, and the seemingly amazing greed for land 
which it revealed, we must remember that the Bul- 
garians felt that they had accomplished everything 
21 321 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

to receive nothing. Salonika and not Adrianople 
was the city of their dreams. Macedonia and not 
Thrace was the country which they had taken arms 
to liberate. The ALgean Sea and not the extension 
of their Black Sea littoral formed the substantial 
and logical economic background to the appeal of 
race which led them to insist so strongly in gathering 
under their sovereignty all the elements of the Bul- 
garian people. European writers have not been able 
to understand how little importance the Bulgarians 
attached to their territorial acquisitions in Thrace, 
and of how little interest it was for them to acquire 
new possessions in which there were so few Bulgarians. 
Then, too, the powerful elements which had pushed 
Bulgaria into the war with Turkey, and had contri- 
buted so greatly to her successes, were of Mace- 
donian origin. In Sofia, the Macedonians are 
numerically, as well as financially and politically, 
very strong. I had a revelation of this, such as the 
compilation of statistics cannot give, on the day 
after the massacre of Kotchana. The newspapers 
called upon all the Macedonians in Sofia to put out 
flags tied with crepe. In the main streets of the 
city, it seemed as if every second house was that of 
a Macedonian. To these people, ardent and power- 
ful patriots, Macedonia was home. It had been the 
dream of their lives to unite the regions from which 
they had come — once emancipated from the Turks 
— to the mother country. From childhood, they 
had been taught to look towards the Rhodope Mount- 
ains as the hills from which should come their help. 
Is it any wonder then, that, after the striking victo- 

322 



RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES 

ries of their arms, there should be a feeling of insan- 
ity — for it was that — when they saw the dreams of 
a lifetime about to vanish? 

But the mischief of the matter, as a Scotchman 
would say, was that Greeks and Servians felt the 
same way about the same places. Populations had 
been mixed for centuries. At some time or other 
in past history each of the three peoples had had 
successful dynasties to spread their sovereignty over 
exactly the same territories. Each then could 
evoke the same historical memories, each the same 
past of suffering, each the same present of hopes, 
and the same prayers of the emancipated towards 
Sofia and Athens and Belgrade. 

After the occupation of Salonika by the Greeks, 
the Bulgarian ambitions to break the power of 
Turkey were not the same as they had been before. 
Had Salonika been occupied two weeks earlier, there 
might not have been a Lule Burgas. An armistice 
was hurriedly concluded. During the trying period 
of negotiations in London, and during the whole of 
the second part of the war, the jealousies of the allies 
had been awakened one against the other. Between 
Greeks and Bulgarians, it had been keen since the 
very first moment that the Greek army entered Mace- 
donia. The crisis between Servia and Bulgaria did 
not become acute until Servia saw her way blocked to 
the Adriatic by the absurd attempt to create a free 
Albania. Then she naturally began to insist that 
the treaty of partition which she had signed with 
Bulgaria could not be carried out by her. In vain 
she appealed to the sense of justice of the Bulgarians. 

323 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

The treaty had been signed on the understanding 
that Albania would fall under the sphere of Servian 
aggrandizement. Nor, on the other hand, had it 
been contested that Thrace would belong to Bul- 
garia. If the treaty were carried out, Bulgaria 
would get everything and Servia nothing. Servia 
also reminded the Bulgarians of the loyal aid that 
had been given them in the reduction of Adrianople. 
But Bulgaria held to her pound of flesh. 

Under the circumstances of the division of ter- 
ritory, Bulgaria's claim to cross the Vardar and 
go as far as Monastir and Okrida, would not 
only have given her possession of a fortress from 
which she could dominate both Servia and Greece, 
but would have put another state between Servia 
and Salonika. Bulgaria was, in fact, demanding 
everything as far as Servia was concerned. Servia 
cannot be blamed then for coming to an understand- 
ing with Greece, even if it were for support in the 
violation of a treaty. For where does history give 
us the example of a nation holding to a treaty when 
it was against her interest to do so? 

After their return from London, the Premiers 
Venizelos and Pasitch made an offensive and defen- 
sive alliance for ten years against the Bulgarian 
aspirations. In this alliance, concluded at Athens 
shortly after King George's death, the frontiers 
were definitely settled. In the negotiations, Greece 
showed the same desire to have everything for 
herself which Bulgaria was displaying. Finally she 
agreed to allow Servia to keep Monastir. Without 
this concession, Servia would have fared as badly 

324 



RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES 

at the hands of Greece as at the hands of Bulgaria. 
It is only because Greece feared that Servia might 
be driven to combine with Bulgaria against her, 
that the frontier in this agreement was drawn south 
of Monastir. The Greek army officers opposed 
strongly this concession, but Venizelos was wise 
enough to see that the maintenance of Greek claims 
to Monastir might result in the loss of Salonika. 
The Serbo- Greek alliance was not made public until 
the middle of June. Bulgaria had also been making 
overtures to Greece, and at the end of May had 
expressed her willingness to waive her claim to 
Salonika in return for Greek support against Servia. 
Venizelos, already bound to Servia, was honourable 
enough to refuse this proposition. 

But the military reputation of Bulgaria was still 
so strong in Bulgarian diplomacy that Servia and 
Greece were anxious to arrive, if possible, at an 
arrangement without war. Venizelos proposed a 
meeting at Salonika. Bulgaria declined. Then 
Venizelos and Pasitch together proposed the arbi- 
tration of the Czar. Bulgaria at the first seemed to 
receive this proposition favourably, but stipulated 
that it would be only for the disputed matter in her 
treaty with Servia. At this moment, the Russian 
Czar sent a moving appeal to the Balkan States to 
avoid the horrors of a fratricidal war. Bulgaria 
then agreed to send, together with her Allies, dele- 
gates to a conference at Petrograd. 

All the while, Premier Gueshoff of Bulgaria had 
been struggling for peace against the pressure and 
the intrigues of the Macedonian party at Sofia. 

525 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

They looked upon the idea of a Petrograd conference 
as the betrayal of Macedonians and Bulgarians by 
the mother country. Unable to maintain his posi- 
tion, Gueshoff resigned. His withdrawal ruined 
Bulgaria, for he was replaced by M. Daneff, who 
was heart and soul with the Macedonian party. A 
period of waiting followed. But from this moment 
war seemed inevitable to those who knew the feeling 
on both sides. Daneff and his friends did not hesi- 
tate. They would not listen to reason. They 
believed that they had the power to force Greece 
and Servia to a peace very nearly on their own 
terms. Public opinion was behind them, for 
news was continually coming to Sofia of Greek and 
Servian oppression of Bulgarians in the region be- 
tween Monastir and Salonika. These stories of 
unspeakable cruelty, which were afterwards estab- 
lished to be true by the Carnegie Commission, had 
much to do with making possible the second war. 

It was not difficult for the Macedonian party at 
Sofia to precipitate hostilities. The Bulgarian 
general staff, in spite of the caution that should have 
imposed itself upon them by the consideration of the 
exhausting campaign in the winter, felt certain of 
their ability to defeat the Servians and Greeks com- 
bined. Then, too, the army on the frontiers, in 
which there was a large element — perhaps twenty 
per cent. — of Macedonians, had already engaged in 
serious conflicts with the Greeks. 

In fact, frontier skirmishes had begun in April. 
The affair of Nigrita was really a battle. After 
these outbreaks, Bulgarian and Greek officers had 

326 



RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES 

been compelled to establish a neutral zone in order 
to prevent the new war from beginning of itself. 
At the end of May, there had been fighting in the 
Panghaeon district, east of the river Strymon. The 
Bulgarian staff had wanted to prevent the Greeks 
from being in a position to cut the railway from 
Serres to Drama. In the beginning of June, Bul- 
garian coast patrols had fired on the Aver off. By 
the end of June, the Bulgarian outposts were not 
far from Salonika. 

The first Bulgarian plan was to seize suddenly 
Salonika, which would thus cut off the Greek army 
from its base of supplies and its advantageous com- 
munication by sea with Greece. There were nearly 
one thousand five hundred Bulgarian soldiers in 
Salonika under the command of General Hassapsieff. 
How many comitadjis had been introduced into the 
city no one knows. I was there during the last 
week of June, and saw many Bulgarian peasants, 
big strapping fellows, who seemed to have no occu- 
pation. When I visited the Bulgarian company, 
which was quartered in the historic mosque of St. 
Sophia, two days before their destruction, they 
seemed to me to be absolutely sure of their position. 
At this moment, the atmosphere among the few 
Bulgarians in Salonika was that of complete 
confidence. 

Among the Greeks, a spirit of excitement and of 
apprehension made them realize the gravity and the 
dangers of the events which were so soon to follow. 
Perfect confidence, while highly recommended by the 
theorists, does not seem to win wars. Nervous- 

327 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

ness, on the other hand, makes an army alert, and 
ready to exert all the greater effort, from the fact 
that it feels it needs that effort. In all the wars with 
which this book deals this has been true, — Italian 
confidence in 191 1, Turkish confidence in 191 2, 
Bulgarian confidence in 1913, and German confidence 
in 1914. 

On the 29th of June, when I left Salonika to go 
to Albania, it was the opinion of the Greek officers 
in Salonika that the war — which they viewed with 
apprehension — would be averted by the conference 
at Petrograd. When I got on my steamship, the 
first man I met was Sandansky, who had become 
famous a decade before by the capture of Miss Stone, 
an American missionary. He had embarked on 
this Austrian Lloyd steamer at Ka valla, with the 
expectation of slipping ashore at Salonika, if possible, 
to prepare the way for the triumphal entry of the 
Bulgarian army. But he was only able to look 
sorrowfully out on the city, for the police were 
waiting to arrest him. What bitter thoughts he 
must have had when he saw the Bulgarian flag, 
which he had planted there with his own hands, 
waving from the minaret of St. Sophia, and he un- 
able to organize its defence! A week later I saw 
Sandansky at a cafe in Valona. The war had then 
started, and he was probably trying to persuade the 
Albanians to enter the struggle and to take the 
Servians in the rear. 

Up to June 29th, Servians and Bulgarians were 
fraternizing at their outposts, and joking about how 
soon they would be getting back to their everyday 

328 



RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES 

occupations, for which months of war and excite- 
ment had begun to unfit them. In several places 
Servians and Bulgarians ate together. I know of 
one outpost where the patrols were photographed 
together on a bridge. Little did they realize the 
horrible plot that was being coolly planned at Sofia, 
and which would cause a new period of bloodshed 
and destruction in Macedonia, frustrate all the 
efforts of the European Chancelleries, and bring in 
its wake the world-wide war. 



329 



CHAPTER XVI 
THE WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES 

ON Sunday night, June 29th, without any de- 
claration of war or even warning, General 
Savoff ordered a general attack all along 
the Greek and Servian lines. There was no direct 
provocation on the part of Bulgaria's allies. 

The responsibility for precipitating the war which 
brought about the humiliation of Bulgaria can be 
directly fixed. Two general orders, dated from the 
military headquarters at Sofia on June 29th, have 
been published. They set forth an amazing and 
devilish scheme, which stands out as a most cold 
and bloody calculation, even among all the horrors 
of Balkan history. General Savoff stated positively 
that this energetic action was not the commence- 
ment of a war. It was merely for the purpose of 
occupying as much territory as possible in the con- 
tested regions before the intervention of the Powers. 
It had a two-fold object: to cut the communications 
between the Greek and Servians at Veles (Kuprulu) 
on the Vardar, and to throw an army suddenly into 
Salonika. The fighting began in the night-time. 
The Bulgarians naturally were able to advance into 
a number of important positions. 

330 



WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES 

When the news became known at Salonika on the 
morning of the 30th, General Hassapsieff, on the 
ground that he was a diplomatic agent, was allowed 
to leave. Before his departure he gave an order to 
his forces to resist, if they were attacked, as he would 
return with the Bulgarian army in twenty-four 
hours. 

Early in the afternoon the Greeks sent an ulti- 
matum ordering the Bulgarians in Salonika to sur- 
render by six o'clock. Their refusal led to all-night 
street fighting. Barricaded in St. Sophia and several 
other buildings, they were able to defend themselves 
until the Greeks turned artillery upon their places of 
refuge. Not many were killed on either side. Salo- 
nika was calm again the next day. One thousand 
three hundred Bulgarian soldiers arid a number of 
prominent Bulgarian residents of Salonika, under con- 
ditions of exceptional cruelty and barbarism, were 
sent to Crete. The Greek forces in Salonika, among 
whom were some twenty thousand from America, 
were hurried to the outposts for the defence of the 
city. 

There was no diplomatic action following the 
treachery of the Bulgarians towards their allies. 
The Greek Foreign Minister stated that Greece 
considered the Bulgarian attack an act of war, and 
that the Greek army had been ordered to advance 
immediately to retake the positions which the Bul- 
garians had captured. Nor did Servia show any 
disposition to treat with Bulgaria. No official 
communications reached Sofia from a Great Power. 
There had been a miscalculation. Bulgaria was 

33i 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

compelled, as a consequence of her ill-considered 
act, to face a new war. There was no withdrawal 
possible. 

From a purely military point of view, it seems 
hard to believe that the Bulgarians really thought 
that their night attack would bring about war. Their 
army had borne the brunt of the campaign against 
the Turks, and had suffered terribly during the 
winter spent in the trenches before Tchatalja. 
They were not in a good strategic position, for the 
army was spread out over a long line, and the char- 
acter of the country made concentration difficult. 
Adequate railway communication with the bases of 
supplies was lacking. The Greeks and Servians, 
on the other hand, held not only the railway from 
Salonika to Nish through the valley of the Vardar, 
but even were it successfully cut, had communication 
by railway with their bases at Salonika, Monastir, 
Mitrovitza, Uskub, and Nish. 

General Ivanoff, in command of the second Bul- 
garian army, was charged with confronting the whole 
of the Greek forces, in a line passing from the ^Egean 
Sea to Demir-Hissar on the Vardar, between Serres 
and Salonika. When we realize that General 
Ivanoff had less than fifty thousand men, a portion 
of whom were recruits from the region of Serres, 
and that he had to guard against an attack on his 
right flank from the Servians, we cannot help won- 
dering what the Bulgarian general staff had counted 
upon in provoking their allies to battle. Did they 
expect that the Greeks and Servians would be intimi- 
dated by the night attack of June 29th, and would 

332 



WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES 

agree to continue the project of a conference at 
Petrograd? Or did they think that the Greek army- 
was of so little value that they could brush it aside, 
and enter Salonika, just as the Greeks had been able to 
enter in November? Whatever hypothesis we adopt, 
it shows contempt for their opponents and belief 
in their own star. The proof of the fact that the 
Bulgarians never dreamed of anything but the suc- 
cess of their "bluff," or, if there was resistance, of an 
easy victory, is found in the few troops at the dis- 
posal of General Ivanoff, and in the choice of Doiran, 
so near the front of battle, as the base of supplies. 
At Doiran everything that the second army needed 
in provisions and munitions of war was stored. 
From the financial standpoint alone, Bulgaria could 
not afford to risk the loss of these supplies. 

On July 2d, the Greek army, under the command of 
Crown Prince Constantine, took the offensive against 
the Bulgarians, who had occupied on the previous 
day the crest of Beshikdag, from the mouth of the 
Struma to the plateau of Lahana, across the road 
from Salonika to Serres, and the heights north of 
Lake Ardzan, commanding the left bank of the 
Vardar. The positions were strong. If the Greek 
army had been of the calibre that the Bulgarians 
evidently expected, or if General Ivanoff had had 
sufficient forces to hold the positions against the 
Greek attack, there would undoubtedly have been 
pourparlers, and a probable cessation of hostilities 
just as the Bulgarians counted upon. 

But the Greeks soon proved that they were as 
brave and as determined as their opponents. Their 

333 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

artillery fire was excellent. There was no wavering 
before the deadly resistance of the entrenched Bul- 
garians. After five days of struggle, in which both 
sides showed equal courage, the forces of General 
Ivanoff yielded to superior numbers. The Bulga- 
rians were compelled to retreat, on July 6th, in 
two columns, towards Demir-Hissar and Strumitza. 
The retreat was effected in good order, and the 
Greeks, though in possession of mobile artillery, 
could not surround either column. Victory had 
been purchased at a terrible price. The Greek 
losses in five days were greater than during the whole 
war with Turkey. They admitted ten thousand 
hors du combat. The Greeks had received their first 
serious baptism of fire, and had demonstrated that 
they could fight. The Turks had never given them 
the opportunity to wipe out the disgrace of 1897. 

It is a tribute to the quickness of decision of the 
Crown Prince Constantine and his general staff, 
and to the spirit of his soldiers, that this severe trial 
of five days of continuous fighting and fearful loss 
of life was not followed by a respite. The Greek 
headquarters were moved to Doiran on the 7 th. 
It was decided to maintain the offensive as long as 
the army had strength to march and men to fill the 
gaps made by the fall of thousands every day. The 
Bulgarians, although they contested desperately 
every step, were kept on the move. On the right, 
the Greeks pushed through to Serres, joining there, 
on July nth, the advance-guard of the detachments 
which the Greek fleet had landed at Kavalla on the 
9th. 

334 



WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES 

The advance of the Greek armies was along the 
Vardar, the Struma, and the Mesta. On the Vardar, 
the Bulgarian abandonment of Demir-Hissar, on the 
ioth, enabled the Greeks to repair the railway, and 
establish communication with the Servian army. 
The right wing, advancing by the Mesta, occupied 
Drama. On July 19th, the Bulgarian resistance was 
concentrated at Nevrokop. When it broke here, 
the Greek right wing was able to send its outposts 
to the foothills of the Rhodope Mountains, on the 
Bulgarian frontier. 

The Greeks began to speak of the invasion of 
Bulgaria, and of making peace at Sofia. But the 
bulk of their forces met an invincible resistance at 
Simitli. From the 23d to the 26th, they attacked 
the Bulgarian positions, and believed that the ad- 
vantage was theirs. But on the 27th the Bulgarians 
began a counter-attack against both wings of the 
Greek army at once. On the 29th, the Greeks began 
to plan their retreat. On the 30th, they realized 
that the retreat was no longer possible. The Bul- 
garians were on both their flanks. It was then that 
the armistice saved them. 

While the Greek army was gaining its victories 
in the hinterland of Macedonia, the ports of the 
^Egean coast, Kavalla, Makri, Porto- Lagos, and 
Dedeagatch were occupied without resistance by the 
Greek fleet. Detachments withdrawn from Epirus 
were brought to these ports. Some went to Serres 
and Drama. Others garrisoned the ports, and occu- 
pied Xanthi and other nearby inland towns. 

The Bulgarians may have had some reason to 

335 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

discount the value of the Greek army. For it had 
not yet been tried. But the Servians had shown 
from the very first day of the war with Turkey that 
they possessed high military qualities. The courage 
of their troops was coupled with agility. They had 
had more experience than the Bulgarians and Greeks 
in quick marches, and in breaking up their forces 
into numerous columns. There is probably no army 
in Europe to-day which can equal the Servians in 
mobility. It is incredible that the Bulgarians could 
have hoped to surprise the Servians, and find a weak 
place anywhere along their lines. On the defensive, 
in localities which they had come to know intimately 
by nine months in the field, it would have taken a 
larger force than the Bulgarians could muster to 
get the better of soldiers such as the Servians had 
proved themselves to be. 

Whether it was by scorn for the Greeks, or by 
appreciation of the Servian concentration, the Bul- 
garians had planned to confront the Servians with 
four of their five armies. We have already seen 
that General Ivanoff had the second army alone to 
oppose to the Greeks, and that even a few battalions 
of his troops were needed on the Servian flank. 

The engagements between the Bulgarians and 
the Servians had two distinct fields of action, one 
in Macedonia, and the other on the Bulgaro-Servian 
frontier. 

In Macedonia, the Bulgarians experienced the 
same surprise in regard to the Servians as in regard 
to the Greeks. Their sudden attack of June 30th 
did not strike terror to the hearts of their opponents. 

33 6 



WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES 

Instead of gaining for them a favourable diplomatic 
position, they found that the Servians did not even 
suggest a parley. On July 1st, the Servians started 
a counter-attack, and kept a steady offensive against 
their former allies for eight days. Gradually the 
Bulgarians, along the Bregalnitza, gave ground, 
retreating from position to position, always with 
their face towards the enemy. The battle, after the 
first day, was for the Bulgarians a defensive action 
all along the line. 

On July 4th, General Dimitrieff assumed the 
functions of generalissimo of the Bulgarian forces. 
He tried his best to check the Servian offensive. 
But the aggressive spirit had gone out of the Bul- 
garian army. Lule Burgas could not be repeated. 
It was incapable of more than a stubborn resistance 
to the Servian advance. By July 8th, the Servians 
were masters of the approaches to Istip, and had 
cleared the Bulgarians out of the territory which 
led down into the valley of the Vardar. Then they 
stopped. From this time on to the signing of the 
armistice, the Macedonian Servian army was content 
with the victories of the first week. 

Along the Servian-Bulgarian frontier, the Bul- 
garian army had some initial success. But General 
Kutincheff did not dispose of enough men to make 
possible a successful aggressive movement towards 
Nish. From the very first, when the Macedonian 
army failed to advance, the Bulgarians' plans of 
an invasion of Servia fell to the ground. They had 
based everything upon an advance in Macedonia 
to the Vardar. So the forward movement wavered. 

337 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

The Servians, now sure of Rumanian co-operation, 
advanced in turn towards Widin. General Kutin- 
cheff was compelled to fall back on Sofia by the 
Rumanian invasion. Widin was invested by the 
Servians on July 23d, 

Rumania had watched with alarm the rise of the 
military power of Bulgaria. She could not inter- 
vene in the first Balkan war on the side of the Turks. 
The civilized world would not have countenanced 
such a move, nor would it have had the support of 
Rumanian public opinion. Whatever the menace 
of Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula, 
Rumania had to wait until peace had been signed 
between the allies and the Turks. But, as we have 
already seen, during the first negotiations at London, 
her Minister to Great Britain had been instructed 
to treat with Bulgaria for a cession of territory from 
the Danube at Silistria to the Black Sea, in order 
that Rumania might have the strategic frontier 
which the Congress of Berlin ought to have given 
her, when the Dobrudja was awarded to her, without 
her consent, in exchange for Bessarabia. As Ruma- 
nia had helped to free Bulgaria in 1877-78, and had 
never received any reward for her great sacrifices, 
while the Bulgarians had done little to win their 
own independence, the demand of a rectification 
of frontier was historically reasonable. Since Ru- 
mania had so admirably developed the Dobrudja, 
and had constructed the port of Constanza, it was 
justified from the economic standpoint. For the 
possession of Silivria, and a change of frontier on 
the Dobrudja, was the only means by which Ru- 

338 



WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES 

mania could hope to defend her southern frontier 
from attack. 

At first, the Bulgarians bitterly opposed any 
compensation to Rumania. They discounted the 
importance of her neutrality, for they knew that 
she could not act against them as long as they were 
at war with Turkey. They denounced the demands 
of Rumania, perfectly reasonable as they were, as 
"blackmail." They were too blinded with the 
dazzling glory of their unexpected victories against 
the Turks to realize how essential the friendship 
of Rumania — at least, the neutrality of Rumania — 
was to their schemes for taking all Macedonia to 
themselves. When, in April, they signed with 
very ill grace the cession of Silivria, as a compromise, 
and refused to yield the small strip of territory from 
Silivria to Kavarna on the Black Sea, the Bulgarians 
made a fatal political mistake. It was madness 
enough to go into the second Balkan war in the 
belief that they could frighten, or, if that failed, over- 
whelm the Servians and Greeks. What shall we 
call the failure to take into their political calcula- 
tions the possibility of a Rumanian intervention? 
Even if there were not the question of the fron- 
tier in- the Dobrudja, would not Rumanian inter- 
vention still be justified by the consideration of 
preserving the balance of power in the Balkans? 
By intervening, Rumania would be acting, in her 
small corner of the world, just as the larger nations 
of Europe had acted time and again since the six- 
teenth century. 

The Rumanian mobilization commenced on July 

339 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

3d. On July 10th, Rumania declared war, and 
crossed the Danube. The Bulgarians decided that 
they would not oppose the Rumanian invasion. 
How could they? Already their armies were on the 
defensive, and hard pressed, by Greeks and Servians. 
There is a limit to what a few hundred thousand men 
could do. It is possible, though not probable, that 
the Bulgarian armies might have gained the upper 
hand in the end against their former allies in Mace- 
donia. But with Rumania bringing into the field 
a fresh army, larger than that of any other Balkan 
States, Bulgaria's case was hopeless. The Ruma- 
nians advanced without opposition, and began to 
march upon Sofia. They occupied, on July 15th, 
the seaport of Varna, from which the Bulgarian 
fleet had withdrawn to Sebastopol. 

It would have been easy for the Rumanians to 
have occupied Sofia, and waited there for the Servian 
and Greek armies to arrive. The humiliation of 
Bulgaria could have been made complete. Why, 
then, the armistice of July 30th? Why the assem- 
bling hastily of a peace conference at Bukarest? 
Political and financial, as well as military, considera- 
tions dictated the wisdom of granting to Bulgaria 
an armistice. 

Greece and Servia were exhausted financially, 
and their armies could gain little more than glory 
by continuing the war. The Greek army, in fact, 
was in a critical position, and ran the risk of being 
surrounded and crushed by the Bulgarians. The 
Servians had not shown much hurry to come to the 
aid of the Greeks. The truth of the matter is that, 

340 



WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES 

after the battle of the Bregalnitza, which ended on 
July ioth, the Servians began to get very nervous 
about the successes of their Greek allies. They 
knew well the Greek character, and feared that too 
easy victories over the Bulgarians might necessitate 
a third war with Greece over Monastir. So, on 
July nth, with the ostensible reason that such a 
measure was necessary to protect their rear against 
the Albanians, the Servian general staff withdrew 
from the front a number of the best regiments, and 
placed them in a position where they could act, if 
the Greeks tried to seize Monastir. On the other 
hand, Rumania gave both Greece and Servia to 
understand that she had entered the war, not from 
any altruistic desire to help them, but for her own 
interests. To see Bulgaria too greatly humiliated 
and weakened was decidedly no more to the interest 
of Rumania than to see her triumphant. 

As for Montenegro, she had entered the second 
Balkan war to give loyal support to Servia, from 
whom she expected in return a generous spirit in 
dividing the sandjak of Novi Bazar. Her co-opera- 
tion, however, as I am able to state from having 
been in Cettinje when the decision was taken to send 
ten thousand men against Bulgaria, was not made 
the subject of any bargain. So, when Servia thought 
best to sign the armistice, Montenegro was in 
thorough accord. 

After a month of fighting, in which the losses had 
been far greater than during the war with Turkey, 
and the treatment of non-combatants by all the 
armies horrible beyond description, the scene of 

34i 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

battle shifted from the blood-stained mountains 
and valleys of Macedonia to the council chamber at 
Bukarest. Rumania was to preside over a Balkan 
Congress of Berlin! 



342 



CHAPTER XVII 
THE TREATY OF BUKAREST 

WHEN the delegates from the various im- 
portant capitals reached Bukarest on 
July 30th, the armies were still fighting. 
Everyone, however, seemed anxious to come to an 
understanding as soon as possible. The first session 
of the delegates was held on the afternoon of July 
30th. Premier Pasitch for Servia and Premier 
Venizelos for Greece were present. But Premier 
Daneff, who had so wanted the war, did not have the 
manhood to face its consequences. The Bulgarians 
were represented in Bukarest by no outstanding 
leader, either political or military. Premier Majo- 
resco of Rumania presided over the conference. 
The first necessity was the decision for an armistice. 
A suspension of arms was agreed upon to begin 
upon July 1st at noon. On August 4th the armistice 
was extended for three days to August 8 th. 

In the conference of Bukarest, Bulgaria, naturally, 
stood by herself. It was necessary, if there was to 
be peace, that her delegates should come to an under- 
standing as to the sacrifices she was willing to make 
with each of her neighbours separately. Conse- 

343 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

quently the important decisions were made in com- 
mittee meetings. The general assembly of delegates 
had little else to do than to ratify the concessions 
wrung from Bulgaria in turn by each of the opponents. 

Rarely have peace delegates been put in a more 
painful position than the men whom Bulgaria sent 
to Bukarest. It will always be an open question as 
to whether the military situation of Bulgaria on the 
31st of July, as regards Servia and Greece, was re- 
trievable. But the presence of a Rumanian army in 
Bulgaria made absolutely impossible the continu- 
ance of the war. Consequently there was nothing 
for Bulgaria to do but to yield to the demands of 
Greece and Servia. The only check upon the Ser- 
vian and Greek delegates was the determination of 
Rumania not to see Bulgaria too greatly weakened. 
She had entered into line to gain her bit of territory 
in the south of the Dobrudja. But she had also 
in mind the prevention of Bulgarian hegemony in 
the Balkan Peninsula, and she did not propose to 
see this hegemony go elsewhere. This explains the 
favourable terms which Bulgaria received. 

The Bulgarian and Rumanian delegates quickly 
agreed upon a frontier to present to the meeting of 
August 4th. By this, the first of the protocols, 
Bulgaria ceded to Rumania all her territory north 
of a line from the Danube, above Turtukaia, to the 
end of the Black Sea, south of Ekrene. In addition, 
she bound herself to dismantle the present fortresses 
and promised not to construct forts at Rustchuk, 
Schumla, and the country between and for twenty 
kilometres around Baltchik. 

344 



THE TREATY OF BUKAREST 

On August 6th, the protocol with Servia was pre- 
sented. The Servian frontier was to start at a line 
drawn from the summit of Patarika on the old 
frontier, and to follow the watershed between the 
Vardar and the Struma to the Greek- Bulgarian 
frontier, with the exception of the upper valley of 
the Strumnitza which remained Servian territory. 

The following day the protocol with Greece was 
presented. The Greek-Bulgarian frontier was to 
run from the crest of Belashitcha to the mouth of 
the River Mesta on the JEgean Sea. Bulgaria for- 
mally agreed to waive all pretensions to Crete. The 
protocol with the Greeks was the only one over which 
the Bulgarians made a resolute stand. When they 
signed this protocol, they stated that the accord 
was only because they had taken notice of the notes 
which Austria-Hungary and Russia presented to 
the conference, to the effect that in their ratification 
they would reserve for future discussion the inclusion 
of Kavalla in Greek territory. 

The Bulgarians insisted on a clause guarantee- 
ing autonomy for churches and schools in the con- 
dominium of liberated territories. Servia opposed 
this demand mildly, and Greece strongly. They were 
right. The question of national propaganda through 
churches and schools had done more to arouse and 
keep alive racial hatred in Macedonia than any 
other cause. If there were to be a lasting peace, 
nothing could be more unwise than the continuance 
of the propaganda which had plunged Macedonia 
into such terrible confusion. 

Rumania, however, secured in the Treaty of 

345 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Bukarest from each of the States what they had been 
unwilling to grant each other. Rumania imposed 
upon Bulgaria, Greece, and Servia, the obligation 
of granting autonomy to the Kutzo-Wallachian 
churches, and assent to the creation of bishoprics 
subsidized by the Rumanian Government. 

A rather amusing incident occurred on August 
5th by the proposition of the United States Govern- 
ment through its Minister at Bukarest, that a pro- 
vision be embodied in the treaty according full 
religious liberties in transferred territories. The 
ignorance of American diplomacy, so frequently to 
be deplored, never made a greater blunder than 
this. It showed how completely the American 
State Department and its advisors on Near Eastern 
affairs had misunderstood the Macedonian question. 
Quite rightly, the consideration even of this request 
was rejected as superfluous. Mr. Venizelos ad- 
ministered a well-deserved rebuke when he said that 
religious liberty, in the right sense of the word, was 
understood through the extension of each country's 
constitution over the territories acquired. 

Much has been written concerning the intrigues 
of European Powers at Bukarest during the ten 
days of the conference which made a new map for 
the Balkan Peninsula. It will be many years, if 
ever, before these intrigues are brought to light. 
Therefore we cannot discuss the question of the 
pressure which was brought to bear upon Rumania, 
upon Bulgaria, and upon Servia and Greece to de- 
termine the partition of territories. Germany 
looked with alarm upon the possibility of a durable 

346 



■THE TREATY OF BUKAREST 

settlement. Austria was determined that Bulgaria 
and Servia should not become reconciled. 

Austria-Hungary and Russia, though for different 
reasons, were right in their attitude toward the 
matter of Greece's claim upon Kavalla. Greece 
would have done well had she been content to leave 
to Bulgaria a larger littoral on the ^gean Sea, and 
the port which is absolutely essential for the proper 
economic development of the hinterland attributed 
to her. By taking her pound of flesh, the Greeks 
only exposed themselves to future dangers. The 
laws of economics are inexorable. Bulgaria cannot 
allow herself to think sincerely about peace until her 
portion of Macedonia, by the inclusion of Kavalla, 
is logically complete. It would have been better 
politics for Greece to have shown herself magnani- 
mous on this point. As George Sand has so aptly 
said: "It is not philanthropy, but our own interest, 
which leads us sometimes to do good to men in order 
that they may be prevented in the future from doing 
harm to us." 

When we come to look back upon the second 
Balkan war, and have traced out the sad conse- 
quences and the continued unrest which followed the 
Treaty of Bukarest, it is possible that Servia's re- 
sponsibility may be considered as great, if not greater, 
than that of Bulgaria in bringing about the strife 
between the allies. In our sympathy with the in- 
herent justice of Servia's claim for adequate terri- 
torial compensation for what she had suffered for, 
and what she had contributed to, the Turkish de- 
bdcle in Europe, we are apt to overlook three indis- 

347 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

putable facts: that Servia repudiated a solemn 
treaty with Bulgaria, on the basis of which Bulgaria 
had agreed to the alliance against Turkey; that the 
territories granted to Servia, south of the line which 
she had sworn not to pass in her territorial claims, 
and a portion of those in the "contested zone" of 
her treaty with Bulgaria, were beyond any shadow 
of doubt inhabited by Bulgarians; and that since 
these territories were ceded to her she has not, as 
was tacitly understood at Bukarest, extended to 
them the guarantees and privileges of the Servian 
constitution. 

The Treaty of Bukarest, so far as the disputed 
territories allotted to Servia are concerned, has 
created a situation analogous to that of Alsace and 
Lorraine after the Treaty of Frankfort. And Servia 
started in to cope with it by following Prussian 
methods. What Servians of Bosnia and Herzego- 
vina and Dalmatia have suffered from Austrian rule, 
free Servia is inflicting upon the Bulgarians who 
became her subjects after the second Balkan war. 

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the 
population of Macedonia, as a whole, of whatever 
race or creed, would welcome to-day a return to 
the Ottoman rule of Abdul Hamid. The Turkish 
"constitutional regime' 1 '' was worse than Abdul 
Hamid, the war of "liberation" worse than the 
Young Turks, and the present disposition of terri- 
tories satisfies none. Poor Macedonia! 

After the disastrous and humiliating losses at 
Bukarest, Bulgaria still had her former vanquished 
foe to reckon with. The Turks were again at Adria- 

348 



THE TREATY OF BUKAREST 

nople and Kirk Kilisse. Thrace was once more in 
her power. The Treaty of Bukarest, while attri- 
buting Thrace to Bulgaria on the basis of the Treaty 
of London, actually said nothing whatever about it. 
Nor were there any promises of aid in helping Bul- 
garia to get back again what she had lost, without 
a struggle, by her folly and treachery. 

A new war by Bulgaria alone in her weakened 
military condition and with her empty treasury, to 
drive once more the Turks back south of the Enos- 
Midia line, was impossible. Bulgaria appealed to 
the chancelleries of Europe to help her in taking 
possession of the Thracian territory ceded to her at 
London. The Powers made one of their futile over- 
tures to Turkey, requesting that she accept the 
treaty which she had signed a few months before. 

But no one could blame the Turks for having 
taken advantage of Bulgarian folly. Who could 
expect them to meekly withdraw behind the Enos- 
Midia line? Bulgaria could get no support in 
applying the argument of force. 

In the end, the victors of Lule Burgas had to go 
to Constantinople and make overtures directly to 
the Sublime Porte. They fared very badly. The 
Enos-Midia line was drawn, but it took a curve 
northward from the Black Sea and westward across 
the Maritza in such a way that the Turks obtained 
not only Adrianople, but also Kirk Kilisse and 
Demotica. The Bulgarians were not even masters 
of the one railway leading to Dedeagatch, their sole 
port on the ^Egean Sea. 

The year 19 13 for Bulgaria will remain the most 

349 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

bitter one of her history. She had to learn the 
lesson that the life of the nations, as well as of indi- 
viduals, is one of give as well as take, and that com- 
promise is the basis of sound statesmanship. Who 
wants all, most often gets nothing. 



35o 



CHAPTER XVIII 
THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 

THE world has not known just what to do with 
the mountainous country which comes out in 
a bend on the upper western side of the Bal- 
kan Peninsula directly opposite the heel of Italy. It 
caused trouble to the Romans from the very moment 
that they became an extra-Italian power. Inherited 
from them by the Byzantines, fought for with the 
varying fortunes by the Frankish princes, the Vene- 
tians, and the Turks, Albania has remained a country 
which cannot be said to have ever been wholly 
subjected. Nor can it be said to have ever had a 
national entity. Its present mediaeval condition 
is due to the fact that, owing to its high mountains 
and its being on the road to nowhere, it has not, 
since the Roman days at least, undergone the influ- 
ences of a contemporary civilization. 

Venice recognized the importance of Albania 
during the days of her commercial prosperity. For 
the Albanian coast, with its two splendid harbours, 
of Valona and Durazzo, effectively guards the 
entrance of the Adriatic into the Mediterranean Sea. 

But Albania did not demand attention a hundred 
years ago when the last map of Europe was being 

35i 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

made by the Congress of Vienna. The reason for 
this is simple. Italy was not a political whole. 
The head of the Adriatic was entirely in the hands 
of Austria. There was no thought at that time of 
our modern navies, and of the importance of keeping 
open the Straits of Otranto. It was the Dalmatian 
coast, north of Albania, which Austria considered 
essential to her commercial supremacy. Then, too, 
Greece had not yet received her freedom, and the 
Servians had not risen in rebellion against the Otto- 
man Empire. There were no Slavic, Hellenic, and 
Italian questions to disturb Austria in her peaceful 
possession of the Adriatic Sea. 

It was not until the union of Italy had been ac- 
complished, and the south Slavic nationalities had 
formed themselves into political units, that Albania 
became a "question" in the chancelleries of Europe. 

Austria-Hungary determined that Italy should 
not get a foothold in Albania. Italy had the same 
determination in regard to Austria-Hungary. Since 
the last Russo-Turkish War, Austria-Hungary and 
Italy have had the united determination to keep the 
Slavs from reaching the Adriatic. For the past 
generation, feeling certain that the end of the Otto- 
man Empire was at hand, Austria and Italy through 
their missionaries, their schools, and their consular 
and commercial agents, have struggled hard against 
each other to secure the ascendancy in Albania. 
Their intrigues have not ceased up to this day. 

When Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzego- 
vina, and the Young Turk oppression of the Albani- 
ans aroused the first expression of what might possibly 

352 



THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 

be called national feeling since the time of Skander 
bey's resistance to the Ottoman conquest, the rival 
Powers, instead of following in the line of Russia 
and Great Britain in Persia, and establishing spheres 
of interest, agreed to support the Albanian national 
movement as the best possible check upon Servian 
and Greek national aspirations. This was the 
status of Albania in her relationship to the Adriatic 
Powers, when the war of the Balkan States against 
Turkey broke out. The accord between Austria 
and Italy had stood the strain of Italy's war with 
Turkey. Largely owing to their fear of Russia and 
to the pressure of Germany, it stood the strain of 
the Balkan War. But both Italy and Austria let it 
be known to the other Powers that if the Turkish 
Empire in Europe disappeared, there must be an 
independent Albania. 

This dictum was accepted in principle by the other 
four Powers, who saw in it the only possible chance 
of preventing the outbreak of a conflict between 
Austria and Russia which would be bound to involve 
all Europe in war. No nation wanted to fight over 
the question of Albania. Russia could not hope to 
have support from Great Britain and France to 
impose upon the Triple Alliance her desire for a 
Slavic outlet to the Adriatic. For neither France 
nor Great Britain was anxious for the Russian to 
get to the Mediterranean. The accord between the 
Powers was shown in the warning given to Greece 
and Servia that the solution of the Albanian question 
must be reserved for the Powers when a treaty of 
peace was signed with Turkey. The accord weathered 
23 353 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

the severe test put upon it by the bold defiance of 
the Montenegrin occupation of Scutari. 

We have spoken elsewhere of the policy of the 
Young Turks towards Albania. This most useful 
and loyal corner of the Sultan's dominions was 
turned into a country of perennial revolutions, 
which started soon after the inauguration of the 
constitutional regime. In the winter of 1911-1912, 
when the group of Albanian deputies in the Ottoman 
Parliament saw their demands for reforms rejected 
by the Cabinet, and even the right of discussion of 
their complaints refused on the floor of Parliament, 
the Albanians north and south, Catholic and Moslems, 
united in a resistance to the Turkish authorities 
that extended to Uskub and Monastir. After the 
spring elections of 19 12, the resistance became a for- 
midable revolt. For the Young Turks had rashly 
manoeuvred the balloting with more than Tammany 
skill. The Albanians were left without representa- 
tives in Parliament! Former deputies, such as 
Ismail Kemal bey, Hassan bey, and chiefs such as 
Isa Boletinatz, Idris Sefer, and AH Riza joined in a 
determination to demand autonomy by force of 
arms. 

When, in July, the Cabinet decided to move an 
army against the Albanians, there were wholesale 
desertions from the garrison of Monastir, and of 
Albanian officers from all parts of European Turkey. 
Mahmoud Shevket pasha was compelled to resign the 
Ministry of War, and was followed by Said pasha 
and the whole Cabinet. The Albanians demanded 
as a sine qua non the dissolution of Parliament. The 

354 



THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 

Mukhtar Cabinet agreed to the dissolution, and 
accepted almost all the demands of the rebels in a 
conference at Pristina. 

For the tables had now been turned. Instead of 
a Turkish invasion of Albania for "pacification," as 
in previous summers, it was a question now of an 
Albanian invasion of Turkey. In spite of the con- 
ciliatory spirit of the new Cabinet, the agitation 
persisted. It was rumoured that the Malissores and 
the Mirdites were planning a campaign against 
Scutari and Durazzo. I was in Uskub in the early 
part of September. Isa Boletinatz and his band 
were practically in possession of the city. A truce 
for Ramazan, the Moslem fast month, had been 
arranged between Turks and Albanians. But the 
Albanians said they would not lay down their arms 
until a new and honestly constitutional election was 
held. 

Immediately after Ramazan came the Balkan War. 
Albania found herself separated from Turkey, 
and in a position to have more than autonomy 
without having to deal further with the Turks. 

During the Balkan War, the attitude of the Alba- 
nians was a tremendous disappointment to the Turks. 
One marvels that loyalty to the Empire could have 
been expected, even from the Moslem element, in 
Albania. And yet the Turks did expect that a 
Pan-Islamic feeling would draw the Albanian beys 
to fight for the Sultan, just as they had expected a 
similar phenomenon on the part of the rebellious 
Arabs of the Arabic peninsula during the war with 
Italy. 

355 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

From the very beginning the Albanians adopted 
an attitude of opportunism. They did not lift a 
hand directly to help the Turks. Had they so 
desired, they might have made impossible the invest- 
ment of Janina by the Greeks. But nowhere, save 
in Scutari, did the Albanians make a stubborn 
stand against the military operations of the Balkan 
allies. Almost from the beginning, they had under- 
stood that the Powers would not allow the partition 
of Albania. They knew that the retention of Janina 
was hopeless after the successes of the allies during 
October. But they received encouragement from 
both Austria-Hungary and Italy to fight for Scutari. 

The heroic defence of Scutari, which lasted longer 
than that of any of the other fortified towns in the 
Balkan Peninsula, cannot be regarded as a feat of 
the Turkish army. During the siege, the general 
commanding Scutari had been assassinated by order 
of Essad pasha, who was his second in command. 
Essad then assumed charge of the defence as purely 
Albanian in character. He refused to accept the 
armistice, and continued the struggle throughout 
the debates in London. Scutari is at the south 
end of a lake which is shared between Albania and 
Montenegro. Commanding the city is a steep 
barren hill called Tarabosh. With their heavy 
artillery on this hill, the Albanians were able to 
prevent indefinitely the capture of their city. 
Servians and Montenegrins found themselves con- 
fronted with the task of taking Tarabosh by assault, 
if they hoped to occupy Scutari. This was a feat 
beyond the strength of a Balkan army. On the 

356 



THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 

steep slopes of this hill were placed miles of barbed 
wire. The assailants were mowed down each time 
they tried to reach the batteries at the top. As 
Tarabosh commanded the four corners of the horizon, 
its cannon could prevent an assault or bombardment 
of the city from the plain. The allies were unable 
to silence the batteries on the crest of this hill. 

During the winter, the principal question before 
the concert of European Powers was that of Scutari. 
Austria-Hungary was so determined that Scutari 
should not fall into the hands of the Montenegrins 
and Servians that she mobilized several army corps 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and on the Russian frontier 
of Galicia, at Christmas time, 1912. The New Year 
brought with it ominous forebodings for the peace 
of Europe. Diplomacy worked busily to bring 
about an accord between the Powers, and pressure 
upon the besiegers of Scutari. In the middle of 
March, it was unanimously agreed that Scutari 
should remain to Albania, and that Servia should 
receive Prizrend, Ipek, Dibra, and Diakova as com- 
pensation for not reaching the Adriatic, and the 
assurance of an economic outlet for a railroad at 
some Albanian port. The European concert then 
decided to demand at Belgrade and Cettinje the 
lifting of the siege of Scutari. 

Servia, yielding to the warning of Russia that 
nothing further could be done for her, consented to 
withdraw her troops from before Scutari, and to 
abandon the points in Albanian territory which had 
been allotted by the Powers to the independent 
Albanian State which they intended to create. 

357 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Servia had another reason for doing this. Seeing 
the hopelessness of territorial aggrandizement in 
Albania, she decided to denounce her treaty of 
partition, concluded before the war, with Bulgaria, 
To realize this act of faithlessness and treachery, 
she had need of the sympathetic support of the 
Powers in the quarrel which was bound to ensue. 
We see here how the blocking of Servia's outlet to 
the Adriatic led inevitably to a war between the 
Balkan Allies. 

But with Montenegro the situation was entirely 
different. She had sacrificed one-fifth of her army 
in the attacks upon Tarabosh, and Scutari seemed 
to her the only thing that she was to get out of the 
war with Turkey. Perched up in her mountains, 
there was little harm that the Powers could do to 
her. Just as King Nicholas had precipitated the 
Balkan War against the advice of the Powers the 
previous October, he decided on April 1st to refuse 
to obey the command of the Powers to lift the siege 
of Scutari. From what I have gathered myself 
from conversations in the Montenegrin capital two 
months later, I feel that the King of Montenegro 
can hardly be condemned for what the newspapers 
of Europe called his "audacious folly" in refusing 
to give a favourable response to the joint note pre- 
sented to him by the European Ministers at Cettinje. 
The Montenegrins are illiterate mountaineers, who 
know nothing whatever about considerations of 
international diplomacy. If their King had listened 
to words written on a piece of paper, and had or- 
dered the Montenegrin troops to withdraw from 

358 



THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 

before Scutari, he would probably have lost his 
throne. 

So the Powers were compelled to make a show of 
force. Little Montenegro, with its one port, and 
its total population not equal to a single arrondis- 
sement of the city of Paris, received the signal honour 
of an international blockade. On April 7th, an 
international fleet, under the command of the British 
Admiral Burney, blockaded the coast from Antivari 
to Durazzo. While all Europe was showing its dis- 
pleasure in the Adriatic, the Montenegrins kept on, 
although deserted by the Servians, sitting in a circle 
around Scutari, only twenty-five miles inland from 
the blockading fleet. An April 23d, after the Balkan 
War was all finished, Europe was electrified by the 
news that the Albanians had surrendered Scutari 
to Montenegro. The worst was to be feared, for 
Austria announced her determination to send her 
troops across the border from Bosnia into Monte- 
negro. Such an action would certainly have brought 
on a great European war. For neither at Rome nor 
at Petrograd could Austrian intervention have been 
tolerated. 

No Power in Europe was at that moment ready 
for war. Largely through pressure brought to bear 
at Cettinje by his son-in-law, the King of Italy, 
King Nicholas decided on May 5th to deliver Scu- 
tari to the Powers. The Montenegrins withdrew, 
and ten days later Scutari was occupied by detach- 
ments of marines from the international squadron. 
The blockade was lifted. The peace of Europe was 
saved. 

359 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

The Treaty of London, signed on May 30, 1913, 
put Albania into the hands of the Powers. The 
northern and eastern frontiers had been arranged 
by the promise made to Servia in return for her with- 
drawal from the siege of Scutari. But the southern 
frontier was still an open question. Here Italy was 
as much interested as was Austria in the north. 
With Corfu in the possession of Greece, Italy would 
not agree that the coast of the mainland opposite 
should also be Hellenic. The Greeks, on the contrary, 
declared that the littoral and hinterland, up beyond 
Santi Quaranta, was part of ancient Epirus, and 
inhabited principally by Greeks. It should therefore 
revert logically to greater Greece. Athens lifted 
again the old cry, "Where there are Hellenes, there 
is Hellas." The Greeks were occupying Santi 
Quaranta. They claimed as far north as Argyro- 
kastron. But they consented to withdraw from the 
Adriatic, north of and opposite Corfu, if interior 
points equally far to the north were left to them. 
An international commission was formed to make 
a southern boundary for Albania. Its task has 
never been satisfactorily completed. The question 
is still open. 

What was to be done with this new state, foster 
child of all Europe, with indefinite boundaries, with 
guardians each jealous of the other, and neighbours 
waiting only for a favourable moment to throw them- 
selves upon her and extinguish her life? 

I visited Albania in July, 1913, during the second 
Balkan War. At Valona, in the south, I found a 
provisional government, self-constituted during the 

360 



THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 

previous winter, whose authority was problematical 
outside of Valona itself. At the head of the govern- 
ment was Ismail Kemal, whom I had known as the 
champion of Albanian autonomy in the Ottoman 
Parliament at Constantinople. He talked passion- 
ately of Albania, the new State in Europe, with its 
united population and its national aspirations. He 
was eager to have the claims of Albania to a generous 
southern frontier presented at London. He assured 
me that I could write with perfect confidence in 
glowing terms concerning the future of Albania, 
that a spirit of harmony reigned throughout the 
country, and that the Albanians of all creeds, freed 
from Turkish oppression, were looking eagerly to 
their new life as an independent nation. When I 
expressed misgivings as to the role of Essad pasha, 
the provisional president asserted that the former 
commander of Scutari was wholly in accord with 
him, and cited as proof the fact that he had that 
very day received from Essad pasha his acceptance 
of the portfolio of Minister of the Interior. 

But that indefinable feeling of misgiving, which 
one always has over the enthusiasm of Orientals, 
caused me to withhold judgment as to the liability 
of Albania until I had seen how things were going in 
other portions of the new kingdom. 

At Durazzo, the northern port of Albania, the 
friends of Essad pasha were in control of the govern- 
ment. Things were still being done a la turgue, and 
there was a feeling of great uncertainty concerning 
the future. Few had any faith whatever in the pro- 
visional government at Valona, and it was declared 

361 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

that the influence of Essad pasha would decide the 
attitude of the Albanians in Durazzo, Tirana, and 
Elbassan. Essad was chief of the Toptanis, the 
most influential family in the neighbourhood of 
Durazzo. He had "made his career" in the gendar- 
merie, and had risen rapidly through the approval 
and admiration of Abdul Hamid. This is an indica- 
tion of his character. He was credited with the 
ambition of ruling Albania. To withdraw his forces 
and his munitions of war intact, so that he could 
press these claims, is the only explanation of his 
"deal" with King Nicholas of Montenegro to sur- 
render Scutari. Essad had sacrificed the pride and 
honour of Albania to his personal ambition. 

From Durazzo, I went to San Giovanni di Medua, 
which was occupied by the Montenegrins, just as I 
had found Santi Quaranta in the south occupied by 
the Greeks. Going inland from this port (one must 
use his imagination in calling San Giovanni di Medua 
a port) by way of Alessio, I reached Scutari, from 
whose citadel flew the flags of the Powers. In every 
quarter of this typically and hopelessly Turkish 
town, one ran across sailors from various nations. 
Each Power had its quarter, and had named the 
streets with some curious results. The Via Garibaldi 
ran into the Platz Radetzky. On the Catholic 
cathedral was a sign informing you that you were 
in the Rue Ernest Renan. 

This accidental naming of streets was a prophecy 
of the hopelessness of trying to reconcile the con- 
flicting aims and ideals of the Powers whose bands 
were playing side by side in the public garden. In 

362 



THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 

the dining-room of the hotel, when I saw Austrians, 
Italians, Germans, British, and French officers eating 
together at the long tables, instead of rejoicing at 
this seeming spirit of European harmony, I had the 
presentiment of the inevitable result of the struggle 
betwesn Slav and Teuton, to prevent which these 
men were there. Just a year later, I stood in front 
of the Gare du Montparnasse in Paris reading the 
order for General Mobilization. There came back 
to me as in a dream the public garden at Scutari, 
and the mingled strains of national anthems, with 
officers standing rigidly in salute beside their half- 
filled glasses. 

In the palatial home of a British nobleman who 
had loved the Albanians and had lived long in Scu- 
tari, Admiral Burney established his headquarters. 
I talked with him there one afternoon concerning 
the present and the future of Albania, and the rela- 
tionship of the problem which he had before him with 
the peace of Europe. Never have I found a man 
more intelligently apprehensive of the possible out- 
come of the drama in which he was playing a part, 
and at the same time more determinedly hopeful 
to use all his ability and power to save the peace of 
Europe by welding together the Albanians into a 
nation worthy of the independence that has been 
given to them by the European concert. Such men 
as Admiral Burney are more than the glory of a 
nation : they are the making of a nation. The great- 
ness of Britain is due to the men who serve her. 
High ideals, self-sacrifice, ability, and energy are 
the corner-stones of the British overseas Empire. 

363 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

There was little, however, that Admiral Burney, 
or anyone in fact, could do for Albania. No nation 
can exist in modern times, when national life is in 
the will of the people rather than in the unifying 
qualities of a ruler, if there are no common ideals 
and the determination to attain them. Albania 
is without a national spirit and a national past. It 
is, therefore, no unit, capable of being welded into 
a state. The creation by the Ambassadors of the 
Powers in London may have been thought by them 
to be a necessity. But it was really a makeshift. 
If the Albanians had done their part, and had shown 
the possibility of union, the makeshift might have 
developed into a new European state. As things 
have turned out, it has stayed what it was in the 
beginning, — a fiasco. 

Among the many candidates put forward for the 
new throne, Prince William of Wied was finally 
decided upon. He was a Protestant, and could 
occupy a position of neutrality among his Moslem, 
Orthodox, and Catholic subjects. He was a German, 
and could not be suspected of Slavic sympathies. 
He was a relative of the King of Rumania, and could 
expect powerful support in the councils of the Balkan 
Powers. 

It would be wearisome to go into the story 
of Prince William's short and unhappy reign. At 
Durazzo, which was chosen for the capital, he quickly 
showed himself incapable of the role which a genius 
among rulers might have failed to play successfully. 
Lost in a maze of bewildering intrigues, foreign and 
domestic, the ruler of Albania saw his prestige, and 

364 



THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 

then his dignity, disappear. He never had any real 
authority. He had been forced upon the Albanians. 
They did not want him. The Powers who had placed 
him upon the throne did not support him. In the 
spring, the usual April heading, "Albania in Arms," 
appeared once more in the newspapers of the world. 
Up to the outbreak of the European war, when 
Albania was "lost in the shuffle," almost daily tele- 
grams detailed the march of the insurgents upon 
Durazzo, the useless and fatal heroism of the Dutch 
officers of the gendarmerie, the incursions of the 
Epirote bands in the south, and the embarrassing 
position of the international forces still occupying 
Scutari. What the Albanians really wanted, none 
could guess, much less they themselves! 

The European war, in August, 1914, enabled the 
Powers to withdraw gracefully from the Albanian 
fiasco. Their contingents hurriedly abandoned 
Scutari, and sailed for home. The French did not 
have time to do this, so they went to Montenegro. 
Since the catastrophe, to prevent which they had 
created Albania, had fallen upon Europe, what 
further need was there for the Powers to bother 
about the fortunes of Prince William and his subjects? 
Italy alone was left with hands free, and her interests 
were not at stake, so long as Greece kept out of the 
fray. For Prince William of Wied, Italy felt no 
obligation whatever. 

Without support and without money, there was 
nothing left to Prince William but to get out. He 
did not have the good sense to make his withdrawal 
from Albania a dignified proceeding. The palace 

365 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

was left under seals. The Prince issued a proclama- 
tion which would lead the Albanians to believe that 
it was his intention to return. It may be that he 
thought the triumph of the German and Austrian 
armies in the European war would mean his re- 
establishment to Durazzo. But after he was once 
again safely home at Neu-Wied, he did what he 
ought to have done many months before. A high- 
sounding manifesto announced his abdication, and 
wished the Albanians Godspeed in the future. After 
this formality had been accomplished, the former 
Mpret of Albania rejoined his regiment in the German 
army, and went out to fight against the French. 

With Prince William of Wied and the international 
corps of occupation gone, the Albanians were left 
to themselves. At Durazzo, a body of notables, 
calling themselves the Senate, adopted resolutions 
restoring the Ottoman flag and the suzerainty of the 
Sultan, invited Prince Burhaneddin effendi, a son 
of Abdul Hamid, to become their ruler, and solemnly 
decreed that hereafter the Turkish language should 
be restored to its former position as the official 
language of the country. 

But Essad pasha thought otherwise. The psycho- 
logical moment, for which he had been waiting ever 
since his surrender of Scutari to the Montenegrins, 
had come. In the first week of October, he hurried 
to Durazzo with his followers, had himself elected 
head of a new provisional government by the Albanian 
Senate, and announced openly that his policy would 
be to look to Italy instead of to Austria for support. 
After rendering homage to the Sultan as Khalif, 

366 



THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 

asking the people to celebrate the happy spirit of 
harmony which now reigned throughout Albania, 
and prophesying a new era of peace and prosperity 
for Europe's latest-born independent state, the 
former gendarme of Abdul Hamid entered the palace, 
broke the seals of the international commission, and 
went to sleep in the bed of Prince William of Wied. 
One wonders whether the new ruler of Albania 
will have more restful slumbers than his predecessor. 
In spite of all protests, Greece is still secretly en- 
couraging the Epirotes in their endeavour to push 
northward the frontier of the Hellenic kingdom. 
Italy has two army corps at Brindisi waiting for a 
favourable moment to occupy Valona. The Mon- 
tenegrins and Servians are planning once more to 
reach the Adriatic through the valleys of the Boy ana 
and Drin, after they have driven the Austro-Hun- 
garian armies from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only 
an Austrian triumph could now save Albania from 
her outside enemies. But could anything save her 
from her inside enemies? When I read of Essad 
Pasha in Durazzo, self-chosen Moses of his people, 
there comes back to me a conversation with the 
leading Moslem chieftain of Scutari, whose guest 
I had the privilege of being, in his home in the sum- 
mer of 1913. When I mentioned Essad pasha, he 
rose to his feet before the fire, waved his arms, and 
cried out: "When I see Essad, I shall shoot him like 
a dog!" 



367 



CHAPTER XIX 

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM 
TO SERVIA 

IN discussing the relations of the Austrians and 
Hungarians with their south Slavic subjects, 
and the rivalries of races in Macedonia, the 
general causes behind the hostile attitude of Austria- 
Hungary to the development of Servia have been 
explained. Specific treatment of the Servian atti- 
tude towards the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina was reserved for this chapter, because the 
events of the summer of 1914 are the direct sequence 
of the events of the winter of 1 908-1 909. 

On October 3, 1908, Marquis Pallavicini, Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople, notified 
verbally the Sublime Porte that Austria-Hungary 
had annexed the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, whose administration was entrusted to 
her by the Treaty of Berlin just thirty years before. 
Austria-Hungary was willing to renounce the right 
given her by the Treaty of Berlin to the military 
occupation of the sandjak of Novi Bazar (a strip of 
Turkish territory between Servia and Montenegro), 
if Turkey would renounce her sovereignty of the 
annexed provinces. 

368 



AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA 

This violation of the Treaty of Berlin by Austria- 
Hungary aroused a strong protest not only in Servia 
and in Turkey, but also among the other Powers 
who had signed at Berlin the conditions of the main- 
tenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 
The protest was especially strong in London and 
Petrograd. But Austria-Hungary had the backing 
of Germany, whose Ambassador at Petrograd, 
Count de Pourtales, did not hesitate several times 
during the winter to exercise pressure that went almost 
to the point of being a threat upon the Russian Foreign 
Office to refrain from encouraging the intractable 
attitude of Servia towards the annexation. 

With Germany's support, Austria- Hungary did 
not have much difficulty in silencing the protests of 
all the Great Powers. She had a free hand, thanks 
to Germany, in forcing Turkey and Servia to accept 
the fait accompli of the annexation. 

Turkish protests took the form of the boycott of 
which we have spoken elsewhere. On November 
22d, Austria-Hungary threatened to put the whole 
status of European Turkey into question by con- 
voking the European congress to revise the Treaty 
of Berlin. This is exactly what Austria-Hungary 
herself did not want. But neither did Turkey. 
Both governments had a common interest in prevent- 
ing outside intervention in the Balkan Peninsula. 
The boycott, as evidencing anti-Austrian feeling, 
was rather a sop to public opinion of Young Turkey, 
and a blind to the Powers to hide the perfect accord 
that existed between Germany and Turkey at the 
moment, than the expression of hostility to Austria- 
24 369 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Hungary. After several months of pourparlers an 
agreement was made between Constantinople and 
Vienna on February 26, 1909. Turkey agreed to 
recognize the annexation in return for financial 
compensation. The negotiations at Constantinople 
concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina are a monument 
to the diplomatic finesse and skill of the late Baron 
Marschallvon Bieberstein and of Marquis Pallavicini. 

To lose something that you know you can no 
longer keep is far different from losing the hope of 
possession. It is always more cruel to be deprived 
of an anticipation than of a reality. Turkey gave 
up Bosnia and Herzegovina with her usual fatalistic 
indifference. Her sovereignty had been only a 
fiction after all. But Servia saw in the action of 
Austria- Hungary a fatal blow to her national aspira- 
tions. The inhabitants of the two Turkish provinces 
on her west were Servian : Bosnia-Herzegovina formed 
the centre of the Servian race. Montenegro on 
the south was Servian. Dalmatia on the west was 
Servian. Croatia on the north was Servian. Every- 
thing was Servian to the Adriatic Sea. And yet 
Servia was land-locked. The Servians determined 
they would not accept this annexation. They ap- 
pealed to the signatory Powers of Berlin, and suc- 
ceeded in arousing a sentiment in Europe favourable 
to a European conference. They threatened to 
make Austrian and Hungarian sovereignty intoler- 
able, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also 
in Croatia and Dalmatia. 

Austria-Hungary was more than irritated; she 
was alarmed. She appealed to her ally, and pictured 

370 



AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA 

the danger to the Drang nach Oesten. The powerful 
intervention of the German ambassadors in the 
various European capitals succeeded in isolating 
Belgrade. Russian support of Servia would have 
meant a European war. Rather than risk this, 
France begged Russia to yield. Russia, not yet 
recovered from the Manchurian disaster, ordered 
Servia to yield. Austria-Hungary was allowed to 
force Servia into submission. 

Friendless in the face of her too powerful adversary, 
Servia directed her Minister at Vienna on March 31, 
1909, to make the following formal declaration to 
the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs : 

"Servia declares that she is not affected in her 
rights by the situation established in Bosnia, and 
that she will therefore adapt herself to the decisions 
at which the Powers are going to arrive in reference 
to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the 
councils of the Powers, Servia binds herself to cease 
the attitude of protest and resistance which she has 
assumed since last October, relative to the annexa- 
tion, and she binds herself further to change the 
direction of her present policies towards Austria- 
Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter 
in friendly and neighbourly relations." 

The crisis passed. Servia's humiliation was the 
price of European peace. Germany had shown her 
determination to stand squarely behind Austria- 
Hungary in her dealings with Servia. It was a 
lesson for the future. Five years later history 
repeated itself — except that Russia did not back 
down! 

37i 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

We have already told the story of Austria-Hun- 
gary's dealings with Servia after the first victorious 
month of the Balkan War with Turkey: how Servia 
was compelled, owing to lack of support from Russia, 
to give satisfaction to Austria-Hungary in the Pro- 
chaska incident, to withdraw her troops from Durazzo 
and from before Scutari; and how the Powers saved 
the peace of Europe in May, 1913, by compelling 
Montenegro to abandon Scutari. 

Ever since the Treaty of Bukarest, Austria-Hun- 
gary watched Servia keenly for an opportunity to 
pick a quarrel with her. It is marvellous how the 
Servians, elated as they naturally were by their 
military successes against Turkey and Bulgaria, 
avoided knocking the chip off the shoulder of their 
jealous and purposely sensitive neighbour. 

It was one thing to be able to keep a perfectly 
correct official attitude towards the Austro-Hunga- 
rian Government. This the Servian Government 
had promised to do in the note wrung from it on 
March 31, 1909. This it did do. But it was a 
totally different thing to expect the authorities at 
Belgrade to stifle the national aspirations of twelve 
million Servians, the majority of whom were outside 
of her jurisdiction. Even if it had been the wiser 
course for her to pursue — and this is doubtful, — 
could Servia have been able to repress the thoroughly 
awakened and triumphant nationalism of her own 
subjects who had borne so successfully and so hero- 
ically the sufferings and sacrifices of two wars within 
one year? 

Individual Servians, living within the kingdom of 
372 



AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA 

Servia, were irredentists, but without official sanc- 
tion. They were undoubtedly in connection with 
the revolutionaries created by Austrian and Hunga- 
rian methods in the Servian provinces of the Dual 
Monarchy. There was undoubtedly a dream of 
Greater Servia, and a strong hope in the hearts of 
nationalists on both sides of the frontiers that the 
day would dawn by their efforts when Greater Servia 
would be a reality. No government could have 
continued to exist in Servia which tried to suppress 
the Narodna Odbrana. I make this statement 
without hesitation. King Peter did not intend to 
become another Charles Albert. 

Ought the Vienna and Berlin statesmen to have 
expected Servia to do so? What answer would 
Switzerland or Holland or Belgium or Brazil receive, 
were their ministers to present a note at Wilhelm- 
strasse or Ballplatz, calling attention to the menace 
to their independence of the Pan-Germanic move- 
ment, citing speeches delivered by eminent professors 
in universities, books written by officials of the 
imperial Governments, and asking that certain 
societies be suppressed and certain geographies be 
removed from use in German schools? Their cause 
would have been as just, and their right as clear, 
for exactly the same reasons, as that of the Austrian 
Government in its attitude towards Servia. The 
only difference between Pan-Servianism and Pan- 
Germanism — and you must remember that the latter 
is not only encouraged, but also subsidized, by the 
Berlin and Vienna governments — is that the former 
is the aspiration of twelve millions while the latter 

373 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

is the aspiration of ninety millions. Is not the 
answer the old Bismarckian formula that might 
makes right? 

During the winter following the Treaty of Bukarest 
the Austro-Hungarian agents and police continued 
their careful surveillance of the Narodna Odbrana, 
and followed all its dealings with Servians of Austro- 
Hungarian nationality. But it could find no casus 
belli. The attitude of the Servian Government was 
perfectly correct at all times. Traps were laid, but 
Servian officials did not fall into them. The occasion 
for striking Servia came in a most tragic way. 

It seems like tempting Providence to have sent 
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife to 
Sarajevo on the anniversary of the battle of Kossova. 
Things had been going from bad to worse in Bosnia. 
Flags of the Dual Monarchy had been burned in 
Sarajevo and Mostar, and the garrisons called upon 
to intervene to restore order. The Constitution of 
19 10 had been modified in 1912, so that the military 
Governor was invested with civil power. The local 
Bosnian Diet had been twice prorogued. In May, 
1 91 3, the constitution was suspended, and a state 
of siege declared in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Through- 
out the winter of 1913-1914, incipient rebellions 
had to be checked by force in many places. It was 
known to the police that Servian secret societies 
were active, and that the provinces were in a state 
of danger and insecurity. The Servian Govern- 
ment was apprehensive concerning the announced 
visit of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. 
In fact, so greatly was it feared that some attempt 

374 



AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA 

might be made against the life of Franz Ferdinand, 
and that this would be used as an excuse for an 
attack upon Servia, that the Servian Minister at 
Vienna, a week before the date announced for the 
visit, informed the Government that there was 
reason to fear a plot to assassinate the Archduke. 

On June 28, 19 14, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assas- 
sinated in the streets of Sarajevo. Austria-Hungary 
realized that her moment had come. Germany- 
was sounded, and found to be ready to prevent 
outside interference in whatever measures Vienna 
might see fit to take with Belgrade. 

In the spring of 19 14, the Pasitch Cabinet had 
almost succumbed in the struggle between civil and 
military elements. Premier Pasitch retained his 
power by agreeing to a dissolution of Parliament, 
and binding himself to the necessity of following the 
leadership of the military part. So far were the 
chiefs of the military party from being in a mood 
to consider the susceptibilities of Austria-Hungary 
that they were actually, according to a telegram from 
a well-informed source in Agram on June 26, 1914, 
debating the means of uniting Servia and Monte- 
negro. The difficult question of dynasties was in the 
way of being solved, and, despite Premier Pasitch's 
misgivings, the ballon d'essai of the project of union 
had been launched in Europe. It was at this critical 
and delicate moment for the Belgrade Cabinet that 
the storm broke. 

I was surprised by the spirit of optimism which 
seemed to pervade the French press during the 

375 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

period immediately following the assassination of 
Franz Ferdinand. For three weeks the telegrams 
from Vienna repeated over and over again the state- 
ment that the ultimatum which Austria- Hungary 
intended to present at Belgrade as a result of the 
Sarajevo assassination would be so worded that 
Russia could not take offence. This optimistic 
opinion, which seems to have been given almost 
official sanction by the Ballplatz, was shared by the 
French Government. France is a country in which 
the inmost thoughts of her statesmen are voiced freely 
in the daily newspapers of Paris. If there had been 
any serious misgivings, the protocol for the visit of 
President Poincare to Petrograd and to the Scan- 
dinavian capitals would certainly have been modified. 
The President of France sailed for the Baltic on 
July 15th. At six o'clock in the evening of the 23d, 
the note of the Austro-Hungarian Government 
concerning the events of the assassination of Sarajevo 
was given to the Servian Government. It com- 
menced by reproducing the text of the Servian de- 
claration of March 31, 1909, which we have quoted 
above. Servia was accused of not having fulfilled 
the promise made in this declaration, and of permit- 
ting the Pan-Servian propaganda in the newspapers 
and public schools of the kingdom. The assassina- 
tion of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand was stated 
to be the direct result of Servian failure to live up 
to her declaration of March 31, 1909. Austria- 
Hungary claimed that the assassination of the heir 
to her throne had been investigated, and that ample 
proof had been found of the connivance of two Ser- 

376 



AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA 

vians, one an army officer and the other a functionary 
who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana; that the 
assassins had received their arms and their bombs 
from these two men, and had been knowingly allowed 
to pass into Bosnia by the Servian authorities on 
the Serbo-Bosnian frontier. Being unable to endure 
longer the Pan-Servian agitation, of which Belgrade 
was the foyer and the crime of Sarajevo a direct 
result, the Austro-Hungarian Government found 
itself compelled to demand of the Servian Govern- 
ment the formal assurance that it condemned this 
propaganda, which was dangerous to the existence 
of the Dual Monarchy, because its final end was to 
detach from Austria-Hungary large portions of her 
territory and attach them to Servia. 

After this preamble, the note went on to demand 
that on the first page of the Journal Officiel of July 
26th the Servian Government publish a new de- 
claration, the text of which is so important that 
we quote it in full. 

"The Royal Servian Government condemns the 
propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e., 
the entirety of those machinations whose aim it is 
to separate from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
territories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincere- 
ly the ghastly consequences of these criminal actions. 

"The Royal Servian Government regrets that 
Servian officers and officials have participated in 
the propaganda cited above, and have thus threat- 
ened the friendly and neighbourly relations which the 
Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate 
by its declaration of March 31, 1909. 

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and 

377 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

rejects every thought or every attempt at influencing 
the destinies of the inhabitants of any part of 
Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most 
emphatically to the attention of its officers and 
officials, and of the entire population of the kingdom, 
that it will hereafter proceed with the utmost severity 
against any persons guilty of similar actions, to 
prevent and suppress which it will make every 
effort." 

Simultaneously with the publication in the Journal 
Officiel, Austria-Hungary demanded that the declara- 
tion be brought to the knowledge of the Servian 
army by an order of the day of King Peter, and be 
published in the official organ of the army. The 
Servian Government was also asked to make ten 
promises : 

i. To suppress any publication which fosters 
hatred of, and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, and whose general tendency is directed 
against the latter's territorial integrity ; 

2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of 
the society Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate its entire 
means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same 
manner against the other societies and associations 
in Servia which occupy themselves with the pro- 
paganda against Austria-Hungary, and to take the 
necessary measures that the dissolved societies may 
not continue their activities under another name or 
in another form ; 

3. To eliminate without delay from the public 
instruction in Servia, so far as the teaching staff as 
well as the curriculum is concerned, whatever serves 
or may serve to foster the propaganda against 
Austria-Hungary ; 

4. To remove from military service and public 

378 



AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA 

office in general all officers and officials who are 
guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary and 
whose names, with a communication of the evidence 
which the Imperial and Royal Government pos- 
sesses against them, the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment reserves the right to communicate to the 
Royal Government; 

5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of mem- 
bers of the official machinery (organes) of the Im- 
perial and Royal Government in the suppression 
of the movement directed against Austro-Hungarian 
territorial integrity ; 

6. To commence a judicial investigation (enquete 
judiciaire) against the participants of the conspiracy 
of June 28th, who are on Servian territory — members 
of the official machinery {organes) delegated by the 
Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the 
researches (recherches) relative thereto; 

7. To proceed immediately to arrest Major Voija 
Tankositch and a certain Milan Ciganovitch, a 
functionary of the Servian State, who have been 
compromised by the result of the preliminary in- 
vestigation at Sarajevo; 

8. To prevent, by effective measures, the partici- 
pation of the Servian authorities in the smuggling 
of arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss 
and punish severely the functionaries at the frontier 
at Shabatz and at Loznica, guilty of having aided 
the authors of the crime of Sarajevo by facilitating 
their crossing of the frontier; 

9. To give to the Austro-Hungarian Government 
explanations concerning the unjustifiable remarks 
of high Servian functionaries, in Servia and abroad, 
who, in spite of their official position have not 
hesitated, after the crime of June 28th, to express 
themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ; 

379 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

10. To notify without delay to the Austro- 
Hungarian Government the execution of the meas- 
ures included in the preceding points. 

Annexed to the note was a memorandum which 
declared that the investigation of the police, after 
the assassination of the Archduke and his wife, had 
established that the plot had been formed at Bel- 
grade by the assassins with the help of a commandant 
in the Servian army, that the six bombs and four 
Browning pistols with their ammunition had been 
given at Belgrade to the assassins by the Servian 
functionary and the Servian army officer whose 
names were cited in the note, that the bombs were 
hand grenades which came from the Servian army 
headquarters at Kragujevac, that the assassins 
were given instruction in the use of the arms by 
Servian officers, and that the introduction into Bos- 
nia and Herzegovina of the assassins and their arms 
was facilitated by the connivance of three frontier 
captains and a customs official. 

The wording of this note seemed to have been 
entirely unexpected. The intention of the ulti- 
matum was clear. It was understood that Russia 
would not accept an attack upon the integrity of 
Servia. Six years had passed since 1908, and two 
since 19 12. Russia had recuperated from the Japan- 
ese War, and her Persian accord with Great Britain 
had borne much fruit. She was sure of France. 
Was this not a deliberate provocation to Russia? 

Forty-eight hours had been given to Servia to 
respond. Russia and France had both counselled 

380 



AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA 

Servia to give an answer that would be a general 
acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. 
Neither France nor Russia wanted war. So anxious 
were they to avoid giving Austria-Hungary the 
opportunity to precipitate the crisis before they were 
ready for it that for the third time in six years Servia 
was asked to swallow her pride and submit. On the 
night of July 24th, a memorable council was held in 
Belgrade. The Premier and the leaders of the 
opposition, together with some members of the Na- 
rodna Odbrana were shown clearly what course they 
must follow, if they expected the loyal support of 
Russia. The answer to the ultimatum must be 
worded in such a way that Austria-Hungary would 
have no ground upon which to stand in forcing im- 
mediately the war. Servia must once more "eat 
humble pie." But this time the promise of Russian 
support was given to defend the territorial integrity 
and the independence of Servia. 

The Servian answer was far more conciliatory than 
was expected. The allegations of the Austro-Hun- 
garian preamble were denied, but the publication 
of the declaration in the Journal Officiel and in the 
army bulletin, and its incorporation in an order of 
the day to the army, were promised. But there were 
to be two changes in the text of the declaration. 
Instead of "the Royal Servian Government con- 
demns the propaganda against Austria-Hungary," the 
Servians agreed to declare that "the Royal Servian 
Government condemns every propaganda which should 
be directed against Austria-Hungary," and instead of 
"the Royal Government regrets that Servian officers 

381 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

and officials . . . have participated in the pro- 
paganda cited above," the Servian King could 
say no more than "the Royal Government regrets 
that according to a communication of the Imperial 
and Royal Government certain officers and function- 
aries . . . etc." 

The German White Book makes a special point of 
the bad faith of Servia in altering the text of the 
declaration in this way. But what government 
could be expected to admit what was only a supposi- 
tion, and what king worthy of the name would de- 
nounce as a regicide openly before his army one of his 
officers upon the unsupported statement of a political 
document? The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum had 
given no proof of its charges against the man named 
in its note, and forty-eight hours was too short a 
time for the Servian Government to investigate the 
charges to its own satisfaction. 

In order to make clear just what was the nature 
of the demands which Austria-Hungary made upon 
Servia, I have cited the ten articles in full. 

One can readily see that the demands of Articles 
1,2, and 3, in their entirety, meant the extinction of 
the Pan-Servian movement and Servian nationalism. 
Austria-Hungary was asking of Servia something 
that neither member of the Dual Monarchy had suc- 
ceeded in accomplishing in its own territories! The 
German White Book attempts to sustain the justice 
of the demands of its ally in striking at the press, the 
nationalist societies, and the schools. The methods 
of arousing a nationalistic spirit in the Servian people 
through the press, through the formation of societies, 

382 



AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA 

and through the teaching of irredentism by school- 
books, were borrowed from Germany. But Servia 
agreed to make her press laws more severe, to dis- 
solve the Narodna Odbrana and other societies; and 
'Ho eliminate from the public instruction in Servia 
anything which might further the propaganda 
directed against Austria-Hungary, provided the 
Imperial and Royal Government furnishes actual 
proofs. " 

Article 4 was agreed to only so far as it could be 
actually proved that the officers and officials in 
question had been "guilty of actions against the 
territorial integrity of the monarchy." To promise 
to remove all who were "guilty of propaganda against 
Austria-Hungary" would have meant the disband- 
ing of the Servian army and the Servian Government ! 
Is there any man with red blood in his veins who can 
be prevented from having hopes and dislikes, and 
expressing them? Could Servia prevent Servians 
from stating how they felt about the political status 
of their race in Croatia and in Bosnia? Did Austria- 
Hungary ever make a similar request to her ally, 
Italy, about irredentist literature and speeches? 

Articles 5 and 6 are open to discussion. There is 
no doubt that the newspapers of nations hostile to 
Austria-Hungary and Germany have been unfair in 
their interpretation and in their translation of these 
two articles. The Servian answer deliberately gives 
a false meaning to the Austrian request here, and 
represents it as an attack upon the independence of 
her courts. Servia had enough good grounds for 
resistance to the ultimatum without equivocating 

3*3 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

on this point. In her answer she refused what had 
not been actually demanded, a co-operation in the en- 
quete judiciaire of Austro-Hungarian organes. What 
Austria-Hungary demanded was the co-operation 
of her police officials in the recherches. 

Articles 7 to 10 were accepted by Servia in toto. 
As a proof of her good faith, the Servian answer 
declared that Major Tankositch had been arrested 
on the evening of the day on which the ultimatum 
was received. 

In conclusion, Servia offered, if her response to the 
ultimatum were found insufficient, to place her case 
in the hands of the Hague Tribunal and of the 
different Powers at whose suggestion she had signed 
the declaration of March 31, 1909, after the excite- 
ment over the Austro-Hungarian annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

The answer to the ultimatum was taken by Premier 
Pasitch in person to the Minister of Austria-Hungary 
at Belgrade before six o'clock on the evening of July 
25th. Without referring the response to his Govern- 
ment, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, acting on 
previous instructions that no answer other than an 
acceptance in every particular of the ultimatum would 
be admissible, replied that the response was not 
satisfactory. At half-past six, he left Belgrade with 
all members of the legation. 

While the European chancelleries were trying to 
find some means to heal the breach, Austria-Hungary 
formally declared war on Servia on the morning of 
July 28th. The same evening, the bombardment 
of Belgrade from Semlin and from the Danube 

384 



AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA 

was begun. The Servian Government retired to 
Nish. 

Only the intervention of Germany could now 
prevent the European cataclysm. 



25 



385 



CHAPTER XX 

GERMANY FORCES WAR UPON RUSSIA 
AND FRANCE 

THE title of this chapter seems to indicate that I 
have the intention of taking sides in what 
many people believe to be an open question. 
But this is not the case. The German contention, 
that Russia caused the war, must be clearly distin- 
guished from the contention, that Russia forced the 
war. There is a great deal of reason in the first 
contention. No impartial student, who has written 
with sympathy concerning Great Britain's attitude 
in the Crimean War, can fail to give Germany just 
as strong justification for declaring war on Russia 
in 1914 as Great Britain had in 1854. But, when we 
come down to the narrower question of responsibility 
for launching the war in which almost all of Europe 
is now engaged, there can be no doubt that it was 
deliberately willed by the German Government, and 
that the chain of circumstances which brought it 
about was carefully woven by the officials of Wilhelm- 
strasse and Ballplatz. There may be honest differ- 
ence of opinion as to whether Germany was justified 
in forcing the war. But the facts allow no difference 
of opinion as to whether Germany did force the war. 

386 



GERMANY FORCES THE WAR 

A war to crush France and Russia has for many 
years been accepted as a necessary eventuality in the 
evolution of Germany's foreign policy. That when 
this war came, Great Britain would take the oppor- 
tunity of joining in order to strike at German com- 
merce, which had begun to be looked upon by British 
merchants as a formidable rival in the markets of 
the world, was thought probable. The leading men 
of Germany, especially since the passing of Morocco 
and Persia, have felt that this war was vital to the 
existence of the German Empire. During recent 
years the questions, "Ought there to be a war?" 
and "Will there be a war?" ceased to be debated in 
Germany. One heard only, "Under what circum- 
stances could the war be most favourably declared?" 
and "How soon will the war come?" 

Germany has believed that the events of the past 
decade have shown the unalterable determination 
of Great Britain and France to make impossible the 
political development of the Weltpolitik, without 
which her commercial development would always 
be insecure. This determination has been consist- 
ently revealed in the hostility of her western rivals 
to her colonial expansion in Africa and Asia. The 
world equilibrium, already decidedly disadvan- 
tageous to the overseas future of Germans at the 
time they began their career as a united people, has 
been disturbed more and more during the past forty 
years. 

The Balkan wars, resulting as they did in the 
aggrandizement of Servia, threatened the equilibrium 
of the Near East, where lay Germany's most vital 

387 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

and most promising external activities. We must 
remember, when we are considering the reasons for 
the consistent backing given to Austria-Hungary 
by Germany in her treatment of Servian aspirations, 
the words of Wirth: " To render powerful the Servian 
people would be the suicide of Germany." 

Germany has had as much reason, in the develop- 
ment of the present crisis, for regarding Servia as 
the outpost of Russia as had Great Britain for award- 
ing this role to Bulgaria in 1876. Germany has had 
as much reason for declaring war on Russia to prevent 
the Russians from securing the inheritance of the 
Ottoman Empire as had Great Britain and France to 
take exactly the same step in 1854. The extension, 
in 1 914, of Russian influence in what was until re- 
cently European Turkey would be just as disastrous 
to the interests of Germany and Austria-Hungary 
— far more so — than it would have been to Great 
Britain and France sixty years ago. What she has 
in Asia-Minor to-day is as great a stake for Germany 
to fight for as what Great Britain had in India in the 
middle of the nineteenth century. 

There is, however, this important difference. 
Germany, in supporting the Austro-Hungarian 
ultimatum, was not responding to the overt act of 
an enemy. She calculated carefully the cost, waited 
for a favourable moment, and, when she decided 
that the favourable moment had come, deliberately 
provoked the war. 

Germany, looking for the opportunity to strike 
her two powerful neighbours on the east and west, 
believed that the propitious moment had come in the 

388 



GERMANY FORCES THE WAR 

summer of 19 14. Her rivals were facing serious 
internal crises. Russia was embarrassed by the 
menace of a widely-spread industrial strike. But 
Russia did not count for much in the German calcula- 
tions. It was the situation in France that induced 
the German statesmen to take advantage of the assassi- 
nation of Franz Ferdinand. The spring elections 
had revealed a tremendous sentiment against the 
law recently voted extending military service for 
three years. The French Parliament had just 
overthrown the admirable Ribot Cabinet for no 
other reason than purely personal considerations of 
a bitter party strife. An eminent Parliamentarian 
had exposed publicly from the tribune the alarming 
unpreparedness of France for war. The trial for 
murder of the wife of the former Premier Caillaux 
bade fair to complicate further internal Parliamen- 
tary strife. 

These were the favourable circumstances of the 
end of June and the beginning of July. 

But the decision had wider grounds than the ad- 
vantages of the moment. The German Government 
was rinding it more and more difficult every year 
to secure the credits necessary for the maintenance 
and increase of her naval and military establish- 
ments. Socialism and anti-militarism were making 
alarming progress in the German Reichstag. On 
the other hand, the Russian military reorganization, 
commenced after the Japanese War, was beginning 
to show surprising fruits. And was France to be 
allowed time for the spending of the eight hundred 
and five million francs just borrowed by her in June 

389 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

to correct the weak spots in her fortifications and war 
material, and for the application of the loi des trois 
ans to increase her standing army? 

Furthermore, would Great Britain be able to 
intervene on behalf of France and Russia? The 
crisis over the Home Rule Bill seemed to have 
developed so seriously that civil war was feared. 
Sir Edward Carson, leader of the Protestant irre- 
concilables in the north of Ireland, had formed an 
army that was being drilled in open defiance of the 
Government. 

The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdi- 
nand and the Duchess of Hohenberg came at this ad- 
vantageous moment. A casus belli against Servia, 
so provokingly lacking, had at last been given. 
Austria-Hungary was only too ready for the chance 
to crush Servia. If there were any misgivings about 
the risk of doing this, they were immediately allayed 
by Germany, who assured Austria-Hungary that she 
would not allow Russia even to mobilize. Austria- 
Hungary was given by Germany carte blanche in the 
matter of her dealings with Servia. It is possible, 
as the German Ambassador at Petrograd declared to 
M. Sasonow, that the text of the Austro-Hungarian 
ultimatum had not been submitted beforehand for 
the approval of Wilhelmstrasse. But the general 
tenor of the ultimatum had certainly been agreed 
upon. Germany knew well that the ultimatum 
would be so worded as to be a challenge to Russia. 
Either Russia would accept once more the humilia- 
tion of a diplomatic defeat and see Servia crushed, or 
she would intervene to save Servia. In the latter 

390 



GERMANY FORCES THE WAR 

contingency, Germany could declare war upon 
Russia on the ground that her ally, Austria-Hungary, 
had been attacked. The Franco-Russian Alliance 
would then be put to the test, as well as whatever 
understanding there might be between Great Britain 
and France. 

Subsequent events proved that Germany left no 
means, other than complete submission to her will, 
to France and Russia for avoiding war. Negotia- 
tions were so carried on that there would be no loop- 
hole for escape either to Servia, or to the Great 
Powers that were her champions. She did not even 
wait for Russia to attack Austria-Hungary, or for 
France to aid Russia. As for Great Britain, it is 
not yet clear whether Germany really thought that 
she was making an honest effort to keep her out 
of the war! 

From the very beginning of the Servian crisis, 
Germany associated herself "for better or for worse 
with Austria-Hungary." On the day that the ulti- 
matum to Servia was delivered, Chancellor von Beth- 
mann-Hollweg wrote to the German Ambassadors 
at London, Paris, and Petrograd, requesting them to 
call upon the Foreign Ministers of the governments 
to which they were accredited and point out that the 
ultimatum was necessary for the "safety and in- 
tegrity" of Austria-Hungary, and to state with special 
"emphasis" that "in this question there is concerned 
an affair which should be settled absolutely between 
Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to which 
it must be the earnest endeavour of the Powers to ensure. 
We anxiously desire the localization of the conflict, 

39i 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

because any intercession by another Power would 
precipitate, on account of the various alliances, 
inconceivable consequences." 

The position of Germany is admirably stated in 
these instructions, which I quote from Exhibit I of 
the German official White Book. To this position, 
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg consistently held 
throughout the last week of July. In the four words 
"localization of the conflict" the intention of Germany 
was summed up. There was to be a conflict between 
Austria-Hungary and Servia. That could not be 
avoided. The only thing that could be avoided was 
the intervention of Russia to prevent the approaching 
attack of Austria-Hungary upon Servia. If the 
Powers friendly to Russia did not prevail upon the 
Czar to refrain from interfering, there would be, 
"on account of the various alliances, inconceivable 
consequences." 

The next day, July 24th, a telegram from the 
German Ambassador at Petrograd to the Chancellor 
stated that M. Sasonow was very much agitated, 
and had "declared most positively that Russia could 
not permit under any circumstances that the Servo- 
Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the 
parties concerned." 

There was still time for Germany, warned by the 
attitude taken by Russia, to counsel her ally to accept 
whatever conciliatory response Servia might give. 
But this was not done. As we have already seen in 
the previous chapter, the Austro-Hungarian Minister 
at Belgrade, without communicating with his Govern- 
ment, declared the Servian response unsatisfactory, 

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n5 



GERMANY FORCES THE WAR 

even though it gave an opening for further negotia- 
tions, and withdrew from Belgrade with all the 
members of the legation staff. 

This precipitate, and, in view of the gravity of 
the international situation, unreasonable action could 
have been avoided, had Chancellor von Bethmann- 
Hollweg telegraphed the word to Vienna. 

Not only was the Austro-Hungarian Minister 
allowed to leave Belgrade in this way, but, after 
three days had elapsed, Austria-Hungary took the 
irrevocable step of declaring war on Servia. 

During these three days, Sir Edward Grey re- 
quested the British Ambassadors at Rome and Vienna 
and Berlin to make every possible effort to find 
ground for negotiation. On the morning of July 
27th, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador 
at Vienna, submitted to Count Berchtold the pro- 
position of Sir Edward Grey, which was made 
simultaneously at Petrograd, that the question at 
issue be adjusted in a conference held at London. 
In the meantime, after a conversation with Sir 
Rennell Rodd, the Marquis di San Giuliano, the 
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to 
Berlin, suggesting that Germany, France, Great 
Britain, and Italy mediate between Austria-Hungary 
and Russia. In sharp contrast to the efforts being 
made by the British Ambassadors, the German 
Ambassador at Paris, in an interview with Premier 
Viviani, insisted upon the impossibility of a confer- 
ence of mediation, and announced categorically that 
the only possible solution of the difficulty was a common 
French and German intervention at Petrograd. In 

393 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

other words, France could avoid war by assisting 
her enemy in humiliating her ally! 

On July 28th, the German position was: "That 
Austria-Hungary must be left a free hand in her 
dealings with Servia, and that it must be pointed 
out to Russia, if France and Great Britain really 
wanted to save the peace of Europe, that she should 
not mobilize against Austria-Hungary." Diplo- 
matic intervention, then, could do nothing except 
attempt to force Russia to refrain from interfering 
between Austria-Hungary and Servia. Germany 
would aid the other Powers in coercing Russia, but 
she would not urge herself, or aid them in urging, 
upon Austria-Hungary, who had started the trouble, 
the advisability of modifying her attitude towards 
Servia, and postponing hostilities that were bound to 
lead to a European war. 

Germany had refused all intervention at Vienna. 
She agreed, however, to prove her good-will by letting 
it be known that Austria-Hungary was willing to 
make the promise to seek no territorial aggrandize- 
ment in her war with Servia, but to limit herself to 
a "punitive expedition." But this suggestion did 
not come until Russia had already committed herself to 
defend Servia against invasion. 

There was another way in which the peace of 
Europe could have been saved, and that was by a 
declaration on the part of Germany that she would 
allow Russia and Austria-Hungary to fight out the 
question of hegemony in south-eastern Europe. But 
there was no proposition from Germany to France 
suggesting a mutual neutrality. On the other hand, 

394 



GERMANY FORCES THE WAR 

Germany let it be known that she would stand by 
Austria-Hungary if Russia attacked her, and, in the 
same breath, warned France against the danger of 
being loyal to the Russian alliance! 

On July 29th, it was announced from Petrograd 
that a partial mobilization had been ordered in the 
south and south-east. The German Ambassador 
in Petrograd, in an interview with M. Sasonow, 
pointed out "very solemnly that the entire Austro- 
Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general 
European conflagration, and endeavoured to present 
to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger. It was 
impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that 
Servia could now be deserted by Russia." On the 
same day, Ambassador von Schoen at Paris was 
directed by the German Chancellor to "call the 
attention of the French Government to the fact 
that preparation for war in France would call forth 
counter-measures in Germany." An exchange of 
telegrams on the 29th and 30th between the Kaiser 
and the Czar showed the irreconcilability between the 
Russian and German points of view. The idea of 
the Kaiser was that the Czar should give Austria- 
Hungary a free hand. The idea of the Czar was 
that the attack by Austria- Hungary upon Servia 
absolutely demanded a Russian mobilization "di- 
rected solely against Austria-Hungary." 

On July 31st, the German Ambassador at Petro- 
grad was ordered to notify Russia that mobilization 
against Austria-Hungary must be stopped within 
twel,e hours, or Germany would mobilize against 
Russia. At the same time a telegram was sent to 

395 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

the German Ambassador at Paris, ordering him 
to "ask the French Government whether it intends 
to remain neutral in a Russo-German war." 

On August ist, at 7.30 p.m., the German Ambassa- 
dor at Petrograd handed the following declaration 
of war to Russia: 

"The Imperial Government has tried its best from 
the beginning of the crisis to bring it to a peace- 
ful solution. Yielding to a desire which had been 
expressed to Him by His Majesty the Emperor of 
Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in 
accord with England, was engaged in accomplishing 
the role of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna 
and of Petrograd, when Russia, without awaiting 
the result of this mediation, proceeded to the 
mobilization of its forces by land and sea. 

"As a result of this threatening measure, which 
was actuated by no military preparation on the part 
of Germany, the German Empire found itself facing 
a grave and imminent danger. If the Imperial 
Government had failed to ward off this danger, it 
would compromise the security and very existence 
of Germany. Consequently the German Govern- 
ment saw itself forced to address itself to the Gov- 
ernment of His Majesty, the Emperor of all the 
Russias, insisting upon the cessation of the said 
military acts. Russia having refused to accede, 
and having manifested by this refusal that this 
action was directed against Germany, I have the 
honour of making known to Your Excellency the 
following order from my Government : 

"His Majesty, the Emperor, my august Sovereign, 
in the name of the Empire, accepts the challenge, 
and considers himself in the state of war with 
Russia." 

396 



GERMANY FORCES THE WAR 

The same afternoon, President Poincare ordered 
a general mobilization in France. What Ambassador 
von Schoen tried to get from Premier Viviani, and 
what he did get was expressed in his telegram sent 
from Paris three hours before the call to mobilization 
was issued : 

"Upon the repeated definite enquiry whether 
France would remain neutral in the case of a Russo- 
German War, the Premier declared that France 
would do that which her interests dictated." 

Germany violated the neutrality of Luxemburg 
on August 2d, and of Belgium on August 3d, after 
vainly endeavouring to secure permission from 
Belgium for the free passage of her troops to the 
French frontier. On Sunday morning, August 2d, 
French soil was invaded. But Ambassador von 
Schoen stayed in Paris until Monday evening "wait- 
ing for instructions." Then he called at the Quai 
d'Orsay, and handed the following note to Premier 
Viviani, who was acting also as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs: 

"The German civil and military authorities have 
reported a certain number of definite acts of hostility 
committed on German territory by French military 
aviators. Several of these have clearly violated 
the neutrality of Belgium in flying over the territory 
of this country. One of them tried to destroy 
structures near Wesel; others have been seen in the 
region of Eiffel, another has thrown bombs on the 
railway near Karlsruhe and Nurnberg. 

"I am charged, and I have the honour to make 
known to Your Excellency that, in the presence of 
these aggressions, the German Empire considers 

397 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

itself in state of war with France by the act of this 
latter Power. 

"I have at the same time the honour to bring to 
the knowledge of Your Excellency that the German 
authorities will detain the French merchant ships 
in German ports, but that they will release them if 
in forty-eight hours complete reciprocity is assured. 

"My diplomatic mission having come to an end, 
there remains to me no more than to beg Your 
Excellency to be willing to give me my passports and 
to take what measures you may judge necessary to 
assure my return to Germany with the staff of the 
embassy, as well as with the staff of the legation of 
Bavaria and of the German Consulate-General at 
Paris." 

In communicating this declaration of war to the 
Chamber of Deputies on the following morning, 
August 4th, Premier Viviani declared formally that 
"at no moment has a French aviator penetrated into 
Belgium; no French aviator has committed either in 
Bavaria or in any part of the German Empire any 
act of hostility." 



398 



CHAPTER XXI 
GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR 

THE balance of power in European diplomacy 
led inevitably to a rapprochement between 
France and Russia and Great Britain to offset 
the Triple Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary 
and Italy. 

The Triple Alliance, however, while purely de- 
fensive, was still an alliance. It had endured for 
over thirty years, and the three Powers generally 
sustained each other in diplomatic moves. Their 
military and naval strategists were in constant com- 
munication, and ready at any time to bring all their 
forces into play in a European war. 

France and Russia had also entered into a defen- 
sive alliance. This had not been accomplished with- 
out great difficulty. Were it not for the constant 
menace to France from Germany, the French Parlia- 
ment would not have ratified the alliance in the first 
place, nor would it have stood the strain of increas- 
ing Radicalism in French sentiment during the last 
decade. While there is much intellectual and tern* 
peramental affinity between Gaul and Slav, there is 
no political affinity between democratic France and 
autocratic Russia. 

The commercial rivalry of Great Britain and 

399 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

Germany led to a rivalry of armaments. The struggle 
of German industry for the control of the world 
markets is the real cause of the creation and rapid 
development of the German navy to threaten the 
British mastery of the seas. It is possible that the 
statesmen of Great Britain, by a liberal policy in 
regard to German colonial expansion in Africa and 
Asia and in regard to German ambitions in Asiatic 
Turkey, might have diverted German energy from 
bending all its efforts to destroy British commerce. 
It is possible that such a policy might have enabled 
the German democracy to gain the power to prevent 
Prussian militarism from dominating the Confedera- 
tion. But that would have been expecting too much 
of human nature. Nations are like individuals. 
There never has been any exception to this rule. 
What we have we want to keep. We want more than 
we have, and we try to get it by taking it away from 
our neighbour. Thus the world is in constant struggle. 
Until we have the millennium, and by the millennium 
I mean the change of human nature from selfishness 
to altruism, we shall have war. Then, too, the 
British have seen in themselves so striking an illus- 
tration of the proverb that the appetite grows with 
eating that they could hardly expect anything else of 
the Germans, were they to allow them voluntarily 
"a place in the sun." 

The rapid growth of Germany along the lines 
similar to the development of Great Britain has 
made the two nations rivals. As a result of this 
rivalry, Great Britain has been forced to prepare for 
the eventuality of a conflict between herself and 

400 



GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR 

Germany by giving up the policy of "splendid 
isolation," and seeking to enter into friendly re- 
lationship with those European Powers that were 
the enemies of her rival. The first decade of the 
twentieth century saw British diplomacy compound- 
ing colonial rivalry with France in Africa and with 
Russia in Asia. The African accord of 1904 and the 
Asiatic accord of 1907 marked a new era in British 
foreign relations. Since their conclusion, Great Brit- 
ain has drawn gradually nearer to France and Russia. 

But British statesmen have had to reckon with the 
development of Radical tendencies in the British 
electorate. These tendencies have become more and 
more marked during the very period in which British 
foreign policy found that its interests coincided with 
those of Russia and France. British democracy had 
the same antipathy to a Russian alliance as had 
French democracy. But the menace of Germany, 
which threw France into the arms of Russia, has not 
seemed as real to the British electorate. There was 
also the sentiment against militarism, which has 
made it difficult for the Liberal Cabinet to secure 
from Parliament sufficient sums for the maintenance 
of an adequate naval establishment, and has blocked 
every effort to provide even a modified form of 
compulsory military service and military training in 
Great Britain and Ireland. 

When one considers all that Sir Edward Grey has 
had to contend with during the years that he has held 
the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the British Cabinet, 
admiration for his achievements knows no limits. It 
is never safe to make comparisons or form judgments 
26 401 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

in the appreciation of contemporary figures in his- 
tory. But I cannot refrain from stating my belief 
that British foreign policy has never passed 
through a more trying and critical period, and 
British interests have never been more ably served, 
than during the years since the conference of 
Algeciras. 

The menace of a war between Great Britain and 
Germany has disturbed Europe several times during 
the past decade. There has not been, however, a 
direct crisis, involving the interests of the two rival 
nations, to make an appeal to arms inevitable, or 
even probable. But, although British public senti- 
ment might have been slow in supporting the inter- 
vention of the Cabinet in favour of France, had 
Germany attacked France in 1905, in 1908, or in 191 1, 
to have stayed out of the war would have been 
suicidal folly, and Great Britain would soon have 
awakened to this fact. 

The crisis over the ultimatum of Austria-Hungary 
to Servia became acute after the terms of the ulti- 
matum were known. Sir Edward Grey, seconded by 
as skilful and forceful ambassadors as have ever 
represented British interests on the continent of 
Europe, honestly tried to prevent the outbreak of 
war. It was not to the interests of Great Britain that 
this war should be fought. All sentimental con- 
siderations to one side, the moment was peculiarly 
unfavourable on purely material grounds. The 
British Parliament was facing one of the most ser- 
ious problems of its history. The confidence of the 
country in the wisdom of the measures in Ireland 

402 



GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR 

that the Government seemed determined to carry 
out was severely shaken. The interest of the British 
public in the troubles between Austria-Hungary and 
Servia was not great enough to make the war popular. 
The efforts of Lord Haldane had done much to im- 
prove the relationship between Great Britain and 
Germany. Sympathy with Russia had been alien- 
ated by the increasingly reactionary policy of the 
Czar's government towards the Poles, the Finns, and 
the Jews. The British press was disgusted by the 
overthrow of the Ribot Ministry and by the revela- 
tions of the Caillaux trial. 

As there was no actual alliance between Great 
Britain and France, and no understanding of any 
nature whatever with Russia, French public opinion 
was far from being certain that British aid would be 
given in the approaching war, and British public 
opinion was far from being certain as to whether it 
would be necessary to give this aid, or whether it 
wanted to do so. I am speaking here of the feeling 
among the electorate, which, accurately represented 
by Parliament, is the final court of appeal in Great 
Britain. There was no doubt about the opinion 
of Sir Edward Grey and the majority of his col- 
leagues in the Cabinet, as well as of the leaders of the 
Opposition. There was, however, very serious doubt 
as to the attitude of Parliament. Would it sustain 
France and Russia over the question of Servia, at a 
time when there was so serious a division in the 
nation concerning the Home Rule Bill — even the 
open menace of civil war? 

When Germany decided to declare war on Russia, 

403 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

and it was seen that France would be drawn into 
the struggle, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg de- 
clared to Sir Edward Goeschen, British Ambassador 
to Germany, that "the neutrality of Great Britain 
once guaranteed, every assurance would be given to 
the Cabinet at London that the Imperial Govern- 
ment did not have in view territorial acquisitions at 
the expense of France." Sir Edward questioned the 
Chancellor about the French colonies, "the portions 
of territories and possessions of France situated 
outside of the continent of Europe." Herr von 
Bethmann-Hollweg answered that it was not within 
his power to make any promise on that subject. 

There was no hesitation or equivocation in the 
response of the British Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs to this proposition. He said that neutrality 
under such conditions was impossible, and that 
Great Britain could not stand by and see France 
crushed, even if she were left her European territory 
intact, for she would be reduced to the position of 
a satellite of Germany. To make a bargain with 
Germany at the expense of France would be a dis- 
grace from which Great Britain would never recover. 
It was pointed out to the Chancellor that the only 
means of maintaining good relations between Great 
Britain and Germany would be for the two Powers to 
continue to work together to safeguard the peace of 
Europe. Sir Edward Grey promised that all his 
personal efforts would be directed towards guarantee- 
ing Germany and her Allies against any aggression 
on the part of Russia and France, and hoped that, if 
Germany showed her good faith in the present crisis, 

404 



GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR 

more friendly relations between Great Britain and 
Germany would ensue than had been the case up to 
that moment. 

This dignified and manly response could have left 
no doubt in the minds of German statesmen as to the 
stand which the British Cabinet intended to take. 
Did they believe that Parliament and the people 
would not support Sir Edward Grey? 

The position of Great Britain was explicitly put 
before the House of Commons on the evening of 
August 3d. Because of her naval agreement with 
France, by which the French navy was concentrated 
in the Mediterranean in order that the British Ad- 
miralty might keep its full forces in home waters, 
Great Britain was bound in honour to prevent an 
attack of a hostile fleet upon the Atlantic seacoast of 
France. If Germany were to make such an attack, 
Great Britain would be drawn into the war without 
any further question. There had also been since 
November, 1912, an understanding between the 
British and French military and naval authorities 
concerning common action on land and sea "against 
an enemy. " But, at the time this understanding was 
made, it was put in writing that it was merely a 
measure of prudence, and did not bind Great Britain 
in any way whatever to act with France either in a 
defensive or offensive war. 

Great Britain was drawn into the war by the 
German violation of the neutrality of Belgium. 

On Sunday evening, August 2d, at seven o'clock, 
Germany gave the following ultimatum to Belgium: 

"The German Government has received sure news, 
405 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

according to which the French forces have the inten- 
tion of marching on the Meuse by way of Givet and 
Namur; this news leaves no doubt of the intention of 
France to march against Germany by way of Belgian 
territory. The Imperial German Government cannot 
help fearing that Belgium, in spite of its very good 
will, will not be able to repulse, without help, a 
forward march of French troops which promises 
so large a development. 

"In this fact we find sufficient certitude of a 
threat directed against Germany; it is an imperious 
duty for self-preservation for Germany to forestall 
this attack of the enemy. 

"The German Government would regret exceed- 
ingly should Belgium regard as an act of hostility 
against it the fact that the enemies of Germany 
oblige her to violate, on her side, the territory of 
Belgium. In order to dissipate every misunder- 
standing, the German Government declares as fol- 
lows: 

"i. Germany has in view no act of hostility 
against Belgium, if Belgium consents, in the war 
which is going to commence, to adopt an attitude of 
benevolent neutrality in regard to Germany. The 
German Government, on its side, promises, at the 
moment of peace, to guarantee the kingdom and its 
possessions in their entire extent. 2. Germany 
promises to evacuate Belgian territory, under the con- 
dition above pronounced, immediately peace is con- 
cluded. 3. If Belgium observes a friendly attitude, 
Germany is ready, in accord with the authorities of 
the Belgian Government, to buy, paying cash, all 
that would be necessary for her troops, and to 
indemnify the losses caused to Belgium. 4. If Bel- 
gium conducts herself in a hostile manner against 
the German troops and makes in particular difficul- 
ties for their forward march by an opposition of the 
fortifications of the Meuse or by the destruction of 

406 



GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR 

roads, railways, tunnels, or other constructions, Ger- 
many will be obliged to consider Belgium as an 
enemy. 

"In this case, Germany will make no promise in 
regard to the kingdom, but will leave the subsequent 
adjustment of the relations of the two states one 
toward the other to the decision of arms. 

"The German Government has the hope with 
reason that this eventuality will not take place, and 
that the Belgian Government will know how to take 
the necessary measures suitable for preventing it 
from taking place. 

"In this case, the relations of friendship which 
unite the two neighbouring states will become 
narrower and more lasting." 

Belgium did not hesitate to respond promptly as 
follows : 

"By its note of August 2, 1914, the German Gov- 
ernment has made known that according to sure news 
the French forces have the intention of marching on 
the Meuse by way of Givet and Namur, and that 
Belgium, in spite of her very good will, would not be 
able to repulse without help the forward march of the 
French troops. 

"The German Government would believe itself 
under the obligation of forestalling this attack and 
of violating the Belgian territory. In these condi- 
tions, Germany proposes to the Government of the 
King to adopt in regard to her a friendly attitude, 
and she promises at the moment of the peace to 
guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and of its 
possessions in their entire extent. 

"The note adds that if Belgium makes difficulty 
for the forward march of the German troops, Ger- 
many will be obliged to consider her as an enemy 
but will leave the subsequent adjustment of the 

407 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

relations of the two states one towards the other by 
the decision of arms. 

"This note has aroused in the Government of 
the King a deep and grievous astonishment. The 
intentions that it attributes to France are in con- 
tradiction with the formal declarations which have 
been made to us on August ist, in the name of the 
Government of the Republic. 

"However, if in opposition to our expectation 
a violation of the Belgian neutrality is going to be 
committed by France, Belgium would fulfil all her 
international duties, and her army would oppose 
itself to the invader with the most vigorous re- 
sistance. The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the 
treaties of 1870, make sacred the independence and 
the neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the 
Powers and notably of the Government of His 
Majesty the King of Prussia. 

"Belgium has always been faithful to her inter- 
national obligations ; she has accomplished her duties 
in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has neglected no 
effort to maintain and to make respected her neu- 
trality. The attack upon her independence with 
which the German Government menaces her would 
constitute a flagrant violation of international law. 

"No strategic interest justifies the violation of 
international law. The Belgian Government in 
accepting the propositions of which it has received 
notice would sacrifice the honour of the nation at 
the same time as it would betray its duties toward 
Europe. Conscious of the role that Belgium has 
played for more than eighty years in the civilization 
of the world, it does not allow itself to believe that 
the independence of Belgium can be preserved only 
at the price of the violation of her neutrality. If 
this hope is deceived, the Belgian Government is 
firmly decided to repulse by every means in its 
power every attack upon its rights. " 

408 



GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR 

As I record these two statements, there is before 
me a cartoon from a recent issue of Punch. The 
Kaiser, with a leer on his face, is leaning over the 
shoulder of King Albert, who is looking out with 
folded arms upon the smoking ruins of his country, 
and the long defile of refugees. The Kaiser says, 
"See, you have lost all." King Albert answers, 
"Not my soul." 

To be just to Germany, is necessary for us to quote 
the explanation of this action made by Chancellor 
von Bethmann-Hollweg to the Reichstag, on August 
4th, when Germany had commenced to carry into 
execution her threat: 

"Here is the truth. We are in necessity, and 
necessity knows no law. 

"Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and 
have perhaps already put their foot upon Belgium 
territory. 

"It is against the law of nations. The French 
Government has, it is true, declared at Brussels that 
it would respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as 
the enemy respected it. We knew, however, that 
France was ready for the aggression. France could 
wait ; we, no. A French attack upon our flank in the 
Lower Rhine might have been fatal to us. So we 
have been forced to pass beyond the well-founded 
protestations of Luxemburg and the Belgian Gov- 
ernment. We shall recompense them for the wrong 
that we have thus caused them as soon as we shall 
have attained our military end. 

"When one is as threatened as we are and when 
one fights for that which is most sacred to him, one 
can think only of one thing, that is, to attain his end, 
cost what it may. 

409 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

"I repeat the words of the Emperor; 'It is with 
pure conscience that Germany goes to the combat. ' " 

On the afternoon of August 3d, as Sir Edward Grey 
was leaving for Parliament to make his expose of 
Great Britain's position in the European crisis, he 
received from the King a telegram that had just 
arrived from King Albert of Belgium : 

"Remembering the numerous proofs of friendship 
of Your Majesty and of Your predecessor, and the 
friendly attitude of Great Britain in 1870, as well as 
of the new gage of friendship that she has just given 
me, I address a supreme appeal to the diplomatic 
intervention of Your Majesty to safeguard the 
integrity of Belgium. " 

Sir Edward Grey read this telegram to Parliament, 
and explained that the diplomatic intervention asked 
for had already been made both at Paris and Berlin, 
for this eventuality had been foreseen. To the ques- 
tions of the British Ambassadors concerning their 
intentions towards Belgium, to respect and maintain 
the neutrality of which each of these Powers was equally 
bound with Great Britain by the treaty of 1839, France 
responded : 

"The French Government is resolved to respect 
the neutrality of Belgium, and it would be only in 
the case where some other Power would violate the 
neutrality that France might find herself in the 
necessity of acting otherwise." 

Germany answered: 

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is in 
410 



GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR 

the impossibility of giving a response before having 
consulted the Emperor and the Chancellor." 

When Sir Edward Goeschen expressed the hope 
that the answer would not be delayed, Herr von 
Jagow gave him clearly to understand that he 
doubted whether he could respond, "for any response 
on his part would not fail, in case of war, to have the 
regrettable effect of divulging a part of the German 
plan of campaign!" 

There was no doubt about the sentiment of Parlia- 
ment. The Cabinet saw that party lines had been 
obliterated, and that the country was behind them. 
The following day, August 4th, Great Britain pre- 
sented an ultimatum to Germany, demanding an 
assurance that the neutrality of Belgium should be 
respected. Germany gave no answer. Her army 
had already invaded Belgium. A few hours after the 
reception of the British ultimatum, the advance on 
Liege was ordered. After waiting until evening, 
Great Britain declared war on Germany. 

It is probable that Germany counted the cost 
before she invaded Belgium. Whatever may have 
been said at Berlin, the intervention of Great Britain 
was not the surprise that it has been represented to 
be. In deciding to violate Belgian neutrality, in 
spite of the British ultimatum, the German argu- 
ment was: It is morally certain that Great Britain 
will intervene if we enter Belgium. But what will 
this intervention mean? She has no army worth the 
name. Her navy can do practically nothing to harm 
us while we are crushing France and Russia. The 

411 



THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 

participation of Great Britain in the war is a cer- 
tainty a few weeks later. By precipitating her in- 
tervention, we are less harmed than we would be 
by refusing to avail ourselves of the advantage of 
attacking France through Belgium. 

In believing that the eventual participation of 
Great Britain was certain, even if there were no 
Belgian question, Germany was right. The violation 
of the neutrality of Belgium was not the cause, but 
the occasion, of Great Britain's entry into the war. 
It was, however, a most fortunate opportunity for 
the British Cabinet to secure popular sympathy and 
support in declaring war upon Germany. For it is 
certain that Great Britain ought not to have delayed 
entering the war. The nation might have awakened 
too late to the fact that the triumph of Germany in 
Europe would menace her national existence. There 
is no room in the world for the amicable dwelling 
side by side of British idealism and German mili- 
tarism. One or the other must perish. 

In August, 1 914, the only way to have avoided the 
catastrophe of a general European war would have 
been to allow Germany to make, according to her 
own desires and ambitions, the new map of Europe. 



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